rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/31/85)
> That's *Raymond* Smullyan, Jim. You're getting him confused with me, > which is easy to do since we're both Taoists, solipsists (but isn't > everyone), classical pianists, and masters of fallacious logic. [CARNES] I see what you mean by fallacious logic. A solipsist wouldn't believe that there is an "everyone" each of whom could believe that he/she is a solipsist. More examples followed. > This sentence should be disregarded, since it was inserted merely to > fill out the article. And *this* sentence isn't even in English, > although it may well seem so at first glance. I am aware that in Guocammoli it means "This sentence is actually in English." > A PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF DOG > > Consider the following statement, which we will call Sentence A: > If this sentence is true, then Dog exists. > > Suppose Sentence A is true. Since this fulfills the condition in > Sentence A, the consequent follows, i.e., that Dog exists. So we > have shown that *if* Sentence A is true, then Dog exists. But that > is just what Sentence A asserts; hence we have proven that Sentence A > is true. It follows (by Sentence A) that Dog exists. Q.E.D. (Let's forget for the moment the fact that Sentence B, "If this sentence is true, god does not exist.", is equally true...) What's really humorous about this "logic" (and the term is being used oh so loosely) is that it is akin to the basis for all belief in god in the first place. Suppose God exists. Then it all follows "logically". Never even bother to consider for one minute the possibility that the sentence might be false. Clearly the sentence isn't true, precisely because it's got cause and effect ass backwards. Let us compare totally self-referential sentences with sentences that aren't (call them "extrareferential" if you like). The structuring of such sentences in particular ways cannot make things exist or not exist in the real world. Extrareferential sentences are true or false because of the way they affect the real world. Since whether or not a thing exists cannot be dependent on the truth or falseness of a sentence alone, Sentence A is clearly false. (There is one exception I can think of: definitions, such as "God is a ... ." They are "true" only because they are relational symbological tautologies. Of course, if the thing described by the definition doesn't exist, e.g., unicorn, then the word doesn't represent something real.) > Arf, arf. By similar reasoning, one can show that humans have free > will. Refute *that*, Rich Rosen. Child's play. No kidding. I'm not impressed. This was not a good example of incredible paradoxical self-referentiality. Try again. :-) > The rest of this article is in Bolivia, written on a terminal at Rich Rosen's house, and it has two incorrect assertions, one of which was about Bolivia. Figure that one out. -- "I was walking down the street. A man came up to me and asked me what was the capital of Bolivia. I hesitated. Three sailors jumped me. The next thing I knew I was making chicken salad." "I don't believe that for a minute. Everyone knows the capital of Bolivia is La Paz." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/05/85)
>> That's *Raymond* Smullyan, Jim. You're getting him confused with me, >> which is easy to do since we're both Taoists, solipsists (but isn't >> everyone), classical pianists, and masters of fallacious logic. [CARNES] > >I see what you mean by fallacious logic. A solipsist wouldn't believe >that there is an "everyone" each of whom could believe that he/she is a >solipsist. More examples followed. [NOT CARNES] As nonexistent, I see nothing whatsover fallacious about Richard's solipsism. After all, someone has to exist. Why not Mr. Carnes? >> This sentence should be disregarded, since it was inserted merely to >> fill out the article. And *this* sentence isn't even in English, >> although it may well seem so at first glance. > >I am aware that in Guocammoli it means "This sentence is actually in English" That's not very logical, Rich. >> A PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF DOG >... > definitions, such as "God is a ... ." They are "true" only because they are > relational symbological tautologies. Of course, if the thing described by > the definition doesn't exist, e.g., unicorn, then the word doesn't represent > something real.) So "Dog exists" is tautologically true because "Dog" does not refer to a genuine bona fide Real Physical entity, just as described by Lao Tzu: (4) Existence flows from nothing.. Who am I to fault that which is as nonexistent as myself, anyway? >> Arf, arf. By similar reasoning, one can show that humans have free >> will. Refute *that*, Rich Rosen. > > Child's play. No kidding. I'm not impressed. This was not a good example of > incredible paradoxical self-referentiality. Try again. :-) Perhaps you might enjoy C.A. Campbell's characterization of free will as a concept which is, like creativity, irreducible by rational explanation: "If we mean by an intelligible act one whose occurrence is capable of "being inferred, since it follows necessarily from something, "then it is certainly true that the Libertarian's {= Freewiller MCE} "free will is unintelligible. But that is only saying .. that "the Libertarian's "free" act is not an act which follows necessarily "from something! "This can hardly rank as a criticism of Libertarianism. It is just "a description of it. That there can be nothing unintelligible in "this sense is precisely what the Determinist has got to prove.. "Repeatedly it is urged against the Libertarian, with a great air of "triumph, that .. he cannot say why I now decide to rise to duty, "or now decide to follow my strongest desire.. "Of course he can't. A free will is ex hypothesi the sort of thing of "which the request for explanation is absurd. Ordinary men are so bright and intelligent. -am I existent yet?