mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/17/85)
In article <1499@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >All you've shown is that you have to power to want to condition yourself not >to do something. That happens to be great, and one of the best and most >useful things about being human. I wouldn't call it "free will" though. >The fact that it took time to squelch the desires and recondition >yourself proves my point: you cannot simply will a desire (!) into or >out of existence. I have to disagree with both sides here; Rich is certainly correct that this ability doesn't "prove" free will (in any of the forms any of us have proposed), but it simply doesn't follow to say that you can't will a desire. Since no one seems to be able to say what the will is like, whether or not it takes time to accomplish the action of its choice is irrelevant. I don't see any scientific evidence forthcoming that actions of the will must be instantaneous, so I have to assume RIch has intuited this conclusion. It seems to me that as far as free will is concerned, this ability doesn't offer conclusive evidence one way or the other. Charley Wingate "I'll simulate the lightning."
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/20/85)
>>All you've shown is that you have to power to want to condition yourself not >>to do something. That happens to be great, and one of the best and most >>useful things about being human. I wouldn't call it "free will" though. >>The fact that it took time to squelch the desires and recondition >>yourself proves my point: you cannot simply will a desire (!) into or >>out of existence. [ROSEN] > I have to disagree with both sides here; Rich is certainly correct that this > ability doesn't "prove" free will (in any of the forms any of us have > proposed), but it simply doesn't follow to say that you can't will a desire. > Since no one seems to be able to say what the will is like, whether or not > it takes time to accomplish the action of its choice is irrelevant. I don't > see any scientific evidence forthcoming that actions of the will must be > instantaneous, so I have to assume RIch has intuited this conclusion.[WINGATE] Not instantaneous, but certainly independent. If I have to strap myself to a chair and have electric shocks given to me until I like apricots, am I exercising free will? What caused me to even want to do this in the first place? If my will is being exercised to cause this, what if the power goes out and I don't get the "treatment" to learn to like apricots? Doesn't that mean it's not my will that changes the desire, but the external experience I chose to cause, which, if absent, will not result in NO change of desire? -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr