jim@ISM780B.UUCP (11/03/84)
>The question then becomes: What is the difference between an event that >certainly *will* not happen and an event that certainly *can* not happen? I would say that it *will* not happen if I believe I have some decision ability, and I intend to exercise my choice in such a way that it will not happen. But I will say that it *can* not happen if it is not a valid outcome given my understanding of the current state of affairs and the transformational rules of cause and effect, regardless of my own choices. But to know it *certainly* will not happen or it *certainly* can not happen implies access to knowledge outside such inductive considerations. To know something certainly will not happen implies that I can peek at the event continuum and see that it is not there. To know that something certainly cannot happen, I have to be certain of the current the state of affairs, and *be certain that the rules of cause and effect will indeed be carried out as I expect them to be.* But no such certainty can be inherent in the rules of cause and effect themselves; for that certainty, I have to peek at the event continuum again, so in effect there is no difference between *certainly* will not and *certainly* can not. The real problem is that "will not" and "can not" are statements about our knowledge more than about events. Events either do happen or they don't. They don't maybe happen. An event that happens is no different from an event that certainly happens, or will happen, or cannot fail to happen, etc. -- Jim "probability is the measure of ignorance" Balter (ima!jim)