flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Walter Wego sponsor) (05/30/85)
Subject: please post net.philosophy s="OED vs. Rosen -- belated reply" [one '>' = Rich Rosen, two = Ellis, zero = me] > My point was and still is: the notion of free will as you describe it, > being free to engage in actions independent of any external or internal > interference, IMPLIES DIRECTLY some agent that is external to physical > cause and effect! IMPLIES DIRECTLY, meaning that it can be deduced > LOGICALLY from the premises of the definitions using the very same logical > reasoning you take as a given elsewhere! But the IMPLICATION doesn't hold, DIRECTLY or otherwise. > You ignored my points on "how can one have free will if one is not free > to 'choose' the experiences that happen in one's life, some truamatic, > that directly influence and in some cases control the way events > and phenomena are interpreted by the brain, stored, and used as a BASIS for > later decisions?" You ignored them completely. Why? I didn't IGNORE them, I just got saddled with a lot of other work at that time, and didn't keep up with the netnews. The OED article was one of the last things I posted before my lull. The article in which I reply to your points should already be out by the time you read this one. > I never claimed that the implications were imbedded in the definition! I > said that they were CONSEQUENCES of that definition. Oh really? I think your tune has changed. Time to peruse my archives of past articles... > (How can you be free to choose anything if the elements of choice and > decision are part of your physical make-up which is involved in the cause > and effect chain? {easy -- pt} Thus to have such a thing, you MUST have > something outside this chain... I repeat myself very unnecessaily. Indeed you do, since I've already refuted this argument before. But for the refutation of the latest version, see my most recent articles. ----------------------------- > Subject: Re: Ellis on my positions >> B) the belief that man's choices ultimately are or can be voluntary, and >> not determined by external causes >> [Rich Rosen's] argument seems to run, roughly: >> If you have free will, the `agent of choice' must either reside >> within the physical world, or without. >> 1)If the agent of choice resides within the physical universe, then it >> is just a bunch of chemicals. But chemicals have no power to decide >> which course they take: >> ...since their behavior is fully determined. { LATER AMENDED TO: } >> ...since their behavior is fully determined by biochemical equations >> up to quantum randomness, after which behavior is nondetermined >> rather than chosen by an agent.[Ellis] > Not "later amended to". I never implied a "fully determined state" at > any point. The word "determined" by the way, may erroneously imply some > form of "determiner", which I also find no reason to believe in.[Rosen] No; "determined" has no such implication, it means only "caused", plus the assumption that the causation is (contra QM) not inherently random. You must have been talking to an Objectivist -- they like to redefine words like "determinism". >> Rich, have I represented your arguments accurately? > Aside from the comment above, yup. Any comments from Mr. Torek? Yes: the inference to "chemicals have no power to decide which course..." from "their behavior is fully determined...", is a non-sequitur. --The developing iconoclast, Paul V. Torek, (soon at) umcp-cs!flink
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) (06/03/85)
> = Paul Torek >> = Rich Rosen >>> = Michael Ellis >>My point was and still is: the notion of free will as you describe it, >>being free to engage in actions independent of any external or internal >>interference, IMPLIES DIRECTLY some agent that is external to physical >>cause and effect! IMPLIES DIRECTLY, meaning that it can be deduced >>LOGICALLY from the premises of the definitions using the very same logical >>reasoning you take as a given elsewhere! > But the IMPLICATION doesn't hold, DIRECTLY or otherwise. It never ceases to amaze me that you, believing that logic proves its own veracity, consistently answer positing of logical arguments with assertions of "That's not true". If freedom involves a lack of dependence on other variables, especially in the area of choice, then the only way for choice not to be dependent on other variables is to be external to the "variable pool". That variable pool being the physical world. >>I never claimed that the implications were imbedded in the definition! I >>said that they were CONSEQUENCES of that definition. > Oh really? I think your tune has changed. Time to peruse my archives of > past articles... And I think you'll find from the start that I said that they WERE consequences of the definition. >>(How can you be free to choose anything if the elements of choice and >>decision are part of your physical make-up which is involved in the cause >>and effect chain? {easy -- pt} Oh, please. Another bold empty assertion in answer to an argument? Give me a break, please. >>Thus to have such a thing, you MUST have >>something outside this chain... I repeat myself very unnecessaily. > Indeed you do, since I've already refuted this argument before. This is Bickfordian. If it was so easy to refute the last time, do it again. I don't recall any such refutation of this either. If you can't, be an adult and admit that. >>> B) the belief that man's choices ultimately are or can be voluntary, and >>> not determined by external causes >>> [Rich Rosen's] argument seems to run, roughly: >>> If you have free will, the `agent of choice' must either reside >>> within the physical world, or without. >>> 1)If the agent of choice resides within the physical universe, then it >>> is just a bunch of chemicals. But chemicals have no power to decide >>> which course they take: >>> ...since their behavior is fully determined. { LATER AMENDED TO: } >>> ...since their behavior is fully determined by biochemical equations >>> up to quantum randomness, after which behavior is nondetermined >>> rather than chosen by an agent.[Ellis] >>Not "later amended to". I never implied a "fully determined state" at >>any point. The word "determined" by the way, may erroneously imply some >>form of "determiner", which I also find no reason to believe in.[Rosen] > No; "determined" has no such implication, it means only "caused", plus the > assumption that the causation is (contra QM) not inherently random. You > must have been talking to an Objectivist -- they like to redefine words > like "determinism". I didn't know you were an Objectivist, Paul, since you like to redefine words like "free will". :-) >>> Rich, have I represented your arguments accurately? >>Aside from the comment above, yup. Any comments from Mr. Torek? > Yes: the inference to "chemicals have no power to decide which course..." > from "their behavior is fully determined...", is a non-sequitur. Then what is their basis for making these "decisions"? -- "Ya dee apockety, rum fing f'doo. Ni, ni, ni, YOWWWWWWWWWW!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr