[net.philosophy] freedom != unpredictability -- reply to John Williams

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (06/10/85)

In <2558@decwrl.UUCP> williams@kirk.DEC (John Williams) writes:
> Furthermore, there is no
> probability  shown  that  the  popular definitions should change,
> meaning that you are participating in an exercise in futility.
>     And now for the clincher!  By defining words  very  rigidly,
> words  and phrases like free will, you are restricting the degree
> of  freedom  of  thought  and  communicatable  concepts [...]

Popular definitions almost certainly will change; many words have 
had their popular interpretations changed slowly over time.  (Of
course, that doesn't mean people will adopt clearer, more realistic
definitions of free will, but there's hope.)  I disagree also with
the assertion that defining words rigidly restricts communication --
it enhances communication, by improving specificity.  Instead of all
the confusion about "free will", we should define that term narrowly
(in terms, I suggest, of rational choice), and use "probability",
"acausality", "unpredictability", etc. when we mean those things.

>      So the universe will chug away on it's laws of physics in  a
> very  meticulous  and rigorous manner, but we will never know the
> initial state.  This is where the " if you knew enough " argument
> falls headlong into the dirt.
>      Thus, free will can be attributed  as  an  artifact  of  the
> unknown  origin.   

You are confusing "free will" with "unpredictability".  That's a common
mistake, but still a mistake.  Someone long ago (probably a religious
official) figured (wrongly) that freedom was incompatible with 
predictability, and we've been stuck with the association ever since.