flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/16/85)
In article <1212@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> The influences of the external environment on choice aren't direct. They >> operate ONLY through INTERNAL factors -- which make choices directly. > >So? They're not direct? The choices themselves aren't implemented "directly" >by that definition, either. That seems to be just doubletalk to get around >the fact that THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* FREE as I said above. What >determines the configuration of the "INTERNAL factors", if not the same >processes? The configuration of the internal factors is caused by inherited traits and previous experiences -- no argument there. But what I'm saying is that when the *immediate* causes of one's behavior are internal, the action is free. Yes, there was a time when the factors that are now internal were externally caused -- in infancy, for example. And that means that *an infant's behavior* is not freely chosen. But it doesn't mean that the adult's behavior is not freely chosen. >> Freedom of choice refers mainly to PRESENT influences on one's actions; if >> THOSE are INTERNAL then it's FREE. Past conditions make a choice unfree >> only if they trace a completely external (to the person's volition) chain >> of cause-and-effect to the time of the choice. > >BUT ALL THOSE PAST EXPERIENCES ARE JUST INSTANCES OF THE SAME TYPE OF PROCESS >THAT OCCURRED IN THE PAST!!!! Thus those "past conditions", those states >in the brain that result from past experiences, were achieved through the >same process as "present" experiences! And thus, the experiences of the >baby taken as an example, the baby whose experiences were not of his/her >own choosing, you answer your own argument---ALL the experiences can be traced >to external chains of cause-and-effect! You mean: all the chains of cause-and-effect can be traced to a point at which they are external. Granted. But my point was that NONE of the chains of cause-and-effect in an ordinary choice are without some point at which an internal factor is involved. Let's use a diagram -- time on the vertical axis, with the most recent time at the bottom, and two parallel lines representing the "boundaries" of the "internal". Chains of x's represent chains of cause and effect that influence an action. ------- x ------- x x ------- | | x| |x x| | x | x | x x x x | x | x x | |x x| x |x | x | x x | | x x |x | x | x | x x | | x x | x | x | x x | | x x| | x | x | x x | | x x| | x | x Now, based on your (interpretation/) definition, only the (impossible) left diagram shows a free choice. But on my interpretation, the center diagram shows a free choice also, because all the causal factors *operating at the time of the decision* are "internal". Only the right-most diagram represents an unfree action; the completely external chain (someone else's decision, say, to use physical force on the hapless person depicted at right) makes it unfree. --Paul V Torek
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/18/85)
>>>The influences of the external environment on choice aren't direct. They >>>operate ONLY through INTERNAL factors -- which make choices directly. >>So? They're not direct? The choices themselves aren't implemented "directly" >>by that definition, either. That seems to be just doubletalk to get around >>the fact that THEY ARE QUITE SIMPLY *NOT* FREE as I said above. What >>determines the configuration of the "INTERNAL factors", if not the same >>processes? > The configuration of the internal factors is caused by inherited traits > and previous experiences -- no argument there. But what I'm saying is > that when the *immediate* causes of one's behavior are internal, the action > is free. Yes, there was a time when the factors that are now internal > were externally caused -- in infancy, for example. And that means that > *an infant's behavior* is not freely chosen. But it doesn't mean that > the adult's behavior is not freely chosen. How so? This is a perfectly example of what you claim that my reductionism doesn't do, but in fact, as shown here, it does. You've claimed that my "reductionism" doesn't show any flaws in the more "macro" level thinking. But here, the fact that the baby's behavior is not freely chosen implies that later behavior CANNOT be freely chosen. When is the demarcation point at which the baby's/child's non-freely chosen behavior suddenly becomes the adult's freely chosen behavior? There is no such point! Throughout one's life the experiences and catalogued knowledge constructs accumulate. If anything, at first, the baby is MORE free, in that he/she doesn't have any (or many) prior experiences to color the "current" one and the interpretation and cataloguing of it. But does the baby control its environment, what happens around him/her? Since that environment, what occurs during infancy, throughout childhood, and into adulthood, builds that storehouse of catalogued knowledge which in turn affects all subsequent storing and cataloguing processes, the resulting actions/decisions/thoughts are dependent on all of this, and thus not free. >>>Freedom of choice refers mainly to PRESENT influences on one's actions; if >>>THOSE are INTERNAL then it's FREE. Past conditions make a choice unfree >>>only if they trace a completely external (to the person's volition) chain >>>of cause-and-effect to the time of the choice. >>BUT ALL THOSE PAST EXPERIENCES ARE JUST INSTANCES OF THE SAME TYPE OF PROCESS >>THAT OCCURRED IN THE PAST!!!! Thus those "past conditions", those states >>in the brain that result from past experiences, were achieved through the >>same process as "present" experiences! And thus, the experiences of the >>baby taken as an example, the baby whose experiences were not of his/her >>own choosing, you answer your own argument---ALL the experiences can be traced >>to external chains of cause-and-effect! > You mean: all the chains of cause-and-effect can be traced to a point at > which they are external. Granted. But my point was that NONE of the chains > of cause-and-effect in an ordinary choice are without some point at which > an internal factor is involved. "Free" means "INdependent, UNfettered". Just because one element of the set of the factors involved internal things (freely created?), doesn't make it free. They'd ALL have to be "INTERNAL" factors for that to be true. And since the internal factors themselves are not "freely created", even that case is a wash. > Let's use a diagram -- time on the vertical > axis, with the most recent time at the bottom, and two parallel lines > representing the "boundaries" of the "internal". Chains of x's represent > chains of cause and effect that influence an action. > > ------- x ------- x x ------- > | | x| |x x| | x > | x | x x x x | x > | x x | |x x| x |x | x > | x x | | x x |x | x | x > | x x | | x x | x | x > | x x | | x x| | x | x > | x x | | x x| | x | x > > Now, based on your (interpretation/) definition, only the (impossible) > left diagram shows a free choice. But on my interpretation, the center > diagram shows a free choice also, because all the causal factors > *operating at the time of the decision* are "internal". Only the > right-most diagram represents an unfree action; the completely external > chain (someone else's decision, say, to use physical force on the > hapless person depicted at right) makes it unfree. You seem to be saying "Because 'your' (i.e., my) definition prevents us from having any freedom, it must be false." Can you give a specific example of the middle case? Moreover, what if some of external X's had been Y's? What then? -- "Discipline is never an end in itself, only a means to an end." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/20/85)
In article <1231@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> [...] But what I'm saying is that when the *immediate* causes of one's >> behavior are internal, the action is free. Yes, there was a time when >> the factors that are now internal were externally caused -- in infancy, >> for example. And that means that *an infant's behavior* is not freely >> chosen. But it doesn't mean that the adult's behavior is not free[...] > >[...] You've claimed that >my "reductionism" doesn't show any flaws in the more "macro" level thinking. >But here, the fact that the baby's behavior is not freely chosen implies >that later behavior CANNOT be freely chosen. When is the demarcation point >at which the baby's/child's non-freely chosen behavior suddenly becomes the >adult's freely chosen behavior? There is no such point! [...] >the resulting [adult] actions/decisions/thoughts are dependent on all >of this [external influences on infant], and thus not free. I hate to beg the question, but since you started it... The demarcation point is the point where r-e-a is applied to behavior and to sifting out influences on oneself to be accepted or rejected. It all comes down to the definition again... >>But my point was that NONE of the chains of cause-and-effect in an ordi- >>nary choice are without some point at which an internal factor is involved. > >"Free" means "INdependent, UNfettered". Just because one element of the >set of the factors involved internal things (freely created?), doesn't >make it free. They'd ALL have to be "INTERNAL" factors for that to be true. >And since the internal factors themselves are not "freely created", even >that case is a wash. There's one other necessary condition for freedom beyond one element of each chain of causes being internal, namely that the internal factor not be some- thing which the person wants to be rid of but can't (such as a "compulsive desire" or mental illness, perhaps). But given that condition, I think it does make it free. Consider responsibility. If one of the causes of a situation was "internal" to my volition, doesn't that make me responsible? And if so, why doesn't freedom work the same way? >> >> ------- x ------- x x ------- >> | | x| |x x| | x >> | x | x x x x | x >> | x x | |x x| x |x | x >> | x x | | x x |x | x | x >> | x x | | x x | x | x >> | x x | | x x| | x | x >> | x x | | x x| | x | x > >You seem to be saying "Because 'your' (i.e., my) definition prevents us from >having any freedom, it must be false." Can you give a specific example of >the middle case? Most decisions fall under the middle case: they flow from internal factors which were caused by ... internal factors which were caused by EXternal factors which were caused by external factors ... (ad infintum). --Paul V Torek
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/22/85)
>>[...] You've claimed that >>my "reductionism" doesn't show any flaws in the more "macro" level thinking. >>But here, the fact that the baby's behavior is not freely chosen implies >>that later behavior CANNOT be freely chosen. When is the demarcation point >>at which the baby's/child's non-freely chosen behavior suddenly becomes the >>adult's freely chosen behavior? There is no such point! [...] >>the resulting [adult] actions/decisions/thoughts are dependent on all >>of this [external influences on infant], and thus not free. > I hate to beg the question, but since you started it... The demarcation > point is the point where r-e-a is applied to behavior and to sifting out > influences on oneself to be accepted or rejected. It all comes down to the > definition again... (1) There is clearly no such clear "demarcation point", since anyone who has learned r-e-a does so over a period of time, gradually, and no one ever gets it perfect, there's always the set of irrational things you've learned from your parents/etc. that have their effect, and (2) R-e-a is not a universal. It is a POTENTIAL capability that humans have, but it is NOT exercised by everyone, and not exercised by ANYONE in its pure perfect state. The ability to make decisions rationally and objectively is a learned thing, and it is not learned by everyone. What everyone has and does is make decisions from stored knowledge accumulated from past experiences, and since the content of those experiences determines the way in which you act (and sometimes the content results in a predisposition for IRRATIONAL choices), that once again, is not freedom. >>"Free" means "INdependent, UNfettered". Just because one element of the >>set of the factors involved internal things (freely created?), doesn't >>make it free. They'd ALL have to be "INTERNAL" factors for that to be true. >>And since the internal factors themselves are not "freely created", even >>that case is a wash. > There's one other necessary condition for freedom beyond one element of each > chain of causes being internal, namely that the internal factor not be some- > thing which the person wants to be rid of but can't (such as a "compulsive > desire" or mental illness, perhaps). But given that condition, I think it > does make it free. Consider responsibility. If one of the causes of a > situation was "internal" to my volition, doesn't that make me responsible? Not if many of the others are based on the way you've learned to react to experiences. If you've learned from your parents that the way to react to an argument with your spouse is violence, are you "responsible" when you act that way? Do you "choose" to do so? Is there a force you can exercise to react differently? Is your "choice" of reaction FREE? -- "Do I just cut 'em up like regular chickens?" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr