rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/15/85)
> I agree with Rich and Paul that people do make choices; furthermore, > that these choices are ultimately the result of chemicals and neurons; > furthermore, that these chemicals and neurons became the way they > are through the action of external influences. > None of this contradicts most people's subjective perception that they > have something we call a "will". Whatever causes and mechanisms > brought a person to her current state, that state is *the person*'s > state. The choices made by that person are *the person*'s choices. > Note, I have not said that they are *free* choices, I am just trying to > work toward definitions of "person" and "will" in the proposition "Does > a person have free will?". Good point, and you are quite right in not saying that these choices are free, since clearly from what you've said, they aren't. > I claim that in order to continue meaningful discussion of the > proposition, we have to refine what we mean by "free will". My > perception is that Rich and Paul are using substantially different > meanings. Let me, at considerable risk, say what I think they are > thinking. Rich says the concept "free will" means that a person makes > choices without having received any instruction, guidance, help, > opposition, or other influence from outside. I agree with Rich that > this proposition is absurd. Just a few reminders. First, the definition I get for free will comes first out of the dictionary, and second out of the term's usage for centuries in philosophical discussion. Second, I don't consider those things described above as actually part of the definition, rather they are implications of the base definition. If all definitions had all their subsequent implications included as part of the definition, they would all be infinitely long. The actual concept of free will I have been speaking of involves a notion of human freedom to choose one's thoughts and actions regardless of (or not at all affected by) "external causes". I argue that the implication of this definition REQUIRES an external agent. You see, if the current state of the person's brain is the cause of the resulting action and thought, and if that state was achieved through the influence of all the chemicals that have passed through (what you ate, what you experienced and how it was encoded based on what you had experienced before THAT, etc.), then any thought or action is clearly dependent on (directly) internal chemicals of the brain (Paul would argue "that's part of what's YOU"), and (indirectly) those internal chemicals are dependent on the external environment. If that external environment is also to be considered a part of you, then the whole universe is "you", a fine notion if you want to get all mystical (or if you're looking at the system "universe" rather than the system "you"), but it doesn't have relevance to discussions of does a person have free will. The point is that since obviously what we are and what we do is determined by 1) our innate inborn chemistry coupled with 2) all our experiences encoded in our brains (that encoding often based on how we had experienced prior experiences, and so on...), unless there is something mystically external to all that, there cannot be free will by that definition. > Paul says the concept "free will" means > that a person makes choices, based on those influences she has > "accepted" (or perhaps "internalized" is a better description), and is > able to "reject" other influences. Subject to a subtle interpretation > of the words I quoted in the preceding sentence, I agree with Paul that > this proposition is quite reasonable. (I apologize in advance if I > have misstated anyone's position, including my own.) That seems to be Paul's position in a way, but what is ignored here is that, although the possibility of "accepting" and "rejecting" exists, the way in which that process is (or possibly, in some people, is NOT) implemented is predetermined by prior experiences (for instance, the fact that some people will reject any influence disputing the existence of god as the work of some anti-god force of "evil", the circularity of which is not really germane to this topic). Thus, unless your prior experiences have somehow resulted in your being absolutely objective (a practical impossibility, since all human experience colors the way in which we look at things--- another reason for the scientific method!!), you cannot be said to be making completely objective rational choices. Furthermore, even if you WERE able to do that, it STILL would not be free: the choices made would be determined by what your experience base was. Still further furthermore, since when is being able to choose the most rational or the "best" choice the same as being "free"? I can't seem to find any interpretation of free to mean "choosing the most rational alternative". > I think I will pause here to allow Paul and Rich a chance to respond, > and also to collect my thoughts on how people internalize influences: > how one distinguishes what one calls "oneself" from something > *external*. To just seed this discussion: I think it is a > fundamentally subjective distinction. *Objectively*, a person is > nothing *but* a collection and digestion of external influences. > Disclaimer: The above opinions aren't really my own, > I was externally influenced. (c; But once they're internalized, they're a part of you. -- Like a turban (HEY!), worn for the very first time... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr