cjp@vax135.UUCP (Charles Poirier) (07/22/85)
[Paul Torek]: > We even agree that the non-existence of what *he* [Rich Rosen] calls > "free will" is nothing to worry about. Great! I will cease discussing it for now. > But I think that fact shows that something is wrong with his > definition, for surely most people want to be "free". Because Paul quotes the word "free", I infer that the point is not (the irrelevancy that) people want to be free (without the quotes). I take this rather as saying "let's not waste the word 'free' on something unproductive"; as saying "we've disposed of classical free will, so let's address a relaxed meaning: that which people commonly perceive as 'the ability to have, and to act on, one's own decisions.'" I proceed on the basis of this interpretation, for which I find further support in Paul's comments: > A cause of behavior is not strictly external if it operates through > "man" and his "volition". [The ability to have one's own decisions.] > Examples of unfree behavior are: being forcibly dragged where you > don't want to go, being locked behind bars and thus confined, etc. [The (in)ability to act on one's own decisions.] I note that these are references to *behavior*, and not specifically to *will* or volition. Perhaps in the reductionist, determinist sense which we (excepting John Williams -- I hope to address his reference to QM if I have time) have disposed of, "volition" is a special case of "behavior". But having disposed of that, I suggest for the sake of clarity (a much-needed commodity) that we restrict our use of "behavior" to refer to things that are consequences of volition and exclude volition itself. I further suggest that we should refrain from implicitly equating "free will" (self-directed volition) with "free behavior" (self-directed action). Do so explicitly if you must. "Will" is what you want to do, not what you do do. Ok so far? I let "behavior" refer to physical or mental action. That which you more-or-less instantaneously know that you want is "volition", but that which you more-or-less have to analyze and figure out (through time) that you want, is a case of "behavior". I draw a fine line through "REA" with the above classification. If I understand it correctly (and I'm far from sure), rational evaluative analysis consists of analytical behavior followed by a (possibly new) volitional state. > Conversely, when the direct causes are internal to "man's volition", > the behavior is free. [taken out of sequence from the next quote] This concept is "free behavior". It certainly exists in some cases: "I pick my nose" (because I felt like it). "Unfree behavior" also exists: "I sneeze" (even though I didn't want to sneeze). > In all these examples [jailing, etc.] the DIRECT cause of the > behavior is external to the man and his volition, THAT is what makes > them unfree. The so-called "acts" of being dragged away, jailed, *et cetera* I don't count as behavior at all. If one counts a falling rock as exhibiting "unfree behavior", one must count a rock just sitting there as "intelligent behavior". Phooey. These things are trivial. I think we should return to "free will" and leave the discussion of behavior to the behaviorists. Getting back to the point, I think this quote sums up Paul's meaning of "free will": > We are made unfree only when there are influences on us that we > *should* reject but *don't*. (Implicitly) what we should reject is what REA tells us to reject. To the extent that rationality is only relative (can't always be determined absolutely), this means free will can't be an absolute. Such a concept of "relatively free will" I find reasonable and acceptable, but not very powerful. I have some final questions about REA for Paul. Since I missed the full original exposition, mail any obviously redundant answers. Suppose someone makes a stupid decision (or action). Does its stupidity *per se* preclude its having been based on REA? Does one qualify for REA if one considered the consequences of the decision in a way that seemed rational but "objectively wasn't" (whatever that might mean)? Does one qualify if one even peripherally considered the consequences? If he just accepted someone else's analysis without getting an opportunity to analyze for himself first? Simply if the choice was self-directed? Bit-wise and byte-foolish, Charles Poirier (decvax, ucbvax, ihnp4)!vax135!cjp P.S. Rich Rosen, mail to your supposed mail address of ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr is bouncing at ihnp4 with the message "Bad system name, pyuxd". Barring, of course, that they're forged bounces and you just don't want to talk to me, maybe you should post alternate paths. Like aversion, (Heave!) disgust for you every last time. (c;
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (07/25/85)
In article <1134@vax135.UUCP> cjp@vax135.UUCP (Charles Poirier) writes: >I note that these are references to *behavior*, and not specifically to >*will* or volition. Perhaps in the reductionist, determinist sense >which we (excepting John Williams -- I hope to address his reference to >QM if I have time) have disposed of, "volition" is a special case of >"behavior". But having disposed of that, I suggest for the sake of >clarity (a much-needed commodity) that we restrict our use of >"behavior" to refer to things that are consequences of volition and >exclude volition itself. I further suggest that we should refrain from >implicitly equating "free will" (self-directed volition) with "free >behavior" (self-directed action). Do so explicitly if you must. >"Will" is what you want to do, not what you do do. Ok so far? I don't think this is quite right. First, you seem to be using "will" and "volition" as synonyms here; I will assume so, but correct me if this is wrong. Second, you should have avoided the word "want". If I want to go to work today, but decide I am too tired and stay in bed instead (this is not a common occurrence), then I do not will my going in to work, although I want it. This seems consistent with the rest of your article. Let me restate this as "'Will' is what you choose to do, not what you do do." This is not a perfect formulation either, because some will interpret "choose" to mean "choose after evaluation"; but I can think of no better word. >I let "behavior" refer to physical or mental action. That which you >more-or-less instantaneously know that you want is "volition", but that >which you more-or-less have to analyze and figure out (through time) >that you want, is a case of "behavior". This is at best a very non-standard meaning of "behavior". Behavior is whatever you do. I don't know of a good way to express the concept you wish to express; nor am sure it is a valid concept. Once one has "analyzed and figured out", and the time has come to act on one's conclusions, one exercizes one's will or volition to take action. Contrariwise, when one takes action immediately in a situation, it is generally because some analysis has gone before; one recognizes the situation as one requiring certain actions. The exceptions to this generalization are potentially enlightening. If an object is flying towards my eyes, I will blink and/or duck. This action is "instinctive"; I will do it even if I have never been in or thought about such a situation before. (It is sometimes possible to suppress this reaction by an exercize of will, but I don't think this is relevant.) I believe that the common usage of the phrase would deny that this is an exercize of my "free will"; although I am not externally constrained any more than I am generally. This is consistent with an REA interpretation, but let me try another definition: I am exercizing my free will when my volition derives from my conscious mind. First objection: consciousness is a subjective phenomenon, not vulnerable to proof. So is volition. Seriously, I think in time we will gain an understanding of brain processes on a level where consciousness is a meaningful and verifiable phenomenon. In the mean time, if you don't believe in it, go away and don't bother me (1/2 :-) Second objection: this is not an all or nothing thing. If I make a conscious decision to buy a candy bar, I may be being influenced by the subliminal advertising. To which I reply, so what? As Rich has so often reminded us, we are the product of a great many influences; why is a recent and specific one more significant than older and less specific ones? If I make a conscious decision to by a candy bar, I am exercizing my free will. If I find myself back in my seat eating a candy bar, and wondering why I bought it, I did not. >The so-called "acts" of being dragged away, jailed, *et cetera* I don't >count as behavior at all. [...] I think we >should return to "free will" and leave the discussion of behavior to >the behaviorists. Yes and no. Those "acts" are indeed not behavior. *Therefore*, it is appropriate for us to keep talking about behavior, since it is closely related to "will". >(Implicitly) what we should reject is what REA tells us to reject. >To the extent that rationality is only relative (can't always be >determined absolutely), this means free will can't be an absolute. >Such a concept of "relatively free will" I find reasonable and >acceptable, but not very powerful. Let me amplify this. It is theoretically impossible to know all the consequences of the facts in one's possession (assuming a non-trivial collection of facts). On a more practical level, one cannot do even a minimal evaluation of the facts in many situations. Consider: I see a person trapped in a burning building. There are number of reasons why I might choose to rescue or not rescue that person. I might get killed trying. The person may die anyhow. He might be a millionaire and give me a lot of money. But I don't have time to consider these possibilities; I must decide immediately what action to take. Does anyone (who believes in free will) care to argue that whatever decision I make is not the product of free will? >I have some final questions about REA for Paul. Since I missed the >full original exposition, I did also. A quick reprise might be useful; otherwise I can receive mail, too.
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/29/85)
In <1134@vax135.UUCP> cjp@vax135.UUCP (Charles Poirier) writes: >[...] I suggest for the sake of >clarity (a much-needed commodity) that we restrict our use of >"behavior" to refer to things that are consequences of volition and >exclude volition itself. I further suggest that we should refrain from >implicitly equating "free will" (self-directed volition) with "free >behavior" (self-directed action). Do so explicitly if you must. >"Will" is what you want to do, not what you do do. Ok so far? Well, let's just say that "will" is the decisionmaking part, and "behavior" is what happens after the decision. >[...] If I understand it correctly (and I'm far from sure), rational >evaluative analysis consists of analytical behavior followed by a >(possibly new) volitional state. Yes. >> In all these examples [jailing, etc.] the DIRECT cause of the >> behavior is external to the man and his volition, THAT is what makes >> them unfree. > >The so-called "acts" of being dragged away, jailed, *et cetera* I don't >count as behavior at all. I was using the word "behavior" in the loose sense that scientists use, in which one can speak of the "behavior" of crystals, electrons, or whatever. To be more precise I should have said "movement". >I have some final questions about REA for Paul. Since I missed the >full original exposition, mail any obviously redundant answers. >Suppose someone makes a stupid decision (or action). Does its >stupidity *per se* preclude its having been based on REA? Does one >qualify for REA if one considered the consequences of the decision in a >way that seemed rational but "objectively wasn't" (whatever that might >mean)? Does one qualify if one even peripherally considered the >consequences? If he just accepted someone else's analysis without >getting an opportunity to analyze for himself first? Simply if the >choice was self-directed? In order: No, but the more REA, the less likely one is to do something that on further inspection is seen to be stupid. No. Yes, to some degree. Yes, if he had evidence that the other person's analysis is likely to be correct (e.g., the other person is generally smart). I don't understand the last question. --Paul V Torek