laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (01/01/70)
Rich, if I follow your argument, I seem to get this. 1. All actions are caused. 2. The actions of your interior mental states cause some of your actions. 3. Past interior mental states cause present interiro mental states. 4. <Itterate a bit> 5. Those interior mental states are caused by your physical structure as determined by heredity. Therefore: all things are determined. the thesis of free will is invalid. You postulate that all those who believe in free will believe that some outside agent (their soul) is responsible for some of the actions in 3 or 4 or 5. Therfore you think that all those who believe in free will also believe in souls. This is not the only objection that has been made to the thesis of strict determinism. A good many people do not buy postulate 1 -- they think that some actions are definitely caused, but others are either uncaused or self-causing. For these people, a non-belief in determinism does not imply a belief in souls. -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) (08/23/85)
In article <1562@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >I'm passingly familiar with some of Dennett's other work. The point is >that in the long run he makes the same fallacy that people in this >newsgroup insist upon making: the Humpty Dumpty position that says "I >can take this word and redefine it to mean this and no one will be any >the wiser". You can't get away with that in this life. There seems to be a consensus in net.philosophy that "free will" in the sense preferred by RR is incompatible with determinism of any kind, and also that some form of determinism holds true for the real world (perhaps one or two people would take exception to either of these statements). The disagreement that several people have with Rich is over his claim that there is only one "real" meaning (or definition -- not exactly the same thing) of the term "free will", just as there is only one true meaning of "Santa Claus" (assuming that this is indeed the case), and that some people are illegitimately redefining the term in order to give free will a place in the real world, just as one might redefine "Santa Claus" if one wished him really to exist (although I don't see how it would fulfill any wishes -- presumably what we are wishing for is the jolly old elf himself and his sleigh-full of toys). Now I'm sure that Rich has already set forth his reasons for his position, but I don't understand what they are; so I would like to invite Rich to state, as clearly and concisely as he can, his reasons for believing that, in the context of the free will/determinism debates, the term "free will" and the terms which are usually treated as synonymous in philosophical discussion ("freedom of the will", "freedom", "liberty") have, and have always had, only one valid, univocal definition, namely the one that Rich advocates, and that usages of these terms which depart from this meaning are illegitimate Humpty-Dumptyisms. This is not a "mere" dispute over words; it is not a trivial question. Anglo-American philosophers have spent much of the last century trying to understand the relation between language and reality. Ancient riddle: Why can't Santa Claus and Mae West be together in the same phone booth? Obviously because Santa Claus doesn't exist. My conclusion: If this sentence is true, then Santa Claus exists. Furthermore, *this* sentence is false and Santa Claus does not exist. Therefore Santa Claus exists. Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/09/85)
> There seems to be a consensus in net.philosophy that "free will" in > the sense preferred by RR is incompatible with determinism of any > kind, and also that some form of determinism holds true for the real > world (perhaps one or two people would take exception to either of > these statements). [CARNES] Unfortunately, it is precisely because that definition is incompatible with the form of determinism seemingly present in this world, AND precisely because that IS the definition of free will (and its implications) that leads us (at least me) to the conclusion that this phenomenon called free will does not exist. Those that it doesn't lead to that conclusion have unilaterally altered the definition so that it does exist, which by the rules of language, it just plain playing dirty. > The disagreement that several people have with > Rich is over his claim that there is only one "real" meaning (or > definition -- not exactly the same thing) of the term "free will", > just as there is only one true meaning of "Santa Claus" (assuming > that this is indeed the case), and that some people are > illegitimately redefining the term in order to give free will a place > in the real world, just as one might redefine "Santa Claus" if one > wished him really to exist (although I don't see how it would fulfill > any wishes -- presumably what we are wishing for is the jolly old elf > himself and his sleigh-full of toys). PRE-cisely. I'm waiting with bated breath to see how you're going to say that this NOT what's going on here. > Now I'm sure that Rich has already set forth his reasons for his > position, but I don't understand what they are; so I would like to > invite Rich to state, as clearly and concisely as he can, his reasons > for believing that, in the context of the free will/determinism > debates, the term "free will" and the terms which are usually treated > as synonymous in philosophical discussion ("freedom of the will", > "freedom", "liberty") have, and have always had, only one valid, > univocal definition, namely the one that Rich advocates, and that > usages of these terms which depart from this meaning are illegitimate > Humpty-Dumptyisms. They have "only" had one very general (yet very specific) definition: the ability of human beings (or possibly some other sentient organisms) to make decisions "freely", independently, without the constraints of either the impositions of the external environment upon them. The implications of that are that that list of constraints includes those constraints found within the brain (those of course being the result of accumulated experiences we acquire interpreted and collated based on previous accumulated experiences we acquire interpreted and collated based on ...). The consequences of such freedom of the will or whatever you wish to call it are that (in the deterministic or even the quantum model) in order for the actions to be free, the agent of choice MUST be outside the realm of physical cause and effect (i.e., a soul). Many people seem to want to beat around this bush, but it remains a consequence of the notion. Either you believe in a soul, or you don't believe in free will. > This is not a "mere" dispute over words; it is not a trivial > question. Anglo-American philosophers have spent much of the last > century trying to understand the relation between language and > reality. Words are simply pointers to objects and/or notions. The words "free will" represent a particular notion as described above. It is abominable to the notion of language and communication to simply arbitrarily switch around word definitions, simply to orange water gibbon bucket of plaster and ashtray's your uncle. > Ancient riddle: Why can't Santa Claus and Mae West be together in > the same phone booth? Obviously because Santa Claus doesn't exist. Why can't a human being make decisions based on free will? Another riddle. > My conclusion: If this sentence is true, then Santa Claus exists. > Furthermore, *this* sentence is false and Santa Claus does not exist. > Therefore Santa Claus exists. We've been through this. One problem your cute Hofstadterisms have in relation to the real world is that the "truth" or "falseness" of a group of sounds strung together do not magically make things exist or not. -- "I was walking down the street. A man came up to me and asked me what was the capital of Bolivia. I hesitated. Three sailors jumped me. The next thing I knew I was making chicken salad." "I don't believe that for a minute. Everyone knows the capital of Bolivia is La Paz." Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
baba@spar.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) (09/10/85)
>They have "only" had one very general (yet very specific) definition: >the ability of human beings (or possibly some other sentient organisms) >to make decisions "freely", independently, without the constraints of >either the impositions of the external environment upon them. The implications >of that are that that list of constraints includes those constraints found >within the brain (those of course being the result of accumulated experiences >we acquire interpreted and collated based on previous accumulated experiences >we acquire interpreted and collated based on ...). > > Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr It would appear that Rich views the constraints "found within the brain" as "impositions of the external environment". If the brain is external, what on No-One's material Earth is *internal*? Baba
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/11/85)
>>They have "only" had one very general (yet very specific) definition: >>the ability of human beings (or possibly some other sentient organisms) >>to make decisions "freely", independently, without the constraints of >>either the impositions of the external environment upon them. The implications >>of that are that that list of constraints includes those constraints found >>within the brain (those of course being the result of accumulated experiences >>we acquire interpreted and collated based on previous accumulated experiences >>we acquire interpreted and collated based on ...). [ROSEN] > It would appear that Rich views the constraints "found within the brain" > as "impositions of the external environment". If the brain is external, > what on No-One's material Earth is *internal*? [BABA] Of course the brain is "internal", but the way it got to be the way that it is, with its current internal configuration, is due to the external influences that we all experience in our lives. The reason these should be viewed as constraints (despite the wishes of some to dismiss them just so that we can "get" free will) is described in the last sentence of mine quoted above (especially the parenthetical part). -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/14/85)
> Rich, if I follow your argument, I seem to get this. > 1. All actions are caused. > 2. The actions of your interior mental states cause some of your actions. > 3. Past interior mental states cause present interiro mental states. > 4. <Itterate a bit> > 5. Those interior mental states are caused by your physical structure as > determined by heredity. > Therefore: all things are determined. the thesis of free will is invalid. Pretty much. > You postulate that all those who believe in free will believe that some > outside agent (their soul) is responsible for some of the actions in 3 or 4 > or 5. Therfore you think that all those who believe in free will also > believe in souls. All those who believe in free will must of necessity and implication believe in souls. There is of course nothing to stop a person from holding two contradictory beliefs. It's just a sign that they haven't thought things through. > This is not the only objection that has been made to the thesis of strict > determinism. A good many people do not buy postulate 1 -- they think that some > actions are definitely caused, but others are either uncaused or self-causing. > For [them], a non-belief in determinism does not imply a belief in souls. Do they believe this (obviously an assertion without evidence behind it) for a solid logical reason, or because choosing that precept allows them to reach a conclusion they want, e.g., god or free will? -- "There! I've run rings 'round you logically!" "Oh, intercourse the penguin!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (09/20/85)
Richard Carnes would like to >> invite Rich to state, as clearly and concisely as he can, his reasons >> for believing that, in the context of the free will/determinism >> debates, the term "free will" and the terms which are usually treated >> as synonymous in philosophical discussion ("freedom of the will", >> "freedom", "liberty") have, and have always had, only one valid, >> univocal definition, namely the one that Rich advocates, and that >> usages of these terms which depart from this meaning are illegitimate >> Humpty-Dumptyisms. Rich Rosen (rlr@pyuxd.UUCP) replies: >They have "only" had one very general (yet very specific) definition: >the ability of human beings (or possibly some other sentient organisms) >to make decisions "freely", independently, without the constraints of >either the impositions of the external environment upon them. The implica- >tions of that are that that list of constraints includes those constraints >found within the brain (those of course being the result of accumulated >experiences we acquire [...] I think Carnes is asking for *evidence* that this is the "one and only" definition. That, it seems, could only be given -- supposing (just for the sake of argument) that you're right -- by listing all the definitions in two or three dictionaries (say, Oxford English, Webster's, and a well-known Dictonary of Philosophy). This might take up about fifty lines of netnews text. You could then proceed to show how each of the definitions implies what you say after the colon in your first sentence above. That seems like a reasonable request; if you're really right, that would show it. I'd then concede that I should coin a new phrase for my concept. --Paul V Torek torek@umich