[net.philosophy] Levels of Explanation and Definitions of Free

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/13/85)

Even number of > = me, Odd number = Paul Torek

>>>>Now this I remember.  This related to your assertion that explanations that
>>>>relate closely to overall perceptions are more useful than explaining what
>>>>happens at the root level.  To which I retorted, "thus it's better to use
>>>>the explanation of the sun 'rising' and 'falling' than the actual
>>>>occurrence."

>>>I don't think I said quite that, though I would basically agree with it.
>>>"High-level" explanations (like heat transfer--see below) are more useful
>>>most of the time.  I do agree with you however that sometimes "root level"
>>>examinations show that we should change the way we interpret our "overall
>>>perceptions".  "Best explanations" as I use the term INCLUDES any such
>>>evidence from "root level" examination.

>>What about the evidence that all that goes on in the brain is purely chemical
>>in nature, that the way decisions and thoughts are contained and organized
>>in the brain has purely chemical roots, and the LACK of evidence pointing
>>to anything otherwise (other than the old standby wishful thinking)?  Doesn't
>>that count as a reason to shirk obsolete and erroneous nomenclature?

> But the nomenclature of free choice isn't erroneous, due to its co-reference
> with the nomenclature of brain processes that underly r-e-a.

Due to the fact that YOU assert a co-reference???  Similarity of nomenclature
is not proof of anything's existence.  And I really don't know what
co-reference you're talking about.

>>>Now, you would probably argue that "root level" examinations show that
>>>we should ABANDON our concept of free will; I disagree -- what's your
>>>evidence?

>>As I said above, what's YOUR evidence that something MORE goes on in the brain
>>than the chemical processes therein?  Unless and until you have some, I think
>>we can shirk erroneous notions like "free will".  

> Nothing ELSE is going on besides the chemical processes.  BUT -- the
> "free will" is THE SAME processes accurately described on a "macro" level.

Again, the sun is "rising" at a macro level.  Is it in fact changing position
at all (with reference to the solar system at large) in relation to the earth,
or is it the earth that revolves causing a PERCEIVED rising and falling?
Are you saying we should ignore what actually goes on in the solar system
so that we can continue to claim that the sun "rises" and "falls"?  Or that
we have "free" "will"?

>>> The reason is that
>>> we have plenty of evidence at a "high level" of description for the
>>> reality of (e.g.) free choice.  Namely, that we do choose things, for
>>> intelligent reasons, etc.  We don't NEED to look at the neuron level to
>>> know that we make many free choices, although it would be nice to have
>>> a neurobiological explanation, and we might have to revise some of our
>>> ideas about HOW choice works.

>>What we "know" is that choices are made based on what goes on in our brains.
>>Sometimes "intelligent" (whatever that means), sometimes not.  Why does this
>>qualify IN ANY WAY as "free"?  It clearly doesn't, and thus you can't call
>>it "free choice" or "free will", except because you seem to assert it as
>>proper usage, and that's not reason enough.

> I assert it as proper usage because it IS proper usage to call behavior free
> when it's based on the rational evaluations and subsequent choices of the 
> person.

What definition of free has a basis in "rational evaluation"?  Apparently
only the one you assert for purposes of claiming that this process is "free".
Can you show definitions of free based on rational evaluation, or show
examples of such usage other than your own?

>>>Sure; take the mental process "seeing red" for example.  Though I'm no
>>>expert on brain biology, as far as I know this mental process is caused
>>>rather straightforwardly by certain neural impulses, which would seem to
>>>be good evidence that it IS "actually happening internally".

>>But we're talking about a particular mental process (supposedly) that you
>>call "free will".  Take the mental process of "choice" now.  As far as I
>>know this process is caused by the brain examining its contents (much
>>of which has been subjectively obtained) and basing its decision on an
>>evaluation of those choices rooted in principles of evaluation learned as
>>the experiences contained therein (also obtained with some degree of
>>subjectivity).  Given that that choice is made on this basis, you can hardly
>>call the result "free will".

> Why not -- because it "depends on" past experiences?  Like I've said before,
> as long as it depends on ONE'S OWN experiences, it's independent *in the
> relevant sense* (i.e. the person can be described as "an *independent*, 
> autonomous person").

"Depends on" != "free", as the dictionary and our previous discussions have
shwon.  Furthermore, the "ONE'S OWN experiences" that you refer to are just
past instances of what goes on in the present, which we just showed are not
free because they are directly dependent on both the external AND internal
world.

>>> No, every time you claim(ed) that "they get in the way" I've argued that
>>> they don't; I've never said "yes they do but don't look at it that way".

>>You've asserted that they don't.  I've shown evidence that they do, because
>>they contradict the notions you proclaim.
       ^^^^^^^^^^
> Only according to your misinterpretations of your dictionary.

Why are they "misinterpretations"?  Because they conflict with your notions,
or because you have some logical reasoning that shows why?  I think the former.
-- 
Like a vermin (HEY!), shot for the very first time...
			Rich Rosen   ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/16/85)

In article <1209@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:
>> But the nomenclature of free choice isn't erroneous, due to its co-reference
>> with the nomenclature of brain processes that underly r-e-a.
>
>Due to the fact that YOU assert a co-reference???  Similarity of nomenclature
>is not proof of anything's existence.  And I really don't know what
>co-reference you're talking about.

I'm saying that free choice is present whenever choices are made by r-e-a.
I know you disagree on that.  But you do agree that r-e-a really goes on.
So, you'll at least concede that IF "free choice" refers to r-e-a, then
it refers to the same thing as a neurological description of r-e-a refers to.

>> Nothing ELSE is going on besides the chemical processes.  BUT -- the
>> "free will" is THE SAME processes accurately described on a "macro" level.
>
>Again, the sun is "rising" at a macro level.  Is it in fact changing position
>at all (with reference to the solar system at large) in relation to the earth,
>or is it the earth that revolves causing a PERCEIVED rising and falling?
>Are you saying we should ignore what actually goes on in the solar system
>so that we can continue to claim that the sun "rises" and "falls"?  Or that
>we have "free" "will"?

We have r-e-a.  If that is a genuine case of "free will", then we have
free will.  Our disagreement has degenerated into a purely verbal disagree-
ment:  a disagreement about the meaning of the word "free".

>What definition of free has a basis in "rational evaluation"?  Apparently
>only the one you assert for purposes of claiming that this process is "free".
>Can you show definitions of free based on rational evaluation, or show
>examples of such usage other than your own?

I probably can't find a dictionary definition that states "free = based in
rational evaluation".  I CAN find examples of usage that support my
definition, though.  For example, there was an interview in *Science Digest*
or some such magazine in which a well-known evolutionary biologist responded
to a question about "free will".   I'll dig it up.

>> ... Like I've said before, as long as it [choice] depends on ONE'S OWN
>> experiences, it's independent *in the relevant sense* (i.e. the person
>> can be described as "an *independent*, autonomous person").
>
>"Depends on" != "free", as the dictionary and our previous discussions have
>shwon.  Furthermore, the "ONE'S OWN experiences" that you refer to are just
>past instances of what goes on in the present, which we just showed are not
>free because they are directly dependent on both the external AND internal
>world.

In other words, you're saying that one's decisions must have ABSOLUTELY NO
INPUT FROM THE EXTERNAL WORLD in order to be free??!  A person blind, deaf,
with no sense of touch, completely ignorant of the external world is a 
paragon of freedom??  WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS (YOUR!) PICTURE??

>> Only according to your misinterpretations of your dictionary.
>
>Why are they "misinterpretations"?  Because they conflict with your notions,
>or because you have some logical reasoning that shows why?  

Because they lead to absurdities like the above.
						--Paul V Torek

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/18/85)

>>>But the nomenclature of free choice isn't erroneous, due to its co-reference
>>>with the nomenclature of brain processes that underly r-e-a.

>>Due to the fact that YOU assert a co-reference???  Similarity of nomenclature
>>is not proof of anything's existence.  And I really don't know what
>>co-reference you're talking about.

> I'm saying that free choice is present whenever choices are made by r-e-a.
> I know you disagree on that.  But you do agree that r-e-a really goes on.
> So, you'll at least concede that IF "free choice" refers to r-e-a, then
> it refers to the same thing as a neurological description of r-e-a refers to.

I won't "concede" anything here, because this is the point I've been
reiterating all along.  That the power to make rational choices is not the
same as freedom.  Is a machine with the power to only make the best rational
decisions "free"?

>>>Nothing ELSE is going on besides the chemical processes.  BUT -- the
>>>"free will" is THE SAME processes accurately described on a "macro" level.

>>Again, the sun is "rising" at a macro level.  Is it in fact changing position
>>at all (with reference to the solar system at large) in relation to the
>>earth, or is it the earth that revolves causing a PERCEIVED rising and
>>falling?  Are you saying we should ignore what actually goes on in the solar
>>system so that we can continue to claim that the sun "rises" and "falls"? 
>>Or that we have "free" "will"?

> We have r-e-a.  If that is a genuine case of "free will", then we have
> free will.  Our disagreement has degenerated into a purely verbal disagree-
> ment:  a disagreement about the meaning of the word "free".

I wouldn't use the term "degenerated".  You may remember that I was saying this
all along:  that you have a very different definition of "free" (as in "free
will") than I do, and mine seems to be well rooted in documentation:
philosophical discussion of the topic for centuries has used that definition,
as does the dictionary.  You're right, it's all semantic, and I've long
claimed that your assertion of "free" = "ability to make rational choices"
is JUST an assertion.

>>What definition of free has a basis in "rational evaluation"?  Apparently
>>only the one you assert for purposes of claiming that this process is "free".
>>Can you show definitions of free based on rational evaluation, or show
>>examples of such usage other than your own?

> I probably can't find a dictionary definition that states "free = based in
> rational evaluation".  I CAN find examples of usage that support my
> definition, though.  For example, there was an interview in *Science Digest*
> or some such magazine in which a well-known evolutionary biologist responded
> to a question about "free will".   I'll dig it up.

You also mentioned Dennett's "Elbow Room".   I must ask if these people are,
as you seem to be, seeking to find a "free will" at all cost, even if it
means warping the definition.  I could just as easily assert that "hot fudge
sauce" is "free will".  We *know* that to exist (as well as we can know
anything to exist, probably better!), so to call "hot fudge sauce" free will
would thus give us free will.  Does that work?  Does that change anything?

>>>... Like I've said before, as long as it [choice] depends on ONE'S OWN
>>>experiences, it's independent *in the relevant sense* (i.e. the person
>>>can be described as "an *independent*, autonomous person").

>>"Depends on" != "free", as the dictionary and our previous discussions have
>>shwon.  Furthermore, the "ONE'S OWN experiences" that you refer to are just
>>past instances of what goes on in the present, which we just showed are not
>>free because they are directly dependent on both the external AND internal
>>world.

> In other words, you're saying that one's decisions must have ABSOLUTELY NO
> INPUT FROM THE EXTERNAL WORLD in order to be free??!  A person blind, deaf,
> with no sense of touch, completely ignorant of the external world is a 
> paragon of freedom??  WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS (YOUR!) PICTURE??

See me, feel me, touch me, heal me.  What's wrong with this (YOUR!)
picture, is that it bears no relation to mine.  My picture simply shows
that the notion of free will as espoused for centuries and as understood
by philosophers and laypeople alike has a contradiction built into it.
For one's "will" to be truly free, it cannot be controlled by the chemicals
that make it up or surround it.  Thus, the agent of "will" must be outside
of the cause and effect spectrum in order for us to have "free will".
On a more internal level, one might ask if we internally can control our
own actions.  I reply by quoting my favorite quote from Schopenhauer:  "A
man can do what he wants, but he cannot want what he wants."  Only if the
latter were true would we have free will.

>>>Only according to your misinterpretations of your dictionary.

>>Why are they "misinterpretations"?  Because they conflict with your notions,
>>or because you have some logical reasoning that shows why?  

> Because they lead to absurdities like the above.

The fact that certain rigorously defined notions lead to absurdities does
not make such interpretations of the notions into misinterpretations, it
merely makes the notions themselves into fallacies.  If the definition of a
notion leads to an absurdity, then that notion must not be realistic.  Can't
you see that?  Or don't you want to?
-- 
"to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day
 to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human
 being can fight and never stop fighting."  - e. e. cummings
	Rich Rosen	ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/20/85)

In article <1232@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:
>the power to make rational choices is not the same as freedom.  Is a 
>machine with the power to only make the best rational decisions "free"?

You're talking about a hypothetical AI project but, yes, it would be.

> you have a very different definition of "free" (as in "free
>will") than I do, and mine seems to be well rooted in documentation:
>philosophical discussion of the topic for centuries has used that definition,
>as does the dictionary.  You're right, it's all semantic [...]

But the Oxford English Dictionary and World Book Dictionary definitions were
compatible with my view, as was definition 1 of the American Heritage Diction-
ary quoted by Poirier (sp?).

>You also mentioned Dennett's "Elbow Room".   I must ask if these people are,
>as you seem to be, seeking to find a "free will" at all cost, even if it
>means warping the definition.  I could just as easily assert that "hot fudge
>sauce" is "free will".  We *know* that to exist (as well as we can know
>anything to exist, probably better!), so to call "hot fudge sauce" free will
>would thus give us free will.  Does that work?  Does that change anything?

We are giving definitions of free will that address what people worry about
when they worry about free will and that are compatible with and suggested
by most of the usage of the term "free will", such as the usage by Robert
Trivers in the interview I quoted.

>> In other words, you're saying that one's decisions must have ABSOLUTELY NO
>> INPUT FROM THE EXTERNAL WORLD in order to be free??!  A person blind, deaf,
>> with no sense of touch, completely ignorant of the external world is a 
>> paragon of freedom??  WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS (YOUR!) PICTURE??
>
>[...] this (YOUR!) picture [...] bears no relation to mine.  My picture 
>simply shows that the notion of free will as espoused for centuries and 
>as understood by philosophers and laypeople alike has a contradiction 
>built into it.

Your definition implies that people with no input from the external world
are more free (less unfree).  This shows that something is wrong with your 
definition, because that's NOT the way people use the word "free".

>[...] I reply by quoting my favorite quote from Schopenhauer:  "A
>man can do what he wants, but he cannot want what he wants."  Only if the
>latter were true would we have free will.

But he CAN want what he wants.  He can be satisfied or dissatisfied with
the way his motives work.  And that's what free will is all about: in
Trivers's words, "reviewing our behavior and modifying it in ways that
seem desirable".

>The fact that certain rigorously defined notions lead to absurdities does
>not make such interpretations of the notions into misinterpretations, it
>merely makes the notions themselves into fallacies.

Yes, but, your interpretation is incompatible with the way people use the
word "free".  The absurdity I was referring to was not the absurdity of
believing that what-you-call-free-will exists -- I grant you, that IS
absurd -- but the absurdity of your calling *that* free will.

--Paul V Torek

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/22/85)

>>the power to make rational choices is not the same as freedom.  Is a 
>>machine with the power to only make the best rational decisions "free"?

> You're talking about a hypothetical AI project but, yes, it would be.

Oh.  A machine programmed to pick the best possible decision is free?
Come on!  What force-fitting!

>> you have a very different definition of "free" (as in "free
>>will") than I do, and mine seems to be well rooted in documentation:
>>philosophical discussion of the topic for centuries has used that definition,
>>as does the dictionary.  You're right, it's all semantic [...]

> But the Oxford English Dictionary and World Book Dictionary definitions were
> compatible with my view, as was definition 1 of the American Heritage Diction-
> ary quoted by Poirier (sp?).

Let's hear them.  Poirier's quoted definition was clearly NOT at all close
to your asserted view, so I'm not sure what's going on here.

>>You also mentioned Dennett's "Elbow Room".   I must ask if these people are,
>>as you seem to be, seeking to find a "free will" at all cost, even if it
>>means warping the definition.  I could just as easily assert that "hot fudge
>>sauce" is "free will".  We *know* that to exist (as well as we can know
>>anything to exist, probably better!), so to call "hot fudge sauce" free will
>>would thus give us free will.  Does that work?  Does that change anything?

> We are giving definitions of free will that address what people worry about
> when they worry about free will and that are compatible with and suggested
> by most of the usage of the term "free will", such as the usage by Robert
> Trivers in the interview I quoted.

See my response to Kenn Barry in a previous article for further discussion on
definitions and their purposes.

>>> In other words, you're saying that one's decisions must have ABSOLUTELY NO
>>> INPUT FROM THE EXTERNAL WORLD in order to be free??!  A person blind, deaf,
>>> with no sense of touch, completely ignorant of the external world is a 
>>> paragon of freedom??  WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS (YOUR!) PICTURE??

>>[...] this (YOUR!) picture [...] bears no relation to mine.  My picture 
>>simply shows that the notion of free will as espoused for centuries and 
>>as understood by philosophers and laypeople alike has a contradiction 
>>built into it.

> Your definition implies that people with no input from the external world
> are more free (less unfree).  This shows that something is wrong with your 
> definition, because that's NOT the way people use the word "free".

Not at all.  Those people are not constrained input-wise, but they are most
certainly constrained by the possible actions open to them.  So clearly this
is a straw man.

>>[...] I reply by quoting my favorite quote from Schopenhauer:  "A
>>man can do what he wants, but he cannot want what he wants."  Only if the
>>latter were true would we have free will.

> But he CAN want what he wants.  He can be satisfied or dissatisfied with
> the way his motives work.  And that's what free will is all about: in
> Trivers's words, "reviewing our behavior and modifying it in ways that
> seem desirable".

Funny, I still can't seem to want to like apricots.  Could you help me?

>>The fact that certain rigorously defined notions lead to absurdities does
>>not make such interpretations of the notions into misinterpretations, it
>>merely makes the notions themselves into fallacies.

> Yes, but, your interpretation is incompatible with the way people use the
> word "free".

It's incompatible with the way YOU use the word "free".

> The absurdity I was referring to was not the absurdity of
> believing that what-you-call-free-will exists -- I grant you, that IS
> absurd -- but the absurdity of your calling *that* free will.

Sorry, that wasn't my doing.  That was the doing of philosophers and thinkers
throughout past centuries.  To suddenly say "No, free will means THIS" is
abhorrent to the notion of language as a common means of communication among
people.  "Oh, you didn't realize I was using MY meaning of free will?  No,
of course you don't have free will in the sense that the words are commonly
used.  Isn't that obvious?  You should have known I was talking about this
new definition.  By the way, I also redefined god so that god exists, too."
-- 
"There!  I've run rings 'round you logically!"
"Oh, intercourse the penguin!"			Rich Rosen    ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr

ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (07/31/85)

>Funny, I still can't seem to want to like apricots.  Could you help me?

    No. You lack free will...

-michael

friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (08/02/85)

In article <1275@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:
>>>the power to make rational choices is not the same as freedom.  Is a 
>>>machine with the power to only make the best rational decisions "free"?
>
>> You're talking about a hypothetical AI project but, yes, it would be.
>
>Oh.  A machine programmed to pick the best possible decision is free?
>Come on!  What force-fitting!
>
	And why not? Just because its a machine? In fact I forsee
some tricky legal problems over the extent to which such a system
would be considered a person and just what its rights would be in
relation to those of its manufacturer!
-- 

				Sarima (Stanley Friesen)

{trwrb|allegra|cbosgd|hplabs|ihnp4|aero!uscvax!akgua}!sdcrdcf!psivax!friesen
or {ttdica|quad1|bellcore|scgvaxd}!psivax!friesen

rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/02/85)

>>Funny, I still can't seem to want to like apricots.  Could you help me?

>     No. You lack free will...
> -michael

No, what I lack is gloobinmostik.  Oh, you don't know what that is?
It's a special power I have because of my gleebwatson that allows me
to do things contrary to my chemistry.  What you don't believe in that
just because I have no proof of it, or no evidence to show for it?
HOW DARE YOU!!!
-- 
"Meanwhile, I was still thinking..."
				Rich Rosen  ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr