esk@wucs.UUCP (Eric Kaylor) (12/11/84)
[] From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) > I'm sure if I were uploaded to a silicon brain I would change, and change > in ways that would not have occurred if I hadn't been moved to different > hardware. But, hey, I change every day, anyway. Whatever changes occurred > would, I think, be gradual enough that I would still have the continuous > sensation of "selfness". My point was that silicon is so different that you would have no reason to expect *any* sensations at all; that is, our sentience would seem to be tied up with the particular type of "meat" found in animals' brains. Can anybody argue against such a connection? > I'm already a far different entity than I was > when I was 5, for instance; not only externally, but also in my experience > of my own selfness. Am I the *same* person? Does it matter? No to the latter question. Nevertheless, being sentient (able to feel) matters a great deal. --the once and future flink@umcp-cs, Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this (last) address, not the sender's.
barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) (12/12/84)
[] From Paul V. Torek, wucec1!pvt1047: > From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) >> I'm sure if I were uploaded to a silicon brain I would change, and change >> in ways that would not have occurred if I hadn't been moved to different >> hardware. But, hey, I change every day, anyway. Whatever changes occurred >> would, I think, be gradual enough that I would still have the continuous >> sensation of "selfness". > > My point was that silicon is so different that you would have no reason > to expect *any* sensations at all; that is, our sentience would seem to > be tied up with the particular type of "meat" found in animals' brains. > Can anybody argue against such a connection? Well, I'll try. Leaving aside consciousness for the moment, let us at least hypothesize a technology that can emulate in silicon all the mechanistic aspects of brain function. Now, suppose I suffer damage to some subsystem in my brain, and have it replaced by a silicon substitute. Are there any subsystems in the brain for which you feel this replacement would eliminate consciousness? Any combination of subsystems? Would I still be me with an electronic visual cortex? With an electronic hypothalamus? With both? My point is that believing consciousness is tied to our particular hardware seems to force one to accept one of two difficult propositions: either that consciousness becomes impossible at some seemingly arbitrary dividing line between "all meat" and "all silicon", or that there is some necessary precondition for consciousness which is separate from the physical mechanism which houses it, a "soul", if you will. If a non-mechanistic soul is necessary for consciousness, it is reasonable (though not required) to maintain it is not portable to other hardware. At the present time, however, I see no reason to believe that the physical operation of the brain is not a sufficient explanation of consciousness. I am therefore inclined to think that my "software", consciousness included, is theoretically portable. Comments, as always, are welcome. - From the Crow's Nest - Kenn Barry NASA-Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- USENET: {ihnp4,vortex,dual,hao,menlo70,hplabs}!ames!barry SOURCE: ST7891