[net.philosophy] The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgements

esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (02/19/85)

[Apologies to R. Rudner for the subject line]

As the late R. Rudner [of good ol' Wahington University!] pointed out, in
his article of the same title as my subject line, science crucially 
involves the acceptance of hypotheses.  This occurs when the evidence is 
*strong enough* (usually, complete certainty is not possible).  How strong
is "strong enough"?  Accepting a hypothesis is a *decision*, with some 
chance of error.  In order to make such a decision, what is required is a
value judgement.  Rudner pointed out that if the consequences of error are
grave, the evidence required is correspondingly greater.  (Consider the 
hypothesis:  "this drug is safe for human beings".)

A number of objections have been offered; none are convincing.  Some
suggest that the scientist's job is not to accept hypotheses, but to tell
the decisionmaker the probability and let him decide if it is high enough.
But this won't do:  in order to make such a report the scientist has to
*accept the hypothesis that the probability is so-and-so*.  Others suggest
that the value judgements involved should be strictly related to the
cognitive goals of science.  But even supposing that such a distinction
can be made, why should other types of value judgements be excluded?

[For a good discussion of these issues, see *Rational Decision and
Causality* by E. Eells.  Rudner's article can be found in *Introductory
Readings in the Philosophy of Science*, ed. E.D. Klemke et. al.]
If Rudner is right, value judgements are a determining factor in what
hypotheses are accepted as scientific knowledge.  Which was the point
of my original question:  
>>>>Can there be -- as I think Rosen wants to suggest -- an "absolute right/
>>>>wrong" in science without implying a similar *cognitivity* for ethics?

>>> "Scientific" right/wrong simply consists of that which is true as
>>> opposed to that which isn't.  "Moral" right and wrong are clouded by
>>> the issue of who is determining the rightness and wrongness and on
>>> what basis.		[Rich Rosen's response -- to which I replied:]

>> How are "moral" issues "clouded" in a way that "scientific" (a
>> completely separate, non-overlapping realm?) ones aren't?  Take a look
>> at a lot of scientific controversies and tell me that there is no "issue
>> of who is determining [correctness] and [incorrectness] and on what 
>> basis"!  "But," you're retorting, "there's a true/false (i.e., 
>> *cognitivity*) to science which *has no counterpart* in ethics."  Oh
>> really?  Care to prove that there's such a *difference*?

> I thought I had, if not proven it, shown facets of it.  What about rain in
> a certain region (good for some farmers who've gone dry, bad for others for
> whom it would cause a river overflow)?  Sorry, but good and evil are always
> in the eye of the beholder, and to think otherwise is nothing more than
> wishful thinking.

The rain is *beneficial to* one farmer and *harmful to* the other; it is
not good (simpliciter) and bad (simpliciter) at the same time.  And these
benefits and harms are a matter of genuine *fact*, not just "in the eye of
the beholder".  People can be and often are (I often am) mistaken about
what's really good or bad for them.  AND, as you admit,
> there is a notion of a "common good", that which is "good" to a whole
> community.  
So, I don't think that you have shown that "'moral' issues are clouded by
the issue of who is doing the determining" in a way that "scientific"
ones aren't.

> But, still, ALL these notions of good and evil have no bearing on factual,
> objective rightness/wrongness of the way the universe physically is.

Ahem.  Benefit and harm, good and evil, are *part of* the way the universe
physically is. (!)  (For example:  put your hand in a flame.  Now there is
a harm, which is part of the physical universe.)  And right and wrong are 
concepts that can be understood through reference to things about the 
physical universe (to wit:  an action is right in a situation iff it is
what the agent would do if rational, informed, and free).

			--Your friendly neighborhood "ethical naturalist",
				Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047
Don't hit that 'r' key!  Send any mail to this address, not the sender's.