esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (02/13/85)
[Will the real Humpty Dumpty please sit down] From: Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr > Again, you assume that because you use the rational path (e.g., rather than > the biochemically instinctive path), employing what you call rational > evaluation, you are engaging in acts of "free will". But you are no freer > to "choose" a rational path than you are to "choose" a biochemically > "instinctive" path: whatever path of "reasoning" (or non-reasoning) that is > taken is based on your chemical makeup. You *are* freer to choose a rational path (given that you do choose one) than those who take an instinctive path are to "choose" that path, because you can represent the options and evaluate them. Simply put: rational actions are chosen; instinctive ones aren't (unless part of a larger context in which rationality operates: I rationally choose to "let myself go" sometimes). > You make a distinction between them (and there IS a difference in the > methods AND [sometimes] the results), but they are functionally equivalent. What you say in the parentheses, amounts to an admission that they are NOT functionally equivalent! > they are BOTH chemical methods that produce (hopefully) optimum survival > results. You choose to make a black-and-white distinction. It is more > of a continuous spectrum. Some organisms have minimal (even biochemical) > means of making decisions. Some have more. Supposedly, we have the most > advanced decision making mechanism. But that's not the same as free will > just because you say it is. No, it's the same as free will just because the term means "having a certain type of advanced decision making mechanism". I do think that human reason has qualitiative advantages over most other animals', but if not, the difference of free will between us and them is just one of degree. >> Apparently you and Sargent are suffering from attachment to a paradigm (in >> the ordinary sense, not T.S. Kuhn's) of free will as some mysterious "ghost >> in the machine" with the ability to make decisions ex nihilo. > But the very notion of free will implies freedom to choose a decision path > regardless of one's surroundings, one's chemical make-up, etc. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ BULL MANURE!! The "very notion" implies no such thing. Your paradigm of free will does, and you are confusing your paradigm with the "very notion". Compare your statement above with: "But the very notion of free will implies an ability to choose regardless of any ghost-in-the-machine". What makes your statement any more plausible than this? Is it because the whole idea of the "ghost in the machine" is that the ghost is supposed to be *you*? Ah, but -- you and I agree -- there is no ghost, and -- I contend -- the chemicals ARE *you*; to say "there's the chemicals of Rosen's brain" and to say "there's Rosen" are two ways of describing the same thing. Free will definitely does NOT mean an ability to choose regardless of the way one is, for then, who would be doing the choosing? Therefore, IF the chemicals are all there is to *you*, then your chemical make-up is NOT one of the things to include in your "regardless of" list. > Which, of necessity REQUIRES the "ghost in the machine", the external > agent. It is not a part of the definition, it is a consequence of it. Challenge: find an ordinary language user (not a philosopher, theologian, or such) whose use of the term 'free will' *logically implies* this "consequence". > I guess my "mistake" here is that I don't equivalence rational evaluative > capabilities with free will. Your argument has still given me no reason > to do so. Are you simply using a word or term the way you like ... Here's my argument again: >> Agency (having free will) consists in being able to choose among >> alternatives -- which raises the question how one chooses, and the >> answer is by evaluating alternatives. This in turn involves the use >> of reason, of having a conception of a norm and being disposed to >> adopt a consistent, best justified set of norms. Where's the hole in the argument? Is the problem that my definition does not capture all the connotations of the term? Probably not, but no helpful definition of a vague concept could. My definition *does* capture what's important about it -- the varieties of free will worth wanting. [Aside: _The varieties of free will worth wanting_ is the subtitle of Daniel Dennett's book _Elbow Room_ .] As Dennett points out, the concept of free will is "essentially" one we care about, i.e. it is something that is (supposed to be) worth wanting. > Rationality is a human-made description of a process. One can just as easily > say that rivers and rocks also behave rationally, though their mechanism for > "decision-making" is less elaborate than our own. No you can't. "Rational" has a narrower meaning than that. It may be a vague word, but you can't stretch it that far -- talk about Humpty-Dumpty-ism. > It seems ironic, Paul, that you, who castigated me for looking "too deep > to the root cause", now claim that it's invalid to say that things are the > same "at a very general level of description". You're misreading me on purpose, right? I did NOT castigate you for looking "too deep to the root cause", but rather for looking ONLY at the "root cause" when both high-level (macroscopic) and microscopic descriptions are accurate. I did NOT claim it's invalid to say things are the same at a very general level of description; I implied that it's wrong to *stop* there. If you want to reject a distinction -- as you wanted to reject my distinction of rationality between the processes in human brains and processes in rivers, etc. -- you must examine *all* levels of description. A distinction is valid if it is valid on *at least one.* > You cannot justify logic with logic. Yes you can. (By showing, e.g., that it is truth-preserving.) > ... You can only prove to them that they are wrong if 1) they accept > the foundations of logic, and 2) they accept the possibility that their > conclusions might be wrong, or erroneous, or based on faulty premises. Prove it "TO THEM"! If by that you mean "so that they accept it", then the fact that we can't prove anything to someone who doesn't use logic, doesn't show that we can't prove it. I can't prove anything "to" the severely brain-damaged either, but that's THEIR problem, not a problem with using logic to justify anything. > You cannot seem to look at a possibility of a system of belief outside > of reason and logic. If someone could reject reason completely, there would remain nothing answering the label "system of belief". There might remain at best a bare, structureless consciousness. > You are imputing quite a lot into Carroll's intentions > there: [he was] not trying to show that use of reason was not circular. Read again what I said (edited, but meaning unchanged): >> Carroll ... shows *not* that reason justifying reason is circular, but >> that reason is not a premise but rather the way of getting from premises >> to conclusions. My claim that he has not shown circularity is not equivalent to saying that he has shown absence of circularity. Absence of circularity can, however, be concluded from what he did show, by further (valid) argument. -- Occam's Razor: I traded it in for a Norelco. No more "gotcha"! Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Don't hit that 'r' key! Send any mail to this address, not the sender's.
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (02/13/85)
I am going to try a simpler version of Paul's argument. Rich can try to find the problem with this one. What is logically wrong wiht the assumption that ``free will'' [defined as the ability to make choices and thus self-determine certain events which have an effect on one's life] like ``language ability'' is a ``power'' that manifests itself in human beings during their lifetime? Why does there have to be a ``ghost in the machine'', or, alternately, no ability to effect changes by choice in one's life? That I started out as an undifferentiated cell zygote that did not have language ability does not mean that I had to stay that way -- why is ``free will'' any different? Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
rwh@aesat.UUCP (Russ Herman) (02/14/85)
>What is logically wrong with the assumption that ``free will'' [defined >as the ability to make choices and thus self-determine certain events >which have an effect on one's life] like ``language ability'' is a >``power'' that manifests itself in human beings during their lifetime? >... That I started >out as an undifferentiated cell zygote that did not have language ability >does not mean that I had to stay that way -- why is ``free will'' any >different? > >Laura Creighton >utzoo!laura When you say "I have language ability", that's a self-evident truth. When you say "I have brown [or whatever] hair", that's subject to consensual validation. But when you say "I have free will", that's like saying "I have a personal deity". You may *feel* that it's true. You may *believe* you behave *as if* it were true. But that doesn't necessarily *make* it true. -- ______ Russ Herman / \ {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!aesat!rwh @( ? ? )@ ( || ) The opinions above are strictly personal, and ( \__/ ) do not reflect those of my employer (or even \____/ possibly myself an hour from now.)
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (02/23/85)
>What is logically wrong with the assumption that ``free will'' [defined >as the ability to make choices and thus self-determine certain events >which have an effect on one's life] like ``language ability'' is a >``power'' that manifests itself in human beings during their lifetime? There is nothing "logically wrong" with it, but you have completely and utterly begged the question. What does "the ability to make choices" mean? What does "self-determine" mean? Does "self" refer to a complex biological machine, or to a "will" independent of same, or to both? There are clearly biological machines which perform complex actions which reflect at least to some degree their initial makeup, growth patterns, and environmental influences. Some people argue that is not all that is involved, and that the other part is "free will". Some argue that is all that is involved, and there is no free will. And others argue that is all that is involved, but there is free will anyway. I argue that the degree to which one has free will is the degree to which causal factors for specific behavior cannot be located (the fact that they exist is irrelevant). In other words, I have free will as long as you cannot prove to me otherwise. But if you can predict my behavior in a given area and I find myself unable to avoid the prediction, then I will recognize lack of free will in that area. Free will is a sensation, not some absolute measurable characteristic. Since free will cannot be defined in a way such that it can be detected, but people don't understand this, they keep foolishly arguing about whether it exists. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (02/26/85)
What I thought Rosen was saying was that the notion of free will is linked to the notion of ``soul'' -- an ephemeral, non-physical ``self'' that is not influenced by physical things. This isn't what I thought that Torek was talking about. I think that the 2 concepts are distinct. I also thought that Rosen implied that one had to freely choose to have free will -- something which I do not think Torek ever implied. I think that Torek implied that you are stuck (``condemned'' in Jean Paul Sartre's view) with freedom. I do not think that predictability (or lack of same) is the same as free will. For instance, it would be very easy for someone who knows me to predict that I will do laundry on Sundays -- I always do it then. However, I don't think that the predictability of this action means that I am not free to do laundry some other day or to not do laundry and wear dirty clothes. It may be meaningful to say that I am not free to buy new clothes and thus never do laundry nor wear dirty clothes (since I cannot afford this) or that I am not free to go to work nude (since I would face imprisonment) -- but that the probability is near 100% that I will do laundry Sunday does not seem to limit my freedom - as long as there are alternatives which I *could have chosen*. Are you saying that I could not have chosen otherwise but merely feel that I could have? Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/04/85)
> What I thought Rosen was saying was that the notion of free will > is linked to the notion of ``soul'' -- an ephemeral, non-physical > ``self'' that is not influenced by physical things. This isn't > what I thought that Torek was talking about. I think that the 2 > concepts are distinct. [LAURA CREIGHTON] Quite right. Paul and I are in fact describing two different phenomena. I have contended that the phenomena he describes has little or nothing to do with "free will" except in that he gives it that same name. > I also thought that Rosen implied that one had to freely choose to > have free will -- something which I do not think Torek ever implied. > I think that Torek implied that you are stuck (``condemned'' in > Jean Paul Sartre's view) with freedom. I neither said nor implied any such thing. Besides, to be able to freely choose (?) to have free will, one would have to HAVE free will. The very fact that you ARE "stuck" with "freedom" (i.e., the decision making apparatus that determines, based on any number of internal and external factors) makes true free will impossible. > I do not think that predictability (or lack of same) is the same as > free will. For instance, it would be very easy for someone who knows me > to predict that I will do laundry on Sundays -- I always do it then. However, > I don't think that the predictability of this action means that I am not > free to do laundry some other day or to not do laundry and wear dirty > clothes. It may be meaningful to say that I am not free to buy new > clothes and thus never do laundry nor wear dirty clothes (since I cannot > afford this) or that I am not free to go to work nude (since I would > face imprisonment) -- but that the probability is near 100% that I > will do laundry Sunday does not seem to limit my freedom - as long as > there are alternatives which I *could have chosen*. Are you saying that > I could not have chosen otherwise but merely feel that I could have? The question really is: given what you are at a given moment, and given your external influencing environment, it is predictable (though human beings may themselves not have all the variables and information to do such predicting) what action you will take. One variable in the equation is that you "always" do laundry on Sundays. Another may be that you have an event to go to this Sunday that will take all day, and you don't have a thing to wear at this late date. Another may be that it's raining, or you're ill, or you want to watch Berlin Alexanderplatz and it's only showing this Sunday and you have to spend the whole day watching it. Insert all those (and probably many many more) into the equation to get the "predictable" answer. From our perspective, such an equation may be unsolvable. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/04/85)
> What I thought Rosen was saying was that the notion of free will > is linked to the notion of ``soul'' -- an ephemeral, non-physical > ``self'' that is not influenced by physical things. This isn't > what I thought that Torek was talking about. I think that the 2 > concepts are distinct. [LAURA CREIGHTON] Quite right. Paul and I are in fact describing two different phenomena. I have contended that the phenomena he describes has little or nothing to do with "free will" except in that he gives it that same name. > I also thought that Rosen implied that one had to freely choose to > have free will -- something which I do not think Torek ever implied. > I think that Torek implied that you are stuck (``condemned'' in > Jean Paul Sartre's view) with freedom. I neither said nor implied any such thing. Besides, to be able to freely choose (?) to have free will, one would have to HAVE free will. The very fact that you ARE "stuck" with "freedom" (i.e., the decision making apparatus that determines, based on any number of internal and external factors) makes true free will impossible. > I do not think that predictability (or lack of same) is the same as > free will. For instance, it would be very easy for someone who knows me > to predict that I will do laundry on Sundays -- I always do it then. However, > I don't think that the predictability of this action means that I am not > free to do laundry some other day or to not do laundry and wear dirty > clothes. It may be meaningful to say that I am not free to buy new > clothes and thus never do laundry nor wear dirty clothes (since I cannot > afford this) or that I am not free to go to work nude (since I would > face imprisonment) -- but that the probability is near 100% that I > will do laundry Sunday does not seem to limit my freedom - as long as > there are alternatives which I *could have chosen*. Are you saying that > I could not have chosen otherwise but merely feel that I could have? The question really is: given what you are at a given moment, and given your external influencing environment, it is predictable (though human beings may themselves not have all the variables and information to do such predicting) what action you will take. One variable in the equation is that you "always" do laundry on Sundays. Another may be that you have an event to go to this Sunday that will take all day, and you don't have a thing to wear at this late date. Another may be that it's raining, or you're ill, or you want to watch Berlin Alexanderplatz and it's only showing this Sunday and you have to spend the whole day watching it. Insert all those (and probably many many more) into the equation to get the "predictable" answer. From our perspective, such an equation may be unsolvable. -- Life is complex. It has real and imaginary parts. Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/05/85)
When you start looking at physical laws, though, you are left with things which, at some point, have no explanation. Why do you get a liquid when you mix the 2 gases hydrogen and oxygen? No matter how much chemistry you tell me I can say ``why?'' until you are backed up against teh wall and forced to say (shout in frustration) ``because that is the way the universe works!!''. From one perspective, Special Relativity looks like a kludge -- a bag -- stuck on the edge of the nice perfect model of Neutonian physics. Why do particles behave differently at high speeds than at low speeds? Why is the speec of light that precise value and no other? Why is *that* value Plank's constant? Why is there a universe at all? Because, you know, the universe works that way.... I know that you are insistent that the existence of free will implies a soul. I think that you are insistent that ``if all the relevant facts were collected then it would be possible to predict the actions of any given individual and thus demonstrate that they were not really free at all''. This assumes that the complexity of an organism has nothing to do with it predictability, but only with the difficulty in obtaining all the relevant facts. You may be correct in this, but, on the other hand, is it really a stranger, or less plausible notion that out of complexity arises real (as in cannot be predicted by anyone, even a theoretical someone who could obtain all the facts and understand them) freedom? Is this notion any ``stranger'' than the notion that matter and energy are the same? or that space and time are not independent? Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/07/85)
> When you start looking at physical laws, though, you are left with > things which, at some point, have no explanation. Why do you get > a liquid when you mix the 2 gases hydrogen and oxygen? No matter > how much chemistry you tell me I can say ``why?'' until you are > backed up against teh wall and forced to say (shout in frustration) > ``because that is the way the universe works!!''. And the only way that this is NOT considered a viable answer (once a truly ultimate level has been reached---if indeed it can be) is if one ASSUMES that there MUST be some intent to it all, that there MUST be some force of direction and purpose associated with the action. > From one perspective, > Special Relativity looks like a kludge -- a bag -- stuck on the edge > of the nice perfect model of Neutonian physics. Why do particles behave > differently at high speeds than at low speeds? Why is the speec of light > that precise value and no other? Why is *that* value Plank's constant? > Why is there a universe at all? Because, you know, the universe works > that way.... Exactly. Perhaps some-"where" else, another universe works another way. So? > I know that you are insistent that the existence of free will implies a soul. By implication of the definition. > I think that you are insistent that ``if all the relevant facts > were collected then it would be possible to predict the actions of > any given individual and thus demonstrate that they were not really > free at all''. This assumes that the complexity of an organism has > nothing to do with it predictability, but only with the difficulty > in obtaining all the relevant facts. "Predictability" is not a facet or feature of an object or organism. The notion of an object's predictability only has relevance in relation to an observer doing/attempting some sort of predicting. *Its* "complexity" is not the issue, but rather the complexity of it as situated in its surrounding universe. > You may be correct in this, but, on the other hand, is it really a > stranger, or less plausible notion that out of complexity arises real > (as in cannot be predicted by anyone, even a theoretical someone who > could obtain all the facts and understand them) freedom? Is this > notion any ``stranger'' than the notion that matter and energy are > the same? or that space and time are not independent? No, it's not. But, again, all you have to do is redefine freedom to get your answer in the form that you want it. -- "It's a lot like life..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (03/09/85)
>When you start looking at physical laws, though, you are left with >things which, at some point, have no explanation. Why do you get >a liquid when you mix the 2 gases hydrogen and oxygen? No matter >how much chemistry you tell me I can say ``why?'' until you are >backed up against teh wall and forced to say (shout in frustration) >``because that is the way the universe works!!''. All this behavior is derivable from some (not necessarily discovered) unified field theory. >From one perspective, >Special Relativity looks like a kludge -- a bag -- stuck on the edge >of the nice perfect model of Neutonian physics. Why do particles behave >differently at high speeds than at low speeds? This is a very shallow view of physics. Particles most certainly do not "act differently" at high and low speeds. The behavior of particles is different at low and high speeds *relative to Newtonian predictions*, because the Newtonian model is wrong. Newtonian physics is an inaccurate model which is close to reality at low speeds and far from reality at speeds near c, just as y=x is a much better approximation to y=x*x for values near zero than it is for values far from zero. >Why is the speec of light >that precise value and no other? Why is *that* value Plank's constant? >Why is there a universe at all? Because, you know, the universe works >that way.... This is a semantic problem. Let us suppose the speed of light were a different value. Then what would your question be? The same. Suppose there were no universe at all? Then you would not be asking the question. The point is that "person asking why universe exists" => universe exists. In universes in which the speed of light is c, the speed of light is c. There is no implication that there are no universes with different values, or that there are no absenses of universes, whatever that may mean. It is tautological that the primitive parameters of this universe are what they are. It is tautological that the universe exists, otherwise the "word" "would" "have" "no" "definition". This same approach applies to lottery winners and in other cases of "synchronicity". "Why was I so lucky as to have won all this money? God must be smiling on me". Nope; someone had to win, it happened to be you, and to think that makes you special beyond the mere circumstance of winning is egocentric. One argument that has been put forth for the existence of life on other planets is "Why, out of all the universe, should we have been singled out?" But, if the statistical odds of life arising were very very low (which I don't believe), then *of course* it would arise on those planets where people end up standing around and talking about it. If this doesn't click for you, then you probably got the coins in the drawers problem wrong too. >I know that you are insistent that the existence of free will implies >a soul. I wish people would stop talking this way with words they have not defined. > I think that you are insistent that ``if all the relevant facts >were collected then it would be possible to predict the actions of >any given individual and thus demonstrate that they were not really >free at all''. First, quantum mechanics argues that all the relevant facts aren't sufficient. The multiple worlds view allows infinite futures from a given state. Second, please define "free" in a way that isn't dependent upon your assumptions about whether freedom exists. >You may be correct in this, but, on the other hand, is it really a >stranger, or less plausible notion that out of complexity arises real >(as in cannot be predicted by anyone, even a theoretical someone who >could obtain all the facts and understand them) freedom? Is this >notion any ``stranger'' than the notion that matter and energy are >the same? or that space and time are not independent? I don't find the latter two notions strange, but I do find "strange" people talking about free choice without having demonstrated the agent of choice. And I see no relationship between complexity and freedom. Complex entities have complex behaviors. In my view, freedom is interesting in regard to human beings but not rocks because human beings go around talking and thinking about it. Most of these philosophical "problems" take on a completely new appearance when you recognize how completely inescapably enmeshed you are in the semantic net which *is* you/your mind/your soul. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/11/85)
No, the position that I was contrasting with Rich Rosen's is that free will is self-evident. If this is correct then it is falacy to go looking for an external ``cause'' for free will when it is not ``caused'' but simply *is*, in the same way that Plank's constant is. By making the assumption that free will has to be caused you will make one of 2 very great misses -- you will either invent a God or a soul which is responsible for the existence of free will, or you will say that because there is no God or soul then there is no free will. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
cooper@pbsvax.DEC (Topher Cooper HLO2-3/M08 DTN225-5819) (03/13/85)
> When you start looking at physical laws, though, you are left with > things which, at some point, have no explanation. Why do you get > a liquid when you mix the 2 gases hydrogen and oxygen? No matter > how much chemistry you tell me I can say ``why?'' until you are > backed up against teh wall and forced to say (shout in frustration) > ``because that is the way the universe works!!''. At least that is your ultimate answer if you are a ``scientismist'' (e.g., your stereotypical grade-school science teacher) rather than a scientist. If you're a scientist you say (probably without shouting) ``I don't know ... yet.'' This is one of the ways in which science differs from most religions. Topher Cooper USENET: ...{allegra,decvax,ihnp4,ucbvax}!decwrl!dec-rhea!dec-pbsvax!cooper ARPA/CSNET: cooper%pbsvax.DEC@decwrl
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/17/85)
If you are still working on ``I don't know'' then I haven't asked ``why'' enough, or you are evading that the answer is unknowable. Saying ``I don't know'' doesn't automatically get you off the hook -- the next question is ``Why don't you know?'' and if I can't get you to ``It is impossible to know the reason for that'' at some point, then I am doing a lousy job of arguing. Patient people would not shout, perhaps, but I know 2 five year olds fairly well. They are adept at ``why?'' and sooner or later drive *everybody* up the wall. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/19/85)
> If you are still working on ``I don't know'' then I haven't asked ``why'' > enough, or you are evading that the answer is unknowable. Saying ``I don't > know'' doesn't automatically get you off the hook -- the next question is > ``Why don't you know?'' and if I can't get you to ``It is impossible to > know the reason for that'' at some point, then I am doing a lousy job > of arguing. "Why don't we know?" you ask. Perhaps because all the information is not available to us, owing to perceptions that you yourself have stated are limited in scope and capability. Is it any wonder that we don't know everything? Isn't it wonderful that, through broadening our avenues of perception, we do keep learning more? (And if you say "but how do we know our perceptions and analyses are valid?" I'll answer with silence, since to ask such a question is to have perceived and analyzed, and if such perception and analysis is faulty, it's pointless to answer such a question...) > Patient people would not shout, perhaps, but I know 2 > five year olds fairly well. They are adept at ``why?'' and sooner or > later drive *everybody* up the wall. Ah, yes, childlike faith. Faith that there's an ultimate "parent"/protector over everything. Faith based on wishful thinking and desires. (Remember, I'm talking about the children here, but of course I recall someone being proud to make erroneous judgments of the world as children do.) -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/20/85)
Rich, Rich, you keep missing it. There are some things that we do not know because we don't have enough information (but we might get it some day). There are other things that it is simply impossible to ever know. The assumption that ``all things are knowable'' (if not at the present time, then at least in some possible future time) is as much an act of faith as anything else. Do tell me what knowledge you will need to know before you can tell me why we have a law of gravity at all? Saying that asking why to such a fact presupposes a creator will not wash -- what you are saying is that ``the universe is that way and it does not have to justify itself'' which is okay as an answer, but also what I was saying earlier. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/23/85)
> you keep missing it. There are some things that we do not know because > we don't have enough information (but we might get it some day). There > are other things that it is simply impossible to ever know. The assumption > that ``all things are knowable'' (if not at the present time, then at > least in some possible future time) is as much an act of faith as anything > else. [LAURA] Gee, this is funny. Am I assuming that "all things are knowable" (I never said that) when I refer to things we don't have enough information about? Or are YOU assuming something when you *assert* that there ARE (!!!) some things that it IS simply IMPOSSIBLE to ever know? I don't know if that's true, so I keep seeking and learning. You assume that it is true, so what do you do? Do you stop at a certain point and say "the rest I will picture the way I like because we can NEVER know this?" It's funny because you're doing exactly what I've been accusing so many others of doing. Looks like you're not that different, and perhaps your belief systems should be classified with the same name. :-? > Do tell me what knowledge you will need to know before you can tell me > why we have a law of gravity at all? Saying that asking why to such a > fact presupposes a creator will not wash -- what you are saying is that > ``the universe is that way and it does not have to justify itself'' > which is okay as an answer, but also what I was saying earlier. The answer does not only wash, it cleans and brightens and softens as well. I'm not seeking a justification or reason for the way the universe is, precisely because I don't assume that it was designed to be that way. We have no reason to speculate on design plans or reasons here. Unless we assume a designer. -- "When you believe in things that you don't understand, you'll suffer. Superstition ain't the way." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/24/85)
Rich, I think that you have a heirarchical notion of desires. For instance, I could be a basically angry person, and ``choose'' to not be angry, but I could not choose to ``not want to be angry'', or if I could, I could not ``choose to choose to not want to be angry'' at some point. The problem is, though, that I do not think that I store things in my brain in such a heirarchical fashion. I think that I can change any of the things out there, not by referring to some ``higher'' or ``more basic level'' that wants changes (either in the traditional sense of want, or the sense that you claim rocks change), but more or less by just doing it. You also seem to assume that I don't think that animals have free will. I don't know where you go that notion. I think that animals have free will as well, though I am not so sure about the brainless ones. I think that the ability to think in concepts gives man a tremedous advantage in exercising free will over animals who either do not have this ability or have it in a more limited way, but that is not what I think you have me saying. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/24/85)
From Rich Rosen: Gee, this is funny. Am I assuming that "all things are knowable" (I never said that) when I refer to things we don't have enough information about? No, when you are referring to those things, you are not (necessarily) assuming that. What I am assuming is that there are certain things which are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant *this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable. There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't ever know it. Or are YOU assuming something when you *assert* that there ARE (!!!) some things that it IS simply IMPOSSIBLE to ever know? I don't know if that's true, so I keep seeking and learning. You assume that it is true, so what do you do? Ah, I get to stop wasting my time with a certain class of questions. Do you stop at a certain point and say "the rest I will picture the way I like because we can NEVER know this?" Sure I do. All the time. The thing to remember is that I have yet to meet a single person who does not do this. What I do not ever lose track of is that these things are things that I have modelled, rather than things that I know are true. So far I haven't needed to build a model of why there is gravity at all -- but I have had to build models of other things. It's funny because you're doing exactly what I've been accusing so many others of doing. Looks like you're not that different, and perhaps your belief systems should be classified with the same name. :-? Looks like you are back to being omniscient and knowing what I am doing again. Before you go out and claim this again, I think that you had better get a better understanding of what it is that I am doing. I am not claiming that any models I build are true in some absolute sense. I don't even have any firm opinions about the existence of ``absolute truth''. What I do claim is that my models are useful for getting something done. Almost all of the time this implies that my models have to be consistent with reality as I perceive it. There are times, though, when even that does not apply. If I am debugging circuit boards I catch myself thinking that ``the current goes along here, and then down there'' and so on and so forth. Thinking that ``the electrons vibrate'' is more consistent with reality as I perceive it, but even that is a model. Electrons aren't things. Shall I try to think of them as locuses for particular behaviour? Better, but shucks, it just isn't incredibly useful. I am willing to put up with inaccuracies for the sake of utility. This brings one back to Byron Howes on religion. Suppose you consider all religions as models of reality which people use to get things done. The question then is, why do people pick different religions? Presumably because they want to get different things done -- or the same thing done in different ways. Inherant in certain religions is the belief that ``This is the ONE and ONLY religion which is TRUE in the ABSOLUTE SENSE''. Other religions do not have this belief. I do not think that you have ever grasped the implications of this, or you would not be asking me if I go out and ``believe whatever I would like'' -- because in a very real sense I have been claiming that *everybody* does this *all* of the time. This is another aspect of the Christian/Materialist debates which others (including Christians such as Byron Howes) may find ludicrous. Certain Christians are claiming the absolute truth of the existence of God and the Bible. You deny the absolute truth of this (or at least, that they have demonstrated this to be the absolute truth). But you are *both* wedded to your idea of an absolute truth -- there is one, and it is important to know whether God is a part of it or not. Since this is one assumption that I do not make except when it suits me (rememeber your search for assumptions, Rich) I find the whole thing rather unusual. The answer does not only wash, it cleans and brightens and softens as well. I'm not seeking a justification or reason for the way the universe is, precisely because I don't assume that it was designed to be that way. We have no reason to speculate on design plans or reasons here. Unless we assume a designer. Rich, you lose. I can speculate on anything I like without assuming a designer. Why does my cat have blue eyes? Getting an answer to that does not necessarily assume a designer -- to understand that one requires knowledge of genetics. We have wonderful reasons to speculate reasons for why the universe is a certain way -- this is exactly how one goes about learning anything. What you are saying is ``unless oen assumes a designer, one is not likely to get any answer to such questions''. Right. The answers to such questions are unknowable. There may even *be* no answers to such a question. Now you have contradicted yourself. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura if you only believe in things that you understand, you'll *still* suffer -- and get killed by the first dangerous thing that you refuse to believe in becuse you don't understand it (yet).
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) (03/26/85)
>> Gee, this is funny. Am I assuming that "all things are >> knowable" (I never said that) when I refer to things we don't >> have enough information about? > No, when you are referring to those things, you are not (necessarily) > assuming that. What I am assuming is that there are certain things which > are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant > *this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is > there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions > whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable. > There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all > of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't > ever know it. "Seems clear" is an assumption, too. But remember that there is no answer to a "why" in the absence of a directed causative will. Thus to ask and to expect a certain answer is to be presumptive in the extreme. >> Or are YOU assuming something >> when you *assert* that there ARE (!!!) some things that it IS >> simply IMPOSSIBLE to ever know? I don't know if that's true, >> so I keep seeking and learning. You assume that it is true, so >> what do you do? > Ah, I get to stop wasting my time with a certain class of questions. You mean the "why" questions I was referring to above? For the same reasons? >> It's funny because you're doing exactly what I've been >> accusing so many others of doing. Looks like you're not that >> different, and perhaps your belief systems should be classified >> with the same name. :-? > Looks like you are back to being omniscient and knowing what I am doing again. > Before you go out and claim this again, I think that you had better get a > better understanding of what it is that I am doing. I am not claiming that > any models I build are true in some absolute sense. I don't even have any > firm opinions about the existence of ``absolute truth''. What I do claim is > that my models are useful for getting something done. Almost all of the > time this implies that my models have to be consistent with reality as I > perceive it. There are times, though, when even that does not apply. If > I am debugging circuit boards I catch myself thinking that ``the current > goes along here, and then down there'' and so on and so forth. Thinking that > ``the electrons vibrate'' is more consistent with reality as I perceive it, > but even that is a model. Electrons aren't things. Shall I try to think of > them as locuses for particular behaviour? Better, but shucks, it just > isn't incredibly useful. I am willing to put up with inaccuracies for the > sake of utility. "Camelot!" "It's only a model." You make a valid distinction here, but all words are just sounds and etchings that represent models of reality. Do they do so accurately or not is the question? Are they used erroneously? > This brings one back to Byron Howes on religion. Suppose you consider all > religions as models of reality which people use to get things done. The > question then is, why do people pick different religions? Presumably > because they want to get different things done -- or the same thing done in > different ways. Inherant in certain religions is the belief that ``This is > the ONE and ONLY religion which is TRUE in the ABSOLUTE SENSE''. Other > religions do not have this belief. I do not think that you have ever > grasped the implications of this, or you would not be asking me if I go > out and ``believe whatever I would like'' -- because in a very real sense > I have been claiming that *everybody* does this *all* of the time. Interesting notion about models. The questions then revolve around the erroneousness of certain dogmatic models. > This is another aspect of the Christian/Materialist debates which > others (including Christians such as Byron Howes) may find ludicrous. > Certain Christians are claiming the absolute truth of the existence > of God and the Bible. You deny the absolute truth of this (or at least, > that they have demonstrated this to be the absolute truth). But you are > *both* wedded to your idea of an absolute truth -- there is one, and it is > important to know whether God is a part of it or not. Since this is one > assumption that I do not make except when it suits me (rememeber your > search for assumptions, Rich) I find the whole thing rather unusual. There is a difference between the absolute truth and words we use to represent the absolute truth. By modeling our words and concepts more closely to reality instead of dogmatic assertion, by being flexible in receiving new hard information and acting on it, we achieve a better picture. By the way, is it an absolute truth that there's not absolute truth, Laura? >> The answer does not only wash, it cleans and brightens and >> softens as well. I'm not seeking a justification or reason for >> the way the universe is, precisely because I don't assume that >> it was designed to be that way. We have no reason to speculate >> on design plans or reasons here. Unless we assume a designer. > Rich, you lose. I can speculate on anything I like without assuming a > designer. Why does my cat have blue eyes? Getting an answer to that > does not necessarily assume a designer -- to understand that one requires > knowledge of genetics. We have wonderful reasons to speculate reasons for why > the universe is a certain way -- this is exactly how one goes about > learning anything. What you are saying is ``unless oen assumes a designer, > one is not likely to get any answer to such questions''. Right. The > answers to such questions are unknowable. There may even *be* no answers > to such a question. Now you have contradicted yourself. Laura, I win. Early in this whole discussion, the difference between how and why was discussed. The genetics you mention is a "how", not a why, as someone else pointed out. A "why" assumes a reason as chosen by a causative will of a designer. Only in the context of a universe assumed to have such a designer does such a question even mean anything. The "why" is not just "unknowable" in the absence of a designer, it's non-existent. All you'll get are "how"s. -- Life is complex. It has real and imaginary parts. Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
brian@digi-g.UUCP (Brian Westley) (03/27/85)
In article <5332@utzoo.UUCP> laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >...What I am assuming is that there are certain things which >are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant >*this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is >there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions >whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable. >There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all >of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't >ever know it. > >Laura Creighton 'They' used to say "We will never know what the surface of the moon is like" or "what the stars are made of" or "Man will never fly". And sure enough, the people who said these things never did. They never tried. Merlyn Leroy "...a dimension between stupidity and substance, between science and superficiality, a place we call...The Usenet Zone"
laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) (03/28/85)
"Seems clear" is an assumption, too. But remember that there is no answer to a "why" in the absence of a directed causative will. Thus to ask and to expect a certain answer is to be presumptive in the extreme. I don't think that a direct causitive will is implied. If somebody came up with a unified field theory, a fair number of ``whys'' could be answered. If the mechanics of universe creation were known, the answer to that ``why'' could be known as well, even if there is no directed causative will. There may be a reason for all of these but I just can't go off to a lab and build a few universes to test out any of my theories. This is too bad. Note that saying that these are ``hows'' doesn't change the problem. There are some ``hows'' which I can't know either. Again, this is too bad, but I am not going to lose sleep over it... Ah, I get to stop wasting my time with a certain class of questions. You mean the "why" questions I was referring to above? For the same reasons? I mean the why questions I brought up above, yes. But I don't think that I am not spending time on them for the same reasons. I don't care how presumptuous I am -- I just care about whether I can get any results. "Camelot!" "It's only a model." You make a valid distinction here, but all words are just sounds and etchings that represent models of reality. Do they do so accurately or not is the question? Are they used erroneously? Ah, ``erroneously'' is a funny word. Do you mean ``are they used to represent things that have no basis in reality''? I think not, or else you would have to reject ``the current goes down here'' as being erroneous. Do you mean that they ``are used in ways that are not useful?'' The problem with this definition is that what you find useful and what other people find useful may be entirely different. Do you mean ``are used by people who forget that they are models of reality and confuse them with reality itself?'' Gee, that is my position, but I brought this one up weeks ago and you were real upset when I accused you of mistaking your concepts with reality. What do you mean? Interesting notion about models. The questions then revolve around the erroneousness of certain dogmatic models. Again, what is ``erroneousness''? The confusion of a concept with reality again? This is another aspect of the Christian/Materialist debates which others (including Christians such as Byron Howes) may find ludicrous. Certain Christians are claiming the absolute truth of the existence of God and the Bible. You deny the absolute truth of this (or at least, that they have demonstrated this to be the absolute truth). But you are *both* wedded to your idea of an absolute truth -- there is one, and it is important to know whether God is a part of it or not. Since this is one assumption that I do not make except when it suits me (rememeber your search for assumptions, Rich) I find the whole thing rather unusual. There is a difference between the absolute truth and words we use to represent the absolute truth. By modeling our words and concepts more closely to reality instead of dogmatic assertion, by being flexible in receiving new hard information and acting on it, we achieve a better picture. By the way, is it an absolute truth that there's not absolute truth, Laura? Rich, go back and read. I did not say that there is no absolute truth. I did not say that there is one either. I hold no opinions on the subject. I use the notion of absolute truth when it suits me and I don't when it does not. The concept of absolute truth is another concept, and, as such I use it when I find it useful. Laura Creighton utzoo!laura
js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) (03/29/85)
> What I am assuming is that there are certain things which > are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant > *this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is > there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions > whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable. > There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all > of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't > ever know it. > Laura Creighton Just how do you decide if a given thing is unknowable? If you didn't know that it came out of a solution to Maxwell's equations, would you see "Why is the speed of light *this* value and not *that* one?" as another 'unknowable' question? How do you know that further advances in science won't answer questions which you now consider unknowable? -- Jeff Sonntag ihnp4!mhuxt!js2j "Parts is parts."-Jack the Ripper
mms1646@acf4.UUCP (Michael M. Sykora) (03/31/85)
One problem that may have been overlooked: How does one determine that one KNOWS that something is unknowable ???? Sorry to be so picky. Michael Sykora
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (04/03/85)
In article <721@mhuxt.UUCP> js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) writes: >> What I am assuming is that there are certain things which >> are not knowable. Why does the world exist? Why is Plank's constant >> *this* value and not *that* one? Why aren't there more stars? Why is >> there a force of gravity anyway? These are all examples of questions >> whose answers (ignoring direct revelation from God, say) are not knowable. >> There may be no reason for any of these. There may *be* a reason for all >> of these. But, whatever the answer is, it seems clear that we won't >> ever know it. >> Laura Creighton > > Just how do you decide if a given thing is unknowable? If you >didn't know that it came out of a solution to Maxwell's equations, would >you see "Why is the speed of light *this* value and not *that* one?" as >another 'unknowable' question? How do you know that further advances >in science won't answer questions which you now consider unknowable? Part of the problem here is that two *different* meanings of the question "why" are being used. The form used by scientists essentially asks "what set of circumstances caused/causes this?". The philosophical question is harder to paraphrase, at least without using the word "why", since it is questioning the inner meaning of the Universe. So the speed of light is "determined" by Maxwells equations, this is only the "scientific" why. It only moves the problem back step. Why are the parameters of Maxwell's equations what they are and not something else? Why do they take te form they do and not some other? In short you have *not* answered the *real* question being asked. It is *this* sort of why question that Laura is claiming is unanswerable, at least from the perspective of science. And she is right, because science has outlawed such questions. -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) {trwrb|allegra|cbosgd|hplabs|ihnp4|aero!uscvax!akgua}!sdcrdcf!psivax!friesen or {ttdica|quad1|bellcore|scgvaxd}!psivax!friesen
rlh@cvl.UUCP (Ralph L. Hartley) (04/16/85)
> You complained > about our being "wedded" to the idea of an absolute truth. It is > reasonable to assume that if you complain about such things, you don't > agree with the concept. Of course, obviously it depends what mood you > were in, whether or not you chose to believe in it at the moment of > reading/writing... I think what she is saying is not that she assumes that there is no absolute truth. She is saying that she dosn't assume that there is one. Just like you and god, no? As you were saying, in the absence of evidence for something you should not assume it exists. Of course the statement "there is no absolute truth" cannot be absolutely true, but that dosn't make it absolutely false either. After all the statement "this statement is false" (which logitions went to great trouble to eliminate frome discusion) is neither true nor false. At least not in any absolute sense. Ralph Hartley rlh@cvl