williams@kirk.DEC (John Williams 223-3402) (09/05/85)
Somewhere in your theory, there *IS* an assumption. Do you suppose you might be willing to admit this? The wishful thinker, John.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/07/85)
> Somewhere in your theory, there *IS* an assumption. Do you > suppose you might be willing to admit this? > The wishful thinker, > John. And what might it be? One that we share? One that we all share? -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/10/85)
Rich, I think that one of your assumptions is the standard objectivist [Note Small ``o''] definition of knowledge: This can be formulated many ways. The way I like best is: Knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence. Note that this says nothing about what the sufficient evidence is. What it says is that if you have sufficient evidence for your belief then you have something called knowledge (which is also true.) Note that while it is possible [at least in theory] to only have beliefs which are consistent with this model, it is not possible to use this definition to test itself absolutely. The best you can do is demonstrate that this model is not inherantly inconsistent. This property of consistency can be had in other models. Consider Knowledge is everything that is written in the Book of Truth. Where the first line of the Book of Truth is this definition of Knowledge. Again, it is possible [at least in theory] to only have beliefs which are consistent with this model. However, I would tend to go with the first model, because I have never actually seen anyone whose set of Knowledges did not also include the first definition. There is no way that I can logically prove any more than the consistency of believing in this, however. -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/11/85)
In article <103@l5.uucp> laura@l5.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: >Rich, I think that one of your assumptions is the standard objectivist [Note >Small ``o''] definition of knowledge: >This can be formulated many ways. The way I like best is: > Knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence. >Note that this says nothing about what the sufficient evidence is. What it >says is that if you have sufficient evidence for your belief then you have >something called knowledge (which is also true.) . . . . >However, I would tend to go with the first model, because I have never >actually seen anyone whose set of Knowledges did not also include the >first definition. There is no way that I can logically prove any more >than the consistency of believing in this, however. As the definition has been stated, I don't see that it rules out knowledge of *subjective* truth. Charley Wingate
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/12/85)
There is nothing in: Knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence which rules out the existence of subjective truth. It is simply a definition of (objective) knowledge. If you want to include subjective knowledge in this definition, you will have a different belief in what constitutes ``sufficient evidence'' than most objectivists. If you merely want to believe that this defines objective knowledge (and thus should be restates as: Objective knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence you may then be able to formulate a corallery such as: Subjective knowledge is true belief for which there cannot be sufficient evidence. What I mean to point out is that there are certain axioms which cannot be proven in everybody's belief system. This is a good one to use since it occurs in nearly everybody's belief system, no matter what their other beliefs. Note that just because these cannot be proven does not make them untrue -- (by what definition? :-) ) but simply unprovable. -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/13/85)
> Rich, I think that one of your assumptions is the standard objectivist [Note > Small ``o''] definition of knowledge: > This can be formulated many ways. The way I like best is: > Knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence. > Note that this says nothing about what the sufficient evidence is. What it > says is that if you have sufficient evidence for your belief then you have > something called knowledge (which is also true.) [LAURA] What can be shown (at the very least) is what constitutes INsufficient evidence. > Note that while it is possible [at least in theory] to only have beliefs > which are consistent with this model, it is not possible to use this > definition to test itself absolutely. The best you can do is demonstrate that > this model is not inherantly inconsistent. > This property of consistency can be had in other models. Consider > Knowledge is everything that is written in the Book of Truth. > Where the first line of the Book of Truth is this definition of Knowledge. > Again, it is possible [at least in theory] to only have beliefs which are > consistent with this model. But we know that the Book (if knowledge were so codified) doesn't begin with such a statement, nor does it contain such a statement. Knowledge, and the methods for acquiring and verifying it, are not simply taken on faith: they are used because they consistently work. It is just common sense built on more common sense built on still more common sense. -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/14/85)
> There is nothing in: > Knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence > which rules out the existence of subjective truth. [LAURA] Can you call it "subjective truth"? What basis can you use for calling it "true"? Subjective BELIEFS, certainly. > It is simply a definition > of (objective) knowledge. If you want to include subjective knowledge in > this definition, you will have a different belief in what constitutes > ``sufficient evidence'' than most objectivists. If you merely want to > believe that this defines objective knowledge (and thus should be > restates as: > Objective knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence > you may then be able to formulate a corallery such as: > Subjective knowledge is true belief for which there cannot be > sufficient evidence. You can't just stick in the word "true" in that corollary just because you feel like it. -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/16/85)
In article <1697@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> There is nothing in: >> Knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence >> which rules out the existence of subjective truth. [LAURA] > >Can you call it "subjective truth"? What basis can you use for calling it >"true"? Subjective BELIEFS, certainly. Look, I didn't say that there was something in that definition which said that there was such a thing as subjective knowledge, either. However there are things which are true but impossible to verify. The statement ``laura creighton is hungry'' happens to be true, but assuming that you are a persistent skeptic I can never convince you that I am not lying. To me, of course, the truth of this knowledge is self-evident. > >> It is simply a definition >> of (objective) knowledge. If you want to include subjective knowledge in >> this definition, you will have a different belief in what constitutes >> ``sufficient evidence'' than most objectivists. If you merely want to >> believe that this defines objective knowledge (and thus should be >> restates as: >> Objective knowledge is true belief in the light of sufficient evidence >> you may then be able to formulate a corallery such as: >> Subjective knowledge is true belief for which there cannot be >> sufficient evidence. > >You can't just stick in the word "true" in that corollary just because you feel >like it. No, but most epistemological definitions of ``knowledge'' imply that knowledge is true, whereas belief can be true or false. If what you are saying is that all knowledge must be objective knowledge (that is to say that subjective knowledge does not exist) then you are a hard-line objectivist. The question to ask hard line objectivists is ``how do you know that your definition of knowledge is true?'' I maintain that it is self-evident. But those things that are self-evident are true in a way that is verified differently than those things which are objectively true. They comprise the set of things that *I* call subjective truths. You are perfectly free to disagree with me that they should be called subjective truths, of course. -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/17/85)
> Look, I didn't say that there was something in that definition which said > that there was such a thing as subjective knowledge, either. However there > are things which are true but impossible to verify. The statement ``laura > creighton is hungry'' happens to be true, but assuming that you are > a persistent skeptic I can never convince you that I am not lying. To me, > of course, the truth of this knowledge is self-evident. [LAURA] If I was really seeking serious proof that you were hungry, I could certainly find an objective way of verifying it. Of course, it would take a lot of data. It would take an analysis of the current state of your digestive system, knowledge of how long it's been since you last ate (sometimes the brain simply wants food as a sensation experience without actually being hungry), and data on the break points at which your body sends messages that your require food. I doubt we have the capabilities to gather all of that (if we did, it might be at the expense of your life, anyway). Do you have a better example of this? (Fact is, sometimes the problem with obese people is that they feel "hungry" without chemical motivation for that feeling, and thus eat too much.) >>You can't just stick in the word "true" in that corollary just because you >>feel like it. > No, but most epistemological definitions of ``knowledge'' imply that > knowledge is true, whereas belief can be true or false. If what you > are saying is that all knowledge must be objective knowledge (that is > to say that subjective knowledge does not exist) then you are a hard-line > objectivist. The question to ask hard line objectivists is ``how do you > know that your definition of knowledge is true?'' I maintain that it is > self-evident. By definition, you are saying, it is only to be called knowledge if it is certain to be true. At bottom level, true knowledge IS self-evident, representing a consistently accurate model of the world. Subjective beliefs, very often, do not stand up to that scrutiny, and are not "self-evident" at bottom level, but rather self-contradictory. > But those things that are self-evident are true in a way that is verified > differently than those things which are objectively true. Not at all. If you get to the bottom level, they are verified in exactly the same way. Often, we choose not to go to the root level, and assume the veracity of certain things, owing to the tediousness of a redundancy we feel is not worthwhile in every case. That of course leaves us very open to being out and out wrong. -- Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/21/85)
Rich is trying to find an objective way of measuring whether or not I am hungry. >If I was really seeking serious proof that you were hungry, I could certainly >find an objective way of verifying it. Of course, it would take a lot of >data. >It would take an analysis of the current state of your digestive system, >knowledge of how long it's been since you last ate (sometimes the brain simply >wants food as a sensation experience without actually being hungry), and >data on the break points at which your body sends messages that your require >food. This is a good try, but remember that I promised to be as unfuriating as possible. So I say that I am hungry. You get out your measuring aparatus and say ``how can you be hungry? you just ate a huge dinner two hours ago!''. I say ``no, your equipment is malfunctioning.'' You go off an test your equpiment and report that it is working fine. I say ``well, it can't be: you see there is this evil plot to starve me to death -- all equipment will fail to measure whether or not I am hungry because that is the way that this plot works.'' ``But you *just* ate dinner!'' ``Pure illusion and deception implanted in your mind. You can't underestimate the damager-god (oops, wrong article!) after all''. And so it goes. At some point you will be forced to choose to believe me or to believe your equipment. If all the objective evidence that you can garner points to the fact that I am not hungry then it will be most reasonable for you to assume that I am lying. But in making that assumption you are implicitly professing a belief in objective reality. But how can you defend that belief without saying either that it is self-evident or that it is possible to construct a consistent set of beliefs while using this belief which is also consistent with the evidence of your senses? > >By definition, you are saying, it is only to be called knowledge if it is >certain to be true. No. By definition knowledge is true. no claims are made on whether or not this is certain, though! The verification is your problem, and there are true statements which are impossible to verify. (try verifying ``Alexander the Great had 12 illegitimate children'' and ``there is an objective reality'' now. You run into snags). >At bottom level, true knowledge IS self-evident, >representing a consistently accurate model of the world. Subjective beliefs, >very often, do not stand up to that scrutiny, and are not "self-evident" >at bottom level, but rather self-contradictory. > That is immaterial to the discussion at hand -- if there are any subjective beliefs that stand up to that scrutiny then those are the ones that I want to deal with. If you say that bottom-level true knowledge is self-evident, then you are making a statement of belief. HOW DO YOU KNOW WHETHER IT IS TRUE? Ihave long believed that consistency *is* truth -- that is when you say that X is true you could just as well have said that X is consistent with all available evidence. But this is belief -- and definitely not shared by everyone. >> But those things that are self-evident are true in a way that is verified >> differently than those things which are objectively true. > >Not at all. If you get to the bottom level, they are verified in exactly >the same way. Often, we choose not to go to the root level, and assume >the veracity of certain things, owing to the tediousness of a redundancy >we feel is not worthwhile in every case. That of course leaves us very >open to being out and out wrong. > I don't think that this is the case. I don't think that I verify ``there is an objective reality and it is not all an illusion produced by the damager-god'' at all -- I either believe it or I do not because I think that it is self-evident or it is not. I actually think that I determine whether or not I am hungry the same way, but I could be wrong about that one. -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/25/85)
> Rich is trying to find an objective way of measuring whether or not I am > hungry. [LAURA] >>If I was really seeking serious proof that you were hungry, I could certainly >>find an objective way of verifying it. Of course, it would take a lot of >>data. >>It would take an analysis of the current state of your digestive system, >>knowledge of how long it's been since you last ate (sometimes the brain simply >>wants food as a sensation experience without actually being hungry), and >>data on the break points at which your body sends messages that your require >>food. > This is a good try, Better than a good try, it provides the answer. > but remember that I promised to be as unfuriating as > possible. So I say that I am hungry. You get out your measuring aparatus and > say ``how can you be hungry? you just ate a huge dinner two hours ago!''. I > say ``no, your equipment is malfunctioning.'' You go off an test your > equpiment and report that it is working fine. I say ``well, it can't be: you > see there is this evil plot to starve me to death -- all equipment will fail > to measure whether or not I am hungry because that is the way that this plot > works.'' ``But you *just* ate dinner!'' ``Pure illusion and deception > implanted in your mind. You can't underestimate the damager-god (oops, wrong > article!) after all''. And, given the evidence against you, I'd be right in concluding that you were deluded, that perhaps there was other chemical imbalance in your body that made it appear to you that you were hungry, or that you WERE simply being your typical infuriating self. :-) > And so it goes. At some point you will be forced to choose to believe me or > to believe your equipment. If all the objective evidence that you can > garner points to the fact that I am not hungry then it will be most > reasonable for you to assume that I am lying. But in making that assumption > you are implicitly professing a belief in objective reality. But how can > you defend that belief without saying either that it is self-evident or > that it is possible to construct a consistent set of beliefs while using this > belief which is also consistent with the evidence of your senses? Precisely because it is verifiable, the testing has been rigorous, and it falls in line with other evidence and data we have about the universe. Either it's ALL as we see it, or it's ALL an "illusion" or a "simulation". But what does such a statement mean? What is the difference between a simulation and the "real thing" inside the system (as we are)? >>By definition, you are saying, it is only to be called knowledge if it is >>certain to be true. > No. By definition knowledge is true. no claims are made on whether or not > this is certain, though! The verification is your problem, and there are > true statements which are impossible to verify. (try verifying ``Alexander > the Great had 12 illegitimate children'' and ``there is an objective reality'' > now. You run into snags). The only reason the first is "unverifiable" is lack of access to the facts. Who's to say we cannot ever obtain such access? >>At bottom level, true knowledge IS self-evident, >>representing a consistently accurate model of the world. Subjective beliefs, >>very often, do not stand up to that scrutiny, and are not "self-evident" >>at bottom level, but rather self-contradictory. > That is immaterial to the discussion at hand -- if there are any subjective > beliefs that stand up to that scrutiny then those are the ones that I want > to deal with. What is it mean for them to "stand up to the scrutiny"? It simply means to be verified. Only those which are verified are true. The rest may or may not be true, but given the lack of evidence for them they can be dismissed. By saying "those are the ones that I want to deal with", you have made my point for me: only that which does stand up can be called knowledge or fact. On the contrary, it is FUNDAMENTAL to the discussion at hand. > If you say that bottom-level true knowledge is self-evident, > then you are making a statement of belief. HOW DO YOU KNOW WHETHER IT IS TRUE? > Ihave long believed that consistency *is* truth -- that is when you say that > X is true you could just as well have said that X is consistent with all > available evidence. But this is belief -- and definitely not shared by > everyone. Consistency represents truth because it simply means that the words and ideas we use to describe things consistently match up to reality. >>> But those things that are self-evident are true in a way that is verified >>> differently than those things which are objectively true. >>Not at all. If you get to the bottom level, they are verified in exactly >>the same way. Often, we choose not to go to the root level, and assume >>the veracity of certain things, owing to the tediousness of a redundancy >>we feel is not worthwhile in every case. That of course leaves us very >>open to being out and out wrong. > I don't think that this is the case. I don't think that I verify ``there > is an objective reality and it is not all an illusion produced by the > damager-god'' at all -- I either believe it or I do not because I think > that it is self-evident or it is not. I actually think that I determine > whether or not I am hungry the same way, but I could be wrong about that > one. And I think I've proven that indeed you are. In any case, can you describe the different way in which these different things are "verified", and can you show the reliability of that verification procedure. If you can't, then beliefs "verified" in that way haven't got a leg to stand on. -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (09/27/85)
In article <1780@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >> Rich is trying to find an objective way of measuring whether or not I am >> hungry. [LAURA] >> but remember that I promised to be as unfuriating as >> possible. So I say that I am hungry. You get out your measuring apparatus >> and say ``how can you be hungry? you just ate a huge dinner two hours >> ago!''. I say ``no, your equipment is malfunctioning.'' You go off an >> test your equipment and report that it is working fine. I say ``well, >> it can't be: you see there is this evil plot to starve me to death -- >> all equipment will fail to measure whether or not I am hungry because >> that is the way that this plot works.'' ``But you *just* ate dinner!'' >> ``Pure illusion and deception implanted in your mind. You can't >> underestimate the damager-god (oops, wrong article!) after all''. >And, given the evidence against you, I'd be right in concluding that you were >deluded, that perhaps there was other chemical imbalance in your body that >made it appear to you that you were hungry, or that you WERE simply being >your typical infuriating self. :-) But that's just the point. You've given up on being able to predict Laura's hunger, and have settled for merely predicting that she ought to be hungry. You've failed to capture Hunger in your theory, and thus you can't verify that Laura is indeed hungry. This problem is perhaps surmountable, but the ways in which it might be overcome are certainly unknown at this time. >> And so it goes. At some point you will be forced to choose to believe me or >> to believe your equipment. If all the objective evidence that you can >> garner points to the fact that I am not hungry then it will be most >> reasonable for you to assume that I am lying. But in making that >> assumption you are implicitly professing a belief in objective reality. >> But how can you defend that belief without saying either that it is >> self-evident or that it is possible to construct a consistent set >> of beliefs while using this belief which is also consistent with >> the evidence of your senses? >Precisely because it is verifiable, the testing has been rigorous, and it >falls in line with other evidence and data we have about the universe. But as it stands, it is not verifiable, because there is (possibly) a lie standing between you and Laura's subjective mental states. You aren't measuring hunger, after all; you are measuring physiological reactions to food, or even (if you a a little more sophisticated) mental responses to food. But it doesn't follow that responses to food (or lack thereof) are indeed hunger; likewise, it is not impossible for humans to feel hunger in the absence of "appropriate" stimuli. So I don't accept the legitimacy of this technique; there are obvious lapses in it which are papered over with dubious assumptions-- especially when you are ready to doubt the only observer rather than change the model. >> That is immaterial to the discussion at hand -- if there are any subjective >> beliefs that stand up to that scrutiny then those are the ones that I want >> to deal with. >What is it mean for them to "stand up to the scrutiny"? It simply means to >be verified. Only those which are verified are true. The rest may or may >not be true, but given the lack of evidence for them they can be dismissed. >By saying "those are the ones that I want to deal with", you have made my >point for me: only that which does stand up can be called knowledge or >fact. On the contrary, it is FUNDAMENTAL to the discussion at hand. THe truth of a proposition is (for all but self-referential propositions) completely independent of whether or not anyone thinks that it is true. If you do not accept this principle, then one must conclude that the earth did not begin to revolve around the sun until people believed that it did. C Wingate
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (09/28/85)
>> but remember that I promised to be as unfuriating as >> possible. So I say that I am hungry. You get out your measuring aparatus and >> say ``how can you be hungry? you just ate a huge dinner two hours ago!''. I >> say ``no, your equipment is malfunctioning.'' You go off an test your >> equpiment and report that it is working fine. I say ``well, it can't be: you >> see there is this evil plot to starve me to death -- all equipment will fail >> to measure whether or not I am hungry because that is the way that this plot >> works.'' ``But you *just* ate dinner!'' ``Pure illusion and deception >> implanted in your mind. You can't underestimate the damager-god (oops, wrong >> article!) after all''. > >And, given the evidence against you, I'd be right in concluding that you were >deluded, that perhaps there was other chemical imbalance in your body that >made it appear to you that you were hungry, or that you WERE simply being >your typical infuriating self. :-) Rich, you obviously don't know what it means to be hungry. Being hungry is not, by definition, a specific physiological state. It is in practice almost always associated with a specific physiological state, but the *definition* is subjective. When we talk about being hungry, we are talking about a subjective feeling. Subjective experience is *embedded within the language*; thus you cannot excise it by dealing only with objective truth, unless you choose to change the meanings of words to satisfy your desires, something you claim not to approve of. Even if we assume that all subjective experience is a manifestation of objective processes, which I think Occam encourages us to do, you cannot prove that Laura does or does not feel hungry, because you do not have sure enough knowledge of *which* processes result in such sensations. The medical profession has made many mistakes, such as denying the possibility of the effectiveness of acupuncture, or the reality of PMS, because they assumed that their simple model was in fact valid. *That* is the nature of scientific arrogance: viewing information as non-evidence in order to preserve the model. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
laura@l5.uucp (Laura Creighton) (09/29/85)
Rich, I think that you are missing the forest for the trees. This is not a very involved or complicated point I am trying to make. I will give it another shot... If you want to determine whether or not I am hungry you look for objective evidence of my hunger or lack of hunger. Okay -- that is your method. Now since you happened to use this method rather than (for instance) casting the I Ching or praying to God, I must conclude that you have more faith in this method than either of those others. Now, since I am playing the role of the skeptic, my next question is, ``what evidence do you have that this method, when applied, yeilds truth?''. In other words -- why are you an objectivist? It should come as no surprise to you that I am also an objectivist, so I can answer this question as I would with out trouble. However, the first time I answered this question I ran into a good deal of trouble. How do I know that all the evidence of my senses are not an elabourate illusion put on for the express purpose of deceiving me? The answer I got then, and that I still get when I look at it is ``I don't.'' I do have a very basic and fundamental belief that there is an objective reality, though I may have doubts about its nature all the time. But this is an example of an unverifiable truth. I cannot get to a meta-level to verufy this belief. I am stuck with leaving it as a belief, albeit one that I hold very strongly and do not question very often. I fail to see why you are not in the same boat. -- Laura Creighton (note new address!) sun!l5!laura (that is ell-five, not fifteen) l5!laura@lll-crg.arpa