[net.philosophy] Defintions of free, esp. Torek's

flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (08/05/85)

>> But he suggested that definition himself -- it wasn't the Omni reporter
>> who gave that definition of free will.  Obviously, Trivers is unsure about
>> the proper definition; he recognizes (unlike some people around here! :->)
>> that there is no such thing as THE right definition.  But he must think that
>> the definition he mentioned is the most common, or one of the most common,
>> otherwise he wouldn't have singled it out.
>
>The way he suggested it was in a pseudo-third person mode:  "if someone said
>this, he could agree with it".  Still doesn't sound like anything but a
>humptydumpty way of dealing with language.

But the fact that he singled that definition out shows that he regards it as
the best, or most common, definition.

>> Not only do new meanings "crop up", they can be deliberately changed, as 
>> (e.g.) the meaning of "mass" was changed after Einstein's discoveries.
>
>Though it still referred to the same physical phenomenon, only utilizing a
>different perspective.

Exactly what my definition does.  In the light of new discoveries, the
meaning of "mass" was changed; old assumptions about what was responsible
for the phenomenon we had labelled "mass" were thrown out.  It was discovered
that what we had previously meant by "mass" -- a resistance to acceleration
independent of velocity -- DID NOT EXIST!  But since there was something
real underlying the phenomenon we had labelled "mass", the definition was
changed to refer to *that property*.  Now, the situation with "free will"
is closely parallel.  It seemed to humans that they initiated chains of cause-
and-effect by making choices; and since it was hard to see any cause of the
conscious states of mind that resulted in the choices, people thought there
was no cause.  That erroneous theory came to be part of the meaning of "free
will", at least in some circles, just as erroneous Newtonian theory came to
be part of the meaning of "mass".  
	But there was a real class of processes that we were labelling
"free will", namely, conscious choice directed by r-e-a; we were just 
mistaken about its nature.  Similarly for "mass", there was a real property
underlying what we saw; it was not a coincidence of hallucinations.  That
is why the concept "mass" was reformed rather than discarded, and that's
why the concept "free will" should be handled likewise.

>> But equally clearly, this person's tendencies are irrational and result in
>> consequences she doesn't want; and would be rejected if the person thought
>> harder about what she was doing.
>
>Excuse me, but who are YOU to tell this person what they WANT?  Aren't they
>"free" to be irrational?  Who are you to proclaim what they "really" want? 
>Maybe they're perfectly happy beating their wives and kids[...]

I seriously doubt it -- ask a few such people if they'd like to change; bet
you'll get an overwhelming "yes" response.

>[...]  Do you still believe that THIS is free will in action?  If not, if
>you believe only when people behave "rationally" are they exercising free
>will, what is the difference? 

The difference is that when they behave rationally, they want to want what
they want (tongue twister! :->); their wants stand up to further thought 
and experience.

>As I said above, those who behave rationally are constrained by THAT, just as
>those who don't behave that way are constrained by THAT.
>
>>>You make a special case about "wanting" not involving constraint because 
>>>it's "what you want".  But clearly that's just assuming your conclusion
>
>> CONSTRAINED, 1. Of persons: Forced, acting under compulsion.  ... 3. Of
>> persons: Behaving under constraint, having the spontaneous and natural
>> impulses checked, embarassed.  {Oxford English Dictionary, 1933}  
>
>Thanks for making my point.  Like "a compulsive gambler", "a compulsive
>drinker". people WANTING to do those sorts of things, CONSTRAINED by their
>wants.  Really, thank you for supporting that with your quoted definition.

But the reason they are "constrained" is because those compulsive wants
frustrate other wants.  If a person rationally wanted to gamble most of
the time (say, because the odds were in his favor), it wouldn't be a
constraint.  It's only a constraint if an "impulse" is "checked", and not
all wants "check" other wants, therefore not all are "constraints".

>  I don't see anything there mentioning one's wants being
>exempt from being a factor in constraint.

But they can be so only if there is *another* want which the first checks.

>  In AUTONOMY, "independence" refers to independence from
>externals, but the internal "self-government" may not br quite free.

True.  But the word "autonomy" can also be applied to persons, and there it
means the same as "self-control".

>> 1:  Okay, call it a "demarcation slope".  You're quite right, it's gradual.
>
>Thus one cannot set up a point at which "freedom" takes over.

But one can point to a continuum over which freedom gradually takes over.

>> 2:  I never claimed that ALL humans are free, or had perfect freedom; I
>> explicitly stated that freedom comes in degrees.
>
>One hand shackled to the wall...

Not really, more like one hand tied to a 15,000-mile, weightless string.
Sure humans are limited, but the limits are quite comfortable most of the
time for most people.  It seems we can want almost anything.

>Oh, now your definitions of free will only apply to a subset of humanity, and
>one arbitrarily defined at that.  ("Who's sane?    Anyone who acts in a way
>I consider responsible, and, thus, free.")  There are lots of "sane, normally
>intelligent adults" for whom the choices you describe are not available.  In
>what way do compulsive gamblers, drinkers, or even wife-beaters disqualify
>themselves from the aforementioned category other than your say-so?

Gamblers, drinkers and wife-beaters are usually sane and near average 
intelligence.  They could change themselves.  They might not be *directly*
responsible for drinking/etc. but they could change their habits over time.

>> "force" you can exercise is rational self-examination, which enables people
>> to get rid of malicious habits.  If they fail, yes, they're responsible.
>
>That's a crock.  People CAN engage in such examination, they CAN change the
>way they think, it IS a viable way to live.  But to claim that anyone who
>doesn't, due to their lack of exposure to the possibility of doing it or
>whatever, is "responsible", is a crock of shit.

Then what do YOU think "responsible" means?

> If you label them "responsible", it is just an excuse for blaming them [...]

No, it's a necessary but not sufficient condition for blaming them.  Some
people react so negatively to being blamed that they shouldn't be, since it
would only be counterproductive.  It depends on a lot of things...

--Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink 		"Thank God I'm an atheist!"