tdh@frog.UUCP (T. Dave Hudson) (09/10/85)
From Metaphysics, Book 4 (note especially the fourth sentence): "Firstly, then, this much is clearly true: that the phrase `to be' or `not to be' means something definite, so that not everything can be both in a given state and not in a given state. Then, we would allow that `man' means one thing only -- let it be `two-footed animal'. What I mean when I say that something `means one thing' is this: if man is such and such, then for anything that is a man that is what being a man will be. Nor does it make any difference if someone says that a word means more than one thing, provided the meanings are limited in number; for each different account could be given a different name. I refer to cases where, for instance, one might say that `man' meant not one but many things, and that `two-footed animal' was the account of one of them, but that there were many others, though they were limited in number; then one could apply a particular name to each different account. If, however, this were not the case, and one were to say that a word had an infinite number of meanings, then plainly there could be no account of anything; for to mean no single thing is to mean nothing; and if words mean nothing, there is an end to discussion between people and, indeed, really to reflection with oneself. For it is not possible to think without thinking of some single thing; and if it is possible to think of this single thing, it must be given a single name." The quote above is clear, but it does not address criteria for choosing the term to describe with a given definition. David Hudson
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/12/85)
In article <303@frog.UUCP> frog!tdh writes: >From Metaphysics, Book 4 (note especially the fourth >sentence): >"Firstly, then, this much is clearly true: that the phrase >`to be' or `not to be' means something definite, so that not >everything can be both in a given state and not in a given >state. Then, we would allow that `man' means one thing only >-- let it be `two-footed animal'. What I mean when I say >that something `means one thing' is this: if man is such >and such, then for anything that is a man that is what being >a man will be. Nor does it make any difference if someone >says that a word means more than one thing, provided the >meanings are limited in number; for each different account >could be given a different name. I refer to cases where, >for instance, one might say that `man' meant not one but >many things, and that `two-footed animal' was the account of >one of them, but that there were many others, though they >were limited in number; then one could apply a particular >name to each different account. If, however, this were not >the case, and one were to say that a word had an infinite >number of meanings, then plainly there could be no account >of anything; for to mean no single thing is to mean nothing; >and if words mean nothing, there is an end to discussion >between people and, indeed, really to reflection with >oneself. For it is not possible to think without thinking >of some single thing; and if it is possible to think of this >single thing, it must be given a single name." One might want to argue that this might be true in the realm of *terms*, but with regard to ordinary language it is known to be FALSE. Translators are constantly faced with the problem that, for many words, it is not in fact possible to separate the "meanings" of a word as Aristotle demands. It is generally more accurate to speak of words covering *areas* of meaning. If one is interested in investigating the common usage of such a word, the problem becomes one of determining where the boundaries of the area lie, and then -- possibly -- to attempt to subdivide it. If one is not so interested, then one can simply define a meaning and be done-- and one immediately is denied any analogy to the use of the word anywhere else, unless one either goes through the meaning-determination process just described, or unless it can be determined that another work uses the same definition. Without either of these, it is quite likely that the other is in fact talking about something different. Charley Wingate
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/14/85)
Unfortunately, words do not mean a single thing, or even a finite list of things. They instead have a fuzzy range of meanings. Thus one can say "this wall is definitely yellow", and "that wall is definitely not yellow", while not being able to say for sure whether another wall is yellow or not. (Some people would call it green.) The fact that some definite statements can be made is enough to enable discourse; it need not be true that every clear statement can be assigned a truth value. (I am not even considering self-referential statements; for purposes of this discussion, they are not "clear statements".) Read some Nietzche. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108