jla@usl.UUCP (Joseph L Arceneaux) (01/28/85)
As this addresses many issues mentioned in net.abortion, I am also posting
this there. However, I believe this truly belongs under net.philosophy.
It seems to me that questions such as abortion and animal rights can easily be
settled once a moral framework is defined. Once a 'moral meterstick' is
determined, such issues need merely be measured against them. Of course the
hard part is agreeing on such a structure.
The only arguable difference between our species and the other animals on the
planet is that of intelligence, but that is a difference of degree, not kind.
(And I believe the difference in degree to be relatively small.) Hence, the
ONLY basis for assigning greater moral value to humans is quantity of intelli-
gence.
If we should place such a premium on that trait known as intelligence that we
give moral superiority to our species over the others on our planet, then we
must also give such MORAL superiority to those of our species who are most in-
telligent. Such an attitude, implemented into the legal system, would no
doubt be realized by such policies as denying less intelligent people the
right to procreate, by creating [many more] sperm banks to propogate the
'good' humans, etc., etc. a la '1984.' Also, one day computers may become
more 'intelligent' than ourselves. Will we then be willing to invest them
with moral superiority over us?
Finally, suppose that we use our intelligence to destroy ourselves and most of
our world. I think that in that event we would be the least moral of the
Earth's inhabitants.
So, as you can see, I don't at all believe that our intelligence inherrently
gives us a moral edge over the other creatures of the earth. what moral back-
ground should be used, but I may have said enough for one time. Also, I'd like
to get some feed back on this initial premise. It's just not clear at all to
me that our species is inherrently better than any other. All such ideas are,
I feel, just a form of prejudice resulting from our egocentricity. So with
reference to Andrew Koenig's (hope I got that right) "simple question," I cer-
tainly cannot see the difference (morally) between killing fetus' and killing
[non-human] animals.
Arguments to change my mind are welcomed.
--
Joseph Arceneaux
USL Computer Science Department
{akgua, ut-sally}!usl!jla
<all-purpose, generic disclaimer fits here>sher@rochester.UUCP (David Sher) (02/02/85)
This article bases its argument on the continuum of features between animals and humans. I know of two features humans have for which there is such a great quantitative difference between the average human and the nearest animal that it may be considered a qualitative difference. One is the ration between body mass and brain mass. The other is the ratio between metabolism and lifespan. I am not sure of the relevant statistics but at least for mammals, I believe these are reletively constant with the sole exception being human beings. -David Sher
rrizzo@bbncca.ARPA (Ron Rizzo) (02/08/85)
<Followup to Joseph Arcenaux>
But most writing on the human/animal difference assume an intelligence
difference in kind, not merely in degree, if they allow intelligence in
animals at all. Saying we are obliged to treat less intelligent humans
as less (than) human rests on an equivocation: the word intelligence is
used to mean alternately a capacity for thought & reason etc., OR the
greater use or development of such a capacity. Attempts to make intelli-
gence the basis of as strong a moral distinction as that usually drawn
between humans & animals (vs. say a desire for eugenics or a meritocracy)
have always concerned possession of the capacity, not its exercise, as
far as I know.
To emphasize this point: Alexander Marshak has studied paleolithic
(human) artifacts to extract by inference etc. as much information
about symbolic and cognitive abilities of early humankind as possible.
His conclusion: mind as human cognitive & symbol-making capacity (&
even in terms of specific skills) has remained constant for the last
40,000 years.
We can't know even by report what occurs in animal minds (if they have
"minds") for they lack language. Every attempt to demonstrate the exis-
tence of an "animal language" has been exploded in precisely the same
way: dolphins, chimpanzees, whales, or ants, for that matter, can learn
and use a system of "signals" (signs representing objects characterized
by proximity in time or space to those objects) but have never displayed
the ability to manipulate a system of "symbols" ("abstract" signs, or
representations of objects removed in time & space from those objects)
which is what (human) language is par excellence. However, this fact
does not seem to deter the "animal language" enthusiasts.
Human intelligence has been repeatedly & intimately linked to the nature
and powers of development of language by many scientists & philosophers.
Besides "animal language", the only other source for belief in animal
intelligence is the detailed observations of & thinking about animal
behavior by ethologists, who feel strongly moved to impute "drives" &
"emotions" to many species. I'm inclined to favor this attribution
since it's based on careful & considered observation. But it points
up the gap between thought & feeling on which the idea of "intelligence"
is based.
It certainly is interesting to speculate about human/animal differences
(or their lack), but given the contrary evidence that exists, it seems
a fruitless enterprise.
Regards,
Ron Rizzoellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (02/27/85)
>We can't know even by report what occurs in animal minds (if they have >"minds") for they lack language. Every attempt to demonstrate the exis- >tence of an "animal language" has been exploded in precisely the same >way... I fail to see what bearing an animal's language ability or intelligence has to do with its right to avoid the torture it recieves from humans. One fact seems clear to me -- that practically any cow or pig you are likely to find is fully capable of experiencing the most hideous pain that we humans can force them to submit to. That fact alone should indicate that animals should be treated with love, dignity, and respect. Oddly enough, philosophers and theologists rank among those most guilty of perpetuating the cruelty of humans towards their animal cousins. The egomaniacal, anthropocentric, and most un-Christ-like `Christian' dogma that denies souls to animals (and nonbelievers) perhaps had its origins in confining the object of human bloodlust to food (and enemies). It's not clear that this planet can or should support such primitive luxuries much longer. Recently I encountered a most enlightening book by Tom (?) Regan in the philosophy section at my local bookstore. Starting with Descartes, Mr. Regan rips through the classic arguments against animal rights. Along the way, he describes the gruesome beatings of dogs by Cartesian philosophers who were convinced of their belief that animals have no feelings. Perhaps we still need to kill animals for experimentation and for products required by our society. But if the huge amount of uninspired and pointless research aimed at producing `minimal publishable units' in other disciplines is any indication of the quantity of unnecessary suffering that is being experienced by laboratory animals, I'd suspect that research personnel could get by on fewer but more substantial experiments, and provide higher quality lives for their victims with the money they saved. Much has been said elsewhere about the excessive and unhealthy quantity of meat the is devoured in this country. Someday, we may cease to be, (borrowing from Stanislaw Lem) a world of necrophiliacs. But first we must at least admit the possibility that the coinhabitants of this planet are as capable of suffering as we are, and that we have no more `right' to happiness than anything else in this world. -michael
jla@usl.UUCP (Joseph L Arceneaux) (03/01/85)
The thing about language in [other] animals is that it's existence (I
grant that there is much discussion about the exact nature of languages in
animals, but for my part, it is obvious that such a capability exists)
is further evidence that [other] animals are not so different than us [humans]
after all. There are certainly chimpanzees who would be infinitely more
interesting conversationalists than a large subset of humanity.
All this aside, I wholeheartedly agree with Michael that animals certainly
can feel pain as well as humans, and I cannot see why it can be wrong to
inflict such discomfort upon humans and not other animals. To extend this
into more contorversial terms, I see no reason why, if it's OK to use animals
for experimentation, humans should not also be used.
The only reason for such distinguishments is, I believe, a form of chauvinism
on the part of humans.
--
Joseph Arceneaux
USL Computer Science Department
{akgua, ut-sally}!usl!jla
"I'm sorry, but my kharma just ran over your dogma."jim@ISM780B.UUCP (03/09/85)
>All this aside, I wholeheartedly agree with Michael that animals certainly >can feel pain as well as humans, and I cannot see why it can be wrong to >inflict such discomfort upon humans and not other animals. To extend this >into more contorversial terms, I see no reason why, if it's OK to use animals >for experimentation, humans should not also be used. Look, it is wrong if you think it is wrong. I don't mind stepping on ants, but I get sqeamish about the slaughter of doe-eyed baby seals. I think partly this is an irrational biologically determined reaction based on characteristics similar to baby humans, and partly I worry about the reduced distance from killing human beings given other people's overcoming of these biological reactions and the political atmosphere. >The only reason for such distinguishments is, I believe, a form of chauvinism >on the part of humans. I believe we extend our morality to those with whom we empathize. It's like Southern hospitality; it doesn't apply to easy riding longhairs. Morality is a survival mechanism selected for in the human creature. Since humans are a social species, some of their survival characteristics are group rather than individual characteristics. This is the reason "survival of the fittest" is such a deep misunderstanding of natural selection (Darwin certainly didn't use the term). -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)