flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (01/01/70)
In article <609@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> My example is easily corrected. No other particles (than the two mentioned >> above) of any kind were within one light-second, and there was not enough >> other energy (light, etc.) in the area to form an electron via E=mc**2. >> --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink > >Your example is still incorrect. It is an assertion on your part that the >electron did not exist in between measurements - this is not >to be confused with "logical" possibility. Like I said before: the electron interacts with another particle, disappears, and reappears later. Need I mention that all of this is observed? (If it weren't, there wouldn't be much point in talking about it.) The electron is *observed* to disappear between time A and time B. >To prove your point you >need to show that the second electron was indeed the same as the first, >which, as far as I know, is not possible, It must be the same electron because there was not enough mass/energy and negative charge within one light-second to form the electron, except for the results of the interaction of the electron and other particle. >and you need to show that it did not exist between measurements. >You cannot assume what you are trying to prove! Again, it is *observed* not to exist between times A and B (your phrase "between measurements" suggests, wrongly, that no measurements occur between times A and B). There is energy there, but no electron. --Paul V Torek, hoping it's finally sinking in.
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (08/24/85)
In article <588@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> >Resurrection implies continuity of something. The continuity >> >is contained in the "we" that is resurected, since the "we" was there >> >before, and after, resurrection. There's no way out of this. and he later explains: > 1) Let A be life before death, and B life after death, > 2) we have X at A where X is the "we" in "we are resurrected" > 3) we have X at B where X is the "we" in "we are resurrected" > >These assumptions are implicit in the resurrection claim. These are not >being challanged here. Now X forms an uninterrupted succession, therefore >it is continuous. WRONG! Look, I'm the last one to argue for Wingate's religious beliefs, BUT: it just ain't implied by a person's existence at time A, and later at time B, that he must have existed during the time between. (It happens to be always true in the real world, but as a matter of physical law and boundary conditions, not as a matter of logic.) CASE: An electron exists at time A (7:00:00 am), and at time B (7:00:01 am), but not in between. It interacts with another particle, and both disappear for one second; then both reappear. (Physics experts, correct me if this is not possible; I've read that it is. Anyway, even if it is not physically possible, it is *logically* possible [i.e. it involves no contradiction].) OBJECTION: If the electon at time A disappears, how can you identify the electron at time B as THE SAME electron? REPLY: No other electrons were within one light-second at the time of the observation. Since the electron observed at time B obviously has a lot in common with the one observed at A, and since no other particle is a candidate for being that electron, it makes perfect sense to say that the electron at time B is THE SAME electron. CONCLUSION: It is not a valid deduction to infer, from the fact that an entity exists at time A and at time B, that it must have existed continuously all along. Therefore, Padraig Houlahan's argument that resurection implies continuity implies soul, is invalid. Q.E.D. Paul V Torek, aspiring ender of silly debates.
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (08/24/85)
> In article <588@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: > >> >Resurrection implies continuity of something. The continuity > >> >is contained in the "we" that is resurected, since the "we" was there > >> >before, and after, resurrection. There's no way out of this. > > and he later explains: > > > 1) Let A be life before death, and B life after death, > > 2) we have X at A where X is the "we" in "we are resurrected" > > 3) we have X at B where X is the "we" in "we are resurrected" > > > >These assumptions are implicit in the resurrection claim. These are not > >being challanged here. Now X forms an uninterrupted succession, therefore > >it is continuous. > > WRONG! Look, I'm the last one to argue for Wingate's religious beliefs, > BUT: it just ain't implied by a person's existence at time A, and later at > time B, that he must have existed during the time between. (It happens > to be always true in the real world, but as a matter of physical law and > boundary conditions, not as a matter of logic.) > > CASE: > An electron exists at time A (7:00:00 am), and at time B (7:00:01 am), > but not in between. It interacts with another particle, and both disappear > for one second; then both reappear. (Physics experts, correct me if this > is not possible; I've read that it is. Anyway, even if it is not physically > possible, it is *logically* possible [i.e. it involves no contradiction].) This is really ripe: "...even if it is not physically possible it is *logically* possible ...". This begins to stink of the problem concerning the amount of teeth that women have. > OBJECTION: > If the electon at time A disappears, how can you identify the electron at > time B as THE SAME electron? > > REPLY: > No other electrons were within one light-second at the time of the > observation. Since the electron observed at time B obviously has a > lot in common with the one observed at A, and since no other particle > is a candidate for being that electron, it makes perfect sense to say > that the electron at time B is THE SAME electron. This is garbage. Electrons can be created in many ways through interactions among other atomic particles. That none are within a certain volume at a certain time does not preclude them forming, through decay perhaps, there. I note that an interesting consequence of Charley's view is that man is nothing more than an assemblage of chemicals. (Maybe some good has come from Rosen's and my postings!) As an analogy one could consider a stack of coins, say, and have some klutz knock them over. The stack is rebuilt, but the question is whether or not it is the "same" stack, in the same sense as that for a similar one that existed all the while. I have no idea why he opts for denying the existence of a soul since it presents a simple and "natural" explanation for his scenario, and is just as credible. Padraig Houlahan.
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (08/25/85)
In article <599@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> CASE: >> An electron exists at time A (7:00:00 am), and at time B (7:00:01 am), >> but not in between. It interacts with another particle, and both disappear >> for one second; then both reappear. (Physics experts, correct me if this >> is not possible; I've read that it is. Anyway, even if it is not physically >> possible, it is *logically* possible [i.e. it involves no contradiction].) > >This is really ripe: "...even if it is not physically possible it is >*logically* possible ...". This begins to stink of the problem concerning >the amount of teeth that women have. You miss the point. If you are going to give a (supposedly) LOGICALLY VALID argument for your assertion about continuity of existence, there must be no logically possible counterexamples. >> No other electrons were within one light-second at the time of the >> observation. Since the electron observed at time B obviously has a >> lot in common with the one observed at A, and since no other particle >> is a candidate for being that electron, it makes perfect sense to say >> that the electron at time B is THE SAME electron. > >This is garbage. Electrons can be created in many ways through interactions >among other atomic particles. That none are within a certain volume at >a certain time does not preclude them forming, through decay perhaps, > there. My example is easily corrected. No other particles (than the two mentioned above) of any kind were within one light-second, and there was not enough other energy (light, etc.) in the area to form an electron via E=mc**2. --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/25/85)
> WRONG! Look, I'm the last one to argue for Wingate's religious beliefs, > BUT: it just ain't implied by a person's existence at time A, and later at > time B, that he must have existed during the time between. (It happens > to be always true in the real world, but as a matter of physical law and > boundary conditions, not as a matter of logic.) [TOREK] True, Paul. But what makes the person at time A the same person at time B? What relates the two "persons" such that they can be said to be the same person? -- "to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight and never stop fighting." - e. e. cummings Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (08/26/85)
> >This is garbage. Electrons can be created in many ways through interactions > >among other atomic particles. That none are within a certain volume at > >a certain time does not preclude them forming, through decay perhaps, > > there. > > My example is easily corrected. No other particles (than the two mentioned > above) of any kind were within one light-second, and there was not enough > other energy (light, etc.) in the area to form an electron via E=mc**2. > > --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink Your example is still incorrect. It is an assertion on your part that the electron did not exist in between measurements - this is not to be confused with "logical" possibility. To prove your point you need to show that the second electron was indeed the same as the first, which, as far as I know, is not possible, and you need to show that it did not exist between measurements. You cannot assume what you are trying to prove! Padraig Houlahan.
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack) (08/26/85)
"we" in "we are resurrected" >> >These assumptions are implicit in the resurrection claim. These are not >> >being challanged here. Now X forms an uninterrupted succession, therefore >> >it is continuous. >> CASE: >> An electron exists at time A (7:00:00 am), and at time B (7:00:01 am), >> but not in between. It interacts with another particle, and both disappear >> for one second; then both reappear. (Physics experts, correct me if this >> is not possible; I've read that it is. Anyway, even if it is not physically >> possible, it is *logically* possible [i.e. it involves no contradiction].) >This is really ripe: "...even if it is not physically possible it is >*logically* possible ...". This begins to stink of the problem concerning >the amount of teeth that women have. [omitted material] >This is garbage. Electrons can be created in many ways through interactions >among other atomic particles. That none are within a certain volume at >a certain time does not preclude them forming, through decay perhaps, > there. >I note that an interesting consequence of Charley's view is that man is >nothing more than an assemblage of chemicals. (Maybe some good has come >from Rosen's and my postings!) As an analogy one could consider a stack >of coins, say, and have some klutz knock them over. The stack is rebuilt, >but the question is whether or not it is the "same" stack, in the same >sense as that for a similar one that existed all the while. >I have no idea why he >opts for denying the existence of a soul since it presents a simple >and "natural" explanation for his scenario, and is just as credible. The point Charley was making is that souls aren't NECESSARY for there to be life after death. Paul was trying to give you an example of a discontinuous existence. What they say is perfectly valid. Existence could be discontinuous. In Star Trek, Dr. McCoy had a number of philosophical questions of this nature, because of the Transporter. The transporter supposedly took a person, disassembled their components, encoded them, transmitted them, and reassembled the person out of available materials at the destination. What Charley says is just like the person being disassembled and encoded, there may be some other transformation at death, that allows a person to be resurrected at a later date. Maybe even a 'temporal warp?' I find it hard that you can argue that this possibility doesn't exist... For your consideration, Chris -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (08/27/85)
> In article <609@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: > >> My example is easily corrected. No other particles (than the two mentioned > >> above) of any kind were within one light-second, and there was not enough > >> other energy (light, etc.) in the area to form an electron via E=mc**2. > >> --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink > > > >Your example is still incorrect. It is an assertion on your part that the > >electron did not exist in between measurements - this is not > >to be confused with "logical" possibility. > > Like I said before: the electron interacts with another particle, > disappears, and reappears later. Need I mention that all of this is > observed? (If it weren't, there wouldn't be much point in talking about it.) > The electron is *observed* to disappear between time A and time B. Is *observed*? I would be interested in seeing a reference for this. Thanks in advance. Padraig Houlahan.
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (08/28/85)
In article <1589@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> BUT: it just ain't implied by a person's existence at time A, and later at >> time B, that he must have existed during the time between. (It happens >> to be always true in the real world, but as a matter of physical law and >> boundary conditions, not as a matter of logic.) [TOREK] > >True, Paul. But what makes the person at time A the same person at time B? >What relates the two "persons" such that they can be said to be the same >person? Well, for example, the person at time B might have the exact same physical structure, molecule by molecule, as the person had at time A. He would then have all the same mental qualities (assuming, as I think we two agree, that Cartesian dualism is wrong). He would then be, for all practical purposes, the same person. I'm not saying that all this is physically possible, of course (but then, I don't believe in Wingate's God). (Technically though, the person at time B (call him Bob) would not be the same person as the one at time A (call him Al), unless he was causally descended from A in such a way that there could not be two identical people produced at time B by the same process. Otherwise, Bob would "merely" be an exact *copy* of Al. I put the word "merely" in scare-quotes because, rationally, it should not make a difference to anyone, including Al, whether Bob will be Al or an exact copy.) --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/28/85)
All this discussion of whether or not survival and afterlife imply continuity is just a red herring Charley threw in to keep the discussion of afterlife, souls, resurrection, salvation, Christian doctrine, etc. alive in net.philosophy, where it does not belong. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) (08/30/85)
>> WRONG! Look, I'm the last one to argue for Wingate's religious beliefs, >> BUT: it just ain't implied by a person's existence at time A, and later at >> time B, that he must have existed during the time between. (It happens >> to be always true in the real world, but as a matter of physical law and >> boundary conditions, not as a matter of logic.) [TOREK] > >True, Paul. But what makes the person at time A the same person at time B? >What relates the two "persons" such that they can be said to be the same >person? [ROSEN] Interesting question! I have a little thought experiment which might amuse anyone who's interested in the answer to it. Let's pretend that someone has invented a "matter transmitter", a device whereby a person can step in a transmitter in, say San Francisco, and step out of a receiver in London a fraction of a second later, having been transmitted from one to the other. However, it's not *really* a matter transmitter; physically sending the atoms that make up your body half-way round the world would not be economical. Instead, it simply sends all the *information* required to duplicate your body at the other end, using materials closer to hand. The result, nevertheless, is an exact duplicate down to the molecular level, with both the "mind" and the body not detectably altered. Some obvious questions arise. Is the person who steps out of the receiver in London the "same" person who stepped in the transmitter in San Francisco? You can determine your gut-reaction to this question by considering whether or not you'd be willing to travel this way, yourself. If you think they are the same person, consider these slight alterations in the situation. The device fails, briefly, while you are "in transit"; your body in SF has been decomposed, but the signal hasn't reached London. Instead, an emergency backup system has stored the information that makes up "you". Five minutes later, the system recovers, and you arrive in London none the worse for wear. Still the same person? Now, the *really* hard one. Different system failure: you arrive in London without mishap, but the transmitter fails to decompose the "original" immediately. For a few seconds, there were two of you. Are they *still* the same person? Or did somebody die there in San Francisco? Better yet, *both* versions end up surviving indefinitely. How many people do we have now, and which one is *you*? Extra credit question for those of you who would not step in to the above device: suppose it really *did* transmit matter; sent your very atoms to your destination, so that no possibility of duplication existed. Would you step into this? Is the person who steps out the same one who stepped in? In short, what are the boundary conditions for the continuity of the self? This is not an answer to the "souls" question, obviously, but I think it relates to it. Comments? - From the Crow's Nest - Kenn Barry NASA-Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- USENET: {ihnp4,vortex,dual,nsc,hao,hplabs}!ames!barry
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/30/85)
>>True, Paul. But what makes the person at time A the same person at time B? >>What relates the two "persons" such that they can be said to be the same >>person? > Well, for example, the person at time B might have the exact same physical > structure, molecule by molecule, as the person had at time A. He would > then have all the same mental qualities (assuming, as I think we two agree, > that Cartesian dualism is wrong). He would then be, for all practical > purposes, the same person. I'm not saying that all this is physically > possible, of course (but then, I don't believe in Wingate's God). > > (Technically though, the person at time B (call him Bob) would not be the > same person as the one at time A (call him Al), unless he was causally > descended from A in such a way that there could not be two identical people > produced at time B by the same process. Otherwise, Bob would "merely" > be an exact *copy* of Al. I put the word "merely" in scare-quotes because, > rationally, it should not make a difference to anyone, including Al, > whether Bob will be Al or an exact copy.) You're right about the perfect copy idea, but of course that brings us to the old transporter argument. If a transporter existed that scanned your body at point A, "disassembled" it, and reconstructed it at point B, you might have the following problem. If the transporter's scanning-at-point-A and reconstructing-at-point-B functions worked, but the disassembler didn't, would there then be two "you"s after the faulty process had completed? The proper phrasing of the question would be "would there be two of the same person?" The answer in either case is no. Since Charles has repeatedly denied his belief in souls, we can skip over them and assume that a material copy produces an exact copy of the "person". Each person will assert (if it was me that was transported, for example) that he is Rich Rosen. And since a Rosen by any other name (ARRRGGH! :-) would still be as Rich, since a name is just a pointer to a person, and since lots of people are named Rich Rosen, there is no problem: there is now one more. So much for the two "you"s notion. But would there be two of the SAME person?" I still say no. Yes, the copy would be an exact copy at the moment of reproduction, but thereafter the very different experiences that each would have would make them different people. It is roughly analogous to the production of identical twins. At one point, you have one zygote, at a subsequent point you have two fetuses that are exact copies of each other. As they grow and mature, even before they are born, they differentiate and diverge so that by the time they are born they are in fact different people. Thus, I can see Charlie's point about exact replication being the resurrection. However, there is one catch. If you are reproduced as you are at the moment of death, when you are reconstructed, what will you be? Dead. Some resurrection! :-) Of course, god could arbitrarily choose some point before death, but I don't think that would classify as resurrection, in that you would be reconstructed at a point before you had experienced death. I'm not sure if that makes a difference, but it sounds like it does. -- Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/06/85)
In article <1619@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: > >You're right about the perfect copy idea, but of course that brings us to the >old transporter argument. If a transporter existed that scanned your body >at point A, "disassembled" it, and reconstructed it at point B, you might >have the following problem. If the transporter's scanning-at-point-A and >reconstructing-at-point-B functions worked, but the disassembler didn't, >would there then be two "you"s after the faulty process had completed? >The proper phrasing of the question would be "would there be two of the same >person?" The answer in either case is no. Since Charles has repeatedly >denied his belief in souls, we can skip over them and assume that a material >copy produces an exact copy of the "person". Each person will assert (if >it was me that was transported, for example) that he is Rich Rosen. [...] >But would there be two of the SAME person?" I still say no. Yes, >the copy would be an exact copy at the moment of reproduction, but thereafter >the very different experiences that each would have would make them different >people. This isn't quite the point. The question is not "are they the same person as each other?" but "is each of them the same person as the person before the transmission?" I submit that the answer to the second question can be yes even though the answer to the first is no.