baba@flairvax.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (10/26/84)
>AAAUUUUGGGGHHHH! Freedom has NOTHING, repeat NOTHING, to do with randomness! >Dice are NOT any freer than billiard balls! And ROM DOS's extra condition is >hopelessly ad hoc -- what do self-awareness and randomness have to do with >each other? Or with free will? Does knowledge of one's slavery make one >less a slave? Should the thought that one is subject to chance give any >comfort? I would rather that my actions follow a consistent rationale. >Freedom has nothing to do with predictability. It has a lot to do with >rationality and the ability to evaluate actions according to a consistent, >best justified set of norms. If my behavior can be accurately predicted, one of two things must be true: either my behavior is deterministic or the predictor has precognition. Predictability has rather more to to do with free will than slavery does. Knowledge of one's ignorance *does* make one less ignorant. And please, Paul, don't scream like that. My terminal has very sensitive phosphors ;-) Baba
unbent@ecsvax.UUCP (10/28/84)
From: baba@flairvax.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) Fri Oct 26 04:06:06 1984 (flairvax.799) net.philosophy : replies on freedom - incomprehensible Message-ID: <799@flairvax.UUCP> . . . If my behavior can be accurately predicted, one of two things must be true: either my behavior is deterministic or the predictor has precognition. Predictability has rather more to to do with free will than slavery does. Knowledge of one's ignorance *does* make one less ignorant. . . Baba If my behavior can be accurately predicted, that may simply be because, in certain respects, I am a highly predictable person. My secretary can predict, quite accurately, that upon coming into the office I will hang up my jacket, pour myself a cup of coffee, and go through the day's mail. Does she have precognition? Not that I know of. Is my behavior "deterministic"? Maybe -- but its *predictability* isn't what would establish that, if anything would. All that the predictability of my behavior shows is (1) that I have adopted a certain morning *routine*, and (2) that my secretary is familiar with it. Whatever else "determinism" requires, it surely requires that I *couldn't* behave other than I do. All that predictability needs, however, is that it be true that I *won't* behave in ways other than I have on relevantly similar occasions. For that, it's enough that I be a creature of habit. Yours for clearer concepts, --Jay Rosenberg Dept. of Philosophy ...mcnc!ecsvax!unbent Univ. of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27514