mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/19/85)
>> Rich Rosen > Chris Warack >>> The basic goal of a moral >>> system is to determine what to do and not to do ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.* >>> If a large group suscribes to a morality, then life is simpler for that >>> group since they can predict certain things about their neighbor's >>> actions. But, it does not make the morality any more or less valid. >>> Maybe the person with the perfect morality is the only one who >>> subscribes to it. >>Hear, hear! Charles' bogus arguments about the "failures" of minimal >>morality apply just as much to his own system (whatever that is -- he >>keeps denying that any particular brand currently available is his). >>The question then becomes: Which system gives the most to the most people? >>Clearly the one that restricts them the least does that. >However, any number of moralities can be 'least restrictive' even >interpretations of the Christian ones [semi- :-)]. There is still a >question about which gives the most to the most people. This is running completely off the track. There seem to be two glaring errors here. The trivial one we can take care of first. My criticism of Rich's basis for his moral system was on entirely different grounds. I am satisfied with the resolution of that discussion (i.e., none at all). What bothers me is that people seem to be incoorectly drawing the conclusion that, because moral systems dictate actions for individuals, that they cannot properly dictate what others should do. Unfortunately, though, almost without exception any real moral system allows for coercive actions; the only exceptions are those which demand absolute pacifism. It follows therefore that all moral systems do in fact have standards of behavior for others besides those who hold the system. Rich's little rhetorical question is therefore quite beside the point. In many moral systems, it is deemed imperative to have the system followed by everyone; such systems demand lots of coercive and persuasive actions to try to keep others in line. Almost every system has as a basis the belief that a certain portion of the population is not competent to make many judgements, moral or otherwise. The real thrust of Rich's question seems to me to be that he tends to value freedom more than almost anything else, for, with a different system, say one that most values conformity, the answer to Rich's question could only be: "Clearly the one which restricts them the most." Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe "You want me to make a donation to the Coast Guard Youth Auxiliary!"
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/23/85)
>> Rich Rosen > Chris Warack >>>The question then becomes: Which system gives the most to the most people? >>>Clearly the one that restricts them the least does that. [ROSEN] >>However, any number of moralities can be 'least restrictive' even >>interpretations of the Christian ones [semi- :-)]. There is still a >>question about which gives the most to the most people. [WARACK] > This is running completely off the track. There seem to be two glaring > errors here. The trivial one we can take care of first. My criticism of > Rich's basis for his moral system was on entirely different grounds. I am > satisfied with the resolution of that discussion (i.e., none at all). I'm not. I'm not even sure what your point was in the first place, if this is considered a separate issue from the one that was (un)resolved. > What bothers me is that people seem to be incoorectly drawing the conclusion > that, because moral systems dictate actions for individuals, that they cannot > properly dictate what others should do. Unfortunately, though, almost without > exception any real moral system allows for coercive actions; the only > exceptions are those which demand absolute pacifism. It follows therefore > that all moral systems do in fact have standards of behavior for others > besides those who hold the system. Rich's little rhetorical question is > therefore quite beside the point. In many moral systems, it is deemed > imperative to have the system followed by everyone; such systems demand lots > of coercive and persuasive actions to try to keep others in line. Almost > every system has as a basis the belief that a certain portion of the > population is not competent to make many judgements, moral or otherwise. > The real thrust of Rich's question seems to me to be that he tends to value > freedom more than almost anything else, for, with a different system, say > one that most values conformity, the answer to Rich's question could only > be: "Clearly the one which restricts them the most." [WINGATE] Ah, but this "different system" can be easily dismissed in that we can objectively determine what sorts of things are value-able. Allow me to explain. Why would we value things like freedom or conformity? Because they would maximize something in our lives. Freedom maximizes our own lives, enabling us to make our own choices, to do what's best for us and our wants and desires. Conformity maximizes benefits to that nebulous thing called society. It makes it easier for society to do its business, whatever that may be. It makes it easier to categorize us, to perform (what's the word I'm looking for?---sociometric?) studies, to exercise marketing strategies, and maybe to deal with other people ourselves without bothering to think of them as individuals. Benefit to individual people? Hardly any worth speaking of. It all boils down to the old question: which is more important, the society or its members? Clearly if society is more important, then let's get rid of us people, we only get in the way of the proper functioning of society by merely being people. If not, I think it's clear what the answer is. Society exist to perform functions for its members, not the other way around. Furthermore, Charles' persistent assumption that a morality should have some coercive element to it does not hold water when you look at minimal morality. The basis for minimal morality is enlightened self-interest. You know the rules involve not interfering, so you don't OR you face the penalty for doing so. Not only is that minimal restrictions, it's minimal coerciveness. But Charles seems to WANT a moralty with a lot of restrictions. In an earlier article, he claimed that JudaeoChristian morality was somehow stronger because it did have more restrictions. I still fail to see how this is so, or how this could used to evaluate moral systems. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (08/25/85)
> Why would we value things like freedom or conformity? Because they would > maximize something in our lives. Freedom maximizes our own lives, enabling > us to make our own choices, to do what's best for us and our wants and > desires. Conformity maximizes benefits to that nebulous thing called > society. It makes it easier for society to do its business, whatever that > may be. It makes it easier to categorize us, to perform (what's the word > I'm looking for?---sociometric?) studies, to exercise marketing strategies, > and maybe to deal with other people ourselves without bothering to think of > them as individuals. Benefit to individual people? Hardly any worth > speaking of. It all boils down to the old question: which is more important, > the society or its members? Clearly if society is more important, then let's > get rid of us people, we only get in the way of the proper functioning of > society by merely being people. If not, I think it's clear what the answer is. > Society exist to perform functions for its members, not the other way around. > > Rich Rosen Society is a set, not an individual entity. Benefits accrued by "society" are not swallowed up into some inhuman void, but are spread thinly across the members of that society, with annoying pseudo-thermodynamic inefficiencies. Society does not perform functions. People do. The issue is not "who whom", but how we evaluate social rules. If we consider "negative" conformities - those that proscribe certain courses of action that we might otherwise want to undertake as individuals - it seems reasonable to argue that *something* should prevent an individual from performing an act that benefits himself at the expense of others, where the expense is spread out among so many people as to be too small to be worth individual action by each person affected, yet the aggregate cost incurred is out of proportion to the benefit accrued by the original actor. If the distribution of victimization is such cases is anywhere close to random, it is pretty evident that the possible benefit I am denied when I conform to the rule against such an action is outweighed by the cost that I *don't* have to bear for others, so long as *they* too conform to the rule. Thus conformity, and the enforcement of conformity, *can* be optimal for individuals. This is not to say that it always is. Not by a long shot. Baba