esk@wucs.UUCP (10/03/84)
[] To be sure, having the power to decide to act in a particular way and not another is a manifestation of freedom, not of unfreedom. However, it seems to me that our freedom is located in that moment of decision: to the extent that we have made an irrevocable decision, we are the servants of our past resolve. There can be no time at which an omniscient being makes a decision, because otherwise previously he would not know what his future action would be. Bob Renninger hou2a!54375rr An omniscient being could make a decision continuously. After all, few decisions are made only once: for example, I decide today to go to class tomorrow, but something comes up and tomorrow I change my mind. The omniscient being knows beforehand what it will decide at the moment when the decision becomes irrevocable, because it knows what the grounds are on which that decision will be based. If the omniscient being has a certain minimum of rationality, it will never do what I do and change its mind, because it always (at least ever since it has been omniscient) knows what the relevant facts are and what decision they justify. Therefore, each time the being remakes its decision, it confirms the original one. (Then why remake the decision? Well, if the omniscient being is also omnipotent, it can afford to, because it has plenty of time and energy.) Far from being unfree, such a being seems to me to be perfectly free. By the way, I agree that God must exist in time or at least "meta-time". However, I do not see how this creates any logical difficulties. Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's. Thanks.
esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor) (10/05/84)
[the plot thickens...] >From Daryel Akerlind (...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker): > But, Paul Torek, imagine the following: > After contemplating my various courses of action, I choose what seems to me > to be the best. Then I note that that was what I knew I would do. > Having the desire to test this whole idea of preknowledge, I decide to > follow my second best course of action -- that is, I choose to do something > different from what I "know" I am going to do. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as *choosing* what you judge to be the second best option. Such would be an instance of irrationality not deserving of the name of choice. Admittedly, the selection of the second best option may sometimes *feel* free, but such feelings do no constitute evidence. For an excellent explanation, see Chin-Tai Kim, "Norms and Freedom", *The Philosophical Forum* 1981. Now, if you are suggesting that you change your mind about what is the best action in light of the need to test this preknowledge thing, then (assuming you act on your new evaluation) you didn't know what you were going to do (your belief was wrong). "But suppose I'm a free being who really does know what he's going to do!" Then, because FREEDOM IMPLIES ACTING ON YOUR EVALUATION, it must be the case that you don't change your evaluation. Thus, a free being can be omniscient only if it does not believe that it would be valuable to test this pre- knowledge thing. But of course, an omniscient being doesn't *need* to test! > I can imagine various solutions to the above problem, but each of them > conflicts with my sense of free will. We can resolve these conflicts > by denying me (my conception of) free will. However, if I were > omnipotent, then I do not see how these conflicts could be resolved, > because omnipotence would seem to guarantee (my conception of) free will. What IS your conception of free will, and what would it be to "deny" it? --The aspiring iconoclast, Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (10/06/84)
[] >Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as *choosing* what you judge to be >the second best option. By "best", I thought you meant best according to some criterion, such as getting the most money for the least number of hours of work. My idea was that I could then choose what was second best according to that criterion. Now you seem to be using "best" to mean "what you most want to do", but that conflicts with ordinary usage. According to the way we usually use the word "best", a person can certainly choose to act contrary to what they consider best. >if you are suggesting that you change your mind about what is the best action >in light of the need to test this preknowledge thing, then (assuming you act >on your new evaluation) you didn't know what you were going to do (your >belief was wrong). "But suppose I'm a free being who really does know what >he's going to do!" Then, because FREEDOM IMPLIES ACTING ON YOUR EVALUATION, >it must be the case that you don't change your evaluation. I am wondering about what it could be like for me, in my mind, to know ahead of time what I am going to do. Let us first consider the situation in which I believe that I am going to, say, sit in my lounge chair at 10am tomorrow. In this case, I could certainly consider my belief and then decide to walk in the garden when 10am came around. That is, I could falsify my belief. So, if foreknowing what I am going to do at 10am tomorrow is like having in my mind a belief as to what I am going to do at 10am tomorrow-- a belief that just happens to be true -- then we have problems, for we are denying that I could decide to act contrary to my belief. So, foreknowing what I am going to do must be different to having in my mind a belief as to what I am going to do. Here is my problem, for whenever I envisage myself thinking at 9am that I am going to sit in my lounge chair at 10am, it always seems to me that I could consider that thought and decide to act contrary to it. I cannot reconcile foreknowing my actions with my freedom. I am left wondering what, as an experience in my mind, foreknowing my actions is supposed to be like. I could continue, but I will stop this response here. I can see questions coming up such as: "Can a free, omniscient being be within time?" Daryel Akerlind ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker
54375rr@hou2a.UUCP (R.RENNINGER) (10/09/84)
> An omniscient being could make a decision continuously.... > If the omniscient being has a certain minimum of rationality, > it will never do what I do and change its mind, because it > always (at least ever since it has been omniscient) knows > what the relevant facts are and what decision they justify. > Therefore, each time the being remakes its decision, it > confirms the original one. Far from being unfree, such a > being seems to me to be perfectly free. > By the way, I agree that God must exist in time > or at least "meta-time". > However, I do not see how this creates any logical difficulties. > > Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 I agree with the second sentence above, but I don't think it leaves such a being with any capacity to make decisions. A "decision" that merely reconfirms the being's pre-existing knowledge of its future actions is indistinguishable from passive contemplation of those future actions. It isn't even right to call them "actions," since our omniscient being never (at no time) decides to do them. One notion of freedom is "freedom from external control." Is this what you are getting at? If so, it is certainly true that a being could be free in this sense, and yet have its actions completely determined. It's just that that kind of freedom strikes me as rather sterile and machine-like. I am inclined to think that human freedom goes beyond that. Bob Renninger hou2a!54375
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (10/11/84)
food for thought: (hi there iconoclast!) one of the classic arguments against the existence of an ``onmipotent'' god has been ``can he create a rock which he cannot lift?''. The classic answer of the people who believe in an ``omnipotent'' god is that this is a mal-formed (or stupid) question. There is no such thing as a ``rock which he cannot lift'' and so the whole question is void. It occurs to me that ``omnipotent'' and ``omniscient'' and ``eternal'' and ``infinite'' (all these things which are ascribed to god) may be literally incredible words -- words which in themselves can not mean what they are supposed to mean because the concept itself is, like ``a blue red'' or ``a round square'' wholly nonsense. (I know -- this is the is Heterological heterological argument. Maybe I have been reading too much Kierkegaard...) I cannot really think of Euclid's points. I cannot think of infinity. I cannot think of omnipotence. All I can do is to think of something ``more powerful than anything else I can think of'' which is pretty awesomely powerful, but hardly omnipotent. If I think of soemthing as *existing* (are we agreed that the omnipotent god exists, at least for the purpose of the argument) then I am thinking of the very limits which are placed upon a being by its existence. To be X one can not be not-X at the same time. To say that ``god is outside time'' may be to beg the entire question -- what is ``existence outside of time'' anyway? Existence seems to be a very temporal thing -- when I say ``I am'' it is understood that ``I am *now*'', is it not? Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
esk@wucs.UUCP (10/12/84)
From: dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (Daryel Akerlind) (>> =me, > =dsaker) >> Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as *choosing* what you judge >> to be the second best option. > By "best", I thought you meant best according to some criterion, > such as getting the most money for the least number of hours of work. > My idea was that I could then choose what was second best according to > that criterion. Now you seem to be using "best" to mean "what you most > want to do", but that conflicts with ordinary usage. I mean best according the ultimate criterion; best overall. Hopefully, that's exactly the same as what you most want to do, but if not, either your wants or your value judgements or both (usually both!) need to be changed. I think my use agrees with ordinary usage. > According to the way we usually use the word "best", a person > can certainly choose to act contrary to what they consider best. No she can't. If she fails to choose what she considers best overall, she has either been in the grip of a compulsion, or has slipped (made a mistake). The point is, FREEDOM IS A NORMATIVE CONCEPT. Think about what kinds of beings can be free; are agents. They are those who can rationally evaluate prospective future actions. To be free is to use one's agency -- i.e., to make evaluations and act on them. > Let us first consider the situation in which I believe that I am going > to, say, sit in my lounge chair at 10am tomorrow. In this case, I could > certainly consider my belief and then decide to walk in the garden when > 10am came around. That is, I could falsify my belief. > So, if foreknowing what I am going to do at 10am tomorrow is like having > in my mind a belief as to what I am going to do at 10am tomorrow-- a > belief that just happens to be true -- then we have problems, for we are > denying that I could decide to act contrary to my belief. No, we are only denying that you *will* decide to do otherwise. The word "could" is ambiguous; it should be eschewed, in favor of "would if ..." or "has a nonzero probability of". > So, foreknowing what I am going to do must be different to having in my > mind a belief as to what I am going to do. Here is my problem, for > whenever I envisage myself thinking at 9am that I am going to sit in my > lounge chair at 10am, it always seems to me that I could consider that > thought and decide to act contrary to it. I cannot reconcile foreknowing > my actions with my freedom. Indeed, AS LONG AS YOU ARE THIS TYPE OF PERSON who wants to do otherwise than what he thinks he's going to do -- i.e. one who wants to test this "foreknowledge" thing -- YOU CAN NEVER FOREKNOW any of your actions. (Exception: if you thought it was extremely important to do what you think you will do, you might do it anyway. Suppose that you think you will sit in your chair at 10am, and having had similar apparent instances of foreknowledge recently, you want to test this foreknowledge thing. But alas, you know that if you don't sit in the chair you will die (for some reason -- use your imagination). You decide to sit at 10am.) > I am left wondering what, as an experience in my mind, foreknowing > my actions is supposed to be like. There are two possibilities corresponding to free actions and to unfree actions. I'll concentrate on free actions. In this case you must firmly believe that you will do the actions AND that they are the best actions available. If you are the type (apparently you are) who would see a gain to knowing whether you do indeed foreknow, then either 1) you are aware of reasons to do the specific actions you anticipate that override this gain, or 2) you KNOW that you have foreknowledge and thus you don't need to test it. Note that condition 2) always applies to an omniscient being. --Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's. Thanks.
dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (10/16/84)
[] >I mean best according the ultimate criterion; best overall. Hopefully, >that's exactly the same as what you most want to do, but if not, either >your wants or your value judgements or both (usually both!) need to be >changed. I think my use agrees with ordinary usage. I still think that we can meaningfully talk of doing what we consider not to be best. Indeed, I would say that the discrepancy between our actions and what we consider to be best is the basis of a moral tension that most of us have experienced. Furthermore, even when we do do what we consider to be best, few of us would claim that it was the best overall. Few of us would claim to have any idea as to what is best overall. One other observation on what is best. We often have before us several choices between which we cannot decide what is best. So that our final choice of action is not the choice of what we consider to be best. Paul Torek seems to be offering the following resolution of how one could have free will and also foreknow that one was going to, say, sit in one's lounge chair at 10am :- One would have a belief that at 10am one was going to sit in one's lounge chair, and one's choice of actions would culminate in one's choosing to sit in that lounge chair come 10am. Even if one firmly decided at 9am not to sit in that chair at 10am, one would change one's mind and by 10am would choose to sit in the lounge chair. This person is certainly free in the sense that they are acting on their choices, but that doesn't capture my conception of free will. Although I can't define what I understand by free will, I can say that there seems to me to be a compulsive element in this hypothetical person's decisions with respect to his lounge chair that is antithetical to my notion of free will. Daryel Akerlind ...ihnp4!inuxc!iuvax!dsaker "Your ignorance makes me ill and angry. This savagery must cease."
jim@ism780b.UUCP (10/18/84)
> But, Paul Torek, imagine the following: > After contemplating my various courses of action, I choose what seems to me > to be the best. Then I note that that was what I knew I would do. > Having the desire to test this whole idea of preknowledge, I decide to > follow my second best course of action -- that is, I choose to do something > different from what I "know" I am going to do. Why did you put the quotes around "know". Because it is possible to choose to do something different from what you "know" you are going to do, but it is not possible to do something different from what you *know* you are going to do (where *knowing* is absolute; that is, knowing something not actually true is a formal contradiction; certainly this sense is implied by true omniscience). If you succeed in your test of preknowledge, then you didn't truly know. So if you truly know, you can't succeed. So if you are omniscient, you are not omnipotent. Q.E.D. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim) "Why does it bother you so much that you can't be both omniscient and omnipotent, as though you had a bloody chance at either one anyway?"