franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/08/85)
[Please, don't eat me!] There has been an underlying in a number of recent discussions recently which I think is invalid. This is, to put it baldly, that randomness equals freedom. For example, Charley Wingate states that the hypothesis that some behavior reflects quantum fluctuations has no evidence against it, and seems to feel that he has proved something thereby. Unless quantum mechanics is very wrong, random events are part of the way the universe works. Determinism is a dead issue. But this does not imply that the behavior of complex systems is not reducible to the interactions of their components. Let me define what I will mean by a mechanistic system. A system is mechanistic if its components, at a sufficiently fine level of detail, can have their behavior in any situation described completely by a probability distribution, and the behavior of the system is *in principle* describable by this behavior, given the (initial) relationships of the system. The modern equivalent of determinism is to assert that the entire universe is mechanistic. I see no reason to regard a resident of a mechanistic universe as any more "free" than the resident of a strictly deterministic universe. Both run equally counter to my sujective sense of free will. It seems to me that there are three possibilities. All have problems: 1) The universe is mechanistic, and my free will is an illusion. But what is it that has that illusion? How do you explain my subjective awareness *to me*? (You can explain it to yourself as simply the behavior of the system, i.e., me.) 2) The universe is mechanistic, but there is some way in which free will is a meaningful concept in such a universe. Frankly, I can't imagine what such a conception would be. One can give definitions such as r.e.a., but these don't match my subjective experience. 3) The universe is not mechanistic. But how can it not be? What does it mean for a system not to be the result of the behavior of its components, or for those components to behave in a way which is not expressible as a probability distribution?
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/11/85)
In article <573@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >There has been an underlying in a number of recent discussions recently >which I think is invalid. This is, to put it baldly, that randomness >equals freedom. For example, Charley Wingate states that the hypothesis >that some behavior reflects quantum fluctuations has no evidence against >it, and seems to feel that he has proved something thereby. > >Unless quantum mechanics is very wrong, random events are part of the way >the universe works. Determinism is a dead issue. But this does not imply >that the behavior of complex systems is not reducible to the interactions >of their components. > >Let me define what I will mean by a mechanistic system. A system is >mechanistic if its components, at a sufficiently fine level of detail, >can have their behavior in any situation described completely by a >probability distribution, and the behavior of the system is *in principle* >describable by this behavior, given the (initial) relationships of the >system. > >The modern equivalent of determinism is to assert that the entire universe >is mechanistic. I see no reason to regard a resident of a mechanistic >universe as any more "free" than the resident of a strictly deterministic >universe. Both run equally counter to my sujective sense of free will. As I understand it, free will is essentially the assertion that the process of consciousness can in fact decide; it is the antithesis of the assertion that all human behavior is caused. It seems to me that acausality can occur on two different levels: the processing mechanism itself can be acausal, and their can be a lack of causation at the information level. The second clearly produces precisely what we all seem to agree to call free will. Frank questions whether or not the first does. The first problem comes when you approach the question of probability. The question of the level of detail is indeed quite important; clearly one cannot deal with anything larger than the behavior of an individual. Even if group behavior is constrained by a probability distribution, there is nothing preventing each individual from exerting freedom in choosing where he lies in the distribution; in addition, there is clearly a feedback loop from the distrbution back to the behavior which severely limits the form that the distribution can be expressed in, and which adds a strong uncertainty element. One can therefore ask whether this same objection could be applied to individual behavior. I think it does apply. There is still the same feedback loop, and again, at any one time the individual only has to show up at one point on the curve. The distribution may in fact only describe the tendencies of the deciding apparatus, in which case it's clearly improper to say that the distribution constrains the choice. To deny free will, therefore, I think you must show two things: (1) That random fluctuations in processing are unimportant. (2) That all behavior can be traced inevitably to external causes. This leads us to to a long list of positions: (A) Soulism: A supernatural entity is the ultimate cause of behavior. (B) Physical Soulism: A physical entity unlike matter or energy as we know it is the ultimate cause of behavior. (C) Quantum indeterminism: Quantum events are so important that the sources of behavior are truly random. (D) Natal Independence: The initial presence of randomness in the brain precludes the development of causality in the mind. (E) Combinations of C and D. (F) Various combinations of the denial of the above. I think we can ignore the first two. The third essentially denies mechanism, since it asserts that gross behavior is truly not predictable, even probabilistically. One can argue at length whether or not this constitutes free will. Position D, however, is the most potent. It essentially asserts that, however the brain works, there is an initial random component at birth which does not dissipate. In this case, processing can be mechanistic, yet there is still free will in the strongest sense. C WIngate
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/11/85)
>2) The universe is mechanistic, but there is some way in which free will > is a meaningful concept in such a universe. Frankly, I can't imagine > what such a conception would be. One can give definitions such as > r.e.a., but these don't match my subjective experience. Consider free will as human-relative; to the degree that you are not aware of the mechanisms of your behavior, you will subjectively feel free. If you determine that most of your feelings about Communism have been conditioned by years of propaganda independent of fact, you will subjectively feel less free about your ability to make rational decisions about it. If you measure and watch your blood pressure, heart rate, and adrenal activity increase when you hear the words "Khomeini", "Kaddafi", "Reagan", "terrorist", "Socialism", etc., you are likely to get a stronger subjective sense of being controlled or influenced, as opposed to being independent and rational (discriminating but un-prejudiced). I think that you, Rosen, and others have sufficiently demonstrated the absurdity of the notion of absolute freedom. But it seems clear to me that people use the word freedom in a useful fashion; it is a *relative* term. As soon as you open your mouth to speak or lift your fingers to type, you have suspended, consciously or unconsciously, your awareness or concern about the absolute mechanistic nature of the universe. I doubt very much that you are sitting there wondering what the mechanisms will lead you to type next. You have entered into the charade of freedom. The word is meaningful within the context of the game being played. Why do we play the game? Why is there subjective experience? The best answer I can think of is that there must be subjective experience in a world where we experience it. If we were in a world were there were none, then we wouldn't be asking the question. It like the person winning the lottery thinking s/he is special; someone had to win, and whoever it is is likely to think the same way. Even if there are very few planets with sentient life, we aren't special or blessed to live on one; we wouldn't exist otherwise. Why is the universe Einsteinian and not Newtonian? Well if it were Newtonian we would be asking the other question (actually, Newtonian physics probably isn't rich enough to give rise to structures complex enough to be sentient). I think all religion, nationality, prejudice, libertarianism, etc. arises from this deep but irrational egocentrism: we think we are special to be the way we are, rather than recognizing the a posteriori necessity of it. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/13/85)
> As I understand it, free will is essentially the assertion that the process of > consciousness can in fact decide; it is the antithesis of the assertion that > all human behavior is caused. [WINGATE] If a decision is not a cause, then what is? If you are referring to a decision outside the realm of so-called "physical" cause and effect, you are talking about something on the order of a soul, though you have denied this repeatedly. But, yes indeed, you got it right: free will is the notion that there can be behavior and thought and action external to "physical" cause. To believe in such a notion requires a willful agent external to the realm of cause and effect. Unless you're just claiming that quantum physics winds up causing things at the macro level. Such random elements, limited in effect, have as much to do with free will as... hot fudge sauce. > To deny free will, therefore, I think you must show two things: > > (1) That random fluctuations in processing are unimportant. > > (2) That all behavior can be traced inevitably to external causes. Or internal causes that are caused by the innate make-up of the person (surely not "self"-determined, more likely determined by parental genes) AND any experiences thereafter (clearly external by definition). > This leads us to to a long list of positions: > > (A) Soulism: A supernatural entity is the ultimate cause of behavior. A necessity if you are speaking in terms of a will independent of the constraints of physical reality. > (B) Physical Soulism: A physical entity unlike matter or energy as we know it > is the ultimate cause of behavior. 1) Why? Why even speculate about other forces, physical or not (?) that are the ultimate cause of behavior? Why not just the physical things we know about and love? Or are you specifically seeking a causative force that allows such independence because you want to think of yourself that way? What's more, if you are talking about some other physical entity, it would thus be a part of the physical universe and thus subject to the laws of cause and effect. > (C) Quantum indeterminism: Quantum events are so important that the sources > of behavior are truly random. Now THIS is wishful thinking if ever I heard it. Because the behavior of particles at the quantum level is indeterminate to human observers, THIS gives us free will??? What about rocks? Don't THEY have quantum level actions going on? Why aren't rocks conscious and decision making objects? Why can't the rock decide not to fall or roll? Surely it has those same quantum events going on... > (D) Natal Independence: The initial presence of randomness in the brain > precludes the development of causality in the mind. This may be an explanation of why some people never learn to think, too much randomness (perceived) in their brains. (Directed at no one in particular, just an observation.) > (E) Combinations of C and D. > (F) Various combinations of the denial of the above. i.e., quantum alchemy > I think we can ignore the first two. But they are NECESSARY if you are talking some real form of free will. I guess you've just thrown the baby out with the bath water. Good riddance. > The third essentially denies mechanism, > since it asserts that gross behavior is truly not predictable, even > probabilistically. One can argue at length whether or not this constitutes > free will. Or one can argue briefly: "No it doesn't, because will implies an agent determining action, not just random events." "Oh, OK." Very brief. > Position D, however, is the most potent. It essentially asserts > that, however the brain works, there is an initial random component at birth > which does not dissipate. In this case, processing can be mechanistic, yet > there is still free will in the strongest sense. Whatever random component you wish to insert, it offers little "willful" agency, just a random variable thrown in with the mechanism. Hardly "free" or "will". -- "Do I just cut 'em up like regular chickens?" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/14/85)
In article <1485@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> As I understand it, free will is essentially the assertion that the >> process of consciousness can in fact decide; it is the antithesis >> of the assertion that all human behavior is caused. [WINGATE] >If a decision is not a cause, then what is? If you are referring to a >decision outside the realm of so-called "physical" cause and effect, >you are talking about something on the order of a soul, though you have >denied this repeatedly. But, yes indeed, you got it right: free will >is the notion that there can be behavior and thought and action external >to "physical" cause. To believe in such a notion requires a willful agent >external to the realm of cause and effect. This is a very strange definition to me; sounds precisely like a definition of spiritualism, having nothing to do with free will at all. The outcome of a decision causes other things, and, for some decisions, the choice made is determined. But the fact that something causes other things deterministically does not imply that it was itself determined. >Unless you're just claiming that quantum physics winds up causing things >at the macro level. Such random elements, limited in effect, have as >much to do with free will as... hot fudge sauce. Demonstrate this assertion. >> To deny free will, therefore, I think you must show two things: >> (1) That random fluctuations in processing are unimportant. >> (2) That all behavior can be traced inevitably to external causes. >Or internal causes that are caused by the innate make-up of the person >(surely not "self"-determined, more likely determined by parental genes) >AND any experiences thereafter (clearly external by definition). But ya gotta demonstrate this scientifically, and this hasn't been done. And isn't genetics an external cause? Given our current understanding of the origin of individual minds, I think that the hypothesis that random processes are important in establishing the deciding process (i.e., will). >> This leads us to to a long list of positions: >> (A) Soulism: A supernatural entity is the ultimate cause of behavior. >A necessity if you are speaking in terms of a will independent of the >constraints of physical reality. Which I am not. >> (B) Physical Soulism: A physical entity unlike matter or energy as we >> know it is the ultimate cause of behavior. >1) Why? Why even speculate about other forces, physical or not (?) that are >the ultimate cause of behavior? Why not just the physical things we know >about and love? Or are you specifically seeking a causative force >that allows such independence because you want to think of yourself >that way? What's more, if you are talking about some other physical >entity, it would thus be a part of the physical universe and thus subject >to the laws of cause and effect. Before I go jump all over Rich, let me look at this on its merits. First of all, causation is NOT physical law. Some observable quantum effects are demonstably random, and NOT caused. Second of all, who are you to demand that new physical laws follow your preconceptions? IF the universe is that way, then it is that way. As for the silly allegation that I think this is a desirable model: >> I think we can ignore the first two. [me] >But they are NECESSARY if you are talking some real form of free will. >I guess you've just thrown the baby out with the bath water. Good riddance. They are only necessary if you want disembodied wills (i.e., spirits). If you are willing to get rid of your homonuculus theory of will and stick to mental processes, then neither of these theories gets you anything. >> (C) Quantum indeterminism: Quantum events are so important that the sources >> of behavior are truly random. >Now THIS is wishful thinking if ever I heard it. Because the behavior >of particles at the quantum level is indeterminate to human observers, THIS >gives us free will??? What about rocks? Don't THEY have quantum level >actions going on? Why aren't rocks conscious and decision making objects? >Why can't the rock decide not to fall or roll? Surely it has those same >quantum events going on... It's quite apparent that rocks don't undergo quantum fluctuations that we can measure. As for the first two sentences, I can only hope that you are arguing out of utter ignorance. The sad facts are that quantum mechanics, as anyone has been able to formulate it, DEMANDS acausality. Theoreticians have been trying to get rid of this for years, but it appears the the randomness is real, and not just hidden variables. The fluctuations can be measured with fairly simple instrumentation (certainly much simpler than a brain). There is no evidence that the brain does not similarly amplify these fluctuations. Rich keeps acting as if there is solid proof that this does not happen. I suggest he produce it if he can. >> (D) Natal Independence: The initial presence of randomness in the brain >> precludes the development of causality in the mind. >This may be an explanation of why some people never learn to think, too >much randomness (perceived) in their brains. (Directed at no one in >particular, just an observation.) Do you have an intelligent criticism to make, Rich? [a flame, in case you didn't notice] >> The third essentially denies mechanism, >> since it asserts that gross behavior is truly not predictable, even >> probabilistically. One can argue at length whether or not this constitutes >> free will. >Or one can argue briefly: "No it doesn't, because will implies an agent >determining action, not just random events." "Oh, OK." Very brief. If the mind itself is the only determiner, though, we have free will. Free will isn't water, that we have to pump it out of the supernatural. End of brief rebuttal. >> Position D, however, is the most potent. It essentially asserts >> that, however the brain works, there is an initial random component at >> birth which does not dissipate. In this case, processing can be >> mechanistic, yet there is still free will in the strongest sense. >Whatever random component you wish to insert, it offers little "willful" >agency, just a random variable thrown in with the mechanism. Hardly "free" >or "will". That's because you have never advanced past the homonuculus theory of consciousness, Rich. C Wingate "The greatest witch in all Europe is a horse?"
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/19/85)
In article <27500092@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP (Jim Balter) writes: > Why is there subjective >experience? The best answer I can think of is that there must be subjective >experience in a world where we experience it. If we were in a world were >there were none, then we wouldn't be asking the question. You didn't answer the question. Why is there subjective experience in ANY world? What is subjective experience, anyway?
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/20/85)
>>>As I understand it, free will is essentially the assertion that the >>>process of consciousness can in fact decide; it is the antithesis >>>of the assertion that all human behavior is caused. [WINGATE] >>If a decision is not a cause, then what is? If you are referring to a >>decision outside the realm of so-called "physical" cause and effect, >>you are talking about something on the order of a soul, though you have >>denied this repeatedly. But, yes indeed, you got it right: free will >>is the notion that there can be behavior and thought and action external >>to "physical" cause. To believe in such a notion requires a willful agent >>external to the realm of cause and effect. [WINGATE] > This is a very strange definition to me; sounds precisely like a definition > of spiritualism, having nothing to do with free will at all. Spiritualism has everything to do with true free will, because it is a consequence *of* it. In order for a will (by your own definition) to be free, it must be unconstrained by feeble constraints like your wants and beliefs as manifested chemically in your brain. >>Unless you're just claiming that quantum physics winds up causing things >>at the macro level. Such random elements, limited in effect, have as >>much to do with free will as... hot fudge sauce. > Demonstrate this assertion. I have, in other articles. Quantum randomness doesn't bring freedom for your will, it merely makes your will dependent on yet another variable: quantum randomness. >>>To deny free will, therefore, I think you must show two things: >>> (1) That random fluctuations in processing are unimportant. >>> (2) That all behavior can be traced inevitably to external causes. >>Or internal causes that are caused by the innate make-up of the person >>(surely not "self"-determined, more likely determined by parental genes) >>AND any experiences thereafter (clearly external by definition). > But ya gotta demonstrate this scientifically, and this hasn't been done. > And isn't genetics an external cause? Certainly there's more basis for the solid ground that this model walks upon than the swamp of presumption and wishful thinking where Charlie's model can be found. Fine, you've just proved my point: yet another external cause to trace things to. I was glad to call genetics innate and internal, but your point is well taken: it's another dependency on externals. > Given our current understanding of the origin of individual minds, I think > that the hypothesis that random processes are important in establishing the > deciding process (i.e., will). To quote a famous scholar of the human mind (a Charley Wignatz), "Demonstrate this assertion." >>>This leads us to to a long list of positions: >>>(A) Soulism: A supernatural entity is the ultimate cause of behavior. >>A necessity if you are speaking in terms of a will independent of the >>constraints of physical reality. > Which I am not. Then you're not talking about FREE will at all. End of discussion. -- Anything's possible... but wait, there's more... >>>(B) Physical Soulism: A physical entity unlike matter or energy as we >>> know it is the ultimate cause of behavior. >>1) Why? Why even speculate about other forces, physical or not (?) that are >>the ultimate cause of behavior? Why not just the physical things we know >>about and love? Or are you specifically seeking a causative force >>that allows such independence because you want to think of yourself >>that way? What's more, if you are talking about some other physical >>entity, it would thus be a part of the physical universe and thus subject >>to the laws of cause and effect. > Before I go jump all over Rich, let me look at this on its merits. First of > all, causation is NOT physical law. Some observable quantum effects are > demonstably random, and NOT caused. Second of all, who are you to demand that > new physical laws follow your preconceptions? IF the universe is that way, > then it is that way. I didn't say that it "had to". But you are coming up with blueprints of the new universe model, not based on speculations in light of evidence, but based on what you want the outcome to be: a world with free will. > As for the silly allegation that I think this is a desirable model: >>>I think we can ignore the first two. [me] >>But they are NECESSARY if you are talking some real form of free will. >>I guess you've just thrown the baby out with the bath water. Good riddance. > They are only necessary if you want disembodied wills (i.e., spirits). If > you are willing to get rid of your homonuculus theory of will and stick to > mental processes, then neither of these theories gets you anything. I'm more than willing. In fact, I see it as a step in the right direction. Unfortunately, by doing that, you shut the door on free will. Fini again. -- Like aversion (HEY!)... wait a minute, what's going on here? >>>(C) Quantum indeterminism: Quantum events are so important that the sources >>> of behavior are truly random. >>Now THIS is wishful thinking if ever I heard it. Because the behavior >>of particles at the quantum level is indeterminate to human observers, THIS >>gives us free will??? What about rocks? Don't THEY have quantum level >>actions going on? Why aren't rocks conscious and decision making objects? >>Why can't the rock decide not to fall or roll? Surely it has those same >>quantum events going on... > It's quite apparent that rocks don't undergo quantum fluctuations that > we can measure. Oh? This is news. Now it's rocks that are different from the rest of the universe... > As for the first two sentences, I can only hope that you are arguing > out of utter ignorance. The sad facts are that quantum mechanics, > as anyone has been able to formulate it, DEMANDS acausality. Theoreticians > have been trying to get rid of this for years, but it appears the the > randomness is real, and not just hidden variables. The fluctuations can be > measured with fairly simple instrumentation (certainly much simpler than > a brain). There is no evidence that the brain does not similarly amplify > these fluctuations. 1) So? All you have proven is that the human will is not only constrained by "hard" chemical make-up, but also by "soft" quantum fluctuations. 2) This sounds an awful lot like religion. Which is more religious sounding to you? "Quantum mechanics provides us with no perceivable means of making determinations" "Quantum mechanics proves that there are things that have no cause, because we are unable to find any." > Rich keeps acting as if there is solid proof that this does not happen. Give an example. >>>(D) Natal Independence: The initial presence of randomness in the brain >>> precludes the development of causality in the mind. >>This may be an explanation of why some people never learn to think, too >>much randomness (perceived) in their brains. (Directed at no one in >>particular, just an observation.) > Do you have an intelligent criticism to make, Rich? [a flame, in case you > didn't notice] Yes, this may be an explantion of why some people never learn to think, too much randomness (perceived) in their brains. (Directed at no one in particular, just an observation.) Seriously, did you have an intelligent *statement* to make (as long as we're flaming)? What does this mean? The brain, like everything else in the universe, has quantum events occurring within it, thus direct causality is impeded? What does this have to do with any of our arguments pro or con? In what way does it affect "will", let alone "free will"? >>>The third essentially denies mechanism, >>>since it asserts that gross behavior is truly not predictable, even >>>probabilistically. One can argue at length whether or not this constitutes >>>free will. >>Or one can argue briefly: "No it doesn't, because will implies an agent >>determining action, not just random events." "Oh, OK." Very brief. > If the mind itself is the only determiner, though, we have free will. Free > will isn't water, that we have to pump it out of the supernatural. End of > brief rebuttal. Since the mind doesn't determine itself, since it is formed based on external dependencies and since it grows and develops continuously based on further external events, it is not the "only" determiner, and thus we don't have free will. End of somewhat longer but more to the point rebuttal with a very long sentence at the end of it that would have been a lot shorter had I ended it with the first instance of the word rebuttal. (Yes, I've been reading too much Gebstadter. :-) >>>Position D, however, is the most potent. It essentially asserts >>>that, however the brain works, there is an initial random component at >>>birth which does not dissipate. In this case, processing can be >>>mechanistic, yet there is still free will in the strongest sense. >>Whatever random component you wish to insert, it offers little "willful" >>agency, just a random variable thrown in with the mechanism. Hardly "free" >>or "will". > That's because you have never advanced past the homonuculus theory of > consciousness, Rich. No, that's because I understand what the difference between "free" and "constrained" is. -- "I was walking down the street. A man came up to me and asked me what was the capital of Bolivia. I hesitated. Three sailors jumped me. The next thing I knew I was making chicken salad." "I don't believe that for a minute. Everyone knows the capital of Bolivia is La Paz." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (08/23/85)
>> Why is there subjective >>experience? The best answer I can think of is that there must be subjective >>experience in a world where we experience it. If we were in a world were >>there were none, then we wouldn't be asking the question. [Jim Balter] > >You didn't answer the question. Why is there subjective experience in ANY >world? What is subjective experience, anyway? [Frank Adams] The Real within the Imaginary A keyboard crazed materialist Encounters an image on the screen Clearly he sees chemicals But they bear no resemblance Too bad, with a muddled head He tries to recognize his reflection! -adapted from Goi Koan by a Monk who lived on Mount To -michael
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/26/85)
>> Why is there subjective >>experience? The best answer I can think of is that there must be subjective >>experience in a world where we experience it. If we were in a world were >>there were none, then we wouldn't be asking the question. >You didn't answer the question. Why is there subjective experience in ANY >world? Because there is. Please give me some criteria for determining what is and is not an answer to a teleological question. As far as I can see, such answers can only reliably be asked of the entity that formed the intent. If you ask me why I did something, or why my program works the way it does, I can answer because I actually know the intent. But, as for why the world works the way it does, the question is only meaningful if there was an intender, and if you can find it or someone who reliably knows its intentions. Otherwise, the best you can do is try to determine *how*. >What is subjective experience, anyway? It's what's happening, man. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (08/27/85)
In article <480@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: >>> Why is there subjective >>>experience? The best answer I can think of is that there must be subjective >>>experience in a world where we experience it. If we were in a world were >>>there were none, then we wouldn't be asking the question. [Jim Balter] >> >>You didn't answer the question. Why is there subjective experience in ANY >>world? What is subjective experience, anyway? [Frank Adams] > > The Real within the Imaginary > A keyboard crazed materialist > Encounters an image on the screen > Clearly he sees chemicals > But they bear no resemblance > Too bad, with a muddled head > He tries to recognize his reflection! > > -adapted from Goi Koan by a Monk who lived on Mount To > >-michael I don't deny that there is such a thing as subjective experience. Indeed, my first impulse is to say that of course there is. But WHAT IS IT? The difficulties involved in trying to answer this make me take seriously the idea that it does not exist, which I would otherwise reject out of hand. I don't see how to get subjective experience out of a mechanistic system, and I don't see any reason to believe in (nor understand the meaning of) a non-mechanistic system. By the way, I don't have any problem explaining the fact that other people claim to have subjective experiences. The problem is in explaining my own subjectivity to myself. Maybe it's all an illusion -- but what is it which is being deceived? By the way, I don't really expect any answers -- the problem is probably unanswerable.
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/30/85)
>I don't deny that there is such a thing as subjective experience. Indeed, >my first impulse is to say that of course there is. But WHAT IS IT? >The difficulties involved in trying to answer this make me take seriously >the idea that it does not exist, which I would otherwise reject out of hand. >I don't see how to get subjective experience out of a mechanistic system, >and I don't see any reason to believe in (nor understand the meaning of) a >non-mechanistic system. You are contradicting yourself; you are saying that you will reject the evidence to preserve the model. Clearly you do have reason to believe in a non-mechanistic system, since you have subjective experience which you cannot deny, but you cannot see how to get it out of a mechanistic system. However, I do not think that the reason to believe in a non-mechanistic system is *compelling*; rather the inability to get subjective experience out of a mechanistic system should be deeply questioned, examined, and challenged, despite the difficulty in doing so, because this still seems easier (to you, and to me) than giving meaning to the notion of a non-mechanistic system. >By the way, I don't have any problem explaining the fact that other people >claim to have subjective experiences. The problem is in explaining my >own subjectivity to myself. Maybe it's all an illusion -- but what is it >which is being deceived? I think the latter is a clue; the thing doing the analysis is so deeply embedded into the analysis that it can't ever see what is really going on. It's a trick, but you will never be able to catch the magician. As Alan Watts, says, it is like trying to look at your own eyeball, or to touch the tip of your right index finger with your right index finger. However, I think you can maybe get a little glimpse; think of being a rock, then think of being a plant, then think of being a tree, then a clam, and on through cats and dogs and monkeys, and really think about your level of emerging awareness; then think about being you, and remember being tired or drugged or just plain slow, of not catching on to things, and then think of becoming senile, and then think of dying. Think of the mechanistic nature of the reactions and neuron firings in your brain; think of their imprecise, heuristic, methods, and then think of your imprecise heuristic ways of thinking, not really all so much crisp and *there* as you like to think; think of the mechanistic biological nature of your actual thought processes. I think if you try real hard you will catch a sense of how you *are* the process, rather than being a mind standing outside of it. You are just a mechanical approximation of the conceptual you. I think it is in this gap between the conceptualization and the realization that the answer to the paradox of subjective experience lies. >By the way, I don't really expect any answers -- the problem is probably >unanswerable. Nah, but it sure is fun to try. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)