carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (08/15/85)
In article <1085@mhuxt.UUCP> js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) writes: >...it seems that this whole argument >is a semantic quibble caused by your varying definitions of 'free will'. At least one person has been reading his Hume. Wouldn't it be lovely if everyone had read and digested the classic discussions of a topic (and some contemporary ones) before discussing it on the net, so that we wouldn't have to reinvent the wheel every time a topic comes up? (How about net.philosophy.expert? :-) Today we are fortunate to have a guest lecturer. Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to present the distinguished Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume. ______________ Thank you very much. My discourse to-day treats of the vexed question of liberty and necessity. It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness, since the first origin of science and philosophy, that the meaning of all the terms, at least, should have been agreed upon among the disputants; and our enquiries, in the course of two thousand years, been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning, and make these definitions, not the mere sound of words, the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly, we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From this circumstance alone, that a controversy has been long kept on foot, and remains still undecided, we may presume that there is some ambiguity in the expression, and that the disputants affix different ideas to the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual; otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together; it were impossible, if men affix the same ideas to their terms, that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject; especially when they communicate their views, and each party turn themselves on all sides, in search of arguments which may give them the victory over their antagonists. It is true, if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity, such as those concerning the origin of worlds, or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits, they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests, and never arrive at any determinate conclusion. But if the question regard any subject of common life and experience, nothing, one would think, could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions, which keep the antagonists still at a distance, and hinder them from grappling with each other. This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity; and to so remarkable a degree that, if I be not much mistaken, we shall find, that all mankind, both learned and ignorant, have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject, and that a few intelligible definitions would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy.... [most of lecture omitted] ...But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science; it will not require many words to prove, that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity, and that the whole dispute, in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions? We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty, then, we can only mean A POWER OF ACTING OR NOT ACTING, ACCORDING TO THE DETERMINATIONS OF THE WILL; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, then, is no subject of dispute. Whatever definition we may give of liberty, we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances; FIRST, that it be consistent with plain matter of fact; SECONDLY, that it be consistent with itself. If we observe these circumstances, and render our definition intelligible, I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it. It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature. But it is pretended that some causes are necessary, some not necessary. Here then is the advantage of definitions. Let any one DEFINE a cause, without comprehending, as a part of the definition, a NECESSARY CONNEXION with its effect; and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea, expressed by the definition; and I shall readily give up the controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received, this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other, we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect; and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding, which is the only connexion, that we can have any comprehension of. Whoever attempts a definition of cause, exclusive of these circumstances, will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define. And if the definition above mentioned be admitted; liberty, when opposed to necessity, not to constraint, is the same thing with chance; which is universally allowed to have no existence.... ________________ I hope everyone will do him/herself the favor of reading Hume's entire discussion in Section VIII of *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Better yet, read the whole book: Hume's lovely prose makes great reading. I can't resist quoting this passage: "So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the CHRISTIAN RELIGION not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by FAITH to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience." [Conclusion of Section X.] Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (08/16/85)
I neglected to mention that anyone who reads Hume's discussion of "liberty and necessity" in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* will enjoy reading his earlier treatment of the same topic in what many consider his best book, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. The two accounts are significantly different. Richard Carnes