rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (10/20/84)
It seems that we have heard a lot of definitions of "free will" floating around. Some revolving around the inability of an observer to predict actions, others revolving around randomness, etc. I think the best and most accurate definition thus far has been: "Free will is the process that occurs whenever you make a decision. Thus, whenever you make a decision, you are exercising free will." But, for purposes of analysis, tautologies don't make good definitions. I offered a definition that no one saw fit to comment on, but I'd like to offer it again. Remember, this is what *I* consider to be free will, and my judgment and analysis have always been based on whether or not THAT THING that I describe does indeed exist. > I always thought that free will meant, at its lowest level, the ability of > an entity to choose between two or more alternatives on its own without any > influence from the outside world, its chemical makeup, etc. Thus at any > time an entity could "choose", regardless of what's going on in and around it, > to do whatever it "liked". Free will to me implies free choice independent > of the "chooser's" surroundings, which of necessity implies an external > agent doing the "choosing". If the surroundings make the choice for the > entity, then it's not free will, because there was no free choice involved. I think there's a good reason why nobody saw fit to comment on this: it's a *very* extreme definition. It goes to the root of the question (something that some people call reductionism). In fact, I define free will in such a way that my claims are correct: the way I define free will, it CANNOT exist (based on this definition) in the absence of the "external agent" I describe. This (the above) is the phenomenon I have defined (from my perspective) as "free will". But this is *my* definition. I've come to think that the basis for all our arguing on the topic is that we have different definitions of the concept. I would guess that mine is the most extreme possible definition (but I could be wrong). I'd like to see Paul Torek's (and others') definitions of free will, especially in comparison to the one I put forth. Another point of clarification: I think there's an obsession here with claiming "it's not right to look at the deepest level possible because it ignores the holistic/gestalt/global/larger view". Let me put this misconception to rest. As I said once before, the whole is more than just the sum of its parts. But what is it that makes the whole into the whole that it is? It IS, in fact, those parts, those elements, and HOW THEY ARE ARRANGED IN FORMATION. No, it is not enough to analyze only the parts themselves, but rather in combination with how they are arranged together. The holistic/gestalt/overall behavior of the "whole" is important, it is different, it is of interest, it is a basis for understanding larger systems. But why the urge to stop at a certain level and say "That's it, that's the 'cause'", as Torek does when he claims an object can "cause itself to move"? The "cause" of its actions is NEVER self-determined at an ultimate level, or even at a reasonably deep level. What "caused" those chemicals that "made the decision to move" to be at that particular place in that particular configuration to "cause" that action? I think only an entity whose actions are truly and ultimately self-determined can be considered to have free will. As Peter Crames pointed out, nothing causes itself to do anything. Of course, his argument assumes the "first cause" to be the "mind of god", in fact assuming a consciousness to the cause itself. This first cause does not have to be assumed to have specific direction, intent, or motive. (This is an assumption that many make about the universe, assuming that it was planned/ designed/ordered to be a specific way. Fact is, determinism, or even modified determinism accounting for Heisenberg, does NOT imply a "determiner".) Speaking of which, why do people assume that at the quantum level, things suddenly "become" non-deterministic, when all that has "happened" is that we have reached a level where *we* lose the ability to do the "determining" or predicting, for whatever reason (e.g, certain cause-and-effect factors are not observable/observed/understood)? -- If it doesn't change your life, it's not worth doing. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr