mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/26/85)
In article <1571@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> What bothers me is that people seem to be incoorectly drawing the >> conclusion that, because moral systems dictate actions for individuals, >> that they cannot properly dictate what others should do. Unfortunately, >> though, almost without exception any real moral system allows for >> coercive actions; the only exceptions are those which demand absolute >> pacifism. It follows therefore that all moral systems do in fact have >> standards of behavior for others besides those who hold the system. >> Rich's little rhetorical question is therefore quite beside the point. >> In many moral systems, it is deemed imperative to have the system >> followed by everyone; such systems demand lots of coercive and >> persuasive actions to try to keep others in line. Almost >> every system has as a basis the belief that a certain portion of the >> population is not competent to make many judgements, moral or otherwise. >> The real thrust of Rich's question seems to me to be that he tends to value >> freedom more than almost anything else, for, with a different system, say >> one that most values conformity, the answer to Rich's question could only >> be: "Clearly the one which restricts them the most." [WINGATE] >Ah, but this "different system" can be easily dismissed in that we can >objectively determine what sorts of things are value-able. Allow me to >explain. >Why would we value things like freedom or conformity? Because they would >maximize something in our lives. Freedom maximizes our own lives, enabling >us to make our own choices, to do what's best for us and our wants and >desires. Conformity maximizes benefits to that nebulous thing called >society. It makes it easier for society to do its business, whatever that >may be. It makes it easier to categorize us, to perform (what's the word >I'm looking for?---sociometric?) studies, to exercise marketing strategies, >and maybe to deal with other people ourselves without bothering to think of >them as individuals. Benefit to individual people? Hardly any worth >speaking of. It all boils down to the old question: which is more >important, the society or its members? Clearly if society is more >important, then let's get rid of us people, we only get in the way of >the proper functioning of society by merely being people. If not, I >think it's clear what the answer is. Society exist to perform functions >for its members, not the other way around. This little statement of religion is all very pretty, but it neglects several important aspects of the picture, on top of its deliberate use of emotionally-charged words where perfectly neutral ones would have done well. Conformity has the enourmous advantage (to many people, anyway) that it minimizes tensions amoung the members of a group. It allows trust, even reliance upon the actions of others. It conserves the energy both of society as whole and of individuals, by reducing the need to re-think and readapt every time a situation appears. All of these benefits hew directly to individuals. The phrasing of Rich's listing of benefits makes it abundantly clear that this his own private evaluation of the relative merits of these benefits. I myself would rank conformity much higher, though not paramount. Others would value it still the more. This evaluation isn't at all objective; it's all based on which benefits Rich is willing to give up, and which he feels he must have. >Furthermore, Charles' persistent assumption that a morality should have some >coercive element to it does not hold water when you look at minimal >morality. The basis for minimal morality is enlightened self-interest. >You know the rules involve not interfering, so you don't OR you face the >penalty for doing so. Not only is that minimal restrictions, it's minimal >coerciveness. But Charles seems to WANT a moralty with a lot of >restrictions. In an earlier article, he claimed that JudaeoChristian >morality was somehow stronger because it did have more restrictions. >I still fail to see how this is so, or how this could used to evaluate >moral systems. The "persistent assumption" is no such, but raw observation. Let us go back to Rich's system for a minute. I number of weeks back I argued that persons who did not feel that "non-interference" was optimal for them had no obligation to follow the system. Rich in turn argued that a society with such a moral standard was justified in preventing these people from interfering in the way that Rich frowns upon. Now, this is certainly coercion, sanctioned by Rich's system. It follows directly that there is a standard of morality being demanded even of those who choose not to follow the system. Enlightened self-interest is, after all, a quaint fiction of some use in economic theory, but quite non-existent in the real world. Minimal restrictions are still restrictions. And besides, I quite clearly stated that moralities of pure pacifism do not have any coercive element in them, so that Rich is representing me as having said something that I explicitly denied. Rich's system, however, DOES endorse coercion, as he admits in the passage quoted above. This business of strength is being persistently misunderstood. I as stated when I brought up the notion, it is not a measure of merit; indeed, one of Rich's arguments against Christian morality is that it is too strong, forbidding things that are perfectly OK. I happen to prefer stronger systems because I feel that the weaker systems tend to neglect the more subtle effects of a person's behavior. But the point is that without some sort of scale, you have no way to compare systems without resorting to moral values. Charley Wingate umcp-cs!mangoe "Better get used to those bars."
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/27/85)
>>>The real thrust of Rich's question seems to me to be that he tends to value >>>freedom more than almost anything else, for, with a different system, say >>>one that most values conformity, the answer to Rich's question could only >>>be: "Clearly the one which restricts them the most." [WINGATE] >>Ah, but this "different system" can be easily dismissed in that we can >>objectively determine what sorts of things are value-able. >> >>Why would we value things like freedom or conformity? Because they would >>maximize something in our lives. Freedom maximizes our own lives, enabling >>us to make our own choices, to do what's best for us and our wants and >>desires. Conformity maximizes benefits to that nebulous thing called >>society. It makes it easier for society to do its business, whatever that >>may be. It makes it easier to categorize us, to perform (what's the word >>I'm looking for?---sociometric?) studies, to exercise marketing strategies, >>and maybe to deal with other people ourselves without bothering to think of >>them as individuals. Benefit to individual people? Hardly any worth >>speaking of. It all boils down to the old question: which is more >>important, the society or its members? Clearly if society is more >>important, then let's get rid of us people, we only get in the way of >>the proper functioning of society by merely being people. If not, I >>think it's clear what the answer is. Society exist to perform functions >>for its members, not the other way around. > This little statement of religion is all very pretty, but it neglects several > important aspects of the picture, on top of its deliberate use of > emotionally-charged words where perfectly neutral ones would have done well. Interesting that a religionist condemns something he doesn't like by calling it a religion. Equally interesting is that he refers to a group of statements about the world, the conclusion of which he DOESN'T like, as a religion. Even more interesting is my being accused of using "emotionally charged words where neutral ones would have done as well". Since I don't like such tactics myself, I'm curious to uncover just what Wingate means. > Conformity has the enourmous advantage (to many people, anyway) that it > minimizes tensions amoung the members of a group. It allows trust, even > reliance upon the actions of others. It conserves the energy both of > society as whole and of individuals, by reducing the need to re-think and > readapt every time a situation appears. All of these benefits hew directly > to individuals. The phrasing of Rich's listing of benefits makes it > abundantly clear that this his own private evaluation of the relative merits > of these benefits. I myself would rank conformity much higher, though not > paramount. Others would value it still the more. This evaluation isn't at > all objective; it's all based on which benefits Rich is willing to give up, > and which he feels he must have. Ah, so it is my negative valuation of conformity that you claim is "emotionally charged". Hmmm. All the cases you offer above represent sacrifices: how much of your individuality do you give up in order to "minimize tensions" and "reduce the need to rethink"? (Funny, I would think that rethinking and readapting were positive constructive things that cause growth and learning and improved adaptability. Sometimes it seems that people that talk about the pleasures of conformity are really seeking to "reduce the need to think", period.) Ideally, you shouldn't have to give up any of it. In a perfect ideal world, you could have both minimal "tensions" and complete individuality. However, there is no ideal world that we know of, and I doubt that there is one, specifically because human beings have needs and wants that may conflict (e.g., two people wanting the same thing). So, in the words of the immortal Karl Malden: "What WILL you do?" Isn't minimal morality the best compromise? What real benefits are gained from coercing people to conform to "minimize thinking" or whatever it was you said, Charles? What you get is a dull, stagnant, lethargic society, ridiculously predictable and boring, and (more importantly) unable to adapt to change or to engage in any creative solutions to problems. ("Why change? Isn't it better to leave things the same so we don't have to worry so much?") Moreover, there will always be those "number six" types who resist your standards, who don't fit into your perfect mold, who will wind up causing even more tension in the long run (tension that a predictable conformist society is ill equipped to deal with). >>Furthermore, Charles' persistent assumption that a morality should have some >>coercive element to it does not hold water when you look at minimal >>morality. The basis for minimal morality is enlightened self-interest. >>You know the rules involve not interfering, so you don't OR you face the >>penalty for doing so. Not only is that minimal restrictions, it's minimal >>coerciveness. But Charles seems to WANT a moralty with a lot of >>restrictions. In an earlier article, he claimed that JudaeoChristian >>morality was somehow stronger because it did have more restrictions. >>I still fail to see how this is so, or how this could used to evaluate >>moral systems. > The "persistent assumption" is no such, but raw observation. Let us go back > to Rich's system for a minute. I number of weeks back I argued that persons > who did not feel that "non-interference" was optimal for them had no > obligation to follow the system. Rich in turn argued that a society with > such a moral standard was justified in preventing these people from > interfering in the way that Rich frowns upon. Now, this is certainly > coercion, sanctioned by Rich's system. It follows directly that there is > a standard of morality being demanded even of those who choose not to follow > the system. Enlightened self-interest is, after all, a quaint fiction of > some use in economic theory, but quite non-existent in the real world. Which real world doesn't it exist in, Charles? I'm at a loss to find one. It seems to work in the one I live in. What about yours? :-? The coercion you describe is common to any moral system with rules of behavior for others. And thus so is the enlightened self-interest. The point of minimal morality is that those rules and restrictions are fewer in number, and it is THIS that makes it so much stronger than yours with its bevy of bogus rules for a wide variety of things you just don't happen to like. > Minimal restrictions are still restrictions. And they are minimal. (Welcome to the Maryland Institute of Tautology. :-) > And besides, I quite clearly > stated that moralities of pure pacifism do not have any coercive element in > them, so that Rich is representing me as having said something that I > explicitly denied. I also said that they don't work. Absolute tolerance does not work in the face of those who would harm other people, or for that matter spread their own intolerance. That is why restrictions are needed. Why any more than the minimum necessary to prevent interference? Why, Charles? What real benefits do those further restrictions really get anyone? > This business of strength is being persistently misunderstood. I as stated > when I brought up the notion, it is not a measure of merit; indeed, one of > Rich's arguments against Christian morality is that it is too strong, > forbidding things that are perfectly OK. I happen to prefer stronger > systems because I feel that the weaker systems tend to neglect the more > subtle effects of a person's behavior. But the point is that without some > sort of scale, you have no way to compare systems without resorting to moral > values. Then use my scale. Oh, I'm sorry, you don't like it, it simply weighs and balances without the need for butcher's thumbs to sway the balance toward restrictiveness. Pray tell, what are these "subtle effects of a person's behavior", and what is it that your moral code does about them, and what are the effects (positive and negative) of the additional restrictions that do something about this? Do let us know. This is the crux. -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr