mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/12/85)
The person who brought up the notion of 'mechanistic' brain action expressed his opinion that his notion of free will couldn't be satisfied by any of the models he proposed. He never expressed exactly what this notion was. I think we should pause a minute and consider various ideas of where the decisions in free will come from. The oldest notion seems to be of souls: beings of pure will. I think that at this time we can reject this hypothesis, or at least set it aside until there is better evidence. Once we have set aside this notion of pure will, the whole question of will becomes a problem. It would seem reasonable to make analogies to present day computers, which I think we can all agree do not have free will. We can then ask at which points is it possible for processing to differ in such a way as to generate will? We may first note that the 'program' of the brain is not loaded from the outside, but is instead generated from within. The initialization is apparently directed from genetic information, although the mechanism is quite unknown at this time. It is possible that will originates here, before outside factors can impinge upon the brain. At the neural level, there are apparently random fluctuations. Let us assume for the moment that these fluctuations sometimes manifest themselves in gross behavior. Can we call this will? If we can't, then we must call it something besides constrained; nothing forces the particular behavior if the fluctuations are truly random. Yet it seems to me that the reluctance to call it free choice seems to me to stem from an unconcious attachment to the first model I presented. Only if you perceive Will to be some sort of substance does this present a problem. If Will is simply the process of choosing, then I would submit that what we have here deserves the name of free will. I would suggest that those who would deny free will please state what they mean by the term, and particularly what they perceive Will to be. No souls, please. C Wingate
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (08/13/85)
> The oldest notion seems to be of souls: beings of pure will. I think that > at this time we can reject this hypothesis, or at least set it aside until > there is better evidence. > ... > > C Wingate If you do not accept the existence of souls, why do you bother with the new testament, christianity, and things like god? I was under the impression that the whole thrust of christianity was salvation. What's to be saved if there is no soul? Padraig Houlahan.
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/13/85)
In article <1195@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: >The person who brought up the notion of 'mechanistic' brain action expressed >his opinion that his notion of free will couldn't be satisfied by any of the >models he proposed. He never expressed exactly what this notion was. I think >we should pause a minute and consider various ideas of where the decisions >in free will come from. > >The oldest notion seems to be of souls: beings of pure will. I think that >at this time we can reject this hypothesis, or at least set it aside until >there is better evidence. > >Once we have set aside this notion of pure will, the whole question of will >becomes a problem. It would seem reasonable to make analogies to present >day computers, which I think we can all agree do not have free will. We can >then ask at which points is it possible for processing to differ in such a way >as to generate will? > >We may first note that the 'program' of the brain is not loaded from the >outside, but is instead generated from within. The initialization is >apparently directed from genetic information, although the mechanism is quite >unknown at this time. It is possible that will originates here, before >outside factors can impinge upon the brain. > >At the neural level, there are apparently random fluctuations. Let us assume >for the moment that these fluctuations sometimes manifest themselves in gross >behavior. Can we call this will? If we can't, then we must call it something >besides constrained; nothing forces the particular behavior if the >fluctuations are truly random. Yet it seems to me that the reluctance to call >it free choice seems to me to stem from an unconcious attachment to the first >model I presented. Only if you perceive Will to be some sort of substance >does this present a problem. If Will is simply the process of choosing, >then I would submit that what we have here deserves the name of free will. > >I would suggest that those who would deny free will please state what they >mean by the term, and particularly what they perceive Will to be. No souls, >please. > >C Wingate I didn't say what I meant by free will because I am not sure exactly what it is I do mean. Actually, I don't think free will is a form of will, at all. Paul Torek, in answer to a point I made, makes a distinction between free will, which is the absence of internal constraint, and freedom (simpliciter), which is the absence of external constraint. I would suggest that free will be further broken up into free thought, and free will proper. Free will proper refers to one's ability to convert one's intentions into volition. (This is violated more often than might be thought. It occurs any time sloth or emotion overcomes one's intentions.) I do not think there is any question about the existence of free will proper, as defined here. It is free thought whose existence and/or meaning is in question. This includes both ideas and decisions, although the latter is more closely related to the original idea of free will. Subjectively, it seems that my decisions are neither determined nor random. Certainly many decisions are made on a purely rational basis. But decisions about objectives do not have this property in general. This gets a bit muddled here, because the distinction between ends and means is not at all clear-cut. It is not entirely clear that one can ever make decisions which are truly about ultimate objectives, and not about intermediate objectives. But it seems like one can. Certainly, one has multiple ultimate objectives: pleasure, desire for knowledge, revenge, survival of family, etc. (Not that everyone shares all these objectives.) And one can make decisions balancing one desire against another. Are such decisions mechanistic? They don't seem to be, but this may be an illusion. I'm afraid I don't see randomness as being any closer to freedom than determinism is. If I flip a coin, is it "free" to come up either heads or tails? (Leave aside the question of whether it's movement is truly random; assume it is.) There is some sense of the word free in which it is -- it is not externally constrained. But it makes no choices; it is just random. Ultimately, this gets down to the question of subjective reality -- a debate raging right now (that's raging, as in raging forest fire). Perhaps I will express my opinions on that later, if I can figure out what they are.
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/16/85)
In article <596@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >>The oldest notion seems to be of souls: beings of pure will. I think that >>at this time we can reject this hypothesis, or at least set it aside until >>there is better evidence. >> Yet it seems to me that the reluctance to call it free choice seems to >> me to stem from an unconcious attachment to the first model I presented. >> Only if you perceive Will to be some sort of substance does this present >> a problem. If Will is simply the process of choosing, then I would >> submit that what we have here deserves the name of free will. >I didn't say what I meant by free will because I am not sure exactly >what it is I do mean. Actually, I don't think free will is a form of >will, at all. Well, Free Will is certainly a statement about the nature of will. >Paul Torek, in answer to a point I made, makes a distinction between >free will, which is the absence of internal constraint, and freedom >(simpliciter), which is the absence of external constraint. I would >suggest that free will be further broken up into free thought, and >free will proper. Free will proper refers to one's ability to convert >one's intentions into volition. (This is violated more often than might >be thought. It occurs any time sloth or emotion overcomes one's >intentions.) >I do not think there is any question about the existence of free >will proper, as defined here. It is free thought whose existence >and/or meaning is in question. This includes both ideas and decisions, >although the latter is more closely related to the original idea >of free will. >Subjectively, it seems that my decisions are neither determined nor >random. Certainly many decisions are made on a purely rational basis. >But decisions about objectives do not have this property in general. >This gets a bit muddled here, because the distinction between ends and >means is not at all clear-cut. It is not entirely clear that one can >ever make decisions which are truly about ultimate objectives, and not >about intermediate objectives. But it seems like one can. >I'm afraid I don't see randomness as being any closer to freedom than >determinism is. If I flip a coin, is it "free" to come up either heads >or tails? (Leave aside the question of whether it's movement is truly >random; assume it is.) There is some sense of the word free in which it >is -- it is not externally constrained. But it makes no choices; it >is just random. Here we run into that bugaboo again. It makes all the difference in the world what lies behind the phrase "it [the coin] makes no choices." First of all, one could argue that the random forces all come from outside the coin. But laying that aside for the moment, why do I get this feeling that the author of the above was thinking, "It makes no choices because it has no mind"? >Ultimately, this gets down to the question of subjective reality -- >a debate raging right now (that's raging, as in raging forest fire). >Perhaps I will express my opinions on that later, if I can figure out >what they are. I think a stronger statement is in order: the whole nature of consciousness and the mind is in question. Now, unless someone out there has some great revelation to deliver on the subject, I think it's safe to say that we know nothing about this. There seems to be a strong tendency to talk about the mind in terms that are only appropriate to souls, or, alternately, to simply speak ex cathedra on the basis of Newtonian mechanics and state that we don't need to know anything about the nature of the mind to substaniate whatever claim is being made. Given both the failure to conceptualize and the lack of any real knowledge to appeal to, I suggest that it is time to end this discussion-- unless someone can get past either of these problems. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe "Do you know what this means? It means that this damn thing doesn't work at all!"
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (08/19/85)
> (Frank Adams) >> (Charley Wingate) >>The oldest notion seems to be of souls: beings of pure will. I think that >>at this time we can reject this hypothesis, or at least set it aside until >>there is better evidence. If we decide that only verifiable physical phenomena are to be taken as evidence, and if the only allowable existent entities are defined as stable physical objects (like rocks) or recognizable confluences of causal chains (like flames, whirlpools), or somewhere in between (rivers, frogs) then we must admit that we have declared souls (and any other purely nonphysical entities) out of existence simply as a matter of definition. Arguments between Christians and Materialists on such issues would therefore seem to be pointless religious confrontations with little substance beyond dogmatic assertions of faith. >>Once we have set aside this notion of pure will, the whole question of will >>becomes a problem. It would seem reasonable to make analogies to present >>day computers, which I think we can all agree do not have free will. There are several totally different aspects of the free will question here that must be separated: 1) How can one speak of freedom if behavior is totally determined? 2) What are the outward physical manifestations of what some people call `free will'? 3) How do those who subjectively perceive free will use it as a meaningful descriptor of internal mental reality? 4) Can (2) and (3) be united into a single entity, like pain, for instance, which has distinctive subjective and objective manifestations? Computers would not appear to have free will in the sense of #1, but if arguments from QM are accepted, I think we can say #1 is a dead issue, since the behavior of humans is arguably not fully determined by a person's physical state at any moment, unlike a purely digital computer. The other issues are clearly open, and I agree that analogies with computers, which can understood as possessing many levels of explanation, may be valuable regardless of one's opinion about #1. >I'm afraid I don't see randomness as being any closer to freedom than >determinism is. If I flip a coin, is it "free" to come up either heads >or tails? (Leave aside the question of whether it's movement is truly >random; assume it is.) There is some sense of the word free in which it >is -- it is not externally constrained. But it makes no choices; it >is just random. But what does random mean? As far as I can tell, behavior is called `random' whenever the observer is unable to discern a predictable pattern beyond statistical distributions in the evidence. I suppose then, that `truly random' must mean that the pattern is not just unknowable for the time being (due to present lack of knowledge), but that complete explanation (causal or otherwise) will forever be unknowable. But what is `knowable'? If we discard subjective experience as a source of knowledge, which seems to be the case if we insist on verifiable scientific evidence, then any spontaneous decisions supposedly attributed to free will (rather than determined by knowable external physical determinations) become as unknowable as `truly random' ones. We have denied the only possible means of determining whether the choice was `truly random' or by `conscious decision of free will'. >Ultimately, this gets down to the question of subjective reality -- >a debate raging right now (that's raging, as in raging forest fire). >Perhaps I will express my opinions on that later, if I can figure out >what they are. The entire question of subjective reality is pointless, since even those who insist that physical entities are the only `real' ones are rapidly diverging from any consensus whatsoever on the so-called absolute nature of physical reality. Consequently, what some call `true physical reality', is but a subjective delusion. I would therefore change the question from: Does free will `really exist'? ..to: Whatever are people talking about when they use the term `free will'? Explaining free will then becomes a problem of providing adequate descriptions within several different philosophical worldviews (if possible). Since each worldview `sees' some phenomena more clearly than others, it would seem to be impossible to establish parallel descriptions with perfect agreement. For example, to the extent that materialism rejects subjective entities, it invalidates its own ability to successfully grasp any subjective distinctions whatsoever. In my opinion, the existence of a truly free agent implies at some intrinsic unknowability -- and in the physical sciences, this is called `randomness'. Thus, I see randomness not as an explanation of free will, but rather as, perhaps, the only possible physical evidence for it. What distinguishes the unpredictability of free will from the blind randomness of a coin flip? Meaning and purpose. -michael
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/27/85)
In article <1267@umcp-cs.UUCP> mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) writes: > >>I'm afraid I don't see randomness as being any closer to freedom than >>determinism is. If I flip a coin, is it "free" to come up either heads >>or tails? (Leave aside the question of whether it's movement is truly >>random; assume it is.) There is some sense of the word free in which it >>is -- it is not externally constrained. But it makes no choices; it >>is just random. > >Here we run into that bugaboo again. It makes all the difference in the world >what lies behind the phrase "it [the coin] makes no choices." First of all, >one could argue that the random forces all come from outside the coin. But >laying that aside for the moment, why do I get this feeling that the author >of the above was thinking, "It makes no choices because it has no mind"? First, let me clarify: I am assuming that the quantum uncertainties in the coin itself make its result random. I don't want to debate about whether that is true; if it isn't, we can easily come up with a system which does reflect internal quantum uncertainties. All right, what does choice mean? I can come up with two possible meanings. 1) a choice is a decision based on analysis [of a situation] in the light of [more or less clearly defined] goals. This applies equally to a branch in a computer program or to a human decision. (It would not apply to a branch taken by a computer executing random code.) 2) a choice is a decision made by free will (whatever that means). These meanings are not incompatible, of course. I was using the second definition; i.e., I was using choice as a code word for free will. A word certainly need not have only one definition (though it is worthwhile to know what meaning one is referring to). I think for example that Rich Rosen is wrong to insist on his definition of free will, which has been used in a wide variety of ways through the years. But I cannot accept a definition of choice whereby a flipped coin "chooses" which way to come down.