tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (07/21/85)
*** REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR MESSAGE *** <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> I am a newcomer to the net, and I apologize in advance for any ineptness in using the system. I have followed the free will debate for a couple of weeks -- long enough to have something to add. Mr. Rosen, arguing the hard determinist/incompatibilist position, is at pains to point out that his understanding of freedom (being exempt from causal necessity) is in some sense *the* meaning of free will. He asserts that it is "well rooted in documentation: philosophical discussion of the topic for centuries has used that definition, as does the dictionary." He then points out that if free will indeed involves a suspension of physical law, then it is incompatible with a scientific worldview. It is, in short, a fiction. This is, in my view, a mistaken way to approach the matter. First of all, a dictionary is the *last* place to look for the meaning of any philosophically interesting term, since a dictionary merely records guidelines of acceptable usage. What is acceptable usage need not be philosophically legitimate. It is a howler to suppose that "free will" has some single univocal meaning that is historically entrenched. This concept has been under philosophic scrutiny for a *long* time; it has worn many "definitions." Hence, it is just wrong to point, as Mr. Rosen does, to a definition of free will as "espoused for centuries and as understood by philosophers and laypeople alike." There is an aspect of human reality that has been of intense interest and concern to thinking people of the West for a very long time. This aspect has something to do with one's intuition of authorship of one's actions. It has been named "free will", and the task of philosophy is not to prove that it does or does not "exist", but to *understand* it and fit it into a larger worldview. For a long time, that larger worldview was religious, and free will was tightly linked to salvation and immortality. I believe that it is this worldview that Mr. Rosen refers to as "wishful thinking." Today, the larger worldview is a scientific one. The *hypothesis* of free will as an emergent property of certain systems is at least a promising one. It is a significant line of questioning that is initiated when one wonders whether there is any rational basis for distinguishing between free and non-free systems. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, the significant definitions come at the *end*, not at the beginning, of philosophical inquiry. And we all know that the deepest inquiries do not end. Todd C. Moody (tmoody@sjuvax) Philosophy Department St. Joseph's University Philadelphia, PA 19131
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (07/24/85)
In article <> tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) writes: > It is a howler to suppose that "free will" >has some single univocal meaning that is historically entrenched. This >concept has been under philosophic scrutiny for a *long* time; it has >worn many "definitions." >... >...the task of philosophy is >not to prove that [free will] does or does not "exist", >but to *understand* it and fit it into a larger worldview. Buy that man a Classic Coke -- Todd Moody makes some excellent points. Freud, like Rosen, argued that freedom is an illusion because our actions are determined by mechanisms beyond our awareness. But one of the principal strands of meaning in the complex notion of freedom has been the ability to do as one wishes, or (a more sophisticated notion) the capacity to make rational choices. We call a man who has been "liberated" (from prison, oppression, bondage to sin, neurosis, ignorance) "free" not only because the previous constraints have been removed, but also because in a positive sense he can now achieve his goals, fulfill his desires, take action according to rational criteria, etc. The fact that his goals, desires, and choices may be determined by "chemicals" (why not quarks and leptons?) or prior events does not negate this new ability of his, just as when Paul (of Tarsus, not Torek) became "a slave to Christ" (i.e. his will was determined by Christ's) he experienced it as freedom from bondage to sin and the law, and wrote about it in those terms (in the Epistle to the Romans, I think). (Rich please note: this comment is not directed against Jewish beliefs about the Law.) Understanding how rational choice-making is possible, given our scientific worldview, seems to be the current philosophical task in this area, requiring a philosophical finesse akin to the theological finesse required for steering between the Pelagian and Manichaean heresies. (Augustine's *Confessions* is one of the more interesting discussions of freedom.) Hope this confuses things. Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes