mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/10/85)
In article <1433@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>If the conscious thought can determine behavior choice, and if that >>>conscious thought is determined by the prior circumstances, in what >>>way is it free? >> There simply is no sceintific proof that ALL conscious thought is >> determined. Therefore, this question could simply be ignored. >> But let's assume for the >> moment that it is all determined. There is still an obvious qualitative >> difference between neurotic and normal behavior which justifies calling the >> [second] "free". (see below) >I always shudder when someone says "an obvious ...". It's usually a >camouflage for a lack of substantiation behind an assertion. If it's not >in this case, I'd be curious to hear specifics about this qualitative >difference. I'm not a psychologist, so I am not really qualified to go on at great length about the difference. Why don't you go and read some psychology texts? Or other works by experts? >> If this argument is valid, than it equally condemns Rich, who so >> passionately argues against freedom, in the abscence of evidence against >> it. >I think your logic is a bit cockeyed there. What I am doing in no different >than arguing against the existence of unicorns, despite the fact that >"there's no evidence that unicorns don't exist". Only if you >work from "freedom exists" as an assumption (the way you work from "god >exists", for example) is there a need to "disprove" that. But you don't >assume that the things you're "looking for" (as you put it) necessarily exist >a priori. (Things like gods and freedom.) To do so is, you guessed it, >wishful thinking. "Only if you work from "determinism is absolute" is there a need to disprove that." The situation is symetrical. There is at this time no more reason to believe in absolute determinism than there is to believe in absolute freedom. Therefore it is equally as relevant for me to ask why you persist in wishing determinism as it is for you to persist in questioning my motivations. It's all rather irrelevant anyway; all that matters is what the experimental evidence shows. At the moment, it shows nothing except that there is a deep and persistent lack of causality at the levels we now investigate. >> It's abnormal on two counts: (1) it's not what the majority do, >Normality is determined (like reality) by popular consensus. Let's take >a vote on whether god exists. On whether wearing loud shirts is "abnormal". >Or any other behavior you might want to JUDGE... Obviously you failed STAT 101. Normality in behavior consists of what they do, not what they approve of. >> and (2) it represents an interference with the mental processes which >> would be there if there were no disorder. >Charley, did you fail "Attaching Horses to Carts 101"? :-) Who's to say >that the behavior YOU call normal represents "no disorder"? A psychologist. Not you. >>>Freedom is a lack of restraint preventing you from doing things. "Wanting" >>>to do certain things is just as much a restraint as anything else. >>>[T]he neurotic and psychotic behaviors Charley mentioned are a *result* of >>>their wantings. If THEY are not free because of that, neither is anyone >>>else. The fact that some people simply want to exclude "wants" from the >>>list of restraints and say "that's different!" (despite the origins >>>of those wants and their effects) is silly. >> Almost everything Rich has to say in this paragraph is conjecture. It's >> quite clear that schitzophrenia is organic, since it responds only to >> chemical treatment. And to say that people "want" their neuroses is >> false; otherwise, why would people voluntarily undergo psychiatric >> treament to get rid of them? >Why is it "quite clear" that schizophrenia is organic, but not clear that >human thought is based on basic physical biochemistry and thus subject to >physical law? Aren't you being arbitrary? Because the first has been established scientifically, and the second-- well, since nobody has any idea of what basic physical biochemistry is inside the brain, the physical law it is subject to could very well involve lots of quantum mechanics. Determinism simply is not physical law. >Note that I didn't say "their neuroses are caused by their wants" (as >Charles implies), I said THEIR BEHAVIORS are caused by their wants. >The neuroses/psychoses change what these >people WANT. They WANT to engage in the silly or violent or whatever >behavior they engage in, because, as you admit, there is an organic basis >that changes their brain chemistry!!!! Thank you for supporting my point, >although somewhat unwittingly. Your understanding of neurosis is not very good. Nobody knows whether neurosis (which is quite distinct from schitzophrenia, by the way, so I am NOT admitting what you claim) is organic or not. Since it seems to respond extremely well to psychotherapy, it would appear that it is a mental state, and not a organic disfunction. It is much fairer to state that they are COMPELLED to act abnormally, because often this behavior exists in the face of strong desires to be rid of it. After all, that's why they go to psychiatrists. >> As for wants themselves, there origin is still a mystery. And wants are >> not absolutes anyway; they modify each other. Rich has also avoided >> confronting the point that one can equate greater freedom with less >> restraint; to prove his point, he must demonstrate that the restraints >> are complete. >My points ARE that the restraints exist at a deeper level than you might >choose to realize, that at bottom level the illusion that you are choosing >this "freely" is based on restraints: you "want" to do this or that >BECAUSE of the way your brain has been organized by previous experiences. But this is not fact; it is conjecture. No one knows at anything even approaching a fundamental level how the brain works, and in particular how the local neural actions compose to produce human thought. Rich's theory on the origin of wants is just speculation. It's clear that some wants arise that way, but there is no evidence that they all do, and indeed, many wants appear to be spontaneous. >>>>I think it's well established that neither Paul nor I denies that some >>>>people are not free. Rich is also (again) ignoring the fact that a >>>>person is capable of recognizing that he would prefer to behave >>>>differently from the way he behaves when he is not thinking about it. >>>Recognizing that he would "prefer"? Says who? Would the wife-beater >>>"prefer" not to beat his wife? Hell, no, he enjoys it. How do you know >>>he would "prefer" to do something else? If he is getting satisfaction >>>out of his behavior that he has learned, and if no one stops him (he >>>might have married a woman who has learned, in the same way he has, >>>to ACCEPT that of part of marriage [sad]), why "prefer" anything else? >> Rich, how come you know so much about wife-beating? Care to confess now? >Maybe I have friends who have suffered at the hands of abusive husbands. >Maybe I have seen people completely "unrepentant" about doing such things >because they had learned that this was the thing to do. Your cute statement >(in your opinion) represents such a callous and vacuous disregard for such >things that it shocks me that I am still continuing this discussion. My point is this: you (presumably) are not a wife-beater. All your evidence is second hand. You do not have any idea what is going on inside the man's head; you are merely conjecturing. I am rather offended that you have the presumption to set yourself up as a judge. You obviously don't know much about mental illness. And I know I can rely on you to continue. You have never been able to discipline yourself enough to resist the desire to have the last word. >> This example is highly dependent on the fact that the husband has a >> character disorder (i.e., that he is inappropriately assigning >> responsibility outside himself) or is evil (i.e., that he is unnecesarily >> destructive). In both of these cases, the behavior tends to be >> self-reinforcing. In the case of a >> neurosis (where inappropriate responsibilities are taken on), however, the >> person often realizes that there is something wrong with his behavior, and >> wants to change it, but essentially doesn't know how. Normally, a person >> can decide to do something different and then just do it. Both of these >> latter states are obviously quite different from the case Rich cites. >> Phobias are a quite common example of behavior where the person does NOT >> desire the behavior, but is unable to stop it. >You draw a line between psychosis and neurosis that I am not sure is valid >from the perspective of psychological definitions, but nonetheless it is >a valid line to draw. The line I am referring to is the line between >"negative" behaviors that the person knows are maladaptive/counterproductive/ >wrong and wants to change them but can't, and similar behaviors that the >person has learned to be "OK, no problem". I'm just not sure if those >two words represent this dichotomy. But I fail to see what relevance this >has to the topic at hand. In both cases, the fact that the behavior sees >nothing wrong with the behavior, or that he/she feels unable to do anything >to change it, is part of that person's learning from experiences, and is >part of that person's brain, as the behaviors themselves are. So? The definitions I give are essentially the standard ones, Rich. The point is that all mental ilness is not like (for instance) wife-beating. It has become clear that the various classes of mental illness have a wide variety of causes. Some appear to be caused by defects in brain chemistry. Others (such as some forms of depression) seem to stem from presistent defects in the mental state. Still others (generally behavioral disorders) appear to involve normal neurology and mental states, but yet the patient exhibits inappropriate behavior. In some of these, the patient is aware of the problem and is free to seek help in overcoming the undesired behavior. In the case of character disorders, however, the patient typically believes that his problems are externally caused; he does not believe that his behavior is inappropriate. Such a person is clearly not as free to seek help. So there are clearly various levels of freedom here. >>>If my experience has NOT involved my having learned to >>>be able to control my emotional reactions and responses, if I have learned >>>negative behavior traits, if I have NOT learned control of such behavior, >>>in what way am I "responsible" for that? Should I have taken my parents in >>>to the Consumer Complaint Bureau, sued them for malpractice? >>>How would a child who has learned NOT to think rationally, NOT to behave >>>sociably, change him/herself if not owing to some outside impetus to do so? >>>(e.g., negative experiences from the behavior, external force) >> You forget that people can make non-rational decisions. I say >> "non-rational" to indicate that the decision is outside of reason rather >> than counter to it. >> The evidence is in fact on my side, not Rich's. People go to get >> psychological help every day in ridding themselves of irrational behavior >> learned from their parents. >Again, so? What does that prove? Yes, indeed, people do what you describe. >They fit into the category you labelled above as "neurotic". Their >experience >has led them to the point where they "cannot take it anymore". If their >experience includes the knowledge that such therapy can and does help >people, and if they also have come to believe that people are not stigmatized >by having such therapy, they may go. If not, if their experience is that >"therapy is for nutcases who are treated by shrinks in looneybins", they >most likely will not go (unless forced), and might resort to any number of >actions in response to their desperateness. So what? Are you really contending that there is a little computer in there that tallies up all these forces, and inevitably reaches the same conclusion? If you do, then you fly in the face of the evidence. If you don't, then you believe there is freedom. >> Well, first off, "responsibility", ignoring whatever moral implications you >> wish to attach, simply implies that you go to the person to change >> behavior, rather than looking for some outside cause to change. This >> is precisely what prompted Paul's (I think it was Paul's) comment that >> "they shouldn't be blamed or punished, *** unless there is no better >> way to change their behavior. ***" >Again, a better way may exist, but if they have been made unaware of it >or turned against it by family/church/media indoctrination, then they CANNOT >be blamed for not taking that path. No Rich, you can't have your materialism and deny this use of blame. Paul is saying that it can be used simply as a conditioning stimulus. Churches have nothing to do with it. By the way, Rich, have you ever stopped to consider that you sould do something about this obsession you have with attaching blame to The Church? Why is it that you react so violently to the notion that people cannot attribute everything they do to the actions of someone else? You see, what you are doing is simply moving blame around. If it is not the wife-beater's fault, then it is no one else's either-- unless of course there's freedom. If there isn't any freedom, then you can hardly rationally object to what the wife-beater's parents did wrong. You can hardly object to Jerry Falwell. You can hardly object to ME. The fact that you do object, and on moral grounds, suggests a large inconsistency. >> Under Rich's system, on the other hand, there's no reason to criticize >> anyone. After all, they can't control their behavior. But of course, >> neither can Rich. He's doomed to repeat this argument forever :-) :-) :-) >But such criticism is itself an external stimulus that, if the person can >see the reasoning behind the viewpoint held by the other person, can (to >use Paul Dubois' favorite word) PRO-FOUNDly influence that person's life, >hopefully in a very positive way. Of course, if they are so entrenched >in a particular mindset that has taught them to deny such reasoning when >it presents itself, or to ignore it, or bestow evil qualities onto it, >then you're right, it is very likely that they will never change. I find >this very very sad. I think you know which type of mindset I am >referring to. [Enter heavy sarcasm mode] Not yours, of course. [End heavy sarcasm] C Wingate
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/12/85)
This argument is a mess on about 20 different levels, but I would like to stick my head in and debate what appears to be the standard argument against relative morality, one which I find completely erroneous: >If there isn't any freedom, then you can hardly rationally >object to what the wife-beater's parents did wrong. You can hardly object >to Jerry Falwell. You can hardly object to ME. The fact that you do object, >and on moral grounds, suggests a large inconsistency. One can rationally find fault with an action; one can blame the perpetrator, if blame is taken in a non-pejorative sense of causation, rather than ascription of sin or evil. I hold morality to be an evolved, social phenomenon, not some sort of divine absolute. People object morally to things which threaten them, their well-being, their families (gene-relatives), their species; they also have moral objections which develop as symbolic transformations of those basic concrete evolutionary concerns. They incorporate and rationalize these moral objections as part of their personalities. Thus morality is a part of one's personal makeup, not merely something chosen. Much morality is shared due to common circumstances. Groups tend to internalize morality by passing laws, invoking religion, and generally trying to "absolutize" it, since individuals not sharing the group morality are seen as a threat to the group. Questioning or debating morality, exploring its origins, displaying its relative nature, make it easier to diverge from the group morality and endanger the group. Many moderately rational beings notice that they can obtain benefit by such divergence, although this benefit may be only short term; highly socialized rational beings may see the benefit but may have the group morality so deeply ingrained and incorporated into their own personalities/egos that they value group benefit above their own in many circumstances. The latter is why many atheists appear highly altruistic even in the absence of moral coercion via religion. In some cases high rationality may allow one to see the self-benefit of group-benefiting behavior that appears on the surface to be self-degrading. Some of Douglas Hofstadter's experiments demonstrate this: in a situation where defectors always do at least as well as cooperators but the more cooperators there are the better everyone does, defecting is only the better strategy if others defect too; if you assume that others are as rational as you, you can assume they will cooperate, since if they assume the same of you their payoff will be higher. That is, a society of cooperators, as an aggregate, is better off than a society of defectors. Thus, evolution favors cooperating societies (Darwin proposed survival of the fit, not the fittest; Social Darwinists be damned!). Even if Jerry Falwell is not inherently evil, and is a product of his environment, and is not morally responsible, it is still rational to criticize him on moral grounds. The criticizer finds him dangerous, appeals to others in the society who also find him dangerous; suuficient opposition will either cause Jerry to change his behavior in the face of social pressure (evolution has favored our being susceptible to various ego-oriented social pressures, not just physically coercive ones), and/or will neutralize him by reducing his social credibility and acceptance, which he needs to retain power in the absence of coercive means under his direct control, and/or by imposing physical sanctions against him (censorship, imprisonment, execution, assassination, whatever (I am not advocating assassination!)). Those who wish to argue philosophically against ethical relativism need to first argue against the plausibility of morality as a evolved mechanism for governing relatively rational and autonomous beings operating within a society. If I am faced with a choice between saving my own ass or the asses of millions, I may well violate my own self-preservation without recourse to rationality or divine nature; guilt and altruism have been built into my psyche, and fear of mental or physical damage inflicted by my fellows is quite justified. These are the basic components of my flesh and blood morality. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)