mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/10/85)
In article <1431@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>Uh, yeah, right. Let's be sure we know who's assuming what here. Only in >>>your little "smash-causality" mindset, in which you ASSUME the existence >>>of something outside the realm of cause and effect in order to make your >>>wishes fit, does this make any sense. Does Michael have an example of >>>such acausality? Evidence that it holds in the human brain? >> Sorry, Rich; the burden of proof is on you. Plenty of human behavior >> appears to be random. YOU need to demonstrate that this is an illusion, >> by showing the basis for such behavior. At present there is no such >> theory which has truly been subjected to experimental verification. >> Therefore you must be asserting a priori that, since outside of quantum >> fluctuation physics as we see it seems strictly causal, we can assume >> for the moment that this holds in the brain as well. But there is no >> evidence against the possibility that some behavior does in fact (for >> instance) reflect quantum fluctuations. >"No evidence against the *possibility*"? Surely there's also no evidence >against the possibility that submicroscopic giraffes from space hidden in >our brain perform all our "free will" functions for it, connecting the wishes >of our "soul" to the physical body (their necks, of course, reaching into >hyperspace to a realm we know not of, ooh!). Ah, so THAT's what makes quantum mechanics work! Rich, I'm so glad you told me so that I can throw out all that silly randomness stuff away. I mean, I should never have questioned a great expert on molecular neurology like you. [End heavy sarcasm mode, for those of you who didn't notice] Unfortunately for your feeble argument,Rich, quantum mechanics is established science. Molecular neurology is down on a scale level where things like uncertainty begin to have a noticeable effect. The fact of the matter is, our current level of understanding does not permit us to say, "yes, these effects are important," or "no, they are not." There is no scientific basis for your claims, Rich. > Yes, indeed, plenty of >human behavior APPEARS to be random, Charley. Plenty of lots of things >APPEAR to be random, but on closer examination, we find something holding >it together. A bit more complex than some people who prefer one-sentence >explanations for things ("God did it!"), but perhaps they're just too lazy >to examine things in that dreaded "scientific" way. One look at the >universe, one careful look, will show you how many "random" things really >have very simple physical processes at their root, complexly interweaving >with each other to give the illusion of "randomness" to the casual observer. And some things really are random. So what? This hardly amounts to any kind of valid scientific reasoning, Rich. One actually has to break down and investigate what is really going on, rather than spout irrelevancies about how such and such a process looked random but really wasn't. I could just as well point out how the randomness in quantum mechanical events has perversely persisted in the face of all attempts to make it go away. It doesn't matter. All that matters is this phenomenon. >> Therefore this hypothesis cannot be ruled out-- until experiment >> demostrates either its truth of falsity. Until then, Rich, your claim >> has no basis. >Nor my giraffe hypothesis, Charles. It does (and should) have equal weight >to yours. All these systems make assumptions. The "scientific" one >makes the "assumption" that the same things go on in the brain as everywhere >else, and no evidence has been shown to give the brain some special status >separate from the rest of the world. As the straw army marches on, we see Rich contradicting himself again. Remember all that talk about Occam's Razor? Is not Rich's quantum giraffe such an unnecessary complication? The "quantum" and "deterministic" hypotheses, on the other hand, introduce nothing new. We already have quantum randomness. There simply is no basis at this time for Rich to flatly say that his hypothesis is right and mine is wrong. Science simply isn't like that. When someone has actually determined what is really going on down at those synapse, then maybe Rich will have a leg to stand on. >> The reader should note that souls never entered into the above discussion. >> Why does Rich keep hallucinating them everywhere? > >A soul is an entity separate from causal reality that foists its "will" onto >the physical body, independent of biochemical causality. Since that is the >side of the stick you are arguing on, souls are very important to your >side of the argument. No, I haven't "seen" souls anywhere in this discussion, >so I'm no hallucinating them. The "acausalist" perspective muse of necessity >HIDE them from the discussion because the notion is so absurd. That's why we >don't "see" them. >The "quasi-religious" one, regarding >acausally connected souls and wills and stuff, makes the blatant assumption >that the human brain is somehow very different from all other matter (can >you say "anthropocentrism"?), without one shred of evidence or even solid >speculation into what this very different human brain matter is made up of. OK, Rich, then why do keep acting as if I were arguing for the existence of souls? Is it because you still think that I and Jerry Falwell hold exactly the same religious beliefs? Could you please, please step off of your pedestal and find out what's going on out here in the real world of theology? Rather than attribute to me what you wish I believed? If you don't wish to attribute this belief in souls to me, then why do you bring it up so often? For your edification, the question of souls has largely become a dead issue in my church. We have ceased to believe in souls. We are quite content to have material brains, with no outside directors. Rich seems to me to be erroneously implying that I am using quantum mechanics as a trapdoor to let souls in from the supernatural. It isn't necessary. It's simply sufficient to point out that, if quantum mechanics do play a part in the workings of the brain, that the chain of causality so necessary to Rich's position leads to nowhere. C Wingate
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/12/85)
>>>Sorry, Rich; the burden of proof is on you. Plenty of human behavior >>>appears to be random. YOU need to demonstrate that this is an illusion, >>>by showing the basis for such behavior. At present there is no such >>>theory which has truly been subjected to experimental verification. >>>Therefore you must be asserting a priori that, since outside of quantum >>>fluctuation physics as we see it seems strictly causal, we can assume >>>for the moment that this holds in the brain as well. But there is no >>>evidence against the possibility that some behavior does in fact (for >>>instance) reflect quantum fluctuations. [WINGATE] >>"No evidence against the *possibility*"? Surely there's also no evidence >>against the possibility that submicroscopic giraffes from space hidden in >>our brain perform all our "free will" functions for it, connecting the wishes >>of our "soul" to the physical body (their necks, of course, reaching into >>hyperspace to a realm we know not of, ooh!). [ROSEN] > Ah, so THAT's what makes quantum mechanics work! Rich, I'm so glad you told > me so that I can throw out all that silly randomness stuff away. I mean, I > should never have questioned a great expert on molecular neurology like you. > [End heavy sarcasm mode, for those of you who didn't notice] > Unfortunately for your feeble argument,Rich, quantum mechanics is established > science. Molecular neurology is down on a scale level where things like > uncertainty begin to have a noticeable effect. The fact of the matter is, > our current level of understanding does not permit us to say, "yes, these > effects are important," or "no, they are not." There is no scientific basis > for your claims, Rich. Funny how Wingate accepts "established science" (almost like a religion?) only when it suits his purposes. Sorry, Charley, still no dice. In the worst case scenario, your position offers a random synapse firing, not a "free will". And that still doesn't account for what you hope to get out of it. >> Yes, indeed, plenty of >>human behavior APPEARS to be random, Charley. Plenty of lots of things >>APPEAR to be random, but on closer examination, we find something holding >>it together. A bit more complex than some people who prefer one-sentence >>explanations for things ("God did it!"), but perhaps they're just too lazy >>to examine things in that dreaded "scientific" way. One look at the >>universe, one careful look, will show you how many "random" things really >>have very simple physical processes at their root, complexly interweaving >>with each other to give the illusion of "randomness" to the casual observer. > And some things really are random. Which things, Charley? >>>Therefore this hypothesis cannot be ruled out-- until experiment >>>demostrates either its truth of falsity. Until then, Rich, your claim >>>has no basis. >>Nor my giraffe hypothesis, Charles. It does (and should) have equal weight >>to yours. All these systems make assumptions. The "scientific" one >>makes the "assumption" that the same things go on in the brain as everywhere >>else, and no evidence has been shown to give the brain some special status >>separate from the rest of the world. > As the straw army marches on, we see Rich contradicting himself again. > Remember all that talk about Occam's Razor? Is not Rich's quantum giraffe > such an unnecessary complication? The "quantum" and "deterministic" > hypotheses, on the other hand, introduce nothing new. We already have > quantum randomness. But YOU introduce a good deal of "new" (presumed) material on top of that to complete your scenario. Who's the general of this straw army, Private Wingate? > There simply is no basis at this time for Rich to flatly > say that his hypothesis is right and mine is wrong. Science simply isn't > like that. When someone has actually determined what is really going on > down at those synapse, then maybe Rich will have a leg to stand on. May the worst straw man lose. > OK, Rich, then why do keep acting as if I were arguing for the existence of > souls? Is it because you still think that I and Jerry Falwell hold exactly > the same religious beliefs? Could you please, please step off of your > pedestal and find out what's going on out here in the real world of theology? > Rather than attribute to me what you wish I believed? If you don't wish to > attribute this belief in souls to me, then why do you bring it up so often? Then what is the mechanism of free will you wish for? If not a "soul", what name do you give it? The entity itself is still required in your model. > For your edification, the question of souls has largely become a dead issue > in my church. We have ceased to believe in souls. We are quite content to > have material brains, with no outside directors. Good for "we". > Rich seems to me to be > erroneously implying that I am using quantum mechanics as a trapdoor to let > souls in from the supernatural. It isn't necessary. It's simply sufficient > to point out that, if quantum mechanics do play a part in the workings of > the brain, that the chain of causality so necessary to Rich's position leads > to nowhere. All it leads you to is a scenario with randomness at the particle level that offers no notion of either free will or anything else, unless you add in your preconceptions. If only you applied your stalwart defense of this "established science" to the rest of scientific knowledge... -- Life is complex. It has real and imaginary parts. Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/14/85)
In article <1478@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> Ah, so THAT's what makes quantum mechanics work! Rich, I'm so glad you >> told me so that I can throw out all that silly randomness stuff away. >> I mean, I should never have questioned a great expert on molecular >> neurology like you. >> [End heavy sarcasm mode, for those of you who didn't notice] >> Unfortunately for your feeble argument,Rich, quantum mechanics is >> established science. Molecular neurology is down on a scale level >> where things like uncertainty begin to have a noticeable effect. >> The fact of the matter is, our current level of understanding does not >> permit us to say, "yes, these effects are important," or "no, they are >> not." There is no scientific basis for your claims, Rich. >Funny how Wingate accepts "established science" (almost like a religion?) >only when it suits his purposes. Sorry, Charley, still no dice. In >the worst case scenario, your position offers a random synapse firing, >not a "free will". And that still doesn't account for what you hope to >get out of it. Odd how you use that phrase "worst case". Seems like you are hardly one to talk about other's emotional investment in their arguments. As for a "will", you seem to have a very primitive idea of what it is. You seem determined to take it to mean some metaphysical entity. I think it's much more reasonable to take it to mean "the decision-making faculty of the mind". This is consistent with what my dictionary says, and neither includes nor excludes souls. If the will can ultimately be traced to quantum fluctuations, then it's hard to see how it can be called anything but free at this time. In any case, the question is largely moot, since at this point no hypothesis about how the mind decides has any experimental basis. >>>Nor my giraffe hypothesis, Charles. It does (and should) have equal weight >>>to yours. All these systems make assumptions. The "scientific" one >>>makes the "assumption" that the same things go on in the brain as >>>everywhere else, and no evidence has been shown to give the brain some >>>special status separate from the rest of the world. >> As the straw army marches on, we see Rich contradicting himself again. >> Remember all that talk about Occam's Razor? Is not Rich's quantum giraffe >> such an unnecessary complication? The "quantum" and "deterministic" >> hypotheses, on the other hand, introduce nothing new. We already have >> quantum randomness. >But YOU introduce a good deal of "new" (presumed) material on top of that >to complete your scenario. Who's the general of this straw army, Private >Wingate? Once again Rich has me wondering about his intellectual integrity. Rich, for your information, the only thing we know about the brain that we also about the rest of existence is that it (presumably) doesn't violate the laws of physics as we now perceive them. These laws include random processes, so the brain may indeed make random choices. Our ignorance of anything else about how the brain functions and produces consciousness (whatever that is) is almost absolute. There's no basis for saying, for instance, that "since mechanics is deterministic, so is the brain" or any similar analogy. We simply don't know enough about the brain to justify any such analogy-- not even in chemistry. >> OK, Rich, then why do keep acting as if I were arguing for the existence of >> souls? Is it because you still think that I and Jerry Falwell hold exactly >> the same religious beliefs? Could you please, please step off of your >> pedestal and find out what's going on out here in the real world of >> theology? Rather than attribute to me what you wish I believed? If >> you don't wish to attribute this belief in souls to me, then why do >> you bring it up so often? >Then what is the mechanism of free will you wish for? If not a "soul", what >name do you give it? The entity itself is still required in your model. Wrong. That's your outdated concept, not mine. It's highly intuitive to talk about the Will as if it were a being, but I think it's quite sufficient to define it as a process. >> Rich seems to me to be >> erroneously implying that I am using quantum mechanics as a trapdoor to let >> souls in from the supernatural. It isn't necessary. It's simply >> sufficient to point out that, if quantum mechanics do play a part in the >> workings of the brain, that the chain of causality so necessary to >> Rich's position leads to nowhere. >All it leads you to is a scenario with randomness at the particle level that >offers no notion of either free will or anything else, unless you add in your >preconceptions. If only you applied your stalwart defense of this >"established science" to the rest of scientific knowledge... I think it should be abundantly clear by now who it is that clings to this spirtualistic model of Wills. Charley Wingate "Are they friendly spirits?"
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/20/85)
>>Funny how Wingate accepts "established science" (almost like a religion?) >>only when it suits his purposes. Sorry, Charley, still no dice. In >>the worst case scenario, your position offers a random synapse firing, >>not a "free will". And that still doesn't account for what you hope to >>get out of it. [ROSEN] > Odd how you use that phrase "worst case". Seems like you are hardly one to > talk about other's emotional investment in their arguments. How so? The term "worst case scenario" is used whenever you are dealing with divergence from a given model. > As for a "will", you seem to have a very primitive idea of what it is. I find that statement odd coming from someone with your religious beliefs. > You seem determined > to take it to mean some metaphysical entity. I think it's much more > reasonable to take it to mean "the decision-making faculty of the mind". Fine. I'll agree with that. That defines "will". > This is consistent with what my dictionary says, and neither includes nor > excludes souls. If the will can ultimately be traced to quantum fluctuations, > then it's hard to see how it can be called anything but free at this time. No, Charles, not at all. It can be called this: "dependent on the current chemical makeup of the brain, and thus not free". You say "But that's not fully determined; the quantum fluctuations make it indeterministic." Fine. Then it can be called "dependent on the current chemical makeup of the brain AND any random quantum fluctuations, and thus not free". Unless the will determines the random quantum fluctuations. In that case, what is it if not a "soul", an entity external to physical cause and effect? > In any case, the question is largely moot, since at this point no > hypothesis about how the mind decides has any experimental basis. But some hypotheses are rooted in presumption of things that people would like to be so, rather than possibilities that make sense in light of evidence. >>>>Nor my giraffe hypothesis, Charles. It does (and should) have equal weight >>>>to yours. All these systems make assumptions. The "scientific" one >>>>makes the "assumption" that the same things go on in the brain as >>>>everywhere else, and no evidence has been shown to give the brain some >>>>special status separate from the rest of the world. >>>As the straw army marches on, we see Rich contradicting himself again. >>>Remember all that talk about Occam's Razor? Is not Rich's quantum giraffe >>>such an unnecessary complication? The "quantum" and "deterministic" >>>hypotheses, on the other hand, introduce nothing new. We already have >>>quantum randomness. >>But YOU introduce a good deal of "new" (presumed) material on top of that >>to complete your scenario. Who's the general of this straw army, Private >>Wingate? > Once again Rich has me wondering about his intellectual integrity. Rich, > for your information, the only thing we know about the brain that we also > about the rest of existence is that it (presumably) doesn't violate the > laws of physics as we now perceive them. These laws include random processes, > so the brain may indeed make random choices. "Choices"? Willful choices? To take an awful big leap (of fa...?) to get from randomness to willful choice. You spend too much time worrying about other people's intellectual integrity. > Our ignorance of anything else > about how the brain functions and produces consciousness (whatever that is) > is almost absolute. There's no basis for saying, for instance, that "since > mechanics is deterministic, so is the brain" or any similar analogy. We > simply don't know enough about the brain to justify any such analogy-- not > even in chemistry. We don't know enough about the brain to make rash assumptions about which way it is different from "mechanics", if indeed it is different at all. You have some sort of stake (apparently) in believing that the brain is somehow different. I have no such stake, and thus far no reason to believe otherwise. >>Then what is the mechanism of free will you wish for? If not a "soul", what >>name do you give it? The entity itself is still required in your model. > Wrong. That's your outdated concept, not mine. It's highly intuitive to > talk about the Will as if it were a being, but I think it's quite sufficient > to define it as a process. But if you are to call it a FREE will, that means something else entirely. That has implications that it is unconstrained by, independent of, the physical world around it. Not outdated, quite relevant. >>>Rich seems to me to be >>>erroneously implying that I am using quantum mechanics as a trapdoor to let >>>souls in from the supernatural. It isn't necessary. It's simply >>>sufficient to point out that, if quantum mechanics do play a part in the >>>workings of the brain, that the chain of causality so necessary to >>>Rich's position leads to nowhere. >>All it leads you to is a scenario with randomness at the particle level that >>offers no notion of either free will or anything else, unless you add in your >>preconceptions. If only you applied your stalwart defense of this >>"established science" to the rest of scientific knowledge... > I think it should be abundantly clear by now who it is that clings to this > spirtualistic model of Wills. Right, Charles. What I said above (and many times before this) is that the notion of FREE will (note how many times Charles talks about "wills" and makes statements that leave out the word "free", leaving the reader to infer that they also apply to "free will") is a fallacy in that for a will (as Charles has described) to be free, is must be unconstrained, and for it to be unconstrained, it must be independent of the effects of the physical environment it occupies. What I have shown is that such things as "souls", or whatever you want to call non-physical (whatever that means) entities, are necessary to the notion of true free will. Apparently Charles would not have us bear witness to his own clinging to this notion, which he must of necessity (unless he simply hasn't thought this through) if he believes in "free will" on his terms. -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/22/85)
In article <1557@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> You seem determined to take [the will] >> to mean some metaphysical entity. I think it's much more >> reasonable to take it to mean "the decision-making faculty of the mind". >Fine. I'll agree with that. That defines "will". >> This is consistent with what my dictionary says, and neither includes nor >> excludes souls. If the will can ultimately be traced to quantum >> fluctuations, then it's hard to see how it can be called anything >> but free at this time. >No, Charles, not at all. It can be called this: "dependent on the current >chemical makeup of the brain, and thus not free". You say "But that's >not fully determined; the quantum fluctuations make it indeterministic." >Fine. Then it can be called "dependent on the current chemical makeup of the >brain AND any random quantum fluctuations, and thus not free". Unless >the will determines the random quantum fluctuations. In that case, what is >it if not a "soul", an entity external to physical cause and effect? Rich, for at least a month now you have confused "dependency" with determinism. If you stand in a raquetball court, and hit the ball around with a racket, the walls CONSTRAIN the position of the ball, and the position of the ball is DEPENDENT upon the walls, but the path of the ball is DETERMINED at least in part by you. The presence of constraints is unimportant, unless they are total. As for the quantum fluctuations, they are not EXTERNAL to the the mind in any meaningful sense. They are part of the decision process of the mind, and therefore part of the will. Therefore, the will would then be free (i.e., undetermined by external causes). >> In any case, the question is largely moot, since at this point no >> hypothesis about how the mind decides has any experimental basis. >But some hypotheses are rooted in presumption of things that people would >like to be so, rather than possibilities that make sense in light of >evidence. Since there are no probabilities, your attack on free will is rather obviously motivated by you need to defend atheism and attack Christianity. >> Our ignorance of anything else >> about how the brain functions and produces consciousness (whatever that is) >> is almost absolute. There's no basis for saying, for instance, that "since >> mechanics is deterministic, so is the brain" or any similar analogy. We >> simply don't know enough about the brain to justify any such analogy-- not >> even in chemistry. >We don't know enough about the brain to make rash assumptions about which >way it is different from "mechanics", if indeed it is different at all. >You have some sort of stake (apparently) in believing that the brain is >somehow different. I have no such stake, and thus far no reason to believe >otherwise. Sure you do. Everyone who cares anything at all about cosmology has a stake in the resolution of the question. Certainly you do, Rich; if the will does turn out to be free, then that's one less weapon you have to support your attacks upon God. Responsibility becomes a quite tangible reality. And besides, there's no basis for saying that we know enough about the brain to make assumptions about how it is like Newtonian Mechanics, if indeed it is like Mechaincs at all. *I* am arguing that the possible theories of the function of the brain include some which allow free will. I'm not the one who is steadfastly determined to exclude free will. >> Wrong. That's your outdated concept, not mine. It's highly intuitive to >> talk about the Will as if it were a being, but I think it's quite >> sufficient to define it as a process. >But if you are to call it a FREE will, that means something else entirely. >That has implications that it is unconstrained by, independent of, the >physical world around it. Not outdated, quite relevant. No, No, NO. It implies that it is at least PARTIALLY unconstrained. And any definition of the world implies that it is dependent upon the world (unless you are only interested in schitzophrenia). Why do you persist in this error? Would you care to defend yourself by showing exactly HOW it implies absolute lack of constraint? Charley Wingate "What the hell's a gigawatt?"
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/24/85)
> Rich, for at least a month now you have confused "dependency" with > determinism. If you stand in a raquetball court, and hit the ball around > with a racket, the walls CONSTRAIN the position of the ball, and the position > of the ball is DEPENDENT upon the walls, but the path of the ball is > DETERMINED at least in part by you. The presence of constraints is > unimportant, unless they are total. But in this closed system you describe, the constraints ARE total. What determines the way in which you will position yourself next and the way you will hit the ball. The actions of the ball, AND any acquired components of your own mindset that make you react in certain ways. > As for the quantum fluctuations, they are not EXTERNAL to the the mind in > any meaningful sense. They are part of the decision process of the mind, and > therefore part of the will. Therefore, the will would then be free (i.e., > undetermined by external causes). "Part of the 'decision' process"? You are really determined ( :-) ) to force fit this notion in order to "get" freedom here. How do the fluctuations decide to happen? Does it constitute freedom, or just randomness. What emotional stake do YOU have in "getting" freedom that you go to these absurd lengths? >>>In any case, the question is largely moot, since at this point no >>>hypothesis about how the mind decides has any experimental basis. >>But some hypotheses are rooted in presumption of things that people would >>like to be so, rather than possibilities that make sense in light of >>evidence. > Since there are no probabilities, your attack on free will is rather obviously > motivated by you need to defend atheism and attack Christianity. No, Charles, just another example (not necessarily related---it isn't just those Christians talking about free will) of the same type of thinking. >>>Our ignorance of anything else >>>about how the brain functions and produces consciousness (whatever that is) >>>is almost absolute. There's no basis for saying, for instance, that "since >>>mechanics is deterministic, so is the brain" or any similar analogy. We >>>simply don't know enough about the brain to justify any such analogy-- not >>>even in chemistry. >>We don't know enough about the brain to make rash assumptions about which >>way it is different from "mechanics", if indeed it is different at all. >>You have some sort of stake (apparently) in believing that the brain is >>somehow different. I have no such stake, and thus far no reason to believe >>otherwise. > Sure you do. Everyone who cares anything at all about cosmology has a stake > in the resolution of the question. Certainly you do, Rich; if the will does > turn out to be free, then that's one less weapon you have to support your > attacks upon God. I think you're confusing me with Mr. Damager God himself, Paul Zimmerman. :-) I haven't been "attacking god". Just because you see an interdependency between free will and god doesn't mean there is one. There can be a god without free will and there can be free will without god. The problem is the erroneousness in both notions taken individually and separately. > Responsibility becomes a quite tangible reality. Because you want it to be? > And besides, there's no basis for saying that we know enough about the brain > to make assumptions about how it is like Newtonian Mechanics, if indeed it > is like Mechaincs at all. *I* am arguing that the possible theories of the > function of the brain include some which allow free will. I'm not the one > who is steadfastly determined to exclude free will. No, you are steadfastly determined to forcefit free will at any cost. If it means throwing out all we know and understand, big deal! As long as you "get" you freedom. Sounds real shoddy to me, Charles. >>>Wrong. That's your outdated concept, not mine. It's highly intuitive to >>>talk about the Will as if it were a being, but I think it's quite >>>sufficient to define it as a process. >>But if you are to call it a FREE will, that means something else entirely. >>That has implications that it is unconstrained by, independent of, the >>physical world around it. Not outdated, quite relevant. > No, No, NO. It implies that it is at least PARTIALLY unconstrained. And > any definition of the world implies that it is dependent upon the world > (unless you are only interested in schitzophrenia). Why do you persist in > this error? Would you care to defend yourself by showing exactly HOW it > implies absolute lack of constraint? This "error"? Is it an error solely because you disagree with it? Your definition of "at least partially unconstrained" (how so?) leaves much to be desired. -- Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr