[net.philosophy] Non sequitur about free will

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) (06/01/85)

I just witnessed (by accident) the tail end of a discussion between
Ray Smullyan and Mortimer Adler on Buckley's "Firing Line" program.
Adler concluded by talking about free will, and claiming that belief in free
will is impeded in so-called determinists because they fail to understand
the possibility of non-materialist non-causational "causes" for decisions.

It would seem that he is thus implying that free will requires a non-material,
non-"cause-and-effect"-al basis for our decisions.  One that I can only
surmise would be described as "external" to "our" (so-called) material
universe.  (Whatever "external to all things" means?----do we define the
material universe to be arbitrarily limited by our limits of observation, or
do we define it to mean EVERYTHING, thus debunking the whole notion of
"non-material", making the word "material" a redundancy?  What exactly
is this boundary between physical and non-physical, material and immaterial,
if not arbitrary anthropocentric ones, and if this is true what is the basis
for making them distinct?)

Are you listening, Mr. Torek?  It would seem that those who discuss free
will are talking in these terms precisely, contrary to your claims.  (Where
have YOU been, anyway?)

(Of course, Michael Ellis is out to smash causality in much the same way tht
religious rightists seek to smash "humanism"...   Oh well.)
-- 
Life is complex.  It has real and imaginary parts.
					Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (06/04/85)

In article <1039@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:
>
>I just witnessed (by accident) the tail end of a discussion between
>Ray Smullyan and Mortimer Adler on Buckley's "Firing Line" program.
>Adler concluded by talking about free will, and claiming that belief in free
>will is impeded in so-called determinists because they fail to understand
>the possibility of non-materialist non-causational "causes" for decisions.
>
>It would seem that he is thus implying that free will requires a non-
>material, non-"cause-and-effect"-al basis for our decisions.  

He didn't just imply that, he stated it in so many words.  (I saw the
same program.)  So, Adler agrees with you -- and you're both wrong.  Adler
gave no argument for his view on "Firing Line", as far as I could tell.
He gives some argument in his book, but not a convincing one.  But why
don't you read Adler (*Ten Phil. Mistakes*), and if you think his
arguments are sound, I'll try to find the holes in them.

>Are you listening, Mr. Torek?  It would seem that those who discuss free
>will are talking in these terms precisely, contrary to your claims.  

Not ALL of "those who discuss free will".  Daniel Dennett is an example
of someone who disagrees with Adler, and argues against Adler's position
(quite well, I might add!).  
--
The Aspiring Iconoclast himself.

ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (06/06/85)

>{Rich Rosen}

>I just witnessed (by accident) the tail end of a discussion between Ray
>Smullyan and Mortimer Adler on Buckley's "Firing Line" program.  Adler
>concluded by talking about free will, and claiming that belief in free will
>is impeded in so-called determinists because they fail to understand the
>possibility of non-materialist non-causational "causes" for decisions.
>It would seem that he is thus implying that free will requires a
>non-material, non-"cause-and-effect"-al basis for our decisions.  

    An acausal connecting principal -- seems I've encountered that before..

>One that I can only surmise would be described as "external" to "our"
>(so-called) material universe.  (Whatever "external to all things"
>means?----do we define the material universe to be arbitrarily limited by
>our limits of observation, or do we define it to mean EVERYTHING...
>.. thus debunking the whole notion of "non-material", making the word
>"material" a redundancy?

    Individual subjective experience is by definition external to
    the universe of science, since the scientific method involves
    by definition phenomena that are verifiable by independent
    observers.

    Materialists who point out that all subjective phenomena are in
    principle manifested by `chemical reactions' should note that,
    should weird quantum effects play a major role in the chemistry
    of human awareness, they are dealing with some fairly spooky
    chemicals.     

    Notably, the constituents of the chemicals behave `randomly'
    {leaving room for the agent to make a selection} and, apparently,
    in a way that thwarts reductionism. 

>What exactly is this boundary between physical and non-physical, material
>and immaterial, if not arbitrary anthropocentric ones, and if this is true
>what is the basis for making them distinct?)

     It seems clear to me that the objective and subjective realms are
     but two viewpoints of the same underlying phenomenon. Each view
     perceives its own kinds of things more clearly than the other.

     We keep them distinct because of the necessity of our situation.
     It is our `architecture' as human beings that cleaves the universe.

     SMASH CAUSALITY!!

-michael

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (06/08/85)

In article <293@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes:
>    Individual subjective experience is by definition external to
>    the universe of science, since the scientific method involves
>    by definition phenomena that are verifiable by independent
>    observers.

Does this mean that the social sciences aren't sciences?

mms1646@acf4.UUCP (Michael M. Sykora) (06/08/85)

>/* flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) /  6:27 pm  Jun  7, 1985 */

>>    Individual subjective experience is by definition external to
>>    the universe of science, since the scientific method involves
>>    by definition phenomena that are verifiable by independent
>>    observers.

>Does this mean that the social sciences aren't sciences?

No, it only limits them.

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) (06/13/85)

>     Materialists who point out that all subjective phenomena are in
>     principle manifested by `chemical reactions' should note that,
>     should weird quantum effects play a major role in the chemistry
>     of human awareness, they are dealing with some fairly spooky
>     chemicals.      [ELLIS]

*Should* they.  It would seem that you are putting your cart before your
horse.  In your neverending vigilant effort to smash causality, you propose
ideas that assume your conclusion.  You speak of "weird quantum play[ing]
a major role in the chemistry of human awareness" as if to say you WANT them
to in order that your conclusions will "come true".

>      SMASH CAUSALITY!!

Why?  I have to say that anyone whose view of the universe involves a desire
to destroy or promote a certain theory rather than seeking the truth about
things is not using science, reason, or logic, but personal preference to
define the universe.
-- 
Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen.
					Rich Rosen    pyuxd!rlr