esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (12/12/84)
[Replies-To: laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton), <mike, R.J. Stewart] > ...At this point we are at a deadlock until one of us renounces our > valuation of freedom, simply because we can never reach any sort of > consensus. ... Yes, either our valuation of freedom or our understanding of it (or both). What kind of freedom is it most rational to want? Not the libertarian definition of freedom, I would contend. > .... It is not fair to call me irrational -- I never claimed to be a > consequentialist. From my point of view it is not sufficient to merely > work out a teleological theory of ethics -- a deontic principle is also > necessary. Certain things are *wrong* -- not in that they produce a > result that I do not (or should not) desire [though they may do that] but > because other people have a moral claim on me to *not do* such actions. You are right, irrational is too strong a word. But "less than fully rational" is appropriate, I think, for any endorsement of a situation that would leave everyone worse off than an alternative situation. I realize that A) such an endorsement is based on deontic principles that are held inviolate, and B) those who accept such deontic principles would in one sense not be "better off" in the alternative situation, because they simply disprefer it on principle. Nevertheless, against both A) and B) I would urge that the principles in question stand (at least as yet) unjustified. Since there is presumably no question that desirable results count for SOME weight, *the burden of argument rests on holders of deontic principles to show why such principles should be allowed to override otherwise good consequences*. Whew, that was a long point, and I will probably have to expand on it later. For now I hope you see what I am getting at. > There is a great difference for me between things which I am morally > permitted to do but *ought* not to do (such as overeating) and things > which I am morally not permitted to do and *should* not do (stealing)... I see the major difference as being that we can trust experience to teach you to protect your own well-being but we have only reason and empathy (weaker motivators) to get you to consider impacts on others. This tends to make keeping people aware of moral considerations a more urgent matter than for prudential considerations. > From my perspective (as an ethical egoist) your claim is that just as > I should not act in a manner contrary to my own interest, neither should > I act in a way which implicitly assumes that you should not act in your > own interest. {aren't triple negatives wonderful...} In robbing you I > am asking you to act, not in your interest, but in *mine*, where your > interest and mine are in conflict. I think this reasoning is unsound in that the robber may very well expect and believe that others should act in their own interests; in fact the robber may think that others should rob him if they get the chance. I do not see how the robber's action is inconsistent with egoism. (I also think that the premise "one should act solely in one's own interest" is, depending on how it is interpreted, either empty or false. Thus I am not an egoist.) > (On another level, it is not actually in my interest to rob you at all. > In addition to the other ethical consequences of this action, it is a > mistake on my part to think that it is in my interest to rob you. This > is not the basis of your claim against me, however.) That is, my claim against you is the basis why it's not in your interest, I think you mean. If you mean something else please specify. > ...and secondly the means which you use to reach your objective must > not be immoral (ie they must not involve you thinking htat other people > should act, not in their own interest but in your interest). This is why co- > ercion is out: the ends will never justify the means. To put it another way > -- any actions which are a result of coercion can never be pareto-optimal. I think you mean Pareto-superior (at least, if so you are technically correct). However, all that supports your total rejection of coercion is your assertion plus a very weak argument. [sorry, I don't remember who posted this but there are two replies below:] >> I seem to remember from John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty" that he stated >> that laws for the common good are legitimate, but laws regulating individual >> welfare are not. Laws are supposed to prevent you from hurting me, not you >> from hurting you. From: stewart@ihldt.UUCP (R. J. Stewart) > Many people would agree with this, if you limit the discussion to laws > that forbid hurting. The laws in question, however, are those that > mandate benefiting someone else. A distinction without a moral difference. Think about it. From: mwm@ea.UUCP (<mike) > Ah, yes, but who decides what "the common good" is? Better yet, who > decides how much it is moral to take from someone at gunpoint (and > from whom) for "the common good?" I will! Now, are you going to sit there and complain while leaving such decisions up to people like me? Or are you going to vote for your own conception of the common good? "... come out of the corner fighting and may the best idea win!" --Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's. Thanks.