[net.philosophy] Michael Eliis VS. Rich Rosen on Free Will

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) (06/13/85)

>     Third -- just what is the connection between the chemicals' `random
>     behavior' and the `agent of choice'? Blind insistence that such
>     randomness is the cause of the agent's choice, rather than the effect,
>     (or even something else..) seems most unconvincing to me.

Of course it does.  You already have a specific conclusion in mind.  That's
hardly an example of logical reasoning and rigorous scientific method to
understand the universe.

>>   2)	If the agent of choice does not reside in the physical world, then
>>it is an external agent...
>
>>{Furthermore a `ghost-in-the-machine', in turn, must have some
>> mechanism itself that causes it to decide, thus, it does not
>> have free will}
> 
>     This presupposes that all phenomena, even in a hypothetical universe,
>     must be reduceable to causal connections among mechanistic parts.
>  
>     Suppose that `in the non-physical universe' of the `ghost-in-the-machine',
>     agents have no `internal mechanisms'? Or if they do, that such mechanisms
>     do not fully `determine' the choice of the agent?

Describe what you mean by "non-physical universe".  I contend that such an
obliquely defined term has its basis in wishful thinking that leads to a
preconceived conclusion.  Where is the boundary between physical and non-
physical?  At the limits of human observation?  But that changes with each
generation, taking the microscope as an example of the alteration of that
boundary.  If not that boundary then what?  I contend "no boundary at all".
That which is simply is, and the desire to distinguish between a "physical"
and a "non-physical" is bogus in the extreme, seeking to prove a presumption
about what one desires in the "non-physical".

>     Rich has pointed out that one of the problems with Free Will is the
>     inability of its proponents to supply an adequate noncontradictory
>     definition. I concur with this criticism, and wish to add that existing
>     philosophical language seems to be unable to grasp known scientific
>     phenomena as well. 

On the contrary, I have pointed out that the definition as it stands directly
implies the whole "ghost in the machine" phenomenon.  What Torek has referred
to as rational evaluative capabilities I agree DOES exist, but that alone
doesn't qualify as the free will that people have been debating about for
centuries.

>     Many intuitive ideas force themselves upon us, not because they are
>     consistent with our flawed preconceptions of the universe, but because
>     they suggest a deeper truth than our language and philosophical
>     notions can capture. 
> 
>     Maybe `Free Will' is such an idea.
> 
>     SMASH CAUSALITY!!

Many such ideas are also rooted in wishful thinking.  "SMASH IRRATIONALITY!"
would seem a better cause to put exclamation points after.
-- 
"Wait a minute.  '*WE*' decided???   *MY* best interests????"
					Rich Rosen    ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr