esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor) (09/28/84)
[] I wonder if anyone has heard the paradox about the incompatibility between omnipotence and omniscience. It goes like this: if you are omniscient, you already know everything you are going to do. Therefore, you have no freedom to do anything else. --Bob Renninger hou2a!54375rr The "Therefore" is a non sequitur. Forget about omniscience for a second; let's focus on "already knowing what you're going to do." Does such knowledge rule out freedom? Not at all. If you know that you are going to do such-and-such at time t, and you rationally judge that that's the best thing to do, and you act on this judgement at t, then your doing such-and-such is free. How many times do I have to tell you, netland? -- the old "determinism" and "predestination" bugaboos are not what they're cracked up to be. Both are compatible with freedom. --Paul Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's. Thanks.
54375rr@hou2a.UUCP (R.RENNINGER) (10/01/84)
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> ... incompatibility between omnipotence and omniscience:
> if you are omniscient, you already know
> everything you are going to do. Therefore, you have no
> freedom to do anything else. --Bob Renninger hou2a!54375rr
>
>... let's focus on "already knowing what you're going to do." Does
>such knowledge rule out freedom? Not at all. If you know that you
>are going to do such-and-such at time t, and you rationally judge that
>that's the best thing to do, and you act on this judgement at t, then
>your doing such-and-such is free...
>"[D]eterminism" and "predestination" [are both] compatible with freedom.
--Paul Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
To be sure, having the power to decide to act in a particular
way and not another is a manifestation of freedom, not of
unfreedom. However, it seems to me that our freedom is
located in that moment of decision: to the extent that we
have made an irrevocable decision, we are the servants of our
past resolve.
There can be no time at which an omniscient being makes a
decision, because otherwise previously he would not know what
his future action would be.
For those who would answer that God operates "outside of
time," I reply that the idea of a "consciousness"
that doesn't operate in a causal sequence is simply
unrelated to anything I associate with consciousness.
If God's mind operates in some kind of "meta-time," then the
paradox is unresolved; it just retreats to another realm.
On the other hand, if His mind is unchangeing, I don't see how
to justify calling It a "mind" at all. Consciousness to me
is inextricably caught up in the idea of continual new
reactions to the world or at least in reminiscences about past
knowledge considered in a new light. The idea of a mind
without any mental activity needs some justification, to say
the least.
Bob Renninger
hou2a!54375rrdsaker@iuvax.UUCP (10/02/84)
[]
But, Paul Torek, imagine the following:
After contemplating my various courses of action, I choose what seems to me
to be the best. Then I note that that was what I knew I would do.
Having the desire to test this whole idea of preknowledge, I decide to
follow my second best course of action -- that is, I choose to do something
different from what I "know" I am going to do.
I can imagine various solutions to the above problem, but each of them
conflicts with my sense of free will. We can resolve these conflicts
by denying me (my conception of) free will. However, if I were
omnipotent, then I do not see how these conflicts could be resolved,
because omnipotence would seem to guarantee (my conception of) free will.
Daryel Akerlind
...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker
"Your ignorance makes me ill and angry. This savagery must cease."polard@fortune.UUCP (Henry Polard) (10/06/84)
In article <423@hou2a.UUCP> 54375rr@hou2a.UUCP (R.RENNINGER) writes: >There can be no time at which an omniscient being makes a >decision, because otherwise previously he would not know what >his future action would be. >For those who would answer that God operates "outside of >time," I reply that the idea of a "consciousness" >that doesn't operate in a causal sequence is simply >unrelated to anything I associate with consciousness. >If God's mind operates in some kind of "meta-time," then the >paradox is unresolved; it just retreats to another realm. >On the other hand, if His mind is unchangeing, I don't see how >to justify calling It a "mind" at all. Consciousness to me >is inextricably caught up in the idea of continual new >reactions to the world or at least in reminiscences about past >knowledge considered in a new light. The idea of a mind >without any mental activity needs some justification, to say >the least. > > Bob Renninger > hou2a!54375rr Sir: You seem to think that _your_ beliefs have somethng to do with the nature of God. If He "exists", so to speak, what He is like may well have nothing to do with how you and I finally decide on how to use words like "mind" and "consciousness". With respect to God or any other superior being or force or whatever, we are like the proverbial seven blind blind men and the elephant. Anything we say is impure speculation. They or it or Him will do whatever they or it or He damn well pleases. If we think it is contradictory or impossible or generally un-God-like, that's _our_ problem. We can't accurately define people, including ourselves, since just about everyone does something unpredictable at least once. How can we then hope to define a supeior being with certainty? Yours for a universe filled with surprises. -- Henry Polard (You bring the flames - I'll bring the marshmallows.) {ihnp4,cbosgd,amd}!fortune!polard N.B: The words in this posting do not necessarily express the opinions of me, my employer, or any AI project.
54375rr@hou2a.UUCP (R.RENNINGER) (10/09/84)
> You seem to think that _your_ beliefs have somethng to do with the > nature of God. If He "exists", so to speak, what He is like > may well have nothing to do with how you and I finally decide > on how to use words like "mind" and "consciousness". > With respect to God or any other superior being or force or > whatever, we are like the proverbial seven blind blind men > and the elephant. Anything we say is impure speculation. > They or it or Him will do whatever they or it or He > damn well pleases. If we think it is contradictory or impossible or > generally un-God-like, that's _our_ problem.... > How can we then hope to define a supeior being with > certainty? > > Yours for a universe filled with surprises. > Henry Polard > {ihnp4,cbosgd,amd}!fortune!polard You can define him any way you want, but you shouldn't expect anyone to believe that you are talking about something that exists unless your description is non-contradictory and you provide some evidence that what you describe is real. Making up a notion of "God" or "supreme being" is easy, but first you really ought to offer some evidence. Our thoughts most assuredly do not determine reality. We must take the utmost care just to make sure that they reflect reality. It doesn't help matters if we uncritically accept notions that are unsupported by facts or logic. I would much rather admit my ignorance about the world than to make assumptions, revel in their incoherence, and call them explanations. Bob Renninger hou2a!54375
jim@ism780b.UUCP (10/10/84)
#R:hou2a:-42300:ism780b:27500046:000:1039 ism780b!jim Oct 8 15:25:00 1984 >... let's focus on "already knowing what you're going to do." Does >such knowledge rule out freedom? Not at all. If you know that you >are going to do such-and-such at time t, and you rationally judge that >that's the best thing to do, and you act on this judgement at t, then >your doing such-and-such is free... >"[D]eterminism" and "predestination" [are both] compatible with freedom. > --Paul Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Come on, Paul. What if you rationally judge that it is *not* the best thing to do. But if you *know* that you will do it anyway (in the sense that you think you will and you are in fact correct) then in what possible way are you free not to do it? Free will is a reflection of lack of certainty. Any reasonable formal definition would necessarily involve that notion. I agree that determinism and predestination are compatible with freedom, but only to the degree that you do not have access to their implications (which makes us pretty free). -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)