mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/23/85)
In article <240@umich.UUCP> torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) writes: >I think Carnes is asking for *evidence* that this is the "one and only" >definition. That, it seems, could only be given -- supposing (just for >the sake of argument) that you're right -- by listing all the definitions >in two or three dictionaries (say, Oxford English, Webster's, and a >well-known Dictonary of Philosophy). This might take up about fifty >lines of netnews text. You could then proceed to show how each of the >definitions implies what you say after the colon in your first sentence >above. ---> Which was: >>the ability of human beings (or possibly some other sentient organisms) >>to make decisions "freely", independently, without the constraints of >>either the impositions of the external environment upon them. The implica- >>tions of that are that that list of constraints includes those constraints >>found within the brain (those of course being the result of accumulated >>experiences we acquire [...] Well, in my Webster's, there are TWO definitions. The first is the same as Rich gives, with the significant addition of the phrase "within limitations or with respect to some matter"; it allows for partial freedom. The second, however, is the notorious "choice creatively determined by conscious subject" definition. Considering that these two definitions are somewhat different, it seems to me that the attempt to define the phrase "free will" is essentially the result of this question: "How do we explain the phenomenon that people appear to make free choices?" [using free in the sense of "not determined by outside stimuli"] My answer: "Perhaps they come from random processes internal to the brain." Paul's answer: "They are the creative result of consciousness." [I will freely admit that I make no claims to the correctness of this statement in representing Paul's thought.] Rich's answer: "It is an illusion. All responses are determined by some set of previous stimuli." It seems to me to be much more fruitful to discuss the proposition in this form. Charley Wingate
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/25/85)
> Well, in my Webster's, there are TWO definitions. The first is the same as > Rich gives, with the significant addition of the phrase "within limitations > or with respect to some matter"; it allows for partial freedom. The second, > however, is the notorious "choice creatively determined by conscious > subject" definition. [WINGATE] As used in the sentence "I choose to do this of my own free will", meaning something very different from the "free will" discussed in a philosophical sense. > "How do we explain the phenomenon that people appear to make free > choices?" [using free in the sense of "not determined by outside stimuli"] > > My answer: > "Perhaps they come from random processes internal to the brain." > > Paul's answer: > "They are the creative result of consciousness." [I will freely admit > that I make no claims to the correctness of this statement in > representing Paul's thought.] > > Rich's answer: > "It is an illusion. All responses are determined by some set of > previous stimuli." Given that I tend to agree that you may have misconstrued Paul's definition, and given that you are essentially correct about mine, I will concentrate on questions about yours. The notion of free will involves some sort of choice-making mechanism that is free, unencumbered by constraints. Obviously my definition is very strict (hey, why not?) about the type of constraints. In addition, free will is often tied, especially in a religious sense, to notions of responsibility. "This wasn't determined by fixed things, this was your choice, thus you are responsible and should take the consequences..." In fact, you have repeatedly mentioned (in the past) that the notion of a morality without acknowledgment of responsibility is repugnant to you. Given all this, what "responsibility" does quantum randomness offer to the choice-making agent, be it a "soul" (which you of course don't believe in) or the mind/body complex itself. Does it offer information, knowledge, assistance in making a "proper" decision? Or does it just throw a banana peel on the floor for you to trip on, at random moments? If anything, this is less freedom, not more. It implies dependencies, not only on fixed deterministic factors, but on random uncontrolled elements as well. I can see no way whatsoever that this could ever be construed as "free will". In fact, I'd say it relieves us of more responsibilities than it would impose on us for our actions. -- "There! I've run rings 'round you logically!" "Oh, intercourse the penguin!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr