ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (06/13/85)
>>{John Williams} >{Paul Torek} >> So the universe will chug away on it's laws of physics in a >> very meticulous and rigorous manner, but we will never know the >> initial state. This is where the " if you knew enough " argument >> falls headlong into the dirt. >> Thus, free will can be attributed as an artifact of the >> unknown origin. > >You are confusing "free will" with "unpredictability". That's a common >mistake, but still a mistake. Someone long ago (probably a religious >official) figured (wrongly) that freedom was incompatible with >predictability, and we've been stuck with the association ever since. Just to keep things straight -- it appears we have at least four views of `Free Will': John Williams: The universe is deterministic but unknowable due to lack of information about the universe's initial conditions. Free Will somehow somehow derives from this built-in lack of knowledge. Paul Torek: Determinism is irrelevant. Even a perfectly predictable agent can have free will, which consists of the ability to satisfactorily manipulate the universe based on one's knowledge and desires. Michael Ellis: Free Will probably requires a nondeterministic universe with acausal connections and randomness, such as we might be living in. Rich Rosen: Regardless of whether the universe is deterministic there is no free will because any definition appears to be self-contradictory. Comments? SMASH CAUSALITY!!! -michael
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) (06/18/85)
> Just to keep things straight -- it appears we have at least four > views of `Free Will': > > John Williams: The universe is deterministic but unknowable due to lack > of information about the universe's initial conditions. > Free Will somehow somehow derives from this built-in > lack of knowledge. But OUR lack of knowledge on a subject surely does not have a bearing on its existence or non-existence. The fact that we didn't know about quarks hundreds of years ago (or microbes) doesn't mean that those things didn't exist back then. Likewise for the predictability factor. Regardless of our knowledge, if sequences of events are determined, they are determined, whether WE humans can determine them or not. > Paul Torek: Determinism is irrelevant. Even a perfectly predictable > agent can have free will, which consists of the ability > to satisfactorily manipulate the universe based on > one's knowledge and desires. > > Michael Ellis: Free Will probably requires a nondeterministic universe > with acausal connections and randomness, such as > we might be living in. > > Rich Rosen: Regardless of whether the universe is deterministic > there is no free will because any definition appears to > be self-contradictory. Not ANY definition. Paul has certainly given definitions that are not self-contradictory, but of course he defines it so that it DOES exist because he wants to believe in free will. What he refers to as "my" (Rich Rosen's) definition of free will is in fact the common accepted notion of what free will means, and it is THAT definition that directly implies a self-contradiction: how can an agent be truly free if it is a part of the world of cause and effect, since that agent itself is thus subject to its laws and is thus determined. I'm with Michael in that the notion of free will requires the acausal universe he describes, and in that it thus requires an agent of action outside the scope of that universe to satisfy the definition. But then again, I think Mike is grasping for straws in that he is defining a universe that provides for free will based on his desire to have a universe in which there could be free will, rather than based on the evidence. Which is why he always concludes his articles by saying: > SMASH CAUSALITY!!! -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (06/20/85)
>But OUR lack of knowledge on a subject surely does not have a bearing on its >existence or non-existence. It most certainly does when the subject consists only of semantic constructs used for conceptual organization and communication between human beings. Such is the case with Free Will. It is even true of Determinism. A strict meaning of Determinism is that it is true if there is only one future. But whether the multiple futures in the multiple-worlds model are "real" futures is subject to debate. A looser form of Determinism which many people seem to use is that there is only one *possible* future. Given quantum uncertainty and no multiple-worlds model, there is only one true future but many possible ones; i.e., the real future is not necessary or *determined* by the current state, but it is the only one that will happen nonetheless. Since our lack of knowledge is reflected in the very *meanings* we assign these terms, their existence is dependent upon it. If you can say that Free Will does not really exist because its just a bunch of chemicals, then I will tell you that chairs do not exist because they are just a bunch of probability waves. Acting as though the language and the words are absolutes upon which you can draw absolute arguments about existence are no more valid than the pre-Einsteinian presumption that time was an absolute upon which you could map simultaneity, or the pre-Galilean presumption that location was an absolute upon which you could map the celestial spheres. >Paul has certainly given definitions that are not >self-contradictory, but of course he defines it so that it DOES exist >because he wants to believe in free will. Paul gives definitions that he thinks are reasonable and match common sense. I happen not to agree. >What he refers to as "my" (Rich Rosen's) >definition of free will is in fact the common accepted notion of what free >will means, If you expect people to accept the truth of this without proof, you are simply an ass. You give definitions which you think are reasonable and match common sense. I happen not to agree. To argue *ad hominem* that your definitions are better is dishonest. *Demonstrate* to the satisfaction of people who disagree with you that your definitions match common accepted notions. Simply stating your definition and asking people if they agree with it is not sufficient, since other definitions have not been stated and since people are naive about contradictions embedded in reasonable-sounding defintions. The question is, do the *conclusions/predictions* of what is or is not a free choice given your definition match peoples' expectations. >how can an agent be truly free if it is a part of the >world of cause and effect, since that agent itself is thus subject to its >laws and is thus determined. You keep asking this question, as though it is an obvious contradiction. But it only is if you have a definition of "truly free" which is mutually exclusive with "determined". Such a definition is not *necessary*. I hold that it is nonsensical and contradictory to common meaning to hold that "truly free" means "completely unrestrained", since this would mean even free from restraints, e.g., to remain human. No one on the street is going to demand the ability to stop being human as a requirement for having Free Will. It is intellectually dishonest, or at least masturbatory, to carry the definition of Free Will to such an extreme that it cannot possibly be applied, and then say "look, see, there is no such thing". Rather, one should try to *constrain* the definition in such a way as that it becomes a meaningful and useful tool for discourse. >But then again, I think Mike is grasping for straws in that he >is defining a universe that provides for free will based on his desire to >have a universe in which there could be free will, rather than based on the >evidence. "the evidence." The evidence says that "Free Will" consists of certain vibrations of elastic bands in our throats, or certain combinations of straight lines, etc. But "the evidence" misses the point, because it is operating at the wrong level of discourse. The evidence also indicates that love, caring, and sensitivity don't exist, they are just manifestations of evolutionarily produced behavior mechanisms. But then people *act* upon such "evidence" and *choose* to write papers and subject people to their beliefs and *feel* that they are justified. *You* know damn well that you are choosing to type what you do. The fact that you may be determined to do it is *irrelevant*. It operates on a different level of discourse. If you ever come to understand the dichotomy, you may become more interesting to talk to. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (06/22/85)
I appreciated much of what Jim Balter (ima!jim) said, but I want to know why he writes: > >Paul gives definitions that he thinks are reasonable and match common >sense. I happen not to agree. You've been largely silent until now. What are your objections? Replying to Rich Rosen you say: >... Simply stating your definition and asking people if they agree >with it is not sufficient, since other definitions have not been stated >and since people are naive about contradictions embedded in >reasonable-sounding defintions. The question is, do the >*conclusions/predictions* of what is or is not a free choice given your >definition match peoples' expectations. I take it this means you find some conclusions/predictions about what is a free choice, given my definition, to be defective. Which? --Paul Torek, Iconbuster-in-chief
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (06/23/85)
>I appreciated much of what Jim Balter (ima!jim) said, Thanks (independent of inferences as to whether you agreed with any of it). >but I want to >know why he writes: >> >>Paul gives definitions that he thinks are reasonable and match common >>sense. I happen not to agree. > >You've been largely silent until now. What are your objections? I withdrew for a while when it appeared that much of what I wrote dropped into a netsink somewhere. As I said in the earlier note, I consider your definition, as least as summarized by Ellis (" Determinism is irrelevant. Even a perfectly predictable agent can have free will, which consists of the ability to satisfactorily manipulate the universe based on one's knowledge and desires."; my archives are empty; if you can provide a more accurate statement of your position, please do so) as begging the question; how does one determine whether ones satisfaction and desires are freely derived? >>... Simply stating your definition and asking people if they agree >>with it is not sufficient, since other definitions have not been stated >>and since people are naive about contradictions embedded in >>reasonable-sounding defintions. The question is, do the >>*conclusions/predictions* of what is or is not a free choice given your >>definition match peoples' expectations. > >I take it this means you find some conclusions/predictions about what is >a free choice, given my definition, to be defective. Which? From the above definition, I would conclude that failure to obtain satisfaction indicates lack of free will. I don't think most people would agree; rather, it would be construed as the result of poor choices. Freedom and satisfaction are poorly correlated *in my opinion* (are you paying attention, Rich?). From the above definition, I would conclude that going and buying popcorn and obtaining satisfaction was exercising free will *regardless of whether I knew I had been subjected to subliminal control* (the actual existence and effectiveness of such techniques is irrelevant to the argument). Addicts may think that they are free to quit their habit, and consider their taking their drug as being a free choice, *until they try to stop*; then they don't feel so free, even if they rationalize that they are continuing to take the drug because it is makes them feel good (satisfactory manipulation of the universe). I consider your definition defective because it doesn't yield an accurate mapping of what we do and do not consider free choice in practice. I believe your dismissal of a connection between free will and predictability to be an error, although an understandable one given that the issue of predictability is so often cast in terms of absolute determinism. Free will and determinism of events are not contradictory; but subjective free will and subjective knowledge of the causes of one's own actions are inversely related, in my view. As a deeper flaw, definitions of free will that involve notions of an agent manipulating the universe are mechanistic; they require defining and identifying agents as distinct from their manipulations and the things manipulated; this is where the "brains are chemicals" morass comes in. I think the only useful and meaningful definition of such terms must be restricted to the subjective domain. Free Will talks about how people view their actions; its definition must operate on the same level of discourse as the presumptions that there are people and that they have views. It really is meaningful to talk about there being people, having views and wills, free or otherwise; that is why we do it. This has absolutely nothing to do with whether the people are made up of chemicals, any more than the fact that programs are made up of characters has any bearing on whether or not they are structured ("How can a program be structured when it is completely made up of components that have no inherent structure?"). That Rich makes this level error is blatantly obvious; that it is the most widespread and fundamental rhetorical error is apparently less so. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim) "Is a Euglena animal or vegetable?" (What, you *still* don't get it?)
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (06/24/85)
>>> John Williams: The universe is deterministic but unknowable due to lack >>> of information about the universe's initial conditions. >>> Free Will somehow somehow derives from this built-in >>> lack of knowledge. [ELLIS] >>But OUR lack of knowledge on a subject surely does not have a bearing on its >>existence or non-existence. [ROSEN] > It most certainly does when the subject consists only of semantic constructs > used for conceptual organization and communication between human beings. > Such is the case with Free Will. It is even true of Determinism. [BALTER] On the contrary, it's NOT the case at all. To be free means to be unhindered by other controlling variables. If in fact the controlling variables are simply unknown to us at present or "non-determinable", that doesn't make us any more free than if we did know them. >>Paul has certainly given definitions that are not >>self-contradictory, but of course he defines it so that it DOES exist >>because he wants to believe in free will. > Paul gives definitions that he thinks are reasonable and match common sense. > I happen not to agree. >>What he refers to as "my" (Rich Rosen's) >>definition of free will is in fact the common accepted notion of what free >>will means, > If you expect people to accept the truth of this without proof, you are > simply an ass. You give definitions which you think are reasonable and > match common sense. I happen not to agree. To argue *ad hominem* that your > definitions are better is dishonest. *Demonstrate* to the satisfaction > of people who disagree with you that your definitions match common accepted > notions. You mean like quoting the dictionary definition of free will? I've done that repeatedly. "Simply an ass"? "Ad hominem"? "Dishonest"? Randomly throwing out these epithets as you've done strikes me as TRULY dishonest. Unlike some others, I don't expect people to accept my definitions because I say so: I quote sources and offer substantiation. I reiterate in case you missed it the first time: "the belief that man's choices ultimately are or can be voluntary AND NOT DETERMINED BY EXTERNAL CAUSES" is the operative definition (or one of them offering a similar perspective). Paul's definition avoids this and is merely an assertion about a behavior, rational evaluative capability, which I agree does exist, simply tagging the label "free will" onto that because Paul wants free will to exist. Could you please refrain from really making this an ad hominem argument by calling me an ass for something you accuse me of doing that I do not and have not done. > Simply stating your definition and asking people if they agree > with it is not sufficient, since other definitions have not been stated > and since people are naive about contradictions embedded in > reasonable-sounding defintions. The question is, do the > *conclusions/predictions* of what is or is not a free choice given your > definition match peoples' expectations. I stated the dictionary definition, not "mine". I still contend that the capability I just mentioned that Paul insists IS free will is not in fact free BECAUSE it IS dependent on other external variables, and that violates the definition of "free". >>how can an agent be truly free if it is a part of the >>world of cause and effect, since that agent itself is thus subject to its >>laws and is thus determined. > You keep asking this question, as though it is an obvious contradiction. > But it only is if you have a definition of "truly free" which is mutually > exclusive with "determined". Such a definition is not *necessary*. > I hold that it is nonsensical and contradictory to common meaning to hold > that "truly free" means "completely unrestrained", since this would mean > even free from restraints, e.g., to remain human. No one on the street > is going to demand the ability to stop being human as a requirement for > having Free Will. It is intellectually dishonest, or at least masturbatory, > to carry the definition of Free Will to such an extreme that it cannot > possibly be applied, and then say "look, see, there is no such thing". > Rather, one should try to *constrain* the definition in such a way as that it > becomes a meaningful and useful tool for discourse. We're talking about the means by which one's choices are reached. If that means was truly free, it would in fact be unconstrained. The ability to "remain human" or choose not to involves making physical changes to the body that the body is not physically capable of making. We are not talking about freedom of action, but freedom in what choices are produced. I contend that by whatever definition you choose, they still come out constrained. Redefining the limits of "constrainability" so that you can have your result become true strikes me as fine tuning your premises to adapt to your conclusion, and that is what would seem to be truly dishonest (not to mention masturbatory) in this argument. >>But then again, I think Mike is grasping for straws in that he >>is defining a universe that provides for free will based on his desire to >>have a universe in which there could be free will, rather than based on the >>evidence. > "the evidence." The evidence says that "Free Will" consists of certain > vibrations of elastic bands in our throats, or certain combinations of > straight lines, etc. But "the evidence" misses the point, because it > is operating at the wrong level of discourse. The evidence also indicates > that love, caring, and sensitivity don't exist, they are just manifestations > of evolutionarily produced behavior mechanisms. On the contrary, the evidence shows quite clearly that, at least in some people, those things do exist. They describe an attitude and feeling about other people which is evident in their behavior. How are love, caring, and sensitivity defined? If you're talking about the inner trappings of how they operate in our minds, that's another story: you were simply talking about whether or not they existed. Let's do the same for free will. Based on the definition. Does such a phenomenon manifest itself? In what way? > But then people *act* upon > such "evidence" and *choose* to write papers and subject people to > their beliefs and *feel* that they are justified. *You* know damn well > that you are choosing to type what you do. The fact that you may be > determined to do it is *irrelevant*. It operates on a different level > of discourse. If you ever come to understand the dichotomy, you may become > more interesting to talk to. As interesting as you perceive yourself to be? (and they call ME abusive?) Of course I am "choosing", we have already discussed the very process of choosing above. The question is: is that process "free"? I say no. -- Like aversion (HEY!), shocked for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (06/25/85)
In article <27500084@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >as summarized by Ellis (" > Determinism is irrelevant. Even a perfectly predictable > agent can have free will, which consists of the ability > to satisfactorily manipulate the universe based on > one's knowledge and desires."; >my archives are empty; if you can provide a more accurate statement of your >position, please do so) My position emphasizes rational evaluation and corresponding action. Ellis was close, but I would add that the knowledge and desires must be rational (the more irrational, the less free). >From the above definition, I would conclude that failure to obtain >satisfaction indicates lack of free will. I don't think most people would >agree; rather, it would be construed as the result of poor choices. Agreed; I would strike "satisfactorily". >... From the above definition, I would conclude >that going and buying popcorn and obtaining satisfaction was exercising >free will *regardless of whether I knew I had been subjected to subliminal >control* (the actual existence and effectiveness of such techniques is >irrelevant to the argument). Addicts may think that they are free to quit >their habit, and consider their taking their drug as being a free choice, >*until they try to stop*; then they don't feel so free... Yes, that's why I say that the beliefs and desires must be rationally formed and (re)evaluated to be free. (And again, freedom as I under- stand it admits of degrees.) >... I believe your dismissal of >a connection between free will and predictability to be an error, although an >understandable one given that the issue of predictability is so often cast in >terms of absolute determinism. Free will and determinism of events are not >contradictory; but subjective free will and subjective knowledge of the >causes of one's own actions are inversely related, in my view. You were doing fine until now, but BZZZZZZ! Wrong answer, and here's why: I *want* to know the causes of my own actions (I also want them to be particular *sorts* of causes, but I digress); I want to be predictable, at least to myself (and I don't mind if others find me predictable, as long as they're not hostile -- and 99.44% of them aren't). If I want, choose, prefer -- rationally -- to know this, how can knowing it make me less free? It can't. >As a deeper flaw, definitions of free will that involve notions of an agent >manipulating the universe are mechanistic; they require defining and >identifying agents as distinct from their manipulations and the things >manipulated; this is where the "brains are chemicals" morass comes in. I'm not sure what your point is here, but the "manipulating the universe" talk is Ellis's, not mine. >... This [free will talk] has absolutely nothing >to do with whether the people are made up of chemicals, any more than the >fact that programs are made up of characters has any bearing on whether or >not they are structured ("How can a program be structured when it is >completely made up of components that have no inherent structure?"). >That Rich makes this level error is blatantly obvious; I agree, and I've made the same or similar point myself, namely that we have enough "high-level" evidence (in our macroscopic everyday world of people, etc.) of free choice that we don't have to withhold our verdict on its existence until we understand the microscopic level. (Although, I don't deny that we would learn something from such investigations on the micro level.) --Paul V. Torek, Iconbuster-in-chief
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (06/29/85)
> My position emphasizes rational evaluation and corresponding action. Ellis > was close, but I would add that the knowledge and desires must be rational > (the more irrational, the less free). [TOREK] As usual, to paraphrase Arthur Dent, this must be a definition of the word "free" (as concocted by Paul) with which I was totally unfamiliar. Rationality and freedom are not congruent, nor are they parallel. You would seem to be defining free as "having the ability to choose the best way offering the most benefit". Free really means "having the ability to choose anything at a whim regardless of external variables". Based on your definition of "free" as having the means to choose the BEST way rather having the capability of choosing any way, I can see where your other definitions follow from. Your definition of free is simply tautologically imposed onto definitions of rational. >>... From the above definition, I would conclude >>that going and buying popcorn and obtaining satisfaction was exercising >>free will *regardless of whether I knew I had been subjected to subliminal >>control* (the actual existence and effectiveness of such techniques is >>irrelevant to the argument). Addicts may think that they are free to quit >>their habit, and consider their taking their drug as being a free choice, >>*until they try to stop*; then they don't feel so free... > Yes, that's why I say that the beliefs and desires must be rationally > formed and (re)evaluated to be free. (And again, freedom as I under- > stand it admits of degrees.) Whoa! You've lost me. Is buying popcorn in the above example thus free will or not free will? Is buying popcorn in ANY example free will or not, remembering that there is little fundamental difference between direct subliminal manipulation (deliberate or not) and experiences that influence our minds and formulate the way we make decisions? > I agree, and I've made the same or similar point myself, namely that we > have enough "high-level" evidence (in our macroscopic everyday world of > people, etc.) of free choice that we don't have to withhold our verdict > on its existence until we understand the microscopic level. (Although, > I don't deny that we would learn something from such investigations on > the micro level.) What IS this evidence? I would contend that you are again referring to global perceptions of a similar vein to viewing the sun as "rising" and "falling". You may perceive human actions (even your own) as "free" only because YOU cannot comprehend the root causes. To YOUR eye they appear free, but at the root level they are not. In the AI world, designers may introduce randomness as an element to make the machines APPEAR more human. Do humans really operate that way, either randomly or through some agent, or are the causes of our actions so complex (rooted in all the catalogued experiences we've accumulated, different for all of us) that we are unable to predict them and thus they APPEAR to be "free". -- Like a vermin (HEY!), shot for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (06/30/85)
In article <1123@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >You mean like quoting the dictionary definition of free will? I've done >that repeatedly. I must have missed this. >I reiterate in case >you missed it the first time: "the belief that man's choices ultimately >are or can be voluntary AND NOT DETERMINED BY EXTERNAL CAUSES" is the >operative definition (or one of them offering a similar perspective). Which dictionary was that? Anyway, a tricky word here is "external". I suggest you look that one up, keeping in mind that the question "external to what" would seem to have the answer "man" or "volition (<voluntary)", based on the definition quoted. --the undaunted iconoclast.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/03/85)
>In article <1123@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>You mean like quoting the dictionary definition of free will? I've done >>that repeatedly. > > I must have missed this. [PAUL TOREK] Obviously. I'd used a number of dictionary definitions, including American Heritage. >>I reiterate in case >>you missed it the first time: "the belief that man's choices ultimately >>are or can be voluntary AND NOT DETERMINED BY EXTERNAL CAUSES" is the >>operative definition (or one of them offering a similar perspective). > Which dictionary was that? Why do you ask? You "sound" almost as if you don't believe your "ears", or that you doubt my word. As I said above, American Heritage, which tends to be a more objective dictionary than Webster's, for example. (Compare the two dictionaries' definitions for "scientism".) > Anyway, a tricky word here is "external". I > suggest you look that one up, keeping in mind that the question "external > to what" would seem to have the answer "man" or "volition (<voluntary)", > based on the definition quoted. Not at all, Paul. My first guess is "outside of the boundaries of". In looking it up, I find that summarizes most of the definitions, but I include another here for your own comments: "4. <Philosophy> Existing independently of the mind; objective; phenomenal." In any case, external causes would refer to the actions of the physical world as having an effect on the mind or brain, which is what I've been contending all along---the outside world, the physical world itself, is what has effects on the rational evaluative analysis process, thus not making it free. -- Like a turban (HEY!), worn for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mmar@sphinx.UChicago.UUCP (Mitchell Marks) (07/04/85)
What is the obsession with dictionaries????
A dictionary is useful for a number of things, including getting
a general idea of the meaning of an unfamiliar word. Sure, fine.
But when you're dealing with a perfectly familiar word, and
it becomes the keyword in an argument, the dictionary is no authority
at all.
Part of the business of doing philosophy is working out what it would
be reasonable to treat this or that keyword as meaning.
--
-- Mitch Marks @ UChicago
...ihnp4!gargoyle!sphinx!mmarflink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/06/85)
In article <1151@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>I reiterate in case >>>you missed it the first time: "the belief that man's choices ultimately >>>are or can be voluntary AND NOT DETERMINED BY EXTERNAL CAUSES" is the >>>operative definition (or one of them offering a similar perspective). > >> Which dictionary was that? > >Why do you ask? Because the definition you quoted above sounds like Ellis's. (For all I know though, maybe Ellis got his def. from the same dictionary as yours?) >> Anyway, a tricky word here is "external". I >> suggest you look that one up, keeping in mind that the question "external >> to what" would seem to have the answer "man" or "volition (<voluntary)", >> based on the definition quoted. >Not at all, Paul. My first guess is "outside of the boundaries of". >In looking it up, I find that summarizes most of the definitions, but I >include another here for your own comments: "4. <Philosophy> Existing >independently of the mind; objective; phenomenal." I think "outside the boundaries of" is the meaning that applies. Outside the boundaries of "man" or "volition". >In any case, external causes would refer to the actions of the physical >world as having an effect on the mind or brain, which is what I've been >contending all along---the outside world, the physical world itself, is >what has effects on the rational evaluative analysis process, thus not >making it free. But those cause-and-effect chains go *through* the man (his sensory system, his ratiocinations, etc.) and thus are *NOT* EXTERNAL to the man! So your argument fails. --Paul Torek, Iconbuster-in-chief
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/10/85)
>>In any case, external causes would refer to the actions of the physical >>world as having an effect on the mind or brain, which is what I've been >>contending all along---the outside world, the physical world itself, is >>what has effects on the rational evaluative analysis process, thus not >>making it free. [ROSEN] > But those cause-and-effect chains go *through* the man (his sensory > system, his ratiocinations, etc.) and thus are *NOT* EXTERNAL to the > man! So your argument fails. [TOREK] No, on the contrary, because of that my argument succeeds. BECAUSE (as you admit here) the cause-and-effect chains go through "the man", as you say, the actions of "the man" are dependent upon those chains, internal AND external, and that violates the definition of free!!!