esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (12/09/84)
[] From: jtc78@ihuxm.UUCP (Mike Cherepov) REPLIES TO ihnp4!ihlpm!cher > It looks like this analysis of distinctions between 'T' and 't' is > inspired by some confusion. The shoe, however, is on the other foot... > One can subscribe to either of the two interpretations of morals: > 1) Handed out to humans by ..... > We know about those. > 2) Current norms of behavior traced to social necessity. > Not as powerfully defined, but well-explained by many people > (I like Freud's The Future of an Illusion) 3) Beliefs about good, bad, right, and wrong based (hopefully) on experience and reason. > Applying the word "Truth/truth" to morals can only make sense if > you subscribe to 1. Mike Cherepov Wrong. See above. From: densinge@stolaf.UUCP (Charles W. Densinger) > Knowledge of eternal, universal, objective truth can be had only by > an eternal, omniscienct being. Oh, I just *love* this strategy. Overload a term with connotations you don't like, and then reject it on that basis. Sorry Densinger, it won't work. Care to define the baggage you're loading on here, like maybe what you mean by "eternal"? Meanwhile, hate to break the news to you, but interpersonally valid knowledge can be had by us mere humans. > ...some measure of objectivity. We want something sure, tangible. > Why do we need this? Because we are terrified of our limitations, > that we might not really know. Totally backwards. Why do we believe in some measure of objectivity? Because we recognize that *error* is *genuinely possible*. Why do some people retreat into subjectivism and relativism? Because they are afraid to be wrong; because they don't want to admit that they could be wrong. > We might not know, for instance, the solution to the abortion question. I grant -- no, I INSIST ON this. My views on the matter might be quite simply MISTAKEN. And the same applies to yours. > We can't say much more than "Because I just do [know]." I think I can say more for some of my moral beliefs than "becuase" or "that's the way I feel". I can say it would be wrong to do X because it hurts person A, because it can't be right for me to hurt A and not vice-versa when the circumstances are reversed, and because mutual harm results in bad consequences all around. I would also argue that I have just as much reason to avoid hurting others as myself, but that argument would be much more complicated and controversial ... > What Paul is really talking about is subjective truth, not objective > truth, and what we must remember with subjective truth is that every > subject has a different truth. I think I've said enough about that so far; let me get to a more crucial issue. Supposing, contrary to fact, that that is correct -- SO WHAT? How is that relevant to abortion or any other issue? Your point (correct me if I'm wrong) is that because subjective truths differ, each person should be allowed to act according to her own (w/o legal restrictions). And you think that this follows from the above. (By the way, let's get Tom Twiss and others who might agree in on this one.) Guess what? Wrong again! > ... I think Paul is deluding himself if he thinks > that it is easy to make decisions like ... I think Chuck is putting words in my mouth. > Difficulty in making a decision is often a sign of the value that situ- > ation has for us; we do not agonize over things we don't care about. Aha, now I think I see what he was trying to say. Unfortunately, last time he said that the difficulty itself was valuable -- at least that was the meaning of his (perhaps poor choice of) sentence structure. > He uses the word "tense" where I used the word difficult. I thought he did use the word "tense" in his original posting (sorry for not making it clear that I was replying to that also). Anyway, I was pointing out that uncertain, painful decisions are if anything *less* of an indication of our freedom than clearcut decisions. > I think he is making a mistake in aligning freedom with easy decisions. and in the "ammendment" he says: > The more I think about it, the more I Think Paul just wants to have it > easy. Besides, his logic makes no sense. Why don't you READ what I SAID, instead of putting words in my mouth. I am saying that uncertain decisions, even if correct, are partial failures, a sign of imperfect freedom. I am resisting your apparent attempt to align freedom with uncertain decisions. > Kant fails, I think, in his attempt to re-establish morality after he > blasts pure reason. He feels uncomfortable with his groundlessness. Kant was at least part right, I think, with the categorical imperative, first formulation. That aside, funny how Densinger wants to accept what Kant said about reason's limits (and claim his authority) but turn right around when it comes to the subject at hand ... From: steiny@scc.UUCP (Don Steiny) > I think Paul Watzlawick said it best, "the only way > to be objective is to not be there." (in *Change* somewhere). Neither true nor specific (entirely objective? or at all objective?) > "What is true is that which it is best for us to believe." > William James Well, at least somebody got something right. --The ever-unpopular THIRD side, Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Please send any mail directly to this address, not the sender's.
jtc78@ihuxm.UUCP (Mike Cherepov) (12/13/84)
> > One can subscribe to either of the two interpretations of morals: > > 1) Handed out to humans by ..... > > 2) Current norms of behavior traced to social necessity. > > Not as powerfully defined, but well-explained by many people > > (I like Freud's The Future of an Illusion) > 3) Beliefs about good, bad, right, and wrong based (hopefully) on > experience and reason. Oh boy. This is an (inferior?) way to rephrase 2. I could write books showing that our current notions of good and bad can be traced to social and psychological necessity, but that's been done by people with better qualifications. I (pompous word follows) challenge you to point to me the source that draws the distinction. Big names are preferred to homespun examples. > > Applying the word "Truth/truth" to morals can only make sense if > > you subscribe to 1. Mike Cherepov > Wrong. See above. But, please, you can not apply that word ("Wrong") with such relentless decisiveness. By being more moderate in rethorics one can aviod being presumptious. Actually from what I composed previously, follows that I consider "imposed morality" an empty argument, as every law is related to imposed morality (in sense (2)). But I am really concerned about imposition of religious views. That is often the case with anti-abortion cause. Mike Cherepov I, hopefully, will be skiing in Wyoming by the time response (if any) will have arrived. Mail to ihnp4!ihlpm!cher would enable me to read all the good stuff.