flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (07/27/85)
Subject: Re: Example of my usage of "free" by someone else Message-ID: <1271@pyuxd.UUCP> >> Trivers: What do you mean by free will? There's no question that >> human beings have been selected to review our behavior >> and alter it in ways that seem desirable. >HAVE BEEN SELECTED? Mighty presumptuous there. I'm not sure what is >meant here. Natural selection, as in evolution. Not presumption, fact. >[...] It sounds to me from the tone of what he is saying that if someone >were to call that free will, he would agree that it existed. Nowhere does >he seem to make a value judgment about its "free will"-ness. But he suggested that definition himself -- it wasn't the Omni reporter who gave that definition of free will. Obviously, Trivers is unsure about the proper definition; he recognizes (unlike some people around here! :->) that there is no such thing as THE right definition. But he must think that the definition he mentioned is the most common, or one of the most common, otherwise he wouldn't have singled it out. Subject: Re: Is what Torek calls "free will" really "free"? Message-ID: <1272@pyuxd.UUCP> >Now, new meanings for words do crop up. But if there's one thing scientific >endeavot has taught us, it is to be precise about definitions and not to >frivolously throw words and meanings. Not only do new meanings "crop up", they can be deliberately changed, as (for example) the meaning of "mass" was changed after Einstein's discoveries. >> What Torek and others are saying (I think) >> is that we can discard the non-material implications of free will, and >> still leave the term with a meaning that corresponds pretty closely with >> common-sense notions of what "free" means. > >That's what the argument has dissolved into, and at root level one finds that >the word free does not apply there, and that that lack of freeness percolates >through to all levels. The word "free" does apply, precisely because the reformed term "corresponds pretty closely with common-sense notions of what 'free' means". Subject: Re: free choice as rational evaluation and action Message-ID: <1273@pyuxd.UUCP> >> Anything reviewed and accepted by r-e-a is (becomes) free, including the >> r-e-a procedure itself. Consider: why should I regard any internal feature >> as making me unfree, when that feature is something *desirable*, something >> I *accept* and have every reason to accept? How is one "constrained" by >> something one *wants*? > >I went into this in another article, but I'll reiterate. Take for example >the child who is brought up in a violent home, with constant fighting by his >parents, etc. The things he/she learns are fmaily abuse, violence in >relationships, etc. as appropriate things. He/she learns to expect from >a relationship what the parents each expect out of their spouses, and >grow up expecting and in fact "wanting" such things. Clearly such a person >grows up "constrained" by what he/she wants. But equally clearly, this person's tendencies are irrational and result in consequences she doesn't want; and would be rejected if the person thought harder about what she was doing. >> But if one can act rationally then one *is* choosing -- the choices are >> *both* one's own *and* are those *determined* as you indicate. > >How so? How are they "choices" at all in the sense you describe? The >behavior described above might be perceived as quite rational to someone >brought up like that. You are not necessarily constrained to be what you >call "rational", you are constrained to be whatever your chemistry makes >you. That ain't freedom in the sense you're talking about. It might be perceived as rational; that wouldn't make it so. Not everyone winds up rational, and none completely so, but the vast majority are largely rational and very susceptible to reason's influence. Not everyone is free, but that doesn't mean nobody is. >You make a special case about "wanting" not involving constraint because >it's "what you want". But clearly that's just assuming your conclusion CONSTRAINED, 1. Of persons: Forced, acting under compulsion. ... 3. Of persons: Behaving under constraint, having the spontaneous and natural impulses checked, embarassed. {Oxford English Dictionary, 1933} The non-tautologous part of the definition clearly shows that constraint involves having wants thwarted -- ain't no "constraint" without that. >> Freedom = autonomy = self-control. > [...] where you get your "="s is truly beyond me! AUTONOMY, 1. independence, self-government. FREE, 1. ... SYN: independent. {World Book Dictionary 1983} In the case of an individual, self-government means self-control; thus free = independent = autonomous = self-governing = self-controlling. Subject: Re: More ... definitions of free Message-ID: <1274@pyuxd.UUCP> >(1) There is clearly no such clear "demarcation point", since anyone who >has learned r-e-a does so over a period of time, gradually, and no one ever >gets it perfect, there's always the set of irrational things you've learned >from your parents/etc. that have their effect, and (2) R-e-a is not a >universal. It is a POTENTIAL capability that humans have, but it is NOT >exercised by everyone, and not exercised by ANYONE in its pure perfect state. 1: Okay, call it a "demarcation slope". You're quite right, it's gradual. 2: I never claimed that ALL humans are free, or had perfect freedom; I explicitly stated that freedom comes in degrees. >> [...] Consider responsibility. If one of the causes of a >> situation was "internal" to my volition, doesn't that make me responsible? > >Not if many of the others are based on the way you've learned to react to >experiences. If you've learned from your parents that the way to react to >an argument with your spouse is violence, are you "responsible" when you act >that way? Do you "choose" to do so? Is there a force you can exercise to >react differently? Is your "choice" of reaction FREE? Yes to all the questions, assuming a sane, normally intelligent adult. The "force" you can exercise is rational self-examination, which enables people to get rid of malicious habits. If they fail, yes, they're responsible. (That doesn't necessarily mean that they should be blamed or punished, unless there is no better way to change their behavior.) --Paul V Torek
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (07/29/85)
> Subject: Re: Example of my usage of "free" by someone else >>>Trivers: What do you mean by free will? There's no question that >>> human beings have been selected to review our behavior >>> and alter it in ways that seem desirable. [TOREK] >>HAVE BEEN SELECTED? Mighty presumptuous there. I'm not sure what is >>meant here. [ROSEN] > Natural selection, as in evolution. Not presumption, fact. [TOREK] Not with that wording it ain't. "Have been selected" implies a selector. >>[...] It sounds to me from the tone of what he is saying that if someone >>were to call that free will, he would agree that it existed. Nowhere does >>he seem to make a value judgment about its "free will"-ness. > But he suggested that definition himself -- it wasn't the Omni reporter > who gave that definition of free will. Obviously, Trivers is unsure about > the proper definition; he recognizes (unlike some people around here! :->) > that there is no such thing as THE right definition. But he must think that > the definition he mentioned is the most common, or one of the most common, > otherwise he wouldn't have singled it out. The way he suggested it was in a pseudo-third person mode: "if someone said this, he could agree with it". Still doesn't sound like anything but a humptydumpty way of dealing with language. > Subject: Re: Is what Torek calls "free will" really "free"? >>Now, new meanings for words do crop up. But if there's one thing scientific >>endeavot has taught us, it is to be precise about definitions and not to >>frivolously throw words and meanings. > Not only do new meanings "crop up", they can be deliberately changed, as (for > example) the meaning of "mass" was changed after Einstein's discoveries. Though it still referred to the same physical phenomenon, only utilizing a different perspective. >>>What Torek and others are saying (I think) >>>is that we can discard the non-material implications of free will, and >>>still leave the term with a meaning that corresponds pretty closely with >>>common-sense notions of what "free" means. [???] >>That's what the argument has dissolved into, and at root level one finds that >>the word free does not apply there, and that that lack of freeness percolates >>through to all levels. > The word "free" does apply, precisely because the reformed term "corresponds > pretty closely with common-sense notions of what 'free' means". "Reformed" term? You sent it to prison and rehabilitated it? Do you often do that with words? > Subject: Re: free choice as rational evaluation and action >>>Anything reviewed and accepted by r-e-a is (becomes) free, including the >>>r-e-a procedure itself. Consider: why should I regard any internal feature >>>as making me unfree, when that feature is something *desirable*, something >>>I *accept* and have every reason to accept? How is one "constrained" by >>>something one *wants*? >>I went into this in another article, but I'll reiterate. Take for example >>the child who is brought up in a violent home, with constant fighting by his >>parents, etc. The things he/she learns are fmaily abuse, violence in >>relationships, etc. as appropriate things. He/she learns to expect from >>a relationship what the parents each expect out of their spouses, and >>grow up expecting and in fact "wanting" such things. Clearly such a person >>grows up "constrained" by what he/she wants. > But equally clearly, this person's tendencies are irrational and result in > consequences she doesn't want; and would be rejected if the person thought > harder about what she was doing. Excuse me, but who are YOU to tell this person what they WANT? Aren't they "free" to be irrational? Who are you to proclaim what they "really" want? Maybe they're perfectly happy beating their wives and kids, getting a lot out of it? THAT'S WHAT THEY WANT!!!!! This is your version of freedom!!! "IF" they thought harder? What if they don't get the opportunity? What if they're perfectly happy with the situation? Do you still believe that THIS is free will in action? If not, if you believe only when people behave "rationally" are they exercising free will, what is the difference? In one case, they are constrained by their internal essence which causes them to behave a certain way, in the other, they are constrained by their internal essence which causes them to behave in a certain way ("All that they can do is, act rationally!" from that old song Ringo used to sing :-). >>>But if one can act rationally then one *is* choosing -- the choices are >>>*both* one's own *and* are those *determined* as you indicate. >>How so? How are they "choices" at all in the sense you describe? The >>behavior described above might be perceived as quite rational to someone >>brought up like that. You are not necessarily constrained to be what you >>call "rational", you are constrained to be whatever your chemistry makes >>you. That ain't freedom in the sense you're talking about. > It might be perceived as rational; that wouldn't make it so. Not everyone > winds up rational, and none completely so, but the vast majority are largely > rational and very susceptible to reason's influence. Not everyone is free, > but that doesn't mean nobody is. As I said above, those who behave rationally are constrained by THAT, just as those who don't behave that way are constrained by THAT. >>You make a special case about "wanting" not involving constraint because >>it's "what you want". But clearly that's just assuming your conclusion > CONSTRAINED, 1. Of persons: Forced, acting under compulsion. ... 3. Of > persons: Behaving under constraint, having the spontaneous and natural > impulses checked, embarassed. {Oxford English Dictionary, 1933} Thanks for making my point. Like "a compulsive gambler", "a compulsive drinker". people WANTING to do those sorts of things, CONSTRAINED by their wants. Really, thank you for supporting that with your quoted definition. > The non-tautologous part of the definition clearly shows that constraint > involves having wants thwarted -- ain't no "constraint" without that. Not just wants. I don't see anything there mentioning one's wants being exempt from being a factor in constraint. Unless, of course, as I said above, you assume that for your conclusion. >>>Freedom = autonomy = self-control. >>[...] where you get your "="s is truly beyond me! > AUTONOMY, 1. independence, self-government. FREE, 1. ... SYN: independent. > {World Book Dictionary 1983} Funny how you only use "independent" as a synonym of "free" when it suits you. I wonder if, by this definition, the "Democratic Republics" of Eastern Europe are "free". In AUTONOMY, "independence" refers to independence from externals, but the internal "self-government" may not br quite free. > In the case of an individual, self-government means self-control; thus > free = independent = autonomous = self-governing = self-controlling. Free will = dark chocolate gloop on ice cream = hot fudge sauce. Come on!!! There's only so much stretch applicable in using third and fourth definitions cascadingly until the last doesn't refer to the first at all. > Subject: Re: More ... definitions of free >>(1) There is clearly no such clear "demarcation point", since anyone who >>has learned r-e-a does so over a period of time, gradually, and no one ever >>gets it perfect, there's always the set of irrational things you've learned >>from your parents/etc. that have their effect, and (2) R-e-a is not a >>universal. It is a POTENTIAL capability that humans have, but it is NOT >>exercised by everyone, and not exercised by ANYONE in its pure perfect state. > 1: Okay, call it a "demarcation slope". You're quite right, it's gradual. Thus one cannot set up a point at which "freedom" takes over. > 2: I never claimed that ALL humans are free, or had perfect freedom; I > explicitly stated that freedom comes in degrees. One hand shackled to the wall... >>>[...] Consider responsibility. If one of the causes of a >>>situation was "internal" to my volition, doesn't that make me responsible? >>Not if many of the others are based on the way you've learned to react to >>experiences. If you've learned from your parents that the way to react to >>an argument with your spouse is violence, are you "responsible" when you act >>that way? Do you "choose" to do so? Is there a force you can exercise to >>react differently? Is your "choice" of reaction FREE? > Yes to all the questions, assuming a sane, normally intelligent adult. Oh, now your definitions of free will only apply to a subset of humanity, and one arbitrarily defined at that. ("Who's sane? Anyone who acts in a way I consider responsible, and, thus, free.") There are lots of "sane, normally intelligent adults" for whom the choices you describe are not available. In what way do compulsive gamblers, drinkers, or even wife-beaters disqualify themselves from the aforementioned category other than your say-so? > The > "force" you can exercise is rational self-examination, which enables people > to get rid of malicious habits. If they fail, yes, they're responsible. That's a crock. People CAN engage in such examination, they CAN change the way they think, it IS a viable way to live. But to claim that anyone who doesn't, due to their lack of exposure to the possibility of doing it or whatever, is "responsible", is a crock of shit. > (That doesn't necessarily mean that they should be blamed or punished, unless > there is no better way to change their behavior.) Now, *there's* a sudden change of tune. If you label them "responsible", it is just an excuse for blaming them, for putting yourself in some position of superiority for having been lucky enough to have had the experience that enabled you to think that way. Such "blaming" belief systems went out with old time religion, my friend. -- "Because love grows where my Rosemary goes and nobody knows but me." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (07/31/85)
[Just passing through this argument, folks...] In article <1351@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>>Trivers: What do you mean by free will? There's no question that >>>> human beings have been selected to review our behavior >>>> and alter it in ways that seem desirable. [TOREK] >> Natural selection, as in evolution. Not presumption, fact. [TOREK] >Not with that wording it ain't. "Have been selected" implies a selector. But it does so only in the most general way, and it's YOU, Rich, who is attaching this implication of purposefulness. In every form of evolutionary theory, there are many, many selectors. Most of them are situational in nature. People avoid the tremendous circumlocution needed to avoid that word "desirable" because it should be fairly clear that it is used metaphorically. >>>Now, new meanings for words do crop up. But if there's one thing >>>scientific endeavor has taught us, it is to be precise about definitions >>>and not to frivolously throw words and meanings. >> Not only do new meanings "crop up", they can be deliberately changed, as >> (for example) the meaning of "mass" was changed after Einstein's >> discoveries. >Though it still referred to the same physical phenomenon, only utilizing a >different perspective. Rich has fallen into an important pitfall. There is an important sense in which mass is NOT a physical phenomenon at all. Remember that you cannot measure mass directly; you can only measure some of its effects (primarily in relation to energy, momentum, and gravity). Mass itself is simply a construct which is postulated to explain a variety of real physical phenomena We presume that it is exactly analogous to whatever the true phenomena are, but we can't tell. Because of this, Einstein did indeed change what mass is, because he used it to explain more physical phenomena. >>>I went into this in another article, but I'll reiterate. Take for example >>>the child who is brought up in a violent home, with constant fighting by >>>his parents, etc. The things he/she learns are fmaily abuse, violence in >>>relationships, etc. as appropriate things. He/she learns to expect from >>>a relationship what the parents each expect out of their spouses, and >>>grow up expecting and in fact "wanting" such things. Clearly such a person >>>grows up "constrained" by what he/she wants. >> But equally clearly, this person's tendencies are irrational and result in >> consequences she doesn't want; and would be rejected if the person thought >> harder about what she was doing. >Excuse me, but who are YOU to tell this person what they WANT? Aren't they >"free" to be irrational? Who are you to proclaim what they "really" want? >Maybe they're perfectly happy beating their wives and kids, getting a lot out >of it? THAT'S WHAT THEY WANT!!!!! This is your version of freedom!!! "IF" >they thought harder? What if they don't get the opportunity? What if >they're perfectly happy with the situation? Do you still believe that THIS >is free will in action? If not, if you believe only when people behave >"rationally" are they exercising free will, what is the difference? In >one case, they are constrained by their internal essence which causes >them to behave a certain way, in the other, they are constrained by their internal essence which causes them to behave in a certain way ("All that >they can do is, act rationally!" It doesn't matter, really. The point is that such a person can in fact sit down, review their life, and decide to undergo treatment (such as psycho- therapy) to change their own behavior patterns. Whether or not it is "rational" to make such a decision is quite irrelevant. Humans have this ability to step back and review their own nature. Whether or not it's all determined, it's quite clear that subconcious forces do not hold absolute power in all individuals. The concious thought (and again, "rationality" is not important) of most individuals does in fact seem to control at least some of their behavior. So in this sense, the example is rather flawed, as it ignores the actual outcome in many similar cases. >>>>But if one can act rationally then one *is* choosing -- the choices are >>>>*both* one's own *and* are those *determined* as you indicate. >>>How so? How are they "choices" at all in the sense you describe? The >>>behavior described above might be perceived as quite rational to someone >>>brought up like that. You are not necessarily constrained to be what you >>>call "rational", you are constrained to be whatever your chemistry makes >>>you. That ain't freedom in the sense you're talking about. >> It might be perceived as rational; that wouldn't make it so. Not everyone >> winds up rational, and none completely so, but the vast majority are >> largely rational and very susceptible to reason's influence. Not >> everyone is free, but that doesn't mean nobody is. >As I said above, those who behave rationally are constrained by THAT, just as >those who don't behave that way are constrained by THAT. I don't know about this; I think you can trim away at rationality and still get some freedom (which is all we're looking for, Rich). Consider a number of people with psychological disorders, ranging from almost none through neuroses, delusions, on up into full-blown schitzophrenia. Now it seems to me that there is a progressive loss of freedom as one goes through this sequence, precisely because thinking processes are more and more interfered with as you go along. Equally so, there is a gain in freedom when one sees smaller and smaller disturbances. For the person with a mild neurosis, the determining force of the neurosis may only manifest itself in certain situations, for instance. And the resistance of schitzophrenia to analysis, it sharp contrast to the extreme responsiveness of neurosis to the technique, suggests that there is indeed a corresponding loss of freedom; the damage is on a different level, and does not respond to internal mental manipulations. >Thanks for making my point. Like "a compulsive gambler", "a compulsive >drinker". people WANTING to do those sorts of things, CONSTRAINED by their >wants. Really, thank you for supporting that with your quoted definition. But precisely because you apply this only to abnormal behavior, you have destroyed your argument. I don't think anyone is arguing that these people are not seriously less free. But you've failed to demonstrate that ALL behavior is like this. It's fairly clear that even all mental disorders aren't like this; if they were, then psychotherapy would be useless. >Thus one cannot set up a point at which "freedom" takes over. He's not. >> 2: I never claimed that ALL humans are free, or had perfect freedom; I >> explicitly stated that freedom comes in degrees. >One hand shackled to the wall... I think it's sufficiently intuitively obvious that a man in a cage is more free than one chained to a post. It is threfore clear that it is Rich who has this notion of absolute freedom, and no one else. >>>>[...] Consider responsibility. If one of the causes of a >>>>situation was "internal" to my volition, doesn't that make me responsible? >>>Not if many of the others are based on the way you've learned to react to >>>experiences. If you've learned from your parents that the way to react to >>>an argument with your spouse is violence, are you "responsible" when you >>>act that way? Do you "choose" to do so? Is there a force you can >>>exercise to react differently? Is your "choice" of reaction FREE? >> Yes to all the questions, assuming a sane, normally intelligent adult. >Oh, now your definitions of free will only apply to a subset of humanity, and >one arbitrarily defined at that. ("Who's sane? Anyone who acts in a way >I consider responsible, and, thus, free.") There are lots of "sane, normally >intelligent adults" for whom the choices you describe are not available. In >what way do compulsive gamblers, drinkers, or even wife-beaters disqualify >themselves from the aforementioned category other than your say-so? I think it's well established that neither Paul nor I denies that some people are not free. Rich is also (again) ignoring the fact that a person is capable of recognizing that he would prefer to behave differently from the way he behaves when he is not thinking about it. There is therefore indeed a responsibility there, because the person is failing to use this facility. Certainly in some cases he is not free to. But there's big jump from that to the assertion that in ALL cases they are not free to. >> The >> "force" you can exercise is rational self-examination, which enables people >> to get rid of malicious habits. If they fail, yes, they're responsible. >That's a crock. People CAN engage in such examination, they CAN change the >way they think, it IS a viable way to live. But to claim that anyone who >doesn't, due to their lack of exposure to the possibility of doing it or >whatever, is "responsible", is a crock of shit. Go ahead, prove it. I think this is just a value judgement on Rich's part. >> (That doesn't necessarily mean that they should be blamed or punished, >> unless there is no better way to change their behavior.) >Now, *there's* a sudden change of tune. If you label them "responsible", >it is just an excuse for blaming them, for putting yourself in some position >of superiority for having been lucky enough to have had the experience that >enabled you to think that way. Such "blaming" belief systems went out with >old time religion, my friend. Wrong, wrong, wrong. It is YOU, Rich, that attached blame to responsibility. Not Paul. You impute to him someone else's morality. (Certainly not mine.) And besides, Rich, why are YOU suddenly so judgemental? Is not the pot a little singed himself? You are acting, in fact, as if Paul WAS responsible for his ideas. Isn't this rather inconsistent? Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe "I've never seen a guy with purple underwear before."
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (08/01/85)
In article <1351@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: > >>>HAVE BEEN SELECTED? Mighty presumptuous there. I'm not sure what is >>>meant here. [ROSEN] > >> Natural selection, as in evolution. Not presumption, fact. [TOREK] > >Not with that wording it ain't. "Have been selected" implies a selector. > As a matter of fact Torek's usage *is* correct, at least it is an accepted usage among biological scientists. It is used to mean that the current condition is the result of prior natural selection. The reason the *passive* is used is because there is *no* non-redundent agent that *can* be mentioned. What verb form would you use? Certainly the longer phrase I used above is mighty clumsy in normal discourse. -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) {trwrb|allegra|cbosgd|hplabs|ihnp4|aero!uscvax!akgua}!sdcrdcf!psivax!friesen or {ttdica|quad1|bellcore|scgvaxd}!psivax!friesen
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/02/85)
>>> Natural selection, as in evolution. Not presumption, fact. [TOREK] >>Not with that wording it ain't. "Have been selected" implies a selector. > But it does so only in the most general way, and it's YOU, Rich, who is > attaching this implication of purposefulness. General way or not, it implies it, and incorrectly so. >>> Not only do new meanings "crop up", they can be deliberately changed, as >>> (for example) the meaning of "mass" was changed after Einstein's >>> discoveries. >>Though it still referred to the same physical phenomenon, only utilizing a >>different perspective. > Rich has fallen into an important pitfall. There is an important sense in > which mass is NOT a physical phenomenon at all. Remember that you cannot > measure mass directly; you can only measure some of its effects (primarily > in relation to energy, momentum, and gravity). Mass itself is simply a > construct which is postulated to explain a variety of real physical > phenomena We presume that it is exactly analogous to whatever the true > phenomena are, but we can't tell. Mass hasn't been changed in definition so that it now refers to speed. It refers to the same aspect of an object, no matter how it winds up being "measured". >>>But equally clearly, this person's tendencies are irrational and result in >>>consequences she doesn't want; and would be rejected if the person thought >>>harder about what she was doing. >>Excuse me, but who are YOU to tell this person what they WANT? Aren't they >>"free" to be irrational? Who are you to proclaim what they "really" want? >>Maybe they're perfectly happy beating their wives and kids, getting a lot out >>of it? THAT'S WHAT THEY WANT!!!!! This is your version of freedom!!! >>Do you still believe that THIS >>is free will in action? If not, if you believe only when people behave >>"rationally" are they exercising free will, what is the difference? In >>one case, they are constrained by their internal essence which causes >>them to behave a certain way, in the other, they are constrained by their >internal essence which causes them to behave in a certain way ("All that >>they can do is, act rationally!" > It doesn't matter, really. The concious thought (and again, "rationality" > is not important) of most individuals does in fact seem to control at least > some of their behavior. So in this sense, the example is rather flawed, as > it ignores the actual outcome in many similar cases. If the conscious thought can determine behavior choice, and if that conscious thought is determined by the prior circumstances, in what way is it free? >>As I said above, those who behave rationally are constrained by THAT, just as >>those who don't behave that way are constrained by THAT. > I don't know about this; I think you can trim away at rationality and still > get some freedom (which is all we're looking for, Rich). Wait a minute. "Get some freedom"? You mean (by the way you word it, and apparently by the way others seem to be doing the same thing) that the goal is NOT to find out whether or not there IS any true freedom involved, but rather to BUILD THE MODEL in such a way so that freedom is "retained", regardless of the accuracy of the model? It sounds like a religious argument about god: let's build our model of the universe to be consistent with the view of the god we believe in and want. Sorry, Charley, no dice. >>Thanks for making my point. Like "a compulsive gambler", "a compulsive >>drinker". people WANTING to do those sorts of things, CONSTRAINED by their >>wants. Really, thank you for supporting that with your quoted definition. > But precisely because you apply this only to abnormal behavior, you have > destroyed your argument. I don't think anyone is arguing that these people > are not seriously less free. But you've failed to demonstrate that ALL > behavior is like this. It's fairly clear that even all mental disorders > aren't like this; if they were, then psychotherapy would be useless. Is the cart before the horse here? Is it abnormal because it is not free (as opposed other "normal" behaviors), or is it just a "slave" to a different master? >>> 2: I never claimed that ALL humans are free, or had perfect freedom; I >>> explicitly stated that freedom comes in degrees. >>One hand shackled to the wall... > I think it's sufficiently intuitively obvious that a man in a cage is more > free than one chained to a post. It is threfore clear that it is Rich who > has this notion of absolute freedom, and no one else. Freedom is a lack of restraint preventing you from doing things. "Wanting" to do certain things is just as much a restraint as anything else. In fact, the neurotic and psychotic behaviors Charley mentioned are a *result* of their wantings. If THEY are not free because of that, neither is anyone else. The fact that some people simply want to exclude "wants" from the list of restraints and say "that's different!" (despite the origins of those wants and their effects) is silly. >>>>If you've learned from your parents that the way to react to >>>>an argument with your spouse is violence, are you "responsible" when you >>>>act that way? Do you "choose" to do so? Is there a force you can >>>>exercise to react differently? Is your "choice" of reaction FREE? >>> Yes to all the questions, assuming a sane, normally intelligent adult. >>Oh, now your definitions of free will only apply to a subset of humanity, and >>one arbitrarily defined at that. ("Who's sane? Anyone who acts in a way >>I consider responsible, and, thus, free.") There are lots of "sane, normally >>intelligent adults" for whom the choices you describe are not available. In >>what way do compulsive gamblers, drinkers, or even wife-beaters disqualify >>themselves from the aforementioned category other than your say-so? > I think it's well established that neither Paul nor I denies that some people > are not free. Rich is also (again) ignoring the fact that a person is > capable of recognizing that he would prefer to behave differently from the way > he behaves when he is not thinking about it. Recognizing that he would "prefer"? Says who? Would the wife-beater "prefer" not to beat his wife? Hell, no, he enjoys it. How do you know he would "prefer" to do something else? If he is getting satisfaction out of his behavior that he has learned, and if no one stops him (he might have married a woman who has learned, in the same way he has, to ACCEPT that of part of marriage [sad]), why "prefer" anything else? >>>The >>>"force" you can exercise is rational self-examination, which enables people >>>to get rid of malicious habits. If they fail, yes, they're responsible. >>That's a crock. People CAN engage in such examination, they CAN change the >>way they think, it IS a viable way to live. But to claim that anyone who >>doesn't, due to their lack of exposure to the possibility of doing it or >>whatever, is "responsible", is a crock of shit. > Go ahead, prove it. I think this is just a value judgement on Rich's part. Say what, Chucko? If my experience has NOT involved my having learned to be able to control my emotional reactions and responses, if I have learned negative behavior traits, if I have NOT learned control of such behavior, in what way am I "responsible" for that? Should I have taken my parents in to the Consumer Complaint Bureau, sued them for malpractice? (Malparenting?) How would a child who has learned NOT to think rationally, NOT to behave sociably, change him/herself if not owing to some outside impetus to do so? (e.g., negative experiences from the behavior, external force) I know, Charley, that you have expressed the opinion that you "don't like" certain world views because they "exclude responsibility". If you can show evidence why it should be INcluded, based on your knowledge of whatever, especially in light of examples given above, I'd be interested. >>> (That doesn't necessarily mean that they should be blamed or punished, >>> unless there is no better way to change their behavior.) >>Now, *there's* a sudden change of tune. If you label them "responsible", >>it is just an excuse for blaming them, for putting yourself in some position >>of superiority for having been lucky enough to have had the experience that >>enabled you to think that way. Such "blaming" belief systems went out with >>old time religion, my friend. > Wrong, wrong, wrong. It is YOU, Rich, that attached blame to responsibility. > Not Paul. You impute to him someone else's morality. (Certainly not mine.) :-) > And besides, Rich, why are YOU suddenly so judgemental? Is not the pot > a little singed himself? You are acting, in fact, as if Paul WAS responsible > for his ideas. Isn't this rather inconsistent? I am berating Paul's ideas, not Paul. And I am making claims about the nature of "responsibility"-based belief systems. If you claim that someone is "responsible" for his/her actions, and they do something negative, then when you say they are "responsible" for a negative thing, you are BLAMING them. Quite clear, I think. What's more, if you proclaim "*I* am responsible for *my*self, why isn't *she* responsible for *her*self?", you are implying some superiority to that person---YOU have taken charge of your life, and SHE is too XXXXX to do the same. (Or so you say, or imply.) -- "to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight and never stop fighting." - e. e. cummings Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/05/85)
In article <1389@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>Not with that wording it ain't. "Have been selected" implies a selector. >> But it does so only in the most general way, and it's YOU, Rich, who is >> attaching this implication of purposefulness. >General way or not, it implies it, and incorrectly so. If the whole universe is taken as the selector, then there is no difference between the two positions; Rich's determinism IMPLIES that the whole universe selects. Therefore, it must have been the supposed implication of purpose which Rich objects to. Rich, however, is the only person who is attributing purpose to the selector. >>>Though [mass] still referred to the same physical phenomenon [after >>>Einstein], only utilizing a different perspective. >> Rich has fallen into an important pitfall. There is an important sense in >> which mass is NOT a physical phenomenon at all. Remember that you cannot >> measure mass directly; you can only measure some of its effects (primarily >> in relation to energy, momentum, and gravity). Mass itself is simply a >> construct which is postulated to explain a variety of real physical >> phenomena We presume that it is exactly analogous to whatever the true >> phenomena are, but we can't tell. >Mass hasn't been changed in definition so that it now refers to speed. >It refers to the same aspect of an object, no matter how it winds up >being "measured". Well, it doesn't refer to "red" either. The concept of mass has been extended to include other aspects of the object that weren't included before. It now includes, for instance, the notion of "how much energy I can get by annihilating this object." >> It doesn't matter, really. The concious thought (and again, "rationality" >> is not important) of most individuals does in fact seem to control at least >> some of their behavior. So in this sense, the example is rather flawed, as >> it ignores the actual outcome in many similar cases. >If the conscious thought can determine behavior choice, and if that conscious >thought is determined by the prior circumstances, in what way is it free? There simply is no sceintific proof that ALL conscious thought is determined. Therefore, this question could simply be ignored. But let's assume for the moment that it is all determined. There is still an obvious qualitative difference between neurotic and normal behavior which justifies calling the first "free". (see below) >>>As I said above, those who behave rationally are constrained by THAT, just >>>as those who don't behave that way are constrained by THAT. > >> I don't know about this; I think you can trim away at rationality and still >> get some freedom (which is all we're looking for, Rich). >Wait a minute. "Get some freedom"? You mean (by the way you word it, >and apparently by the way others seem to be doing the same thing) that the >goal is NOT to find out whether or not there IS any true freedom involved, >but rather to BUILD THE MODEL in such a way so that freedom is "retained", >regardless of the accuracy of the model? It sounds like a religious argument >about god: let's build our model of the universe to be consistent with the >view of the god we believe in and want. Sorry, Charley, no dice. If this argument is valid, than it equally condemns Rich, who so passionately argues against freedom, in the abscence of evidence against it. Ignoring that for the moment, I would also like to point out that the Master of Taking the Wrong Meaning of Words has take get to mean obtain when I meant "brings you to" (as in the phrase "It's ugly but it gets you there."). >>>Thanks for making my point. Like "a compulsive gambler", "a compulsive >>>drinker". people WANTING to do those sorts of things, CONSTRAINED by their >>>wants. Really, thank you for supporting that with your quoted definition. >> But precisely because you apply this only to abnormal behavior, you have >> destroyed your argument. I don't think anyone is arguing that these people >> are not seriously less free. But you've failed to demonstrate that ALL >> behavior is like this. It's fairly clear that even all mental disorders >> aren't like this; if they were, then psychotherapy would be useless. >Is the cart before the horse here? Is it abnormal because it is not free >(as opposed other "normal" behaviors), or is it just a "slave" to a different >master? It's abnormal on two counts: (1) it's not what the majority do, and (2) it represents an interference with the mental processes which would be there if there were no disorder. >>>> 2: I never claimed that ALL humans are free, or had perfect freedom; I >>>> explicitly stated that freedom comes in degrees. >>>One hand shackled to the wall... >> I think it's sufficiently intuitively obvious that a man in a cage is more >> free than one chained to a post. It is threfore clear that it is Rich who >> has this notion of absolute freedom, and no one else. >Freedom is a lack of restraint preventing you from doing things. "Wanting" >to do certain things is just as much a restraint as anything else. In fact, >the neurotic and psychotic behaviors Charley mentioned are a *result* of >their wantings. If THEY are not free because of that, neither is anyone >else. The fact that some people simply want to exclude "wants" from the >list of restraints and say "that's different!" (despite the origins >of those wants and their effects) is silly. Almost everything Rich has to say in this paragraph is conjecture. It's quite clear that schitzophrenia is organic, since it responds only to chemical treatment. And to say that people "want" their neuroses is false; otherwise, why would people voluntarily undergo psychiatric treament to get rid of them? As for wants themselves, there origin is still a mystery. And wants are not absolutes anyway; they modify each other. Rich has also avoided confronting the point that one can equate greater freedom with less restraint; to prove his point, he must demonstrate that the restraints are complete. >>>Oh, now your definitions of free will only apply to a subset of humanity, >>>and one arbitrarily defined at that. ("Who's sane? Anyone who acts >>>in a way I consider responsible, and, thus, free.") There are lots >>>of "sane, normally intelligent adults" for whom the choices you >>>describe are not available. In what way do compulsive gamblers, >>>drinkers, or even wife-beaters disqualify themselves from the >>>aforementioned category other than your say-so? >> I think it's well established that neither Paul nor I denies that some >> people are not free. Rich is also (again) ignoring the fact that a >> person is capable of recognizing that he would prefer to behave >> differently from the way he behaves when he is not thinking about it. >Recognizing that he would "prefer"? Says who? Would the wife-beater >"prefer" not to beat his wife? Hell, no, he enjoys it. How do you know >he would "prefer" to do something else? If he is getting satisfaction >out of his behavior that he has learned, and if no one stops him (he >might have married a woman who has learned, in the same way he has, >to ACCEPT that of part of marriage [sad]), why "prefer" anything else? Rich, how come you know so much about wife-beating? Care to confess now? :-) This example is highly dependent on the fact that the husband has a character disorder (i.e., that he is inappropriately assigning responsibility outside himself) or is evil (i.e., that he is unnecesarily destructive). In both of these cases, the behavior tends to be self-reinforcing. In the case of a neurosis (where inappropriate responsibilities are taken on), however, the person often realizes that there is something wrong with his behavior, and wants to change it, but essentially doesn't know how. Normally, a person can decide to do something different and then just do it. Both of these latter states are obviously quite different from the case Rich cites. Phobias are a quite common example of behavior where the person does NOT desire the behavior, but is unable to stop it. >>>That's a crock. People CAN engage in such examination, they CAN change the >>>way they think, it IS a viable way to live. But to claim that anyone who >>>doesn't, due to their lack of exposure to the possibility of doing it or >>>whatever, is "responsible", is a crock of shit. >> Go ahead, prove it. I think this is just a value judgement on Rich's part. >Say what, Chucko? If my experience has NOT involved my having learned to >be able to control my emotional reactions and responses, if I have learned >negative behavior traits, if I have NOT learned control of such behavior, >in what way am I "responsible" for that? Should I have taken my parents in >to the Consumer Complaint Bureau, sued them for malpractice? (Malparenting?) >How would a child who has learned NOT to think rationally, NOT to behave >sociably, change him/herself if not owing to some outside impetus to do so? >(e.g., negative experiences from the behavior, external force) I know, >Charley, that you have expressed the opinion that you "don't like" certain >world views because they "exclude responsibility". If you can show evidence >why it should be INcluded, based on your knowledge of whatever, especially >in light of examples given above, I'd be interested. You forget that people can make non-rational decisions. I say "non-rational" to indicate that the decision is outside of reason rather than counter to it. The evidence is in fact on my side, not Rich's. People go to get psychological help every day in ridding themselves of irrational behavior learned from their parents. >>>it is just an excuse for blaming them, for putting yourself in some >>>position of superiority for having been lucky enough to have had >>>the experience that enabled you to think that way. Such "blaming" >>>belief systems went out with old time religion, my friend. >> Wrong, wrong, wrong. It is YOU, Rich, that attached blame to >> responsibility. Not Paul. You impute to him someone else's >> morality. (Certainly not mine.) >> And besides, Rich, why are YOU suddenly so judgemental? Is not the pot >> a little singed himself? You are acting, in fact, as if Paul WAS >> responsible for his ideas. Isn't this rather inconsistent? >I am berating Paul's ideas, not Paul. And I am making claims about the >nature of "responsibility"-based belief systems. If you claim that someone >is "responsible" for his/her actions, and they do something negative, then >when you say they are "responsible" for a negative thing, you are BLAMING >them. Quite clear, I think. What's more, if you proclaim "*I* am >responsible for *my*self, why isn't *she* responsible for *her*self?", >you are implying some superiority to that person---YOU have taken >charge of your life, and SHE is too XXXXX to do the same. > (Or so you say, or imply.) Well, first off, "responsibility", ignoring whatever moral implications you wish to attach, simply implies that you go to the person to change behavior, rather than looking for some outside cause to change. This is precisely what prompted Paul's (I think it was Paul's) comment that "they shouldn't be blamed or punished, *** unless there is no better way to change their behavior. ***" Under Rich's system, on the other hand, there's no reason to criticize anyone. After all, they can't control their behavior. But of course, neither can Rich. He's doomed to repeat this argument forever :-) :-) :-) Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/07/85)
> If the whole universe is taken as the selector, then there is no difference > between the two positions; Rich's determinism IMPLIES that the whole universe > selects. Therefore, it must have been the supposed implication of purpose > which Rich objects to. Rich, however, is the only person who is attributing > purpose to the selector. [WINGATE] That's funny, I thought it was the religionists who imputed purpose to the process of selection by calling it "god" and giving it a will and deeming it "good". > Well, it doesn't refer to "red" either. The concept of mass has been extended > to include other aspects of the object that weren't included before. It now > includes, for instance, the notion of "how much energy I can get by > annihilating this object." Extending a definition is very different from fundamentally altering it in its entirety. >>If the conscious thought can determine behavior choice, and if that conscious >>thought is determined by the prior circumstances, in what way is it free? > There simply is no sceintific proof that ALL conscious thought is determined. > Therefore, this question could simply be ignored. It could be (and is) by those who simply WANT to believe that the workings of the human brain are fundamentally different from those of other things in the universe. What evidence is presented to make such a distinction? Could the basis for this distinction JUST POSSIBLY be anthropocentrism and wishful thinking? (NAAH!) > But let's assume for the > moment that it is all determined. There is still an obvious qualitative > difference between neurotic and normal behavior which justifies calling the > first "free". (see below) I always shudder when someone says "an obvious ...". It's usually a camouflage for a lack of substantiation behind an assertion. If it's not in this case, I'd be curious to hear specifics about this qualitative difference. I think you meant to say "calling the second 'free'", but it just goes to show that it can go either way, can't it? >>> I don't know about this; I think you can trim away at rationality and still >>> get some freedom (which is all we're looking for, Rich). >>Wait a minute. "Get some freedom"? You mean (by the way you word it, >>and apparently by the way others seem to be doing the same thing) that the >>goal is NOT to find out whether or not there IS any true freedom involved, >>but rather to BUILD THE MODEL in such a way so that freedom is "retained", >>regardless of the accuracy of the model? It sounds like a religious argument >>about god: let's build our model of the universe to be consistent with the >>view of the god we believe in and want. Sorry, Charley, no dice. > If this argument is valid, than it equally condemns Rich, who so passionately > argues against freedom, in the abscence of evidence against it. I think your logic is a bit cockeyed there. What I am doing in no different than arguing against the existence of unicorns, despite the fact that "there's no evidence that unicorns don't exist". (whatever that means) Only if you work from "freedom exists" as an assumption (the way you work from "god exists", for example) is there a need to "disprove" that. But you don't assume that the things you're "looking for" (as you put it) necessarily exist a priori. (Things like gods and freedom.) To do so is, you guessed it, wishful thinking. > Ignoring that > for the moment, I would also like to point out that the Master of Taking the > Wrong Meaning of Words has take get to mean obtain when I meant "brings you > to" (as in the phrase "It's ugly but it gets you there."). What wrong meaning did I extract from your use of the phrase "looking for"? (said Mr. Rosen to the Master of Attempting to Alter the Meaning of What He Had Already Said...) >>Is the cart before the horse here? Is it abnormal because it is not free >>(as opposed other "normal" behaviors), or is it just a "slave" to a different >>master? > It's abnormal on two counts: (1) it's not what the majority do, Normality is determined (like reality) by popular consensus. Let's take a vote on whether god exists. On whether wearing loud shirts is "abnormal". Or any other behavior you might want to JUDGE... > and (2) it represents an interference with the mental processes which would be > there if there were no disorder. Charley, did you fail "Attaching Horses to Carts 101"? :-) Who's to say that the behavior YOU call normal represents "no disorder"? >>Freedom is a lack of restraint preventing you from doing things. "Wanting" >>to do certain things is just as much a restraint as anything else. In fact, >>the neurotic and psychotic behaviors Charley mentioned are a *result* of >>their wantings. If THEY are not free because of that, neither is anyone >>else. The fact that some people simply want to exclude "wants" from the >>list of restraints and say "that's different!" (despite the origins >>of those wants and their effects) is silly. > Almost everything Rich has to say in this paragraph is conjecture. It's quite > clear that schitzophrenia is organic, since it responds only to chemical > treatment. And to say that people "want" their neuroses is false; otherwise, > why would people voluntarily undergo psychiatric treament to get rid of them? Why is it "quite clear" that schizophrenia is organic, but not clear that human thought is based on basic physical biochemistry and thus subject to physical law? Aren't you being arbitrary? Note that I didn't say "their neuroses are caused by their wants" (as Charles implies), I said THEIR BEHAVIORS are caused by their wants. The neuroses/psychoses change what these people WANT. They WANT to engage in the silly or violent or whatever behavior they engage in, because, as you admit, there is an organic basis that changes their brain chemistry!!!! Thank you for supporting my point, although somewhat unwittingly. > As for wants themselves, there origin is still a mystery. And wants are not > absolutes anyway; they modify each other. Rich has also avoided confronting > the point that one can equate greater freedom with less restraint; to prove > his point, he must demonstrate that the restraints are complete. My points ARE that the restraints exist at a deeper level than you might choose to realize, that at bottom level the illusion that you are choosing this "freely" is based on restraints: you "want" to do this or that BECAUSE of the way your brain has been organized by previous experiences. >>>I think it's well established that neither Paul nor I denies that some >>>people are not free. Rich is also (again) ignoring the fact that a >>>person is capable of recognizing that he would prefer to behave >>>differently from the way he behaves when he is not thinking about it. >>Recognizing that he would "prefer"? Says who? Would the wife-beater >>"prefer" not to beat his wife? Hell, no, he enjoys it. How do you know >>he would "prefer" to do something else? If he is getting satisfaction >>out of his behavior that he has learned, and if no one stops him (he >>might have married a woman who has learned, in the same way he has, >>to ACCEPT that of part of marriage [sad]), why "prefer" anything else? > Rich, how come you know so much about wife-beating? Care to confess now? :-) Maybe I have friends who have suffered at the hands of abusive husbands. Maybe I have seen people completely "unrepentant" about doing such things because they had learned that this was the thing to do. Your cute statement (in your opinion) represents such a callous and vacuous disregard for such things that it shocks me that I am still continuing this discussion. > This example is highly dependent on the fact that the husband has a character > disorder (i.e., that he is inappropriately assigning responsibility outside > himself) or is evil (i.e., that he is unnecesarily destructive). In both > of these cases, the behavior tends to be self-reinforcing. In the case of a > neurosis (where inappropriate responsibilities are taken on), however, the > person often realizes that there is something wrong with his behavior, and > wants to change it, but essentially doesn't know how. Normally, a person > can decide to do something different and then just do it. Both of these > latter states are obviously quite different from the case Rich cites. > Phobias are a quite common example of behavior where the person does NOT > desire the behavior, but is unable to stop it. You draw a line between psychosis and neurosis that I am not sure is valid from the perspective of psychological definitions, but nonetheless it is a valid line to draw. The line I am referring to is the line between "negative" behaviors that the person knows are maladaptive/counterproductive/ wrong and wants to change them but can't, and similar behaviors that the person has learned to be "OK, no problem". I'm just not sure if those two words represent this dichotomy. But I fail to see what relevance this has to the topic at hand. In both cases, the fact that the behavior sees nothing wrong with the behavior, or that he/she feels unable to do anything to change it, is part of that person's learning from experiences, and is part of that person's brain, as the behaviors themselves are. So? >>If my experience has NOT involved my having learned to >>be able to control my emotional reactions and responses, if I have learned >>negative behavior traits, if I have NOT learned control of such behavior, >>in what way am I "responsible" for that? Should I have taken my parents in >>to the Consumer Complaint Bureau, sued them for malpractice? (Malparenting?) >>How would a child who has learned NOT to think rationally, NOT to behave >>sociably, change him/herself if not owing to some outside impetus to do so? >>(e.g., negative experiences from the behavior, external force) I know, >>Charley, that you have expressed the opinion that you "don't like" certain >>world views because they "exclude responsibility". If you can show evidence >>why it should be INcluded, based on your knowledge of whatever, especially >>in light of examples given above, I'd be interested. > You forget that people can make non-rational decisions. I say "non-rational" > to indicate that the decision is outside of reason rather than counter to it. > The evidence is in fact on my side, not Rich's. People go to get > psychological help every day in ridding themselves of irrational behavior > learned from their parents. Again, so? What does that prove? Yes, indeed, people do what you describe. They fit into the category you labelled above as "neurotic". Their experience has led them to the point where they "cannot take it anymore". If their experience includes the knowledge that such therapy can and does help people, and if they also have come to believe that people are not stigmatized by having such therapy, they may go. If not, if their experience is that "therapy is for nutcases who are treated by shrinks in looneybins", they most likely will not go (unless forced), and might resort to any number of actions in response to their desperateness. > Well, first off, "responsibility", ignoring whatever moral implications you > wish to attach, simply implies that you go to the person to change behavior, > rather than looking for some outside cause to change. This is precisely what > prompted Paul's (I think it was Paul's) comment that "they shouldn't be > blamed or punished, *** unless there is no better way to change their > behavior. ***" Again, a better way may exist, but if they have been made unaware of it or turned against it by family/church/media indoctrination, then they CANNOT be blamed for not taking that path. > Under Rich's system, on the other hand, there's no reason to criticize anyone. > After all, they can't control their behavior. But of course, neither can > Rich. He's doomed to repeat this argument forever :-) :-) :-) But such criticism is itself an external stimulus that, if the person can see the reasoning behind the viewpoint held by the other person, can (to use Paul Dubois' favorite word) PRO-FOUNDly influence that person's life, hopefully in a very positive way. Of course, if they are so entrenched in a particular mindset that has taught them to deny such reasoning when it presents itself, or to ignore it, or bestow evil qualities onto it, then you're right, it is very likely that they will never change. I find this very very sad. I think you know which type of mindset I am referring to. -- Providing the mininum daily adult requirement of sacrilege... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr