ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (01/01/70)
>> There seems to be a consensus in net.philosophy that "free will" in >> the sense preferred by RR is incompatible with determinism of any >> kind, and also that some form of determinism holds true for the real >> world (perhaps one or two people would take exception to either of >> these statements). [CARNES] > >Unfortunately, it is precisely because that definition is incompatible with >the form of determinism seemingly present in this world, AND precisely >because that IS the definition of free will (and its implications) that leads >us (at least me) to the conclusion that this phenomenon called free will does >not exist. Those that it doesn't lead to that conclusion have unilaterally >altered the definition so that it does exist, which by the rules of language, >it just plain playing dirty. [Rosen] Huh? Playing dirty!!?? You claim that your pet definition is the ONE TRUE DEFINITION -- yet when practically everybody here disagrees, you accuse us of PLAYING DIRTY? May I humbly suggest that you are simply ignorant? Since you have previously criticized Dennett's book on free will without ever bothering to read it, by empirical induction, I conclude that you have read very little about free will in general. As the most vocal critic of free will in DrivelNet history, I hope to correct an appalling gap in your philosophical knowledge. Here are some quotes from Copleston's `History of Philosophy' regarding the views of some of the classic philosophers regarding free will. Each view is quite different, and you will notice that all of the ideas presented to date in this newsgroup (rational choice, spontaneity, lack of constraint, the subjective nature nature of mind...) all appear. Remember that divine omniscience and/or strict determinism were the fashion of the day for most of these folks: Descartes: That we possess free will is self-evident: We had before a very clear proof of this; for, at the same time as we tried to doubt all things and even assumed that He who created us employed His unlimited powers in deceiving us in every way, we perceived in ourselves such a liberty such that we were able to abstain from believing what was not perfectly certain and indubitable...We are in a special way the masters of our actions and thereby merit praise or blame. Leibniz: Though it was certain that Caesar would resolve to cross the Rubicon, his decision was a free decision. He made a rational decision, and therfore acted freely.. To ask whether there is freedom in our will is the same as to ask whether there is choice in our will. Hobbes: Effect follows necessarily from cause..all the effects that have been, or shall be produced, have their necessity in things antecedent. This at once rules out all freedom in man, at least if freedom is taken to imply absence of necessity.. A man's volitions, desires, and inclinations are necessary in the sense that they are the results of a chain of determining causes; but when he acts in accordance with these desires and inclinations, he is said to act freely. A free man is thus "he that in those things which by his own strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has the will to do. Hume: Necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently, liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing as chance. Free action would be uncaused action...the assertion of freedom involves denial of necessity. Voltaire: The idea of free will is absurd; for a free will would be a will without sufficient motive, and it would be outside the course of Nature... It would act by chance, and there is no chance. Rousseau: Every free action is produced by two causes. One is a moral cause, namely the will which determines the act; the other is the physical namely the physical power which determines the act. Both causes are required. A paralytic may will to run, but, lacking the physical power to do so, he stays where he is. Kant: ..the idea of freedom involves.. our regarding ourselves as belonging, not only to the physical world of sense, the world ruled by causality, but also to the intelligible or noumenal world. How can a man be called completely free at the same moment and in regard to the same action in which he is subject to an inevitable natural necessity? In so far as a man's existence is subject to time-conditions, his actions form part of the mechanical system of Nature and are determined by antecedent causes. But the very same subject, being being on the other hand conscious of himself as a thing-in-itself, considers his existence also in so far as it is not subject to time-conditions, and he regards himself as determinable only through laws which he gives himself through reason. And to be determinable through self-imposed laws is to be free. Of the above, Hume and Voltaire seem closest to your position -- likewise, their anti-libertarian arguments are weakened in light of 20th century physics. The others hold free will as reasonable in spite of their belief in the same strict determinism that upholds your Behaviorist position. Modern philosophers are similarly varied, although few since ~1930 are foolish enough to deny free will using deterministic arguments. If there is the time and interest, I might dig up some more for you. >They have "only" had one very general (yet very specific) definition: the >ability of human beings (or possibly some other sentient organisms) to make >decisions "freely", independently, without the constraints of either the >impositions of the external environment upon them. In light of the quotes from Descartes, Leibniz, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant (all of whom believed in strict determinism), not to mention many recent philosophers I could supply, and the overwhelming opposition from contributors to this newsgroup, I can only wonder how you can support this blatantly false statement. -michael
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/21/85)
>>> There seems to be a consensus in net.philosophy that "free will" in >>> the sense preferred by RR is incompatible with determinism of any >>> kind, and also that some form of determinism holds true for the real >>> world (perhaps one or two people would take exception to either of >>> these statements). [CARNES] >>Unfortunately, it is precisely because that definition is incompatible with >>the form of determinism seemingly present in this world, AND precisely >>because that IS the definition of free will (and its implications) that leads >>us (at least me) to the conclusion that this phenomenon called free will does >>not exist. Those that it doesn't lead to that conclusion have unilaterally >>altered the definition so that it does exist, which by the rules of language, >>it just plain playing dirty. [Rosen] > Huh? Playing dirty!!?? You claim that your pet definition is the ONE TRUE > DEFINITION -- yet when practically everybody here disagrees, you accuse us > of PLAYING DIRTY? May I humbly suggest that you are simply ignorant? You've been doing that in a variety of ways for some time now, Michael. Mostly extremely boorish abusive ways. "Practically everybody disagrees"? I've noted how so many people have disagreed: "Well, yeah, the consensus among dictionary definitions and among language users is that free will means, not just freedom from interference by other people in choosing your actions, but freedom from your own physical make-up. But still, if we use that definition, we have to accept the notion of souls, or some non-physical means of making choices independent of the physical body/brain. Since I don't believe in souls, the definition of free will must be wrong, thus we should change the definition to something that allows us to reach the conclusion that we have free will. How dare Rosen say that this is a butchering of the notion of language and communication!" > Since you have previously criticized Dennett's book on free will without > ever bothering to read it, by empirical induction, I conclude that you > have read very little about free will in general. I have concluded from your obnoxious tone that you have little to say on any topic at all of significant merit anymore. The excerpts posted from Dennett's book showed clearly that he was doing exactly what I described above. > As the most vocal critic of free will in DrivelNet history, I hope to > correct an appalling gap in your philosophical knowledge. Oh, teach me, oh great teacher. > Here are some quotes... > > Descartes: > That we possess free will is self-evident: We had before a very > clear proof of this; for, at the same time as we tried to doubt all > things and even assumed that He who created us employed His > unlimited powers in deceiving us in every way, we perceived in > ourselves such a liberty such that we were able to abstain from > believing what was not perfectly certain and indubitable...We are in > a special way the masters of our actions and thereby merit praise or > blame. Clearly Descartes was referring to "such a liberty" that enabled us to be the "masters of our actions", meaning that no matter how we were physically constructed, we were free to make any choice. His other assumptions notwithstanding, I think it's clear he is referring to the same type of "freedom even from one's physical make-up" that I have spoken. > Leibniz: > Though it was certain that Caesar would resolve to cross the > Rubicon, his decision was a free decision. He made a rational > decision, and therfore acted freely.. To ask whether there is > freedom in our will is the same as to ask whether there is choice in > our will. Hmmm, Leibniz, whose Principle of Sufficient Reason, which states that nothing takes place without a reason? Odd that the bellwether of acausality should draw from Leibniz. All I see is an assertion here. Could he possibly have been working from the same "premises" (i.e., backwards from the conclusion) as you? > Hobbes: > Effect follows necessarily from cause..all the effects that have > been, or shall be produced, have their necessity in things > antecedent. This at once rules out all freedom in man, at least if > freedom is taken to imply absence of necessity.. A man's volitions, > desires, and inclinations are necessary in the sense that they are > the results of a chain of determining causes; but when he acts in > accordance with these desires and inclinations, he is said to act > freely. A free man is thus "he that in those things which by his own > strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has > the will to do. Hobbes also said that as part of a causally determined world we are also causally determined, and thus in the commonsense meaning of the word freedom, we are NOT free. He drew an analogy between what we perceive to be our freedom and water running "freely" to the sea---not really "freely" at all. > Hume: > Necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently, > liberty, by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very > same thing as chance. Free action would be uncaused action...the > assertion of freedom involves denial of necessity. It seems awful clear to me that Hume was working from the assumption about the nature of causality (as you do) to "get" to a worldview in which actions can be deemed to be unconstrained by "causes", thus (apparently?) making us free. Clearly he built a system which included non-causal elements, which thus allowed the type of freedom we are talking about. > Voltaire: > The idea of free will is absurd; for a free will would be a will > without sufficient motive, and it would be outside the course of > Nature... It would act by chance, and there is no chance. Funny, that's exactly what I've been saying (though Voltaire is more dogmatic about indeterminism). > Of the above, Hume and Voltaire seem closest to your position -- > likewise, their anti-libertarian arguments are weakened in light of 20th > century physics. The others hold free will as reasonable in spite of > their belief in the same strict determinism that upholds your > Behaviorist position. Altering things enough so that free will would "fit". Clearly your friends agree with the position I have put forth that free will requires an independence from physical causality, including the physicality of their own bodies. >>They have "only" had one very general (yet very specific) definition: the >>ability of human beings (or possibly some other sentient organisms) to make >>decisions "freely", independently, without the constraints of either the >>impositions of the external environment upon them. > In light of the quotes from Descartes, Leibniz, Hobbes, Rousseau, and > Kant (all of whom believed in strict determinism), not to mention many > recent philosophers I could supply, and the overwhelming opposition from > contributors to this newsgroup, I can only wonder how you can support > this blatantly false statement. Well, I just showed that it was YOU who was making the blatantly false statements. Everyone you quoted believed that free will meant freedom even from one's own physical make-up, and either they didn't believe that it existed or they added in new axioms to make it "exist" on those terms. If anyone can be accused of turning this group into "net.ignorant.opinion", it is you, Michael. If this is to be your style of argument, namecalling followed by assorted random quoting rather than some serious reasoning, don't bother to respond. I've grown sick of your abusive tone. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (09/25/85)
In article <1749@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: > >You've been doing that in a variety of ways for some time now, Michael. Mostly >extremely boorish abusive ways. "Practically everybody disagrees"? I've >noted how so many people have disagreed: "Well, yeah, the consensus among >dictionary definitions and among language users is that free will means, not >just freedom from interference by other people in choosing your actions, but >freedom from your own physical make-up. But still, if we use that definition, >we have to accept the notion of souls, or some non-physical means of making >choices independent of the physical body/brain. Since I don't believe in >souls, the definition of free will must be wrong, thus we should change the >definition to something that allows us to reach the conclusion that we have >free will. How dare Rosen say that this is a butchering of the notion of >language and communication!" > Except that the dictionary definition does *not* imply what you say it implies(at least the one in my dictioanry doesn't). I say ther *is* *not* any such consensus, there is instead a broad class of related, interlocking definitions, only *one* of which is yours. The dictionary "definition" is rather general and is in fact non-commital at the level you are trying to assert. I say that the definition I use is just as consistant with the dictionary definition as yours! And there are many others who agree with me. Thus there is no valid argument for accepting the definition you use as *the* definition. >> Descartes: > >> Leibniz: > >> Hobbes: > >> Hume: > >> Voltaire: > >Altering things enough so that free will would "fit". Clearly your friends >agree with the position I have put forth that free will requires an >independence from physical causality, including the physicality of their >own bodies. > Hmm, well now I can see how you can read the dictionary to necessarily imply your favored definition. You seem to be able to read a belief in acausality into every one of these philosophers, despite the fact that several of them *clearly* stated otherwise and still maintained a belief in free will based on conscious choice or some such thing. Only Hume and Voltaire actually believed that free will necessarily implies acausality of some sort. I am amazed at how far you have misunderstood what Descartes and Leibniz were trying to say! >Well, I just showed that it was YOU who was making the blatantly false >statements. Everyone you quoted believed that free will meant freedom even >from one's own physical make-up, and either they didn't believe that it >existed or they added in new axioms to make it "exist" on those terms. > That is most definately not what I read in Descartes, Leibniz and Hobbes(not to mention Kant). In fact they very clearly stated just the opposite! -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa