rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/10/85)
Even no. of >'s = me, Odd no. = Paul Torek >>>>Note the dependencies of the actions leading to r-e-a [rational evaluative >>>>analysis]. You can only make such r-e-a if your experience up to that >>>>point has not been fraught with inhibitive preconceptions that impede the >>>>incorporation of useful knowledge into your "stored constructs". >>>So? >>So, that means that any r-e-a leading to a decision (e.g., to take action) >>is dependent on the prior experiences and xposures, and hence is not free. >True up to the last comma, but "and hence is not free" doesn't follow. Why stop at the comma? If it's DEPENDENT, it's not FREE, no matter how much you want to assert that it is. It's that simple. >>>>Could you've chosen not to have had a traumatic experience as a child that >>>>tainted the way you look at the world and incorporate knowledge about it? >>> But, in point of fact, I didn't have such an experience. >>They say birth is a traumatic experience. Can I take this to mean that, >>confirming my suspicions, you were not born (but rather hatched)? :-) >I mean I haven't had an experience that drastically impairs my ability to >perceive accurately and reason well. Birth may be traumatic, but the point >is that most people survive it (and other things) without losing rationality. Point is that EVERY experience in your life has an affect on the way in which you act and think thereafter, from the traumatic ones down to the trivial ones and all those in-between, with degree of effect proportional to severity. And often those experiences form a basis for the way in which you reason. It's admirable to try to shirk their effects or to recognize them, but it's not likely that you'll ever do so. >>> You assume (at least, what you say makes sense only on the >>> assumption that) being free now requires as a prerequisite that one was >>> free to choose the influences on one's character in the past. Not so! >>> One might just as well assume, that having language ability now requires >>> that one was able to use language in the past. >> Paul, to use analogy to prove a point, the two things being related must >> be SIMILAR. Got it? I don't "assume" that being free noe requires that >> one was free to choose one's earlier experiences. I state that the basis >> for the making of the choices that you make today is FUNDAMENTALLY >> DEPENDENT upon the past experiences, and thus[...] the current choices >> cannot be considered free because they are DEPENDENT on other things. > Again, you are doing fine right up to the conclusion. Far from needing > to be independent from past experiences to be free, a choice NEEDS TO > DEPEND on them to be free -- past experiences form the basis of an > intelligent choice. (E.g., "should I reach into the fire? No, last > time I did something like that, I was painfully burned.") Ah, freedom is slavery again. The definition of free (there are a few) that pertains to this discussion (from Random House this time) is as follows: "exempt from external authority, interference, restriction, etc. *INDEPENDENT*, unfettered". Got it? Freedom implies INdependence from interference, restriction, etc. which includes the restrictions of the chemicals within your own body. Can you unshackle yourself from those restrictions? I don't think so. >>> It only shows that free choice, like language ability, is something we >>> acquire during our childhood in the learning process. Big news! >>You "learn" free choice as a child? Some points here. First, does everyone >>learn the same things as children? With this in mind, I could say that some >>people might learn free choice and others not. Second, remember what free >>choice is all about: one's choices not being dependent on other things. > Aha -- but that's NOT what it's all about. (See my discussion of "other" > things in a previous article). No more moebius strip pointers to other articles, OK? In those other articles I recall that I stripped out your notions of "other things" to the bone. In that light, you've offered nothing of substance and you haven't answered the point above. >>Remember, I agree with you about rational evaluative analysis, and I agree >>that THAT *CAN* *BE* learned. What I object to is your calling THAT "free >>choice" when it is not free, except in that you LIKE to use the word >>"free" to describe for solely aesthetic reasons. > That was indeed my point in suggesting that free choice can be learned. > Why do I call r-e-a "free choice"? Because it satisfies all the conditions > of ordinary talk about freedom and choice. Consider some of the closely > related concepts to "free will", such as "agency" and "self-control". > (For a good discussion of all the main concepts involved in the issue, > and how "free will" can be compatible with a naturalistic perspective, > see Dennett, *Elbow Room*.) An "agent" in legal contexts is a responsible, > intelligent actor. "Control" requires a controller and a controllee, the > behavior of the controllee must be causally dependent on behavior of the > controller (*among other factors*), and the controller must have goals -- > evaluations -- concerning the behavior of the controllee, beliefs about > the controllee, and intelligence. (See the example of the remote > controlled model plane in Dennett.) Beliefs, goals, intelligence, > responsibility -- all the elements of r-e-a. But where is the freedom? What you choose to refer to as the agents of r-e-a are clearly bound and restricted by what they are chemically. They cannot will something different from what their make-up would point to. Great, so you (according to you) have an agent, and control, but YOU AIN'T GOT FREEDOM!!! So it ain't free will!!!!!! >>>>> And to say that one ought to avoid >>>>>error is to say that one *can* avoid error: "ought" implies "can". >>>>"Can" through addition of new knowledge into one's mind. >>> Yes. And if she can do so, she is FREE to do so -- it's a tautology. >>Are inanimate objects free to do the things they CAN do? C O M E O N !! > No, good point, but there is a sense of "can" meaning "is an option", so that > if one can do it one is free to do it. This strong sense of "can" would seem > to be presupposed by statements that someone "ought" to do something. But is it an "option", or (when you get down to it and look at what's happening chemically) is it the only "choice" available? As Henry Ford told his customers "you can have it in any color as long as it's black", aren't you saying "you can make any choice you want to as long as it's the choice 'determined' by your chemical make-up"??? >>I can "rationally criticize" her [Laura] for it [believing in free choice] >>because there are inherent flaws in the belief. I'm not pinning "blame" >>on her for believing it, I'm simply showing the fallacies therein. "Can't- >>lose propositions" aren't necessarily true (e.g., Pascal's reason for >>believingh in god) > As I pointed out before, Pascal's wager was NOT truly can't-lose, so that > is a straw man argument against me. It's the one you had compared all this to, no? >>and someone else long ago pointed out to you that rational reasons for >>holding beliefs revolve around their truthfulness and not their utility. >>A point you passed by. > A point I replied to. Since we don't have a LIST OF TRUTHS (at least, I > think we don't -- you haven't become a fundamentalist, have you Rich? :->) > we have to go on evidence which is never final; we have to decide if the > evidence is "good enough", and that depends on utilities of the consequences > of believing what is not true, and failing to believe what is. And if anything the evidence points AWAY from your conclusions, showing them to be nothing more than the same brand of wishful thinking the religious believers engage in. And contrary to your "fearful thinking" concept that claimed that I reject wishful thinking because I fear its truth (you never did respond to that after I made it clear where you were coming from) and because I reject out of hand all wishful thinking, I reject beliefs that asre based ONLY in wishful thinking and have no other foundation to support them. Like evidence...
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/12/85)
In article <1191@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>So, that means that any r-e-a leading to a decision (e.g., to take action) >>>is dependent on the prior experiences and xposures, and hence is not free. > >>True up to the last comma, but "and hence is not free" doesn't follow. > >Why stop at the comma? If it's DEPENDENT, it's not FREE, no matter how much >you want to assert that it is. It's that simple. If it's dependent on things that are a crucial part of one's identity, reasoning and evaluations, i.e. that are INTERNAL to the "man" and his "volition", then it is free. >Point is that EVERY experience in your life has an affect on the way in which >you act and think thereafter, from the traumatic ones down to the trivial >ones and all those in-between, with degree of effect proportional to severity. >And often those experiences form a basis for the way in which you reason. Yes, but the way in which one reasons, one's experiences -- which form a crucial basis of one's identity and a basis for one's evaluations (and thus one's "volition") -- are INTERNAL in the relevant sense. >> Far from needing to be independent from past experiences to be free, a >> choice NEEDS TO DEPEND on them to be free -- past experiences form the >> basis of an intelligent choice. (E.g., "should I reach into the fire? >> No, last time I did something like that, I was painfully burned.") > >Ah, freedom is slavery again. The definition of free (there are a few) that >pertains to this discussion (from Random House this time) is as follows: >"exempt from external authority, interference, restriction, etc. INDEPENDENT, >unfettered". Got it? Freedom implies INdependence from interference, >restriction, etc. which includes the restrictions of the chemicals within your >own body. Can you unshackle yourself from those restrictions? I don't think >so. "Unshackle"? "Interference"? In what way do the chemical processes that constitute my thought processes "interfere" with me or "shackle" me? The fact that "chemical process XYZ caused his behavior" is just THE SAME FACT as "his decision caused his behavior", given that "chemical process XYZ" and "his decision" REFER TO THE SAME EVENT. Must one be independent from HIMSELF (ain't that a contradiction in terms?) before you will call him free? Independence means that *one's own* experiences motivate one's behavior, NOT that *no* experiences do. >>>choice is all about: one's choices not being dependent on other things. > >> Aha -- but that's NOT what it's all about. (See my discussion of "other" >> things in a previous article). > >No more moebius strip pointers to other articles, OK? In those other articles >I recall that I stripped out your notions of "other things" to the bone. I don't think so; those "other things" have to be strictly external to "man" and his "volition" for dependence on them to be unfreedom. So far all you've come up with are factors that *crucially depend* on something *internal*. >> [...] > >But where is the freedom? What you choose to refer to as the agents of r-e-a >are clearly bound and restricted by what they are chemically. They cannot >will something different from what their make-up would point to. Great, so >you (according to you) have an agent, and control, but YOU AIN'T GOT FREEDOM! You have an agent and *self*-control, which IS freedom. (I think that if you look at a detailed dictionary definition of freedom you'll find "self-control" listed as one of the synonyms.) >>[...] This strong sense of "can" would seem to be presupposed by >>statements that someone "ought" to do something. > >But is it an "option", or (when you get down to it and look at what's >happening chemically) is it the only "choice" available? If it's not an option, then why criticize Laura by saying that she ought not to believe in free will? If it's a foregone conclusion that she's going to believe it anyway, your criticism is pointless! That's my point. >>>I can "rationally criticize" her [Laura] for it [believing in free choice] >>>because there are inherent flaws in the belief. I'm not pinning "blame" >>>on her for believing it, I'm simply showing the fallacies therein. "Can't- >>>lose propositions" aren't necessarily true (e.g., Pascal's reason for >>>believingh in god) > >> As I pointed out before, Pascal's wager was NOT truly can't-lose, so that >> is a straw man argument against me. > >It's the one you had compared all this to, no? No. Someone else made (tried to make) that comparison. >[...] And contrary to your "fearful thinking" concept that >claimed that I reject wishful thinking because I fear its truth (you never >did respond to that after I made it clear where you were coming from) For the last time: I never claimed you reject wishful thinking because you fear its truth, I claimed that you reject it automatically without examining its truth. >and because I reject out of hand all wishful thinking, I reject beliefs >that are based ONLY in wishful thinking and have no other foundation [...] But do you always *examine* the possibility of other foundations -- i.e. evidence -- for such beliefs? --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink
dmm@calmasd.UUCP (David M. MacMillan) (07/12/85)
Perhaps the "Mat Making" chapter of Melville's Moby Dick might be of interest to this discussion. In it, he provides a very nice image of the interdependence of Will, Destiny, and Chance. Melville being Melville, Chance gets the final sounding blow, but that is not critical to his point, which is that the existence of any one of these three factors does not exclude the other two - indeed (though I am suspect of the Universal Quantifier) the situation in which all three are not present seems quite rare.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/17/85)
>>>>So, that means that any r-e-a leading to a decision (e.g., to take action) >>>>is dependent on the prior experiences and xposures, and hence is not free. >>>True up to the last comma, but "and hence is not free" doesn't follow. >>Why stop at the comma? If it's DEPENDENT, it's not FREE, no matter how much >>you want to assert that it is. It's that simple. > If it's dependent on things that are a crucial part of one's identity, > reasoning and evaluations, i.e. that are INTERNAL to the "man" and his > "volition", then it is free. Those things that are a "part of one's identity". How were they acquired? Does one get to choose the patterning with which one later evaluates and analyzes? Of course not. Thus, since the decisions and actions are dependent on these unfree internal elements plus the externals over which one has no control as they become part of the internalized knowledge construct structure. this whole process is not free. >>Point is that EVERY experience in your life has an affect on the way in which >>you act and think thereafter, from the traumatic ones down to the trivial >>ones and all those in-between, with degree of effect proportional to severity. >>And often those experiences form a basis for the way in which you reason. > Yes, but the way in which one reasons, one's experiences -- which form a > crucial basis of one's identity and a basis for one's evaluations (and > thus one's "volition") -- are INTERNAL in the relevant sense. How were those internal elements determined? See above. They come about through processes over which one has no control or choice, hence they are not free. >>>Far from needing to be independent from past experiences to be free, a >>>choice NEEDS TO DEPEND on them to be free -- past experiences form the >>>basis of an intelligent choice. (E.g., "should I reach into the fire? >>>No, last time I did something like that, I was painfully burned.") >>Ah, freedom is slavery again. The definition of free (there are a few) that >>pertains to this discussion (from Random House this time) is as follows: >>"exempt from external authority, interference, restriction, etc. INDEPENDENT, >>unfettered". Got it? Freedom implies INdependence from interference, >>restriction, etc. which includes the restrictions of the chemicals within your >>own body. Can you unshackle yourself from those restrictions? I don't think >>so. > "Unshackle"? "Interference"? In what way do the chemical processes that > constitute my thought processes "interfere" with me or "shackle" me? You make the extremely erroneous claim the freedom is equivalent to the ability to act rationally, which is very far from the truth. (More later.) But, even with regard to our old friend rational evaluative analysis (REA), when one's experiences are catalogued as prejudices or preconceptions or stereotypes, they interfere with true REA in any case. The fact remains, to be truly free, one's choices of action must be one's own, and not those *determined* by a series of events that were experienced. > The fact that "chemical process XYZ caused his behavior" is just THE SAME > FACT as "his decision caused his behavior", given that "chemical process > XYZ" and "his decision" REFER TO THE SAME EVENT. Must one be independent > from HIMSELF (ain't that a contradiction in terms?) before you will call > him free? Independence means that *one's own* experiences motivate one's > behavior, NOT that *no* experiences do. How are the things one experiences in life the same as "oneself"? Only YOU are YOU, and the fact that YOU have incorporated into your brain many experiences that have a direct effect on the way you think and evaluate quite clearly makes YOU un-free: you are bound to act as your experiences and accumulated knowledge dictate that you will. >>>>choice is all about: one's choices not being dependent on other things. >>>Aha -- but that's NOT what it's all about. (See my discussion of "other" >>>things in a previous article). >>No more moebius strip pointers to other articles, OK? In those other articles >>I recall that I stripped out your notions of "other things" to the bone. > I don't think so; those "other things" have to be strictly external to "man" > and his "volition" for dependence on them to be unfreedom. So far all you've > come up with are factors that *crucially depend* on something *internal*. Since the way in which those internals are developed and formed are outside one's control, one's actions and thoughts are thus (at minimum indirectly) dependent on those things that do that determining, and thus you are not free no matter how much you may assert it. >>>[PAUL TALKS ABOUT AGENTS AND CONTROL] >>But where is the freedom? What you choose to refer to as the agents of r-e-a >>are clearly bound and restricted by what they are chemically. They cannot >>will something different from what their make-up would point to. Great, so >>you (according to you) have an agent, and control, but YOU AIN'T GOT FREEDOM! > You have an agent and *self*-control, which IS freedom. (I think that if > you look at a detailed dictionary definition of freedom you'll find > "self-control" listed as one of the synonyms.) You must have a very unusual dictionary. In all the dictionaries I've looked in, there is no such synonym. I quote, though, from Webster's: "1. the quality or state of being free [TAUTOLOGY TIME!], as [HERE WE GO] a) the absence of necessity, coercion, or constraint [LIKE ONLY BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE TO DO WHAT YOUR INNER CHEMICALS DETERMINE THAT YOU WILL DO] in choice or action, b) liberation from slavery or restraint or from the power of another [I WOULD ASSUME ANOTHER THING AS WELL AS ANOTHER PERSON HERE]". You seem to be under the erroneous impression that being free means being able to choose the best rational course of action. Being free, in fact, means being able to choose without constraint (choosing the rational only would be a constraint). Self-control and REA are not synonyms for freedom. >>>[...] This strong sense of "can" would seem to be presupposed by >>>statements that someone "ought" to do something. >>But is it an "option", or (when you get down to it and look at what's >>happening chemically) is it the only "choice" available? > If it's not an option, then why criticize Laura by saying that she ought not > to believe in free will? If it's a foregone conclusion that she's going to > believe it anyway, your criticism is pointless! That's my point. If my criticism can lead her (as an external influence) to a more accurate conclusion, then it certainly does have a point and it is thus very worthwhile. -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/19/85)
In article <1227@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >Those things that are a "part of one's identity". How were they acquired? >Does one get to choose the patterning with which one later evaluates and >analyzes? Of course not. Thus, since the decisions and actions are dependent >on these unfree internal elements plus the externals over which one has no >control as they become part of the internalized knowledge construct structure. >this whole process is not free. Yes, the internal elements are caused by "external" events. They're not freely chosen -- at first. But in your argument the "unfreeness" of an internal factor caused by external factors is assumed to "carry over" to whatever the internal factor causes. I don't think that's legitimate, at least not when the internal factor is something like the capacity for r-e-a. Anything reviewed and accepted by r-e-a is (becomes) free, including the r-e-a procedure itself. Consider: why should I regard any internal feature as making me unfree, when that feature is something *desirable*, something I *accept* and have every reason to accept? How is one "constrained" by something one *wants*? >> "Unshackle"? "Interference"? In what way do the chemical processes that >> constitute my thought processes "interfere" with me or "shackle" me? > >You make the extremely erroneous claim the freedom is equivalent to the >ability to act rationally, which is very far from the truth. [...] >to be truly free, one's choices of action must be one's own, and not those >*determined* by a series of events that were experienced. But if one can act rationally then one *is* choosing -- the choices are *both* one's own *and* are those *determined* as you indicate. > [...] the fact that YOU have incorporated into your brain many >experiences that have a direct effect on the way you think and evaluate quite >clearly makes YOU un-free: you are bound to act as your experiences and >accumulated knowledge dictate that you will. Neat word there, "bound", ambiguous between "constrained" and "predisposed to". I am predisposed to act as my experiences, etc. dictate -- that's true -- but I'm not "constrained" to do so, because "constrained" means that there's something else I might want to do or have reasons to do. And there isn't. One can't be "constrained" by something one wants and has every reason to want -- that's no constraint at all. >> You have an agent and *self*-control, which IS freedom. (I think that if >> you look at a detailed dictionary definition of freedom you'll find >> "self-control" listed as one of the synonyms.) > >You seem to be under the erroneous impression that being free means being able >to choose the best rational course of action. Being free, in fact, means >being able to choose without constraint (choosing the rational only would be >a constraint). Self-control and REA are not synonyms for freedom. Freedom = autonomy = self-control. REA is a synonym for "free will", as that term has been used in some philosophical discussions, as well as by some non-philosophers (such as Robert Trivers in the Omni interview I quoted). >I quote, though, from Webster's: "1. [...] a) the absence of necessity, >coercion, or constraint [LIKE ONLY BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE >TO DO WHAT YOUR INNER CHEMICALS DETERMINE THAT YOU WILL DO] in choice >or action, b) liberation from slavery or restraint or from the power of >another [I WOULD ASSUME ANOTHER THING AS WELL AS ANOTHER PERSON HERE]". The causal determinism of choice might count as "necessity" -- you might have a case there -- but as long as the mechanisms by which we make choices are both desirable and desired, then, it seems to me, no limitation of our freedom is implied. --Paul V Torek
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/22/85)
>>Those things that are a "part of one's identity". How were they acquired? >>Does one get to choose the patterning with which one later evaluates and >>analyzes? Of course not. Thus, since the decisions and actions are dependent >>on these unfree internal elements plus the externals over which one has no >>control as they become part of the internalized knowledge construct structure. >>this whole process is not free. > Yes, the internal elements are caused by "external" events. They're not > freely chosen -- at first. But in your argument the "unfreeness" of an > internal factor caused by external factors is assumed to "carry over" to > whatever the internal factor causes. I don't think that's legitimate, at > least not when the internal factor is something like the capacity for r-e-a. > Anything reviewed and accepted by r-e-a is (becomes) free, including the > r-e-a procedure itself. Consider: why should I regard any internal feature > as making me unfree, when that feature is something *desirable*, something > I *accept* and have every reason to accept? How is one "constrained" by > something one *wants*? I went into this in another article, but I'll reiterate. Take for example the child who is brought up in a violent home, with constant fighting by his parents, etc. The things he/she learns are fmaily abuse, violence in relationships, etc. as appropriate things. He/she learns to expect from a relationship what the parents each expect out of their spouses, and grow up expecting and in fact "wanting" such things. Clearly such a person grows up "constrained" by what he/she wants. (Another more frivolous example: I want to like apricots, but I just can't.) >>You make the extremely erroneous claim the freedom is equivalent to the >>ability to act rationally, which is very far from the truth. [...] >>to be truly free, one's choices of action must be one's own, and not those >>*determined* by a series of events that were experienced. > But if one can act rationally then one *is* choosing -- the choices are > *both* one's own *and* are those *determined* as you indicate. How so? How are they "choices" at all in the sense you describe? The behavior described above might be perceived as quite rational to someone brought up like that. You are not necessarily constrained to be what you call "rational", you are constrained to be whatever your chemistry makes you. That ain't freedom in the sense you're talking about. >> [...] the fact that YOU have incorporated into your brain many >>experiences that have a direct effect on the way you think and evaluate quite >>clearly makes YOU un-free: you are bound to act as your experiences and >>accumulated knowledge dictate that you will. > Neat word there, "bound", ambiguous between "constrained" and "predisposed > to". I am predisposed to act as my experiences, etc. dictate -- that's true > -- but I'm not "constrained" to do so, because "constrained" means that > there's something else I might want to do or have reasons to do. And there > isn't. One can't be "constrained" by something one wants and has every > reason to want -- that's no constraint at all. See above. You make a special case about "wanting" not involving constraint because it's "what you want". But clearly that's just assuming your conclusion to do so. >>> You have an agent and *self*-control, which IS freedom. (I think that if >>> you look at a detailed dictionary definition of freedom you'll find >>> "self-control" listed as one of the synonyms.) >>You seem to be under the erroneous impression that being free means being able >>to choose the best rational course of action. Being free, in fact, means >>being able to choose without constraint (choosing the rational only would be >>a constraint). Self-control and REA are not synonyms for freedom. > Freedom = autonomy = self-control. REA is a synonym for "free will", as that > term has been used in some philosophical discussions, as well as by some > non-philosophers (such as Robert Trivers in the Omni interview I quoted). I went into that in another article. But where you get your "="s is truly beyond me! I could just as easily say "freedom = dark gloopy things on ice cream = hot fudge sauce". (In fact, I have! :-) >>I quote, though, from Webster's: "1. [...] a) the absence of necessity, >>coercion, or constraint [LIKE ONLY BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE >>TO DO WHAT YOUR INNER CHEMICALS DETERMINE THAT YOU WILL DO] in choice >>or action, b) liberation from slavery or restraint or from the power of >>another [I WOULD ASSUME ANOTHER THING AS WELL AS ANOTHER PERSON HERE]". > The causal determinism of choice might count as "necessity" -- you might > have a case there -- but as long as the mechanisms by which we make > choices are both desirable and desired, then, it seems to me, no > limitation of our freedom is implied. But which things become "desirable" or "desired" is not a universal thing, it is based on those prior experiences I keep talking about and that you keep ignoring. Since desirability of things is a result of the conditioning of the prior experiences, that is clearly not freedom. -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr