[net.philosophy] Redefining free will

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/05/85)

> Are we going to do this again? The existence of free will does not imply
> the existence of a soul, or a ``me trapped inside the body''.  Certainly
> there are lots of dualists who belive in free will. But there are a lot
> of materialists as well who have the same notion.  [LAURA CREIGHTON]

Are we going to do this again?  In recent discussions with Paul Torek,
I've been trying to explain that the concept of free will as it is
commonly defined DIRECTLY IMPLIES the notion of a soul or external agent.
To be truly *free* to make any "decision", the agent of choice MUST be
outside of the realm of cause and effect, external to the physiochemical
makeup of the brain and body.

If, as Paul Torek does, you claim that something along the lines of
rational evaluative analytical capabilities do exist, I'd be inclined
to agree (as I have done with Paul), but that's not the same as free will.
True freedom has nothing to do with rational evaluative capabilities.
True freedom would involve the ability to make decisions independent of
ANY external physical cause, INCLUDING the rational evaluative processes.
If one is truly free, one is truly free to choose either rationality or
irrationality at will, and not simply based on making a rational choice.

Since this is somewhat outside the realm of religion proper and more in the
realm of philosophy, and since discussions have been going on for a while
now in net.philosophy, I'd recommend that further discussion be carried on
there.  (Do you see how that was done, "charley"?)
-- 
Life is complex.  It has real and imaginary parts.
					Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

tdh@frog.UUCP (T. Dave Hudson) (03/08/85)

I presume that the original argument on free will came from the
hypostasization of cause and effect in some alleged deity and the
question of that deity's control over human actions.  Then it is
consistent, denying the existence of any such deity, to claim that
free will can exist and that nothing is outside of cause and effect.

To argue that there might be something outside of cause and effect
that is somehow related to our conciousness is so far from the
common understanding of the word "free" that the expression "free
will" as it is commonly interpreted in philosophy should be replaced
with something suitable to what is being discussed.  The discussion
of free will could then return to the question of the existence of
some superbeing controlling human beings, if it were worthwhile, or
of some being controlling another's mind (to distinguish free will
from freedom).

I'd also like to see the range of will discussed separately from its
freedom, except where there are controlling agents within the range.

The future is what we make it.

					David Hudson

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/12/85)

> To argue that there might be something outside of cause and effect
> that is somehow related to our conciousness is so far from the
> common understanding of the word "free" that the expression "free
> will" as it is commonly interpreted in philosophy should be replaced
> with something suitable to what is being discussed.  The discussion
> of free will could then return to the question of the existence of
> some superbeing controlling human beings, if it were worthwhile, or
> of some being controlling another's mind (to distinguish free will
> from freedom).  [DAVID HUDSON]

The notion of free will is independent of any notions of deity.  The
implication is not "If we don't have free will, some superbeing does;
thus if we don't have such a superbeing, we can have free will".  The
possibility exists that there is neither free will in ourselves nor is
there free will in a deity (if it existed---interesting question:
Is it possible that we don't have free will, but that god doesn't either?)
(If, of course, there is such an animal.)

As Schopenhauer said:  "A man can do what he wants to, but he cannot want
what he wants to."  If he could, that would be free will.  As long as
we are not free to want what we want to want, as long as that wanting is
controlled by something, we have no free will.

tdh@frog.UUCP (T. Dave Hudson) (03/14/85)

>> To argue that there might be something outside of cause and effect
>> that is somehow related to our conciousness is so far from the
>> common understanding of the word "free" that the expression "free
>> will" as it is commonly interpreted in philosophy should be replaced
>> with something suitable to what is being discussed.  The discussion

>From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff)
>As Schopenhauer said:  "A man can do what he wants to, but he cannot want
>what he wants to."  If he could, that would be free will.  As long as
>we are not free to want what we want to want, as long as that wanting is
>controlled by something, we have no free will.

"Controlled" by something?? :-)  How much time do you think people
would squander discussing the traditional "free will" if instead it
were called "absurd will" (to try to pick a suitable term)?

					David Hudson

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/16/85)

>>>To argue that there might be something outside of cause and effect
>>>that is somehow related to our conciousness is so far from the
>>>common understanding of the word "free" that the expression "free
>>>will" as it is commonly interpreted in philosophy should be replaced
>>>with something suitable to what is being discussed.  The discussion

>>From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff)
>>As Schopenhauer said:  "A man can do what he wants to, but he cannot want
>>what he wants to."  If he could, that would be free will.  As long as
>>we are not free to want what we want to want, as long as that wanting is
>>controlled by something, we have no free will.

> "Controlled" by something?? :-)  How much time do you think people
> would squander discussing the traditional "free will" if instead it
> were called "absurd will" (to try to pick a suitable term)?
> 					David Hudson

But it's not, is it?  In fact, to be truly free, one has to be free to be
absurd.  The "controlled by something" means controlled by the biophysics
of our own bodies and environments.
-- 
Otology recapitulates phonology.
					Rich Rosen    ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

tdh@frog.UUCP (T. Dave Hudson) (03/17/85)

>From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff)
>In fact, to be truly free, one has to be free to be absurd.

In other words, to be truly free one has to be free not to be. :-)

					David Hudson

zmk04@udenva.UUCP (zmk04) (04/07/85)

> >From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff)
> >In fact, to be truly free, one has to be free to be absurd.
> 
> In other words, to be truly free one has to be free not to be. :-)
> 
> 					David Hudson

*** REPLACE THIS MESS WITH YOUR LINEAGE ***

But, "half a bee, philosophically, must ipso facto half not be.
But, half the bee has got to be, vis-a-vis its entity, you see?
But, can a bee be said to be or not to be an entire bee
If half the bee is not a bee due to some ancient injury?"

--Monty Python's Flying Circus

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Dr. Emmanuel Wu) (04/09/85)

> > >From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff)
> > >In fact, to be truly free, one has to be free to be absurd.
> > 
> > In other words, to be truly free one has to be free not to be. :-)
> > 
> > 					David Hudson
> 
> *** REPLACE THIS MESS WITH YOUR LINEAGE ***
> 
> But, "half a bee, philosophically, must ipso facto half not be.
> But, half the bee has got to be, vis-a-vis its entity, you see?
> But, can a bee be said to be or not to be an entire bee
> If half the bee is not a bee due to some ancient injury?"
> 
> --Monty Python's Flying Circus    [udenva!zmk04]

Someone sell this man a fish license!  (Semi-carnally?)
-- 
Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen.
					Rich Rosen    pyuxd!rlr