tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (08/10/85)
[]
In a recent posting, I pointed out that the extremely small scale of
the events involved in neural electron transfer would render them
subject to quantum indeterminacy. Paul Torek, in a private
communication, pointed out that the large number of such interactions
involved in typical congitive processes might tend to make the quantum
indeterminacy negligible. He suggested that I say something about
this (a good idea), so here goes:
Paul is right, I think, but the tricky part has to do with the word
"negligible." If the debate were strictly concerned with the
prediction of human behavior, then I would agree that neural
indeterminacy might indeed be negligible, although it *need* not be.
This is an interesting question in its own right. The context of my
posting, however, was the seemingly endless free will debate. In
particular, I was responding to Rich Rosen's challenge to "show that
there is something more going on in the brain than causal neural
activity (not an exact quote, I'm afraid)." In this context, nothing
is negligible, since Rosen has insisted that only a strictly
"micro"-level description of the world has objective validity. My
only point was to show that if he indeed rejects the objective
validity of "macro"-level descriptions, then he must also reject his
hard determinism. That the brain is a deterministic machine is a
description at an emergent level, as Paul Torek's reminder suggests.
But if Rosen doesn't insist that only "micro"-level descriptions have
objective validity, then he has lost whatever facsimile of an argument
he might have had for insisting that all descriptions of free will as
an emergent phenomenon are erroneous. He can't have it both ways.
I hope this clarifies things. It rehashes some things I've already
posted. I did not bring this subject up in order to demonstrate that
quantum indeterminacy is, in itself, a kind of freedom. That would be
a very perverse kind of freedom indeed.
Todd Moody {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody
Philosophy Department
St. Joseph's U.
Philadelphia, PA 19131jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/11/85)
I think tmoody's discussion makes clear that, contrary to Rosen's statements elsewhere, the notion that mental actions may be non-deterministic is plausible, without violating Occam's maxim as his analogy of multi-dimensional long-necked giraffes would; as Wingate has repeatedly stated, there is no necessary implication of a soul; Rosen's statements that Wingate's position necessarily implies same out of wishful thinking must be viewed as an ad hominem argument. This is clear when you consider that I need not temporarily suspend a Christian moral outlook as Wingate has attempted to do nor disconsider my belief in a soul, since I have no such moral outlook or belief (lacking adequate definitions of God or soul), yet I still find non-deterministic mental decisions quite plausible. Someone who wants to label that as wishful thinking has the burden of demonstrating that I prefer or value a non-deterministic mind. But as I have stated before, I think that the true underlying semantics of free will is involved with lack of knowledge of the causes of the subject's behavior, and given the unsolvability of the halting problem I don't find the deterministic or non-deterministic nature of the universe to be particularly relevant to the notion of freedom of behavior (I quite agree that freedom obtained as a result of quantum indeterminacy is "perverse"). So, from a neutral position in terms of desire, I find non-determinacy plausible. > Paul Torek ... > pointed out that the large number of such interactions >involved in typical congitive processes might tend to make the quantum >indeterminacy negligible. >... > If the debate were strictly concerned with the >prediction of human behavior, then I would agree that neural >indeterminacy might indeed be negligible, although it *need* not be. >This is an interesting question in its own right. It is, and since it has been raised I'd like to briefly discuss it. In the past others have stated more strongly than Paul (he said "might") that micro-indeterminacy does not have macro effects, but I consider this very far from obvious. If synaptic events were Brownian, then I would give such averaging out a high probability. But instead synaptic firings are threshold-driven, so there is a quantization which could translate a micro-quantum decision into a less micro quantum decision. Given that large numbers of firings are involved, but that many macro effects are of a binary nature (e.g., fight or flight; see catastrophy theory) where the payoffs are very close, at least within the subject's set of knowledge (i.e. deciding one way is not blatantly obviously preferable to deciding the other way), it doesn't seem hard to imagine that either of the two macro results could arise from the same initial brain state, depending upon the sum results of the total set of quantum bifurcations. I favor a multiple worlds model which contains a separate universe for each possible configuration of quantum outcomes. (Please note that favoring such a model simply means that I like to use it to organize thought; it does not make any statement about how the world "really" works! As far as I can see, it pointless to argue whether there is "really" just one universe with random outcomes or whether all the different universes "exist", since there is no way for us to observe a difference between the two cases, and since the semantics of "alternate universes exist" is not well established. But, just as the "external world" model seems to provide more analytic meat than the solipsistic model, or the evolution model seems to provide more analytic meat than the "God created the fossil record to tempt us" model, even though neither model can be demonstrated to be more true, so the multiple worlds model allows us to continue playing the analysis game where the chance model seems to stop.) Coupling the multiple worlds model with the "quantum decisions can lead to macro effects in the brain" possibility provides a plausible model wherein all sides of all major decisions have been made in various alternate universes, and this universe happens to be the one that contains the particular constellation of events that these us'es have been subjected to. Full contemplation of this should give rise to a deep sense of humility, and a deeper understanding of the statement "There, but for fortune, go I." By providing a model that replaces randomness with parallel occurrences of multiple possibilities, we reestablish determinism at a higher level: a given initial state gives rise to a tree of futures; not all possible futures can arise; the tree is determinable; in a quantum universe it is even enumeratable. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim) "Mature player of philosophy as a cooperative mind game seeks others for multiple mutual enjoyment. Send photo."
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/12/85)
> The context of my > posting, however, was the seemingly endless free will debate. In > particular, I was responding to Rich Rosen's challenge to "show that > there is something more going on in the brain than causal neural > activity (not an exact quote, I'm afraid)." In this context, nothing > is negligible, since Rosen has insisted that only a strictly > "micro"-level description of the world has objective validity. My > only point was to show that if he indeed rejects the objective > validity of "macro"-level descriptions, then he must also reject his > hard determinism. [MOODY] What is "rejected" is the illusion present in many macro models when viewed at the base leve, e.g., sun rising. > That the brain is a deterministic machine is a > description at an emergent level, as Paul Torek's reminder suggests. > But if Rosen doesn't insist that only "micro"-level descriptions have > objective validity, then he has lost whatever facsimile of an argument > he might have had for insisting that all descriptions of free will as > an emergent phenomenon are erroneous. He can't have it both ways. In only insist that the macro models be consistent with what is really going on at the micro level to be a solid model of reality. > I hope this clarifies things. It rehashes some things I've already > posted. I did not bring this subject up in order to demonstrate that > quantum indeterminacy is, in itself, a kind of freedom. That would be > a very perverse kind of freedom indeed. If it can be called a "freedom" at all. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/17/85)
> I think tmoody's discussion makes clear that, contrary to Rosen's statements > elsewhere, the notion that mental actions may be non-deterministic is > plausible, without violating Occam's maxim as his analogy of multi-dimensional > long-necked giraffes would; [BALTER] I never cared one way or the other whether the universe (and the brain) was ultimately deterministic or not. It is irrelevnat to the subject at hand, which is: can there be a "will" that controls human action independent of the status of the person's current chemical makeup and surrounding environment? > as Wingate has repeatedly stated, there is no > necessary implication of a soul; Rosen's statements that Wingate's position > necessarily implies same out of wishful thinking must be viewed as an > ad hominem argument. Alternatively, that last sentence could (and perhaps should) be viewed as an ad hominem argument. ("Must"???) Wingate "states" a lot of things. So do I. So do you. Wingate failed to show how such a will could exist without something on the order of a soul. So he (and you) can state all you want. Stating (asserting) doesn't make it so. Sorry, that's the way the world works. > This is clear when you consider that I > need not temporarily suspend a Christian moral outlook as Wingate has > attempted to do nor disconsider my belief in a soul, since I have no such > moral outlook or belief (lacking adequate definitions of God or soul), yet I > still find non-deterministic mental decisions quite plausible. Me, too, to a degree. So? What does THAT have to do with free will? > Someone who > wants to label that as wishful thinking has the burden of demonstrating that > I prefer or value a non-deterministic mind. I can't imagine why such a thing would be preferred or valued in any case. Such a thing cracks not just pure deterministic models but also free will. > I don't find the deterministic or > non-deterministic nature of the universe to be particularly relevant to the > notion of freedom of behavior (I quite agree that freedom obtained as a > result of quantum indeterminacy is "perverse"). So, from a neutral position > in terms of desire, I find non-determinacy plausible. Agreed. (But again, so?) -- "Do I just cut 'em up like regular chickens?" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (08/26/85)
In article <1523@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >was ultimately deterministic or not. It is irrelevnat to the subject at >hand, which is: can there be a "will" that controls human action independent >of the status of the person's current chemical makeup and surrounding >environment? > That is not my perception of the question. You are making the assumption that your definition of free will is the only one, it isn't. I would say the question is "can there be a will that makes decisions which effect subsequent events?" My answer to your question would be no there cannot, but what does that have to do with free will? -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/28/85)
>>was ultimately deterministic or not. It is irrelevnat to the subject at >>hand, which is: can there be a "will" that controls human action independent >>of the status of the person's current chemical makeup and surrounding >>environment? > That is not my perception of the question. You are making the > assumption that your definition of free will is the only one, it > isn't. I would say the question is "can there be a will that makes > decisions which effect subsequent events?" > My answer to your question would be no there cannot, but > what does that have to do with free will? > Sarima (Stanley Friesen) Everything, for that is what free will means. And I am sick and tired of hearing people claim that this is "my definition" that I am "assuming" is the only one. Especially when we hear people glorifying the notion we can simply change the meaning of words to new private definitions that "work" better to prove their point, as if the fact that millions of people speak and use the language hoping for some degree of consistency of meaning (that's what a language is!) is just some minor inconvenience that we can deal with later. -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr