[net.philosophy] Free will -- reply to baba, unbent, merrill, and jon

esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor) (11/02/84)

From: baba@flairvax.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS)
> If my behavior can be accurately predicted, one of two things must be true:
> either my behavior is deterministic or the predictor has precognition.

Let's consider the case where it's deterministic: then SO WHAT?  I thought
I just got through with this issue with Rich Rosen.

> Predictability has rather more to to do with free will than slavery does.

Why on earth would you think so?

From: unbent@ecsvax.UUCP       (Jay Rosenberg)
> Whatever else "determinism" requires, it surely
> requires that I *couldn't* behave other than I do.  

No.  It requires only that your actions have causes and that the relation
between cause and effect is (contrary to quantum mechanics, at least under
the Copenhagen interpretation) non-probabilistic.

From: merrill@rex.DEC (Rick)
> "Free" will does NOT mean free-of-any-influence chemical, psychological,
> political, emotional, even physical;  the "free" in "free will" refers to
> freedom from ANOTHER person's will ( Mother, God, Freud ... ).  

I agree with the first clause but reject the second.  There is more to
it than that.

From: jon@qusavx.UUCP (Jon Lewis)
>	It was Hegel who gave what I believe to be the first step in
> the right direction with regard to ascertaining free will.  His 
> philosophy required that no one could act freely unless they were in
> possession of the truth.  This			 ... makes an
> essential point: you cannot be said to be acting freely if your 
> actions are being determined or channeled by some other forces, EVEN
> IF you are totally unaware of these influences.  

I think Hegel was getting warm at least.  As to your last sentence, I
think the crucial word is OTHER in "other forces".  As long as the
forces determining your decision are truth-respecting (i.e. rational,
learning from experience) you're free.

In summary:  I will not give the incompatibilists (those who hold that
determinism (see above definition) is incompatible w/ freedom) an inch.
In spite of the fact that current physics disavows deterministic causa-
tion, in case current theory is replaced I don't want people to start
disbelieving in their own free will.  Besides, anyone who thinks that
incompatibilism is true is not likely to believe that their freedom
lies in quantum uncertainty; at least not if they have any understanding
of freedom.
		--The aspiring iconoclast,
				Paul V Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
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