esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (10/18/84)
[Replies to Bob Renninger, Jim Balter, baba, ptc, mrh] >> If the omniscient being has a certain minimum of rationality, >> it will never do what I do and change its mind, because it >> always (at least ever since it has been omniscient) knows >> what the relevant facts are and what decision they justify. >> Therefore, each time the being remakes its decision, it >> confirms the original one. > I agree with [Torek here], but I don't think > it leaves such a being with any capacity to make decisions. > A "decision" that merely reconfirms the being's pre-existing > knowledge of its future actions is indistinguishable from > passive contemplation of those future actions. [R. Renninger] It certainly *is* distinguishable! Are you saying that when I reconsider a decision and reconfirm my old one, I haven't really decided? When I recognize something as my future action, evaluate it, and then "get ready" (mentally commit myself) to do it, I certainly *have* decided! And the omniscient being does these things. > It isn't even right to call them "actions," since our > omniscient being never (at no time) decides to do them. It decides *many* times; perhaps even continuously; and at one of these moments it even puts the decision into action! > One notion of freedom is "freedom from external control." > Is this what you are getting at? No. Freedom is the evaluation of prospective actions and the implemen- tation of such evaluations. One of these days I'm going to type in a major article on this ... From: jim@ism780b.UUCP > If you succeed in your test of preknowledge, then you didn't truly know. > So if you truly know, you can't succeed. > So if you are omniscient, you are not omnipotent. Q.E.D. First sentence: correct. Second: NON SEQUITUR! All you can conclude here is that if you truly know, you *don't* succeed. Not *can't*, *don't*. And the reason you *don't* is that you don't try. The truth of the first sentence DOES NOT IMPLY ANYTHING ABOUT YOUR ABILITIES. As long as the counterfactual "if you tried, you would succed" is true, you can succeed, though you don't try, and would never try under similar circumstances. By the way, I agree completely with the spirit of your article, "Re: Re: Torek on Skinner (determinism & ", and the other article on reductionism and when "only" is appropriate. (I'm just not sure your implicit definition of reductionism is correct). > From: baba@flairvax.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) > Well, what is free will? The best definition I've seen put forth on the net > is the inability to consistently and deductively predict the behavior of an > entity, no matter how much is known about the entity and its environment. > By this definition, electrons have free will, which may be OK, but I would > add the further restriction that the entity be self-aware. From: mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) > I'd think that the definition should distinguish some real sort of free will > ("because free will exists, even with omniscience we wouldnt be able to make > 100% reliable predictions of the decision-making process"). AAAUUUUGGGGHHHH! Freedom has NOTHING, repeat NOTHING, to do with randomness! Dice are NOT any freer than billiard balls! And ROM DOS's extra condition is hopelessly ad hoc -- what do self-awareness and randomness have to do with each other? Or with free will? Does knowledge of one's slavery make one less a slave? Should the thought that one is subject to chance give any comfort? I would rather that my actions follow a consistent rationale. Freedom has nothing to do with predictability. It has a lot to do with rationality and the ability to evaluate actions according to a consistent, best justified set of norms. From: ptc@cybvax0.UUCP (Peter Crames) > In order to have free will, an object must have the ability to cause > itself to move. Motion happens, but nothing in our universe has the > ability to CAUSE its own motion. That depends how much you (over!)load into the phrase "cause its own motion". By the normal usage of the words, even a simple robot can cause itself to move. Certainly we can. Of course, you can redefine the phrase if you want, but the plausibility of your first sentence may be fatally diminished by such redefinition. --The untiring iconoclast, Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's. Thanks.