rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (01/01/70)
> Hmm, it seems your definition of Free Will involves the > capacity to magically, instantaneously accomplish a decision by > force of will alone! With such a definition I can see why you do > not believe it exists! All my definition requirtes is that I have > the capability of carrying out my decisions as long as I am not > directly constrained by external forces. I consider the past > experiences and existing emotional structures which are involved > in making a decision to be *internal* factors, and thus not in any > way contradictory to my ability to make decisions. [FRIESEN] Yes, you have hit the definition of free will as I understand right on the head. Actually, what you have hit on the head are the implications of such a definition of free will as understood by English speaking people. My point is that we cannot whimsically choose to change the definition of something that, as you rightly say, does not exist, in order to "get" the term to point to something that DOES exist. To do so is both deceptive and contrary to the notion of language and communication. It is analogous to calling eastern bloc countries "democratic republics", or missiles by the name "Peacekeeper", or horses by the name "unicorn". You cannot just say "now I mean this" and expect the rest of the world to understand. Even if all the philosophers in the world took a vote, it would not change the meaning of the word. Only the body of speakers of a language can do that by usage. And people generally don't take very well to changing the meanings of words at whim so that oil tub prickle bottom vestige catharsis beany. Furthermore, you talk of free will by saying your past experiences and existing emotional factors are "internal factors", and thus exempt from examination in determining how free it all is. But clearly those past experiences were obtained (initially) in an unfree fashion (say, during infancy), which determined the way in which later experiences were integrated, which determined... Given this chain of dependencies, the final outcome is surely not a free choice: you are constrained by what you have become due to past experiences. To claim "but that's in the past" seems awfully arbitrary to me. Can you explain your basis for such exclusion? > If I make a > decision to change myself, and that decision was made on the basis > of my own internal needs and desires, then I consider that decision > to have been freely made, and any manipulation of externals that I > need to accomplish it may be considered to proceed from the decision. But the means to (or not to) be able to make decisions so as to make such changes is ALSO determined (or not) by past experiences. Granted, being in that state of mind where you are able to induce such changes in yourself offers you the most control over your life, and is arguably the "most" free line of choice. But the ability to do this or not is rooted in past learning experiences, and thus not truly free. Can you choose to learn to take control in this way? If you can, chances are you already have learned enough to take the first step and thus (possibly, given the right circumstances) subsequent steps. But the possibility exists that you might not be able. >>Because the decision to do that was in fact based on external control!!! >>Because the only reason you decided to choose that was because of the >>way your mind happened to be set up at the time. YOU had the opportunity >>to choose that self-conditioning therapy of sorts because you had the >>fortuitousness to have your mind set up to be able to make such a decision. > But I do not call such things external, I call them internal. But their roots are just as external as any other. I fail to see where the basis of distinction is. >>Others in your situation, who want to change the way things are for them, >>may not be amenable to making such a decision. They might choose to pray >>for the change to happen, or to just forget about it and "accept" the way >>things are. > Well, I consider those to be viable alternatives also, they > are not even mutually exvclusive. Or don't you realise that to "just > forget about it and accept the way things are" is itself a sort of > change, a change in one's attitude towards a situation! In some cases, but in such cases it is learned as a result of the experience. In other cases, it is already part of the mindset. -- "I was walking down the street. A man came up to me and asked me what was the capital of Bolivia. I hesitated. Three sailors jumped me. The next thing I knew I was making chicken salad." "I don't believe that for a minute. Everyone knows the capital of Bolivia is La Paz." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (01/01/70)
In article <1499@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >All you've shown is that you have to power to want to condition yourself not >to do something. That happens to be great, and one of the best and most useful >things about being human. I wouldn't call it "free will" though. The fact >that it took time to squelch the desires and recondition yourself proves my >point: you cannot simply will a desire (!) into or out of existence. >-- Well, here is the main difference between us, that is *exactly* what I call free will. I do not remember any proponent of free will ever claiming the ability to magically will a result instantly. That is totally irrelevent to free will as far as I am concerned. Why should my inability to do something I never claimed was possible have any bearing on the existence of free will? -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) {trwrb|allegra|cbosgd|hplabs|ihnp4|aero!uscvax!akgua}!sdcrdcf!psivax!friesen or {ttdica|quad1|bellcore|scgvaxd}!psivax!friesen
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (07/31/85)
>I cannot decide to want to want to eat apricots, no more than you can decide >to want to like people if you don't. New experiences might change that, but >it is not a matter of "will". [Rich] Speak for yourself, Rich. It is becoming clear to me that difference of opinion on this issue ultimately derives from personal experience. -michael
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/02/85)
>>I cannot decide to want to want to eat apricots, no more than you can decide >>to want to like people if you don't. New experiences might change that, but >>it is not a matter of "will". [Rich] > Speak for yourself, Rich. > > It is becoming clear to me that difference of opinion on this issue > ultimately derives from personal experience. > -michael Can you give an example from your personal experience of something you didn't like that you chose to like. Try it. Take something you absolutely despise, and decide to like it. Remember, no conditioning to change your behavior toward that thing will be allowed. After all, you can do it without "new experiences"... -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (08/06/85)
In article <1388@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: > >> Speak for yourself, Rich. >> >> It is becoming clear to me that difference of opinion on this issue >> ultimately derives from personal experience. >> -michael > >Can you give an example from your personal experience of something you >didn't like that you chose to like. Try it. Take something you absolutely >despise, and decide to like it. Remember, no conditioning to change your >behavior toward that thing will be allowed. After all, you can do it >without "new experiences"... Oh great! Now you want to say that free will in your definition requires that only certain methods be used to accomplish a decision! I am *sorry*, but if I make a decision to do something I see no reason why I cannot be free to accomplish that goal in any manner that works. If I decide to like something and I conclude that self-conditioning is the most effective way of doing this, then why is that contrary to free-will, since the conditioning process was initiated by *my* decision, not external control. And if this dort of thing *isn't* possible, I might as well stop going to therapy and save myself a lot of money every month! -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) {trwrb|allegra|cbosgd|hplabs|ihnp4|aero!uscvax!akgua}!sdcrdcf!psivax!friesen or {ttdica|quad1|bellcore|scgvaxd}!psivax!friesen
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (08/07/85)
>>>I cannot decide to want to want to eat apricots, no more than you can >>>decide to want to like people if you don't. New experiences might change >>>that, but it is not a matter of "will". [Rich] > >> Speak for yourself, Rich. >> >> It is becoming clear to me that difference of opinion on this issue >> ultimately derives from personal experience. [Not Rich] > >Can you give an example from your personal experience of something you >didn't like that you chose to like. Try it. Take something you absolutely >despise, and decide to like it. Remember, no conditioning to change your >behavior toward that thing will be allowed. After all, you can do it >without "new experiences"... [Rich] OK. I do not like Scientific Materialism at all, so I decided to like it. And I spoke to Nihil, the God of Scientific Materialism: "Our Father, who art not I ignore Thee!" And lo, I did not behold the Materialist God Nihil, Clothed in Ether and Phlogiston. And Nihil did not reveal unto me: "Like what thou dost not like" This may seem unnecessarily contrary, but is not logically inconsistent: It is tautologically easy to have/not have something which does not exist, like Free Will, when I do not exist either. Which is yet another example, Rich: I apparently used to wish for the existence of Something Supernatural, (as yet have pointed out so very many times) yet here I am blissfully nonexistent. "The real world truly exists But nothing actually happens there.." -not Rich Rosen
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/09/85)
>>Can you give an example from your personal experience of something you >>didn't like that you chose to like. Try it. Take something you absolutely >>despise, and decide to like it. Remember, no conditioning to change your >>behavior toward that thing will be allowed. After all, you can do it >>without "new experiences"... [Rich] > OK. > I do not like Scientific Materialism at all, so I decided to like it. This is somewhat similar to the way a number of people seem to form beliefs: just choosing to "like" (believe in) a particular set based on what the family and friends do without thinking about them. But seriously, what do you now like about it? > And I spoke to Nihil, the God of Scientific Materialism: > "Our Father, who art not > I ignore Thee!" I wonder if the difference between sanity and insanity is that sane people ignore the things that are not, while insane people can't seem to... > This may seem unnecessarily contrary, but is not logically inconsistent: > It is tautologically easy to have/not have something which does not exist, > like Free Will, when I do not exist either. Did you do as I asked and stab yourself in the arm with a fork? After all, if you don't exist, it won't hurt, will it? > "The real world truly exists > But nothing actually happens there.." You just don't go out to the right clubs... > -not Rich Rosen [i.e., MICHAEL ELLIS] -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. NOT Not Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
sher@rochester.UUCP (David Sher) (08/11/85)
>In article <1388@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>Can you give an example from your personal experience of something you >>didn't like that you chose to like. Try it. Take something you absolutely >>despise, and decide to like it. Remember, no conditioning to change your >>behavior toward that thing will be allowed. After all, you can do it >>without "new experiences"... I believe a challenge of this sort was aimed at me by the redoubtable Rich Rosen. So I choose to respond! I have dredged up from memory an incident where I chose to change my desires. It was about 4 or 5 years back when I was begining to become adequate at judo. My sensei (coach sort of) had decided that I was overweight and told me to diet. I chose as the simplest route to stop desiring any deserts and any bread outside of sandwiches. I admit that it took about two days before my desires left me entirely. In this period I naturally did not partake of either free standing bread or deserts (though both were offered to me free of charge due to the benificence of the Yale dining halls) but this is natural since I had already lost most of my desire for them. After about a month of this I broke my collar bone and decided I need any available form of pleasure to deal with this depressing situation. Fulfilling a desire is an easy way to cheer oneself so I decided to once again desire free standing bread and deserts. It again took about two days. -David Sher sher@rochester seismo!rochester!sher Ps: I will be at a conference about a week so if you would like me to see your replies please send them as well as posting, otherwise they might expire before I get to them.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/12/85)
>>Can you give an example from your personal experience of something you >>didn't like that you chose to like. Try it. Take something you absolutely >>despise, and decide to like it. Remember, no conditioning to change your >>behavior toward that thing will be allowed. After all, you can do it >>without "new experiences"... [ROSEN] > Oh great! Now you want to say that free will in your > definition requires that only certain methods be used to accomplish > a decision! [FRIESEN] Those "certain methods" being freedom from externals. If you have to alter your mind(set) using external modification, if you cannot simply WILL the change to occur, you have struck a death blow to the notion of free will. You do have the power to accomplish this decision, but it is not decided freely. > I am *sorry*, but if I make a decision to do something > I see no reason why I cannot be free to accomplish that goal in any > manner that works. If I decide to like something and I conclude that > self-conditioning is the most effective way of doing this, then why > is that contrary to free-will, since the conditioning process was > initiated by *my* decision, not external control. Because the decision to do that was in fact based on external control!!! Because the only reason you decided to choose that was because of the way your mind happened to be set up at the time. YOU had the opportunity to choose that self-conditioning therapy of sorts because you had the fortuitousness to have your mind set up to be able to make such a decision. Others in your situation, who want to change the way things are for them, may not be amenable to making such a decision. They might choose to pray for the change to happen, or to just forget about it and "accept" the way things are. But whatever decision is made is going to be based on your previous conditioning and experiences. You were just lucky enough to have learned to realize a way in which you can achieve change. But the way in which that decision was made was not free. > And if this sort of thing *isn't* possible, I might as well stop going to > therapy and save myself a lot of money every month! If you say so. It seems to me that a decision to choose such therapy, if its purpose is indeed to cause new conditioning or elimination of negative learned conditioned responses, is a very good one. It just wasn't made "freely". What's wrong with that? What decision IS made freely? -- "Do I just cut 'em up like regular chickens?" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/14/85)
All you've shown is that you have to power to want to condition yourself not to do something. That happens to be great, and one of the best and most useful things about being human. I wouldn't call it "free will" though. The fact that it took time to squelch the desires and recondition yourself proves my point: you cannot simply will a desire (!) into or out of existence. -- "Do I just cut 'em up like regular chickens?" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (08/16/85)
In article <1474@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: > >> Oh great! Now you want to say that free will in your >> definition requires that only certain methods be used to accomplish >> a decision! [FRIESEN] > >Those "certain methods" being freedom from externals. If you have to alter >your mind(set) using external modification, if you cannot simply WILL >the change to occur, you have struck a death blow to the notion of free will. >You do have the power to accomplish this decision, but it is not decided >freely. > Hmm, it seems your definition of Free Will involves the capacity to magically, instantaneously accomplish a decision by force of will alone! With such a definition I can see why you do not believe it exists! All my definition requirtes is that I have the capability of carrying out my decisions as long as I am not directly constrained by external forces. I consider the past experiences and existing emotional structures which are involved in making a decision to be *internal* factors, and thus not in any way contradictory to my ability to make decisions. If I make a decision to change myself, and that decision was made on the basis of my own internal needs and desires, then I consider that decision to have been freely made, and any manipulation of externals that I need to accomplish it may be considered to proceed from the decision. > >Because the decision to do that was in fact based on external control!!! >Because the only reason you decided to choose that was because of the >way your mind happened to be set up at the time. YOU had the opportunity >to choose that self-conditioning therapy of sorts because you had the >fortuitousness to have your mind set up to be able to make such a decision. But I do not call such things external, I call them internal. >Others in your situation, who want to change the way things are for them, >may not be amenable to making such a decision. They might choose to pray >for the change to happen, or to just forget about it and "accept" the way >things are. > Well, I consider those to be viable alternatives also, they are not even mutually exvclusive. Or don't you realise that to "just forget about it and accept the way things are" is itself a sort of change, a change in one's attitude towards a situation! -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) {trwrb|allegra|cbosgd|hplabs|ihnp4|aero!uscvax!akgua}!sdcrdcf!psivax!friesen or {ttdica|quad1|bellcore|scgvaxd}!psivax!friesen
js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag) (08/20/85)
> > Hmm, it seems your definition of Free Will involves the > > capacity to magically, instantaneously accomplish a decision by > > force of will alone! With such a definition I can see why you do > > not believe it exists! All my definition requirtes is that I have > > the capability of carrying out my decisions as long as I am not > > directly constrained by external forces. I consider the past > > experiences and existing emotional structures which are involved > > in making a decision to be *internal* factors, and thus not in any > > way contradictory to my ability to make decisions. [FRIESEN] > > Yes, you have hit the definition of free will as I understand right on > the head. Actually, what you have hit on the head are the implications > of such a definition of free will as understood by English speaking people. > My point is that we cannot whimsically choose to change the definition of > something that, as you rightly say, does not exist, in order to "get" > the term to point to something that DOES exist. Perhaps you could clear up just one little detail for me, Rich. If the definition of free will which *you* use is the real, historically used definition of the term, why has the existence of 'free will' been a subject of debate for so long? From your definition, it's obvious that 'free will' does not exist, but the existance of free will has been debated by philosophers for centuries, at least. Were they dim, or were they using a different definition? -- Jeff Sonntag ihnp4!mhuxt!js2j "Just them up like regular chicken cuts, do I?" - Yoda
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/21/85)
> Perhaps you could clear up just one little detail for me, Rich. If > the definition of free will which *you* use is the real, historically used > definition of the term, why has the existence of 'free will' been a subject > of debate for so long? From your definition, it's obvious that 'free will' > does not exist, but the existance of free will has been debated by > philosophers for centuries, at least. Were they dim, or were they using > a different definition? [SONNTAG] Obviously not. It wasn't quite so "obvious" to them, perhaps, because they wishfully thought up things like souls and such to account for what they perceived as free will. The notion that souls (or agents external to physical reality---whatever that means) do not exist is not fully accepted even today. Many people who rooted their thinking in religious beliefs just took it for granted that there were. The fact that this definition depends on such things as souls does not ipso facto make it bad. In fact, it makes it quite good if you happen to believe in such things. Unfortunately, such a belief is a form of circular reason. (We have free will because we have souls, which we know to exist because we have free will, because...) It is only without the added notion of souls, which serves only to make our wishful wishes come true, that the definition of free will becomes "obviously" wrong. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (08/23/85)
>> Perhaps you could clear up just one little detail for me, Rich. If >> the definition of free will which *you* use is the real, historically used >> definition of the term, why has the existence of 'free will' been a subject >> of debate for so long? From your definition, it's obvious that 'free will' >> does not exist, but the existance of free will has been debated by >> philosophers for centuries, at least. Were they dim, or were they using >> a different definition? [SONNTAG] > >Obviously not. It wasn't quite so "obvious" to them, perhaps, because >they wishfully thought up things like souls and such to account for what >they perceived as free will. The notion that souls (or agents external >to physical reality---whatever that means) do not exist is not fully accepted >even today. [Rich Rosen] Whether or not `X exists' depends on one's general axioms, definitions, etc about `reality' ie - Metaphysics. For example, Rich, your metaphysics seem to indicate that everything is physical matter and interactions thereof (which would seem to deny reality to awareness, but that's not important), that anything mental is illusory, that all phenomena are reductionistically determined by causes. Assuming that I have truly characterized your metaphysics: `acausal' spontaneous decay MUST have a cause. `free will' cannot exist because, by definition, all things are determined. `external to physical reality' is bogus, by definition The above would clearly result by logical necessity. However, you'd have to also conclude, if everything has a cause, that: There is also a cause for `awareness'. (let's call it a `luos') There is also a cause for the universe. (let's call it `Dog') Of course, they are physical entities, and they are reduceable, like everything else, to lower level entities. But they would seem to be required by your Metaphysics. Anyway, I believe the Greek philosophers (Aristotle, etc.), used the words `soul' and `God' not out of faith, but out of logical necessity, by force of the fundamental axioms of logic and their basic metaphysical assertions, just as I `proved' the existence of luoses and Dog. Sorry if I've misunderstood your metaphysics. I'm simply trying to understand what you believe, so we may all understand you better. Please clarify.. >Many people who rooted their thinking in religious beliefs just took it for >granted that there were. The fact that this definition depends on such >things as souls does not ipso facto make it bad. In fact, it makes it quite >good if you happen to believe in such things. Unfortunately, such a belief >is a form of circular reason. (We have free will because we have souls, >which we know to exist because we have free will, because...) It is only >without the added notion of souls, which serves only to make our wishful >wishes come true, that the definition of free will becomes "obviously" >wrong. Who has ever given that argument? And who are all these freewillers that `wish for' souls to exist? Furthermore, the circular argument pro-free will you just presented is as empty as the your favorite anti-freewill argument: If free will exists, then it must be a physical phenomenon All physical phenomena are determined by causes therefore free will is determined by causes but if it is determined then it is not free This is not unreasonable; it logically flows from your axioms. But freedom, like love or beauty, is a real and irreducible state of mind (for some of us), even should our universe be totally deterministic. Can I exist now? -not Rich Rosen The body indeed has a genuine ruler but that is the way itself the mysterious order which runs through all things which we follow spontaneously as soon as we cease to use rationality to analyze alternatives -Chuang Tzu
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/24/85)
>>All you've shown is that you have to power to want to condition yourself not >>to do something. That happens to be great, and one of the best and most useful >>things about being human. I wouldn't call it "free will" though. The fact >>that it took time to squelch the desires and recondition yourself proves my >>point: you cannot simply will a desire (!) into or out of existence. > Well, here is the main difference between us, that is > *exactly* what I call free will. I do not remember any proponent of > free will ever claiming the ability to magically will a result > instantly. That is totally irrelevent to free will as far as I am > concerned. Why should my inability to do something I never claimed was > possible have any bearing on the existence of free will? Because that's the definition. What you call free will is hardly free. If you cannot will your desires (and thus your actions) into or out of existence, you are dependent upon the way your brain happens to be at that time, and thus you are not free. If it's NOT predisposed to doing what you describe, due to not having learned it or other possibilities, then it won't happen. -- "to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight and never stop fighting." - e. e. cummings Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/24/85)
> Assuming that I have truly characterized your metaphysics: > > `acausal' spontaneous decay MUST have a cause. > `free will' cannot exist because, by definition, all things > are determined. > `external to physical reality' is bogus, by definition > > The above would clearly result by logical necessity. Indeed. > However, you'd have to also conclude, if everything has a cause, that: > > There is also a cause for `awareness'. (let's call it a `luos') > There is also a cause for the universe. (let's call it `Dog') Or let's not. Dog (or its reversal) has specific connotations of a consciousness in charge, and louses (or whatever) have a connotation of separateness from the physical entity. > Furthermore, the circular argument pro-free will you just presented is as > empty as the your favorite anti-freewill argument: > > If free will exists, then it must be a physical phenomenon > All physical phenomena are determined by causes > therefore free will is determined by causes > but if it is determined then it is not free > > This is not unreasonable; it logically flows from your axioms. But your first statement uses a word that makes no sense in the context. > But freedom, like love or beauty, is a real and irreducible state of > mind (for some of us), even should our universe be totally deterministic. Love and beauty are observable phenomena by individuals. > Can I exist now? No, stay in your cage. Outside of reality. Where there are no causes. -- Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr