esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor) (10/18/84)
[I finally throw some light on a subject] From: dsaker@iuvax.UUCP (Daryel Akerlind) > I still think that we can meaningfully talk of doing what we consider > not to be best. Indeed, I would say that the discrepancy between our > actions and what we consider to be best is the basis of a moral tension > that most of us have experienced. Well, you are talking about what has been called in recent philosophical discussion, "weakness of the will". I am not going to deny, because I'm not sure, that this ever occurs in a rational, reflective decision. How- ever, I do deny that such decisions are instances of freedom. Freedom is the exercise of one's capacity to normatively evaluate actions; failure to carry out the evaluation is a failure to be free. This applies to thought as well as action. In both cases, freedom is a normative concept. (In a later article, I'll pursue this analogy to thought further.) > Furthermore, even when we do do what we consider to be > best, few of us would claim that it was the best overall. Few of us would > claim to have any idea as to what is best overall. Although one may not be sure what standards to apply, one applies those which seem to be justified. One need not claim to know what makes an action best overall, nor what actions would fulfill those criteria, as long as one has more reason than not to suppose that what one considers best is best overall. In other words, as long as we have *some* standards and *some* justification for them, we're on the right track. > One other observation on what is best. We often have before us several > choices between which we cannot decide what is best. So that our final > choice of action is not the choice of what we consider to be best. In other words, sometimes there is a "tie" for first. Still, the freedom of our action rests in our judgement that the alternatives are equal, and not in the ensuing arbitrary choice between them. Discussing my explanation of free will in the presence of foreknowledge, dsaker says: > This person is certainly free in the sense that they are acting on their > choices, but that doesn't capture my conception of free will. Although I > can't define what I understand by free will, I can say that there seems to > me to be a compulsive element in this hypothetical person's decisions with > respect to his lounge chair that is antithetical to my notion of free will. I think the reason you feel that there is a compulsive element is that in the case you focused on, on is "forced" to change one's mind by unfavorable circumstances. You focused on the case where one decides at 9am not to sit in the chair at 10am, but changes one's mind by 10am. In my discussion of this case I suggested that the reason one changes one's mind is that one will die unless one sits at 10am. Clearly, you are "forced" to change your mind, in the sense that circumstances make you choose to sit when you would prefer to "test this foreknowledge thing" by choosing not to sit. But this case is tempting you to put the cart before the horse. You are thinking, "fate has decided that you will sit at 10am, but this requires a motive, so fate supplies the motive". However, in the most likely case of foreknowledge, it is your decisions that lead the way; what you foreknow follows them. IT IS BECAUSE YOU WILL DECIDE TO DO X THAT YOU KNOW YOU WILL DO X, *NOT* THE OTHER WAY AROUND. Do you see the distinction? Imagine that you had a "crystal ball". Now, you do not like the idea of looking into your crystal ball because you fear being fated to do what it says. But your fear is based on a misunderstanding of how the ball works -- of, indeed, the only way it CAN work. The only way the ball works is to follow your future decisions -- it cannot dictate those decisions. Therefore, when you look into the crystal ball you will either see nothing, or you will see your future actions *plus* enough good reasons to do the actions that you will want to do them. These are the only possibilities for the ball, because you are a free being. If the first possibility obtains, then obviously your ball is defective -- take it back to the Magic Store {:-)}. If you are the type of person who wants to "test this foreknowledge thing", then the only way your crystal ball can work is to satisfy your need to know whether the ball is reliable -- the ball must prove to your satisfaction that it is indeed a reliable crystal ball, so that you don't feel any inclination to test it. If this is impos- sible -- if you are not that easy to convince -- then the crystal ball WON'T work, and the Magic Store is going to go out of business. Now let's apply these results to the omniscience-vs-free will issue. The omniscient being is indeed convinced that its "crystal ball" (itself) is reliable. After all, this is a fact, so the omniscient being knows it. Therefore, it is possible for the "crystal ball" to work, even for a free willed omnisicient being. Therefore, there is no contradiction between omniscience and freedom. --Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's. Thanks.