esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor) (09/28/84)
[]
R P K>= karl@dartmouth
R P R>= Rich Rosen, in earlier article
R P> = me, Paul Torek, in earlier article
R> = Rich Rosen, in letter to me
= my reply
R P K> As for Skinner, I think you're referring to another kind of free
R P K> will with him. He tells us that we act in certain ways NOT BECAUSE
R P K> WE WANT TO, OR CHOOSE TO, BUT BECAUSE OF STIMULI in the
R P K> environment, genetic predispositions, and our past conditioning
R P K> history. ( I know I'm repeating myself, but it doesn't seem to be
R P K> sinking in! ) [EMPHASIS added]
R> Whoever said this (quoted from Paul Torek article?) seems to have hit it
R> right on the head. But...
R P> PLEASE, *P L E A S E* get that through your thick heads!
You only quoted one half-sentence from my reply to the above! Why? In
case the computer ate a few lines, let me tell you what was supposed to
be there. In my reply to the person who said, "As for Skinner ..." (it
was karl@dartmouth, btw), I quoted something from an article I had written.
My point in that article had been to point out that behaviorist objections
to the term "mind" were based on overloading that term with connotations
that they don't like. Thus they assume -- falsely -- REPEAT: FALSELY --
that "mind" implies "nonphysical", "soul", etc. In reply to karl@dartmouth,
I pointed out that THE SAME POINT APPLIES to the free will issue. That is,
behaviorists falsely assume that free will is incompatible with determinism.
R P K> [...] Also, the word "choose" is misleading for
R P K> Skinner, implying that we went through some sort of decision
R P K> process, everything whirled around in our brains [...]
R P K> Free will seems to me to be much like minds. How does it help
R P K> us explain anything that we couldn't before?
R P K> dartvax!karl karl@dartmouth
R P> But things DO swirl around in our brains! And as far as "explaining
R P> things", if you mean explaining BEHAVIOR, then YOU'RE BEGGING THE
R P> QUESTION! Behaviorists have arbitrarily (and foolishly) decided
R P> beforehand that the mental must be judged by the yardstick of behavior;
R P> that it has no worth of its own apart from that. Stacking the deck again.
R> Free will implies some agent of choice doing the choosing. No one is
R> denying the swirling around in the brain. It's just that there is no agent
R> that makes a "choice" as to how the chemicals will swirl.
Yes there is: THE SAME agent who is constituted by those chemicals. What an
agent chooses to do determines how the chemicals will swirl. The chemical-
swirling correlated with choice A is different from that associated with
choice B. Let me put it this way for you: the agent IS those chemicals;
or more precisely, is constitued by (or if the "mind as program" view is
correct, is instantiated by) those chemicals.
R> The best you can do, even if you invoke Heisenberg, is that the
R> current positions and states of the chemical makeup of the brain (and body-
R> after all, *it* provides input to the brain also, and thus indirectly
R> so does the "real world") combined with a degree of indeterminacy, in
R> effect "determine" what the resulting behavior will be. (You might
R> say: how does indeterminacy determine something? The point being: based
R> on Heisenberg, we may be able to say that results cannot be "pre"-
R> determined, but this does not imply an agent doing the determining.)
R P R> Why free will at all? Isn't it just a subjective perspective that
R P R> one has about one's actions ("I *decided* to do that!! That wasn't
R P R> the result of some chemical reactions! That was *me* *deciding* and
R P R> *willing*!").
R P R> Rich Rosen
R P> "Just" subjective: the subjective is spurned again.
R> And with good reason. Given the capacity of the human brain to impose its
R> own preconceived patterns on those things it does not fully understand, and
R> to interpret based on that often faulty patterning (look at the evidence
R> AGAINST viability of hypnotic recall), the subjective perspective simply
R> isn't worth looking at from an analytical viewpoint. (Except maybe as part
R> of an analysis of brain functions where subjectivity is viewed objectively.)
Let's put it this way: if, contrary to fact but consistent with many people's
beliefs, the freedom of an action were a matter of its FEELING free, then the
subjective perspective would be valid. And there ARE some things for which
subjective (i.e., in the subject -- NOT equivalent to "biased",etc.) feelings
ARE decisive. For example, if I feel like I'm in pain, I AM in pain. And to
make matters worse (for behaviorism), being in pain IS IMPORTANT. And that is
what is wrong with spurning the subjective. This has nothing to do with the
free will issue, but I felt it was worth picking this bone too.
BTW, I wonder if you realize how crucial your parenthetical sentence above is.
R P> But no, free will isn't just subjective; subjective feelings have
R P> nothing to do with it. It is a matter (to make things too brief)
R P> of the rationality of decisions; something which is not evidenced
R P> by the feeling Rosen refers to, and which is not incompatible (I
R P> wish he would get this through his thick head) with the theory of
R P> the nature of human intelligence to which he subscribes.
R> Free will requires an agent external to the chemical processes
R> "governed" by the cause and effect of physical laws.
Again, that's dead wrong. NO EXTERNALITY IS REQUIRED. Here again the crucial
behaviorist fallacy comes into play ("fallacy" in the colloquial sense). It
is the "either/or" fallacy -- the fallacy of assuming that two categories are
mutually exclusive. In this case, the categories are agents and physical
things; in my dispute with karl@dartmouth, minds and physical things. TO
REPEAT MY BASIC POINT ONCE MORE: THESE CATEGORIES ARE *NOT* EXCLUSIVE; THE
ASSUMPTION -- AND THAT'S WHAT IT IS -- THAT THEY ARE IS UNJUSTIFIED.
R> What "willed" the chemicals in your brains to move in a certain way to
R> cause movement/action? And what "willed" whatever process in your brain
R> that caused that chemical movement to start?
Again, the agent and the chemicals are one and the same. Viewed on one level,
we have an agent (me) making a decision; viewed on a lower (component) level,
we have certain chemical processes. To deny that there is an agent on the
ground that it is "just" a bunch of chemicals makes about as much sense as
denying that there is warmth in the room on the ground that there is "just"
a bunch of molecules moving around, or denying that there is wetness to the
water on the ground that we have "just" a bunch of molecules, none of which
(considered individually) is wet.
R P> p.s. see also my latest news posting, "On freedom".
R> Which reminds me, was this supposed to have been an article that you sent
R> me? [...] Please post this letter [...] to the net as a followup if this
R> is the case. Witty (?) title might be: Skinner = the one who skins, not
R> the one who gets skinned. (I thought it was witty.)
Consider it done! --The aspiring iconoclast,
Paul Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
Note: Please send any mail to this address, not the sender's address.ptc@cybvax0.UUCP (Peter Crames) (10/05/84)
R> = Rich Rosen, in letter to Paul Torek
PT> = Paul Torek from "Torek on Rosen on Torek on Skinner", Sep. 27, 1984
= my reply
R> Free will requires an agent external to the chemical processes
R> "governed" by the cause and effect of physical laws.
PT> Again, that's dead wrong. NO EXTERNALITY IS REQUIRED. Here again the crucial
PT> behaviorist fallacy comes into play ("fallacy" in the colloquial sense). It
PT> is the "either/or" fallacy - the fallacy of assuming that two categories are
PT> mutually exclusive. In this case, the categories are agents and physical
PT> things; in my dispute with karl@dartmouth, minds and physical things. TO
PT> REPEAT MY BASIC POINT ONCE MORE: THESE CATEGORIES ARE *NOT* EXCLUSIVE; THE
PT> ASSUMPTION -- AND THAT'S WHAT IT IS -- THAT THEY ARE IS UNJUSTIFIED.
R> What "willed" the chemicals in your brains to move in a certain way to
R> cause movement/action? And what "willed" whatever process in your brain
R> that caused that chemical movement to start?
PT> Again, the agent and the chemicals are one and the same.Viewed on one level,
PT> we have an agent (me) making a decision;viewed on a lower (component) level,
PT> we have certain chemical processes. To deny that there is an agent on the
PT> ground that it is "just" a bunch of chemicals makes about as much sense as
PT> denying that there is warmth in the room on the ground that there is "just"
PT> a bunch of molecules moving around, or denying that there is wetness to the
PT> water on the ground that we have "just" a bunch of molecules, none of which
PT> (considered individually) is wet.
PT> Paul Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
There is an external agent or "I" who causes the chemicals to swirl in
our brains (and in the universe). That agent is God. All movement,
including our thoughts and actions, can be traced back to God's First
Cause, also known as the Big Bang. We (and the universe) can be viewed
as a machine programmed by God.
A machine is a physical object which moves according to God's laws
of cause and effect, with no will of its own. A machine can not
cause itself to move. Since our brains are machines, we can not
cause our own thoughts and actions. Our thoughts and actions are
caused to us by God. THIS THOUGHT is being caused, transmitted,
or silently "spoken" by God, and it is being experienced, received,
or silently "heard" by you, as a result of God's First Cause. This
means that we all share the same causal agent, will, or "I" -- God.
My use of the word 'machine' here is not meant to connote anything
bad, nor is it meant to detract from the beauty of the universe.
"Be still, and know that I am God." (Psalms 46:10)brian@digi-g.UUCP (Mr. Bozo) (10/11/84)
Hmmm, saying that God causes our deterministic brain to have free will reminds me of the old German idea that "You don't really think; a little man in your head is doing the REAL thinking". I would like to see proof of this (the former, not the latter). Now a question for the people still on Earth; how is a deterministic brain different from a non-deterministic brain, if it is impossible to test any particular decision more than once? Since we can't reverse the universe back in time to make the decision more than once, we can never know if decisions can be made independently, given an identical 'brain state'. Also, given this premise, what is the DIFFERENCE between them? "Determinism - I wouldn't have it any other way."