torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (01/01/70)
In article <636@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes: >Yes, one can get a consistent definition of free will in this way [by >considering "external influences" to refer to those *currently* influencing >objects which are external to the person --pvt]. But you don't want it. >It obliges to grant that my computer, which is a running a program >I entered and commanded it to run some time ago, is exhibiting free will. Nay, there's a difference. An act of "free will" is caused by a *conscious mind*. (By the way, I've thought about T. Dave Hudson's argument that free will should be *defined* via the notion of activity caused by a conscious mind; and that r-e-a should not be built into the definition of free will but should be part of the explanation of it, as one of the conditions for it. (I hope I represent his views accurately.) Mr. Hudson, take a bow: you've convinced me (no easy feat! :->).) --Paul V Torek, Bill Honig Fan Club (Bill Honig is California's Superintendent of Public Instruction; recently California rejected high school science texts because publishers had played down evolution under pressure from fundamentalists)
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (08/30/85)
>>>I think we are dealing in the same definition of free here: unconstrained >>>by dependencies on other things. [RLR] > >> The definition I use is "unconstrained by *external* >> factors", that is "not controlled from *without*". This definition >> is in my dictionary(American Heritage Collegiate) and is the one used >> by a number of major philosophers when talking about human will. It >> differs from yours in the emphasized words, and this makes a large >> difference in requirements for the existence of free will. [Friesen] > >Hardly. Since the current configuration of the mind is determined (more >than just slightly) by external experiences, is that not an external >constraint? I'd really like to know why you can so easily dismiss this >by saying "oh, but that's in the past, we're talking about right now", >as if it was somehow exempt. [Rosen] But the past DOES NOT EXIST any more. The past has turned into the present moment. You have not recognized that a phenomenon can be described in two different ways: (1) Instantaneously, as a time slice -- in which case, all past experiences have been incorporated into the present moment, via memories, structure, momentum, impinging causes etc. External in this case can only mean that which is physically outside of the entity in question, but entirely within the current timeslice (assuming materialistic metaphysics). (2) As a Godlike viewer, examining all events transpiring within an interval of time, in which case, external means outside of the entity's `world tube'. Neither method of description is incorrect -- in principle, given a suitable instantaneous definition of a phenomenon, one ought to be able to examine the structure of its worldtube. Now Mr. Friesen is speaking in instantaneous terms; therefore, Rich, your comments about past experiences are irrelevant, unless you restate them in present-moment terms (eg - memories, habits, momentum, impinging causes..). >And even if it were, aren't there events >going on right now in the external world that affect the current decision? >How much light there is in the room. How hot it is. What sights, sounds, >smells, etc. happen to be around you at the time. Don't those factors >alter your choice of action? Is it really free? Very good points. The actual state of the environment does not directly affect me until it encounters the causal nexus -- the point where cause meets effect. Exactly where do we draw this arbitrary boundary where causal chains cross from external to internal (or vice versa)? Most input must pass from its initial neural encounter through many transformations including some fairly high-level interpretations before `I' actually become aware of it. Some knee-jerk items elicit immediate and totally unwilled response -- and these are typically not considered to be the actions of `free will'. The filtering of one's internal data structuring mechanisms is powerful. For instance, a red ace of spades among normal cards is usually seen as an ace of hearts. Preconceptions and low level sensory habits all work to shield one's carefully evolved internal structures (intentions, semantics, beliefs..) and thereby maintain psychological coherence. Most causal chains from the outside are dispersed or deflected before they go very deep. We see what we want to see, thereby providing a sanctuary from causality wherein internal entities can either evolve or fossilize, relatively untouched from external constraint. What kinds of entities? Not physical objects, but rather, externally perceivable patterns of behavior that can be born, remain inflexible or grow, and die, things like habits, preferences, purposes, etc. As nonphysical entities, they are largely unaffected by most physical forces. For example, I will probably like music until I die, whatever else may happen. Brainwashing techniques could alter that. Taking advantage of this vulnerability by force of self will, it is possible to plant, encourage, or thwart the patterns and filters that create subjective reality. Free will should at times resemble a self-modifying B.F.Skinner in order to escape the constraints of habit and other unwanted relics from the past. We are usually in autopilot, performing mundane rituals. I think free will is normally a dormant trait, a kind of spontaneous integrity that rises out from the depths, like the Russian legend Ilya Mourometz, who awakes from literally monolithic slumber as necessary to alter destiny, ideally with force appropriate to the severity of the decision at hand. Free will does NOT mean insensitivity to experience. On the contrary, it means transforming impinging causes into creative action thereby infusing one's character into causal chains that may well return as future experiences. Consequently, we blend into our evolving feedback loops, and, if we act in goodwill (whatever that is), external events become healthy extensions of self. For example, the acts of close friends and lovers are events I usually wish to be affected by. Most importantly, free will entails the ability to explore unknown regions where one is certain to be bombarded by external CAUSES, hardly the same as CONSTRAINTS. Don't most people want to experience new things? Even a fatal blunderer who, falling from a cliff, faces immediate and certain annihilation, can be totally free. With impeccable free will, you would take care not to overlook the delicate beauty of any fortuitously blossoming flowers you passed on the way down... You see, with free will, all is possible! >> And that same dictionary defines free will as "the power or >> discretion to choose" and "man's choices are ... not determined by >> *external* causes", which definitions clearly are based on the >> definitions I am using, not the more restrictive one you are using. > >They're only "more restrictive" in that I don't nonchalantly exempt >past external influences because they interfere with my conclusion. >And given the other examples I offer above, they don't work even if >you could just exempt the past. The past does not exist. It has become the present. -blissfully nonexistent
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/04/85)
>>Hardly. Since the current configuration of the mind is determined (more >>than just slightly) by external experiences, is that not an external >>constraint? I'd really like to know why you can so easily dismiss this >>by saying "oh, but that's in the past, we're talking about right now", >>as if it was somehow exempt. [Rosen] > But the past DOES NOT EXIST any more. The past has turned into the > present moment. [ELLIS] I find it amazing that you quote science when it serves your purposes and deny it when it doesn't. How convenient. "The past doesn't exist any more" is a meaningless statement, and quite incorrect in the global >4-dimensional universe we live in. Whether you're a determinist or a many worldist or a whimsicalist. Furthermore, it "exists" in the same sense that other things whose existence you speak out for exist: in the mind. As surely as beauty and love exist in mind constructs, so does the past. And it's that very existence that determines current action, no? > You have not recognized that a phenomenon can be described in two > different ways: > (1) Instantaneously, as a time slice -- in which case, all past > experiences have been incorporated into the present moment, via > memories, structure, momentum, impinging causes etc. External in > this case can only mean that which is physically outside of the > entity in question, but entirely within the current timeslice > (assuming materialistic metaphysics). > (2) As a Godlike viewer, examining all events transpiring within > an interval of time, in which case, external means outside > of the entity's `world tube'. I think it's YOU who doesn't recognize this, since you asserted that the past "no longer exists". > Now Mr. Friesen is speaking in instantaneous terms; therefore, Rich, > your comments about past experiences are irrelevant, unless you > restate them in present-moment terms (eg - memories, habits, momentum, > impinging causes..). Which of course is exactly what I do. Had the past been different, you would be acting differently today. >>And even if it were, aren't there events >>going on right now in the external world that affect the current decision? >>How much light there is in the room. How hot it is. What sights, sounds, >>smells, etc. happen to be around you at the time. Don't those factors >>alter your choice of action? Is it really free? > Very good points. > The actual state of the environment does not directly affect me > until it encounters the causal nexus -- the point where cause meets > effect. Exactly where do we draw this arbitrary boundary where causal > chains cross from external to internal (or vice versa)? When they begin having effect. > Most input must pass from its initial neural encounter through many > transformations including some fairly high-level interpretations before > `I' actually become aware of it. Some knee-jerk items elicit immediate > and totally unwilled response -- and these are typically not considered > to be the actions of `free will'. And more strung out decisions and actions. In what way are they different except in that the process lasts longer. > The filtering of one's internal data structuring mechanisms is powerful. > For instance, a red ace of spades among normal cards is usually seen > as an ace of hearts. Preconceptions and low level sensory habits all > work to shield one's carefully evolved internal structures (intentions, > semantics, beliefs..) and thereby maintain psychological coherence. Congrats! You have hit upon the reason why subjective experience is discarded from analysis if it is not supported by evidence. > Most causal chains from the outside are dispersed or deflected before > they go very deep. We see what we want to see, thereby providing a > sanctuary from causality wherein internal entities can either evolve or > fossilize, relatively untouched from external constraint. > What kinds of entities? Not physical objects, but rather, externally > perceivable patterns of behavior that can be born, remain inflexible or > grow, and die, things like habits, preferences, purposes, etc. As > nonphysical entities, they are largely unaffected by most physical > forces. This is news to me. Such habits and such may become so ingrained as to stagnate, but it would seem that the way they got there in the first place is the issue here. > For example, I will probably like music until I die, whatever else may > happen. Brainwashing techniques could alter that. Taking advantage of > this vulnerability by force of self will, it is possible to plant, > encourage, or thwart the patterns and filters that create subjective > reality. Free will should at times resemble a self-modifying B.F.Skinner > in order to escape the constraints of habit and other unwanted relics > from the past. Interesting analogy. Grabbing on to such control of one's own mind in a Skinnerian is only a slight exaggeration of the type of self-control that Paul and I have described from time to time. But such a process is learned (or not) by people. And the degree to which it is learned (can anyone learn it perfectly?) determines the degree of control. Still, in what way is this an example of free will? I think (and I agree very strongly with the notion) that this is something we DO have (as opposed to free will as defined rigorously), and something EXTREMELY worth cultivating and utilizing. But why call it free will when the definition doesn't apply? Emotional attachment to the term? I think language usage takes priority over such things. > We are usually in autopilot, performing mundane rituals. I think free > will is normally a dormant trait, a kind of spontaneous integrity that > rises out from the depths, like the Russian legend Ilya Mourometz, who > awakes from literally monolithic slumber as necessary to alter destiny, > ideally with force appropriate to the severity of the decision at hand. Nice legend. Still, free will by the rigorous definition requires a means of control external to internal chemical makeup. If you believe that, fine. If not, then free will is a moot point. But R-E-A (or whatever better term might describe for self-modifying Skinnerizing) does exist and can be utilized. > Free will does NOT mean insensitivity to experience. On the contrary, it > means transforming impinging causes into creative action thereby > infusing one's character into causal chains that may well return as > future experiences. Consequently, we blend into our evolving feedback > loops, and, if we act in goodwill (whatever that is), external events > become healthy extensions of self. For example, the acts of close > friends and lovers are events I usually wish to be affected by. > Most importantly, free will entails the ability to explore unknown > regions where one is certain to be bombarded by external CAUSES, hardly > the same as CONSTRAINTS. Don't most people want to experience new > things? R-E-A (or some other term for self-modifying behavior modification... SBM?) has these characteristics and does exist. > Even a fatal blunderer who, falling from a cliff, faces immediate and > certain annihilation, can be totally free. With impeccable free will, > you would take care not to overlook the delicate beauty of any > fortuitously blossoming flowers you passed on the way down... What being able to notice the beauty of it all as you plummet to your death has to do with free will escapes me, Michael. > You see, with free will, all is possible! As with Santa Claus. Unfortunately, neither is for real. >>> And that same dictionary defines free will as "the power or >>> discretion to choose" and "man's choices are ... not determined by >>> *external* causes", which definitions clearly are based on the >>> definitions I am using, not the more restrictive one you are using. >>They're only "more restrictive" in that I don't nonchalantly exempt >>past external influences because they interfere with my conclusion. >>And given the other examples I offer above, they don't work even if >>you could just exempt the past. > The past does not exist. It has become the present. No it hasn't, Michael. It exists just as much as your beauty and love and music. Likewise, it cannot be touched. But it would seem that the past still exists, whether "currently" in a >4D universe or in its effects on the present. -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/06/85)
In article <492@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > > But the past DOES NOT EXIST any more. The past has turned into the > present moment. > > You have not recognized that a phenomenon can be described in two > different ways: > > (1) Instantaneously, as a time slice -- in which case, all past > experiences have been incorporated into the present moment, via > memories, structure, momentum, impinging causes etc. External in > this case can only mean that which is physically outside of the > entity in question, but entirely within the current timeslice > (assuming materialistic metaphysics). > > (2) As a Godlike viewer, examining all events transpiring within > an interval of time, in which case, external means outside > of the entity's `world tube'. > > Neither method of description is incorrect -- in principle, given > a suitable instantaneous definition of a phenomenon, one ought to > be able to examine the structure of its worldtube. > > Now Mr. Friesen is speaking in instantaneous terms; therefore, Rich, > your comments about past experiences are irrelevant, unless you > restate them in present-moment terms (eg - memories, habits, momentum, > impinging causes..). Yes, one can get a consistent definition of free will in this way. But you don't want it. It obliges to grant that my computer, which is a running a program I entered and commanded it to run some time ago, is exhibiting free will. ... on the other hand, if you are going to allow memories of past events to count as external factors, you have given away the whole argument.
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/10/85)
>> >> But the past DOES NOT EXIST any more. The past has turned into the >> present moment... >> ... >> Now Mr. Friesen is speaking in instantaneous terms; therefore, Rich, >> your comments about past experiences are irrelevant, unless you >> restate them in present-moment terms (eg - memories, habits, momentum, >> impinging causes..). [ME] > >Yes, one can get a consistent definition of free will in this way. But you >don't want it. It obliges to grant that my computer, which is a running a >program I entered and commanded it to run some time ago, is exhibiting free >will. [Frank Adams] Sorry about any confusion -- the part you quoted from my article was hardly an argument for free will. It was only an attempt to clarify a disagreement about effects and past events that, I believe, arose from Sarima's (3-D timeslice) and Rich's (4-D worldtube) differing viewpoints. >... on the other hand, if you are going to allow memories of past events to >count as external factors, you have given away the whole argument. Sorry again -- I'll try once more... What remains of past experiences has been incorporated into one's memory, habits, etc... They were only external influences when they crossed from external to internal. Exactly where they `cross the boundary' and become integrated into the person is arbitrary, though I suggested later in the same article that this point occurs at the moment of one first becomes aware of the experience. Anyway, external or not, pleasant memories, knowledge, skills, good habits, etc, increase one's freedom by opening the mind to healthy and varied interests. In fact, LACK of past experiences -- parental neglect, poor education, insufficient human contact, boredom, etc -- is probably as constraining to personal freedom as traumatic or bitter experience. Finally, the strict Behaviorist belief that past experience totally determines one's actions is NOT fact. -michael
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/13/85)
>>... on the other hand, if you are going to allow memories of past events to >>count as external factors, you have given away the whole argument. > Sorry again -- I'll try once more... > What remains of past experiences has been incorporated into one's > memory, habits, etc... They were only external influences when they > crossed from external to internal. > Exactly where they `cross the boundary' and become integrated into > the person is arbitrary, though I suggested later in the same > article that this point occurs at the moment of one first > becomes aware of the experience. > Anyway, external or not, pleasant memories, knowledge, skills, good > habits, etc, increase one's freedom by opening the mind to healthy and > varied interests. I wouldn't call it "freedom". What is increased is our flexibility in action, that which makes us different from supposedly lower animals. What Torek and I have referred to as rational evaluative analysis of stored knowledge constructs (possibly not even at a conscious level). The moment one first becomes aware is an arbitrary point indeed, because the stored experience may have an effect on your decision making without your being aware of it at a conscious level. But, back to the original point, calling it freedom sounds Orwellian to me, because clearly we are "free" only to do what our experiences and mind constructs lead us to do. This may be perceived as a "conscious choice" if the monitoring brain happens to be monitoring that process (i.e., is conscious of it), but... > In fact, LACK of past experiences -- parental neglect, poor education, > insufficient human contact, boredom, etc -- is probably as constraining to > personal freedom as traumatic or bitter experience. But there's no difference at all. One case constrains you to do one set of things, the other constrains you to do another. > Finally, the strict Behaviorist belief that past experience totally > determines one's actions is NOT fact. So, what is "fact" here? If "strict" behaviorism is not true, what are you assuming to be true. I assume that by "strict behaviorism" you mean that all our behaviors are determined by things in our brains, which were accumulated as a result of past experiences, which were... If not this, what? -- "to be nobody but yourself in a world which is doing its best night and day to make you like everybody else means to fight the hardest battle any human being can fight and never stop fighting." - e. e. cummings Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/18/85)
>>Yes, one can get a consistent definition of free will in this way [by >>considering "external influences" to refer to those *currently* influencing >>objects which are external to the person --pvt]. But you don't want it. >>It obliges to grant that my computer, which is a running a program I >>entered and commanded it to run some time ago, is exhibiting free will.[ADAMS] > Nay, there's a difference. An act of "free will" is caused by a *conscious > mind*. (By the way, I've thought about T. Dave Hudson's argument that > free will should be *defined* via the notion of activity caused by a > conscious mind; and that r-e-a should not be built into the definition of > free will but should be part of the explanation of it, as one of the > conditions for it. (I hope I represent his views accurately.) Mr. Hudson, > take a bow: you've convinced me (no easy feat! :->).) [TOREK] Great. An act of free will is causes by a conscious mind. (Never mind the fact that it has nothing to do with the definition, but Eric Blair said redefining words would be the status quo by just around last year...) And how do you now define a conscious mind, as opposed to something else? Does a cat have a conscious mind? "Why, no, it doesn't have free will, so it can't be..." (Or maybe it does this week...) Round and round and round and it comes out at square one. -- "There! I've run rings 'round you logically!" "Oh, intercourse the penguin!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/20/85)
>>..It obliges to grant that my computer, which is a running a program >>I entered and commanded it to run some time ago, is exhibiting free will. > Frank Adams > >Nay, there's a difference. An act of "free will" is caused by a *conscious >mind*. (By the way, I've thought about T. Dave Hudson's argument that >free will should be *defined* via the notion of activity caused by a >conscious mind; and that r-e-a should not be built into the definition of >free will but should be part of the explanation of it, as one of the >conditions for it. (I hope I represent his views accurately.) Mr. Hudson, >take a bow: you've convinced me (no easy feat! :->).) > Paul V Torek Rational decision by a conscious mind. Sounds familiar. Oh yes.. > Kant: > ..But the very same subject, being on the other hand conscious > of himself as a thing-in-itself, considers his existence also in so > far as it is not subject to time-conditions, and he regards himself > as determinable only through laws which he gives himself through > reason. And to be determinable through self-imposed laws is to be > free. [History of Philosophy, Copleston] Still, I have a problem with the notion that freedom is self-conscious rational choice. All that logic-chopping can be numbing, and, in excess, may become yet another constraint on personal freedom. The freest minds I know can be brutally self-scrutinizing as appropriate, yet otherwise follow spontaneous impulse as effortlessly as a frog might splash into an old pond. These additional definitions may help to clarify the issue: Chuang Tzu: Freedom derives from the abandonment of fixed goals, the dissolution of rigid categories and launching out of the confines of self so that one may respond anew to the totality of every new situation [Inner Chapters, AC Graham] Bergson: Free will is the breathing manifestation and unpredictable creativity of evolution: Evolution is truly creative, like the work of an artist. An impulse to action, as undefined want, exists beforehand, but until the want is satisfied, it is impossible to know how nature will satisfy it. For example, we may suppose some vague desire in sightless animals to be able to be aware of objects before theywere in contact with them. This led to efforts which finally which finally resulted in the creation of eyes. Sight could not have been imagined beforehand. For this reason, evolution [even within an individual] is unpredictable, and determinism cannot refute advocates of free will. [History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell] Sartre: The characteristic of the for-itself implies that it is being which finds no help, no pillar of support in what it WAS. The for-itself is free and can make the world exist because the for-itself is the being which has to be what it is in light of what will be. Therefore the freedom of the for-itself appears as its being.. We shall never experience ourselves except as choice in making. Freedom is simply the fact that this choice is always unconditioned.. Such choice without basis yet dictating its own purposes is absurd. [20th Century to Wittgenstein and Sartre, WT Jones] Feyerabend: Who needs free will? Freedom entails absence of elitist control and the encouragement of cultural pluralism -- separate religion (including science) from state! Smullyan: Once you can see the so-called "you" and the so-called "nature" as a continuous whole, then you can never again be bothered by such questions as whether it is you who are controlling nature or nature who is controlling you. [contributed by Richard Carnes] Campbell: Free will irreduceably exists without rationale; to account for it would be a contradiction in terms, it is ex hypothesi the sort of thing for which an explanation is absurd. Pu Jen: Enjoy that which you despise -- you don't exist anyway. Compton: Free will is plastic control: not just chance, but rather the result of a subtle interplay between something almost random or haphazard, and something like a restrictive or selective control -- such as a goal or a standard -- though certainly not a cast-iron control. [Objective Knowledge, Karl Popper] Gandhi: The first thing of all and the most important of all is the inner unity, the overcoming and healing of inner division, the consequent spiritual and personal freedom, of which autonomy and liberty would be consequences. [Gandhi on NonViolence, Thomas Merton] "Carry data chop logic" Ordinary men are so bright and intelligent! -michael
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/20/85)
>>>... on the other hand, if you are going to allow memories of past events to >>>count as external factors, you have given away the whole argument. [Frank?] >> Sorry again -- I'll try once more... >> What remains of past experiences has been incorporated into one's >> memory, habits, etc... They were only external influences when they >> crossed from external to internal. >> Exactly where they `cross the boundary' and become integrated into >> the person is arbitrary, though I suggested later in the same >> article that this point occurs at the moment of one first >> becomes aware of the experience. >> Anyway, external or not, pleasant memories, knowledge, skills, good >> habits, etc, increase one's freedom by opening the mind to healthy and >> varied interests. [ME] >I wouldn't call it "freedom". What is increased is our flexibility in >action, that which makes us different from supposedly lower animals. What >Torek and I have referred to as rational evaluative analysis of stored >knowledge constructs (possibly not even at a conscious level). [Rich] I wouldn't call it free will either; however, those who stress rationality as the highest possible virtue would be entirely justified in selecting r-e-a as their definition of free will. >The moment one first becomes aware is an arbitrary point indeed, because the >stored experience may have an effect on your decision making without your >being aware of it at a conscious level. Fine! As long as the effect is to increase my freedom, I'm eager to incorporate such an experience into myself. Most experiences do, in fact, widen my ability to respond or initiate action creatively. It's the unfortunate traumas (usually resulting from lack of experience) that can be constraining. Tragically, some misfortunates suffer so many of these that their freedom is forever broken.. >But, back to the original point, >calling it freedom sounds Orwellian to me, because clearly we are "free" >only to do what our experiences and mind constructs lead us to do. This may >be perceived as a "conscious choice" if the monitoring brain happens to be >monitoring that process (i.e., is conscious of it), but... I challenge you to prove this highly dubious assertion!! At most, the empirical evidence shows that past experiences only partially restrict my behavior -- and QM downright contradicts strict behaviorism. Furthermore, I am frequently quite successful at NOT monitoring my behavior -- except when I really need to. BTW, any lawn mower engine (or even electron, for that matter) arguably makes `decisions' that are not fully determined by antecedent causes, yet display primitive intelligence in their `choice' of action -- if relative independence from antecedent causes is paramount, there are entities possessing free will all over the place. >> In fact, LACK of past experiences -- parental neglect, poor education, >> insufficient human contact, boredom, etc -- is probably as constraining to >> personal freedom as traumatic or bitter experience. >But there's no difference at all. One case constrains you to do one set of >things, the other constrains you to do another. You mean a person whose development was so blighted that they cannot relate with other aware beings (even in written form) has as much freedom as a person who can enjoy friendships, careers, literature, or other life-opening experiences that come from human interactions? If so, your concept of freedom has little to do with the ordinary meaning of the word, my friend. >> Finally, the strict Behaviorist belief that past experience totally >> determines one's actions is NOT fact. > >So, what is "fact" here? If "strict" behaviorism is not true, what are you >assuming to be true. I assume that by "strict behaviorism" you mean that >all our behaviors are determined by things in our brains, which were >accumulated as a result of past experiences, which were... If not this, >what? Only highly causal entities like digital computers and billiard balls approach strictly deterministic behavior (and even they display high-level random behavior when they break). Whitenoise phenomena whose high-level behavior is of quantum or analog nature are in principle random -- like Brownian motion or noise between radio stations, admittedly boring, but nonetheless not precisely determined by past behavior -- we can predict how such things will behave with mere statistics. Even the most perfect vacuum theoretically possible (in which electromagnetic radiation is totally minmized) possess such statistically random behavior. Then we have more interesting phenomena possessing high-level deterministic nonlinear behavior that magnifies whatever fluctuations are present at the bifurcation points -- the n-body problem is in this category, and the ultimate outcome is in general theoretically unpredictable because the amount of accuracy in knowledge of the initial conditions rapidly encounters quantum limits for long-range prediction. In this case, antecedent conditions determine everything except the intermittent critical decisions, where chaos reigns. At best, we can categorize the possible outcomes and attach a probability to each class. The most interesting case is dissipative structures, where the chaos of nonlinear thermodynamics (possibly augmented by noncausal quantum connections) is driven by an energy source and evolves into progressively higher levels of order -- living and growing things. Here, antecedent causes are but a mere background that, only in exceptional cases, have noticeable effect on the integrity of such highly nondeterministic and autonomous entities. Science hardly understands intelligent life, of course. Somehow animals resonate with surrounding patterns so well that they mirror the surrounding world, anticipating future events more than reacting to past ones. My earlier quote from Bergson seems appropriate here: Free will is the breathing manifestation and unpredictable creativity of evolution: Evolution is truly creative, like the work of an artist. An impulse to action, as undefined want, exists beforehand, but until the want is satisfied, it is impossible to know how nature will satisfy it. For example, we may suppose some vague desire in sightless animals to be able to be aware of objects before they were in contact with them. This led to efforts which finally which finally resulted in the creation of eyes. Sight could not have been imagined beforehand. For this reason, evolution [even within an individual] is unpredictable, and determinism cannot refute advocates of free will. [History of Western Philosophy, Bertrand Russell] Yet another whimsical definition of free will for you, Rich: Autonomous behavior determined by future events SMASH CAUSALITY!!! -michael
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/21/85)
In article <1725@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes: >>>Yes, one can get a consistent definition of free will in this way [by >>>considering "external influences" to refer to those *currently* influencing >>>objects which are external to the person --pvt]. But you don't want it. >>>It obliges to grant that my computer, which is a running a program I >>>entered and commanded it to run some time ago, is exhibiting free will. >>>[ADAMS] > >> Nay, there's a difference. An act of "free will" is caused by a *conscious >> mind*. (By the way, I've thought about T. Dave Hudson's argument that >> free will should be *defined* via the notion of activity caused by a >> conscious mind; and that r-e-a should not be built into the definition of >> free will but should be part of the explanation of it, as one of the >> conditions for it. (I hope I represent his views accurately.) Mr. Hudson, >> take a bow: you've convinced me (no easy feat! :->).) [TOREK] I thought that was my definition. If Mr. Hudson proposed the same thing, I didn't see it. (Which is quite possible, since our disks keep getting full and we lose mail.) >Great. An act of free will is causes by a conscious mind. (Never mind the >fact that it has nothing to do with the definition, but Eric Blair said >redefining words would be the status quo by just around last year...) I believe the situation is as follows. There is a common use of the term free will, which is not well defined. There have been a number of attempts to define the term through the years, in a way that conforms to the common usage. The most common one philosophically is that free will is acausal action (not *completely* acausal, just not *completely* deterministic). I have argued that in light of modern physics, this should be modified to "acausal and non-random" (that is, having a (primitive) component which is neither deterministic nor random). There is no evidence that free will, in this sense, exists; and I believe the burden of proof lies on the side of proving it. (This does mean that it doesn't exist, just that its non- existence is the simpler assumption.) The second most common definition, historically, is some variant on "free will is doing what is right", or "free will is doing what God says to do". I have heard no arguments for this class of definition here, so I will not bother trying to refute it. So, if free will is not either of these things, what is it? I think I agree with my earlier posting, and Paul Torek, and Dave Hudson (if he said it), that free will is the action of a conscious mind which is (partly) free from current external influence. >And how do you now define a conscious mind, as opposed to something else? A good question. I don't really know how to define a conscious mind. I do know of a good many cases where I know a conscious mind is present, and a good many others where I am reasonably certain it is not. Thus I know it is a real object. I suspect more scientific research will be required before I could attempt a definition. Ask me when the first artificial intelligence is functional. >Does a cat have a conscious mind? This is one of the cases where I'm not sure. When (if) I find out, I will be able to tell you whether it has free will. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) (09/21/85)
In article <531@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > Still, I have a problem with the notion that freedom is self-conscious > rational choice. All that logic-chopping can be numbing... > > The freest minds I know can be brutally self-scrutinizing as appropriate, > yet otherwise follow spontaneous impulse as effortlessly as a frog might > splash into an old pond. That's *not* a problem with understanding freedom as self-conscious rational choice. See Dennett, *Elbow Room*, Chapter 2 esp. the latter part of the chapter. --Paul V Torek, the once and future "top 25" news submitter
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/22/85)
> Still, I have a problem with the notion that freedom is self-conscious > rational choice. All that logic-chopping can be numbing, and, in excess, > may become yet another constraint on personal freedom. [ELLIS] And to think, that's "all" we've got. Either "think things through" (producing possibly the best results) or "go with instincts" (which often means acting on learned behaviors in an instinctive way, behaviors either impressed upon the person through conditioning or chosen rationally by the person---and that only if one such learned behavior is choosing rationally). > The freest minds I know can be brutally self-scrutinizing as appropriate, > yet otherwise follow spontaneous impulse as effortlessly as a frog might > splash into an old pond. The difference between a genius and an average Joe/Joan like you or me is in their ability to make use of intuition and spontaneity. Intuition and spontaneity aren't "great" things, they're only great when the results of using them are great. Geniuses (or whatever you want to call them) simply have learned how to make the best use of these tools. Is the reason you believe in "acausality" because you know that the only abilities open to us otherwise do not allow for "freedom"? I for one find the abilities we do have to be more than adequate, in fact quite incredible. -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/22/85)
>>I wouldn't call it "freedom". What is increased is our flexibility in >>action, that which makes us different from supposedly lower animals. What >>Torek and I have referred to as rational evaluative analysis of stored >>knowledge constructs (possibly not even at a conscious level). [Rich] > I wouldn't call it free will either; however, those who stress > rationality as the highest possible virtue would be entirely > justified in selecting r-e-a as their definition of free will. [ELLIS] I don't understand, you mean based on our other beliefs, we get to "select" the definitions we like for given words or terms? Hmmm. Thank you for clarifying (at last) your position on language and definition. >>But, back to the original point, >>calling it freedom sounds Orwellian to me, because clearly we are "free" >>only to do what our experiences and mind constructs lead us to do. This may >>be perceived as a "conscious choice" if the monitoring brain happens to be >>monitoring that process (i.e., is conscious of it), but... > I challenge you to prove this highly dubious assertion!! Highly dubious? If you don't believe in a non-physical soul as the cause of the willing of your actions, then clearly our actions are determined by the make-up of our brains, which are determined by what we have gone through throughout our lives. I wasn't aware that obvious tautologies were "assertions" that are "dubious" and must be "proved". > At most, the empirical evidence shows that past experiences only > partially restrict my behavior -- and QM downright contradicts > strict behaviorism. It does? > Furthermore, I am frequently quite successful at NOT monitoring my > behavior -- except when I really need to. Your articles here are evidence of that. :-( -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) (09/24/85)
In article <531@spar.UUCP> ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) writes: > Rational decision by a conscious mind. Sounds familiar. Oh yes.. Me, I don't insist that the decision be rational. Only that it be made by a conscious mind. Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka Multimate International 52 Oakland Ave North E. Hartford, CT 06108
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/24/85)
>> The freest minds I know can be brutally self-scrutinizing as appropriate, >> yet otherwise follow spontaneous impulse as effortlessly as a frog might >> splash into an old pond. > >The difference between a genius and an average Joe/Joan like you or me is >in their ability to make use of intuition and spontaneity. Intuition and >spontaneity aren't "great" things, they're only great when the results of >using them are great. Geniuses (or whatever you want to call them) simply >have learned how to make the best use of these tools. Even irrational dullards who have love in the hearts can work wonders with little more than childlike spontaneity. >Is the reason you believe in "acausality" because you know that the only >abilities open to us otherwise do not allow for "freedom"? I do not believe in "acausality", if belief is taken to mean faith contrary to reason. Rather, I have concluded by examining the empirical evidence and rigorous arguments that causal determinism is an archaic a priori assertion that contradicts facts of the physical world we live in. And I am fully prepared to accept the triumphant return of determinism if and when the evidence indicates otherwise. >I for one find the abilities we do have to be more than adequate, in fact >quite incredible. Bravo -- we totally agree on this point.. "Carry data chop logic" -michael
ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) (09/24/85)
>> I wouldn't call it free will either; however, those who stress >> rationality as the highest possible virtue would be entirely >> justified in selecting r-e-a as their definition of free will. [ELLIS] > >I don't understand, you mean based on our other beliefs, we get to "select" >the definitions we like for given words or terms? Hmmm. Thank you for >clarifying (at last) your position on language and definition. You have your own ideas about what you consider `freedom' to be, and I accept them as reasonable for you -- but I fail to understand why others must accept your insistence that they are the only reasonable ones, especially in light of the huge amount of philosophical divergence on this issue. Most people consider themselves to be constrained only when unwanted realities compel behavior against their will. Dennett offers a strong argument of this point: Jones hates Smith and decides, in full possession of his faculties, to murder him. Meanwhile, Black, the nefarious neurosurgeon.. , who also wants Smith dead, has implanted something in Jones' brain so that just in case Jones changes his mind (and chickens out), Black, by pushing his special button, can put Jones back on his murderous track.. Black doesn't have to intervene; Jones does the deed all on his own. Jones could not have done otherwise, yet he behaved according to his own choice! Black's total control never subverted Jones decision process. I'd say that Jones behaved of his own free will. Likewise, even if I am constrained by physical causality, I only consider such constraints to be external when they prevent me from following my will. After all, what could I do without a physical body? And how could I gain new knowledge if I did not remember past experiences? Freedom without experience or physical abilities requires a mystical viewpoint, and that would be most unscientific! And I fail to see how those who desire to be totally rational are not free when behave according to rational conscious choice... >Highly dubious? If you don't believe in a non-physical soul as the cause of >the willing of your actions, then clearly our actions are determined by the >make-up of our brains, which are determined by what we have gone through >throughout our lives. I wasn't aware that obvious tautologies were >"assertions" that are "dubious" and must be "proved". The below are not `obvious tautologies', they are a priori assertions: (1) Our minds are totally determined by our brain state (2) Our brain states are totally determined by antecedent causes I'm willing to suppose (1) if that's what it takes to hold a philosophical discussion with you, Rich. Especially since I can offer no evidence that it is obviously wrong. However, I'll gladly drop this assumption in philosophical discourse with those who are more skeptical than yourself, since subjective decisions clearly affect physical events. (1) is reasonable, but not yet fact. However, (2) has been scientifically disproven. Nobody knows what determines the outcome of individual random quantum events, but those occurring in our brains arguably can and do manifest themselves as high-level conscious phenomena (unlike the quantum phenomena in rocks, which have no perceptible effect on a rock's high-level behavior). One thing we do know is that quantum events are only partially determined antecedent causes; we also know that they are partially determined by synchronous noncausal connections. >> At most, the empirical evidence shows that past experiences only >> partially restrict my behavior -- and QM downright contradicts >> strict behaviorism. > >It does? Strict behavioristic assertions that one's choices are totally determined by past causal chains rooted in the past would have been clearly validated by strict causal determinism. First, quantum considerations provide empirical evidence that events are apparently not totally determined by known physical causes (admittedly, future discoveries may change this). Secondly, rigorous analysis proves that any future deterministic theories will have to be noncausally deterministic (ie- not determined by spatially and temporally impingent events). Thus, I conclude that one's behavior is partially determined by noncausal considerations, and strict Behaviorism is false. >> Furthermore, I am frequently quite successful at NOT monitoring my >> behavior -- except when I really need to. > >Your articles here are evidence of that. :-( At least I restrict my flamage to the only flamer here (besides myself). I'll correct that omission -- Ellis, you are an ignorant and arrogant fool!! "Others are so bright and intelligent" -michael
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/29/85)
> I believe the situation is as follows. There is a common use of the term > free will, which is not well defined. There have been a number of attempts > to define the term through the years, in a way that conforms to the common > usage. The most common one philosophically is that free will is acausal > action (not *completely* acausal, just not *completely* deterministic). I > have argued that in light of modern physics, this should be modified to > "acausal and non-random" (that is, having a (primitive) component which is > neither deterministic nor random). There is no evidence that free will, > in this sense, exists; and I believe the burden of proof lies on the side > of proving it. (This does mean that it doesn't exist, just that its non- > existence is the simpler assumption.) [FRANK ADAMS] If anything, Ellis' extended diatribe did a lot to convince me that, yes indeed, the meaning you describe is the meaning ascribed to free will throughout the ages. Everyone Ellis quoted/paraphrased took this as a jumping off point and either agreed with its existence (for whatever reason), disagreed, or built some whole new system of axioms to "make" it exist. Bravo, for noting where the burden of proof lies for this. > The second most common definition, historically, is some variant on "free > will is doing what is right", or "free will is doing what God says to do". > I have heard no arguments for this class of definition here, so I will > not bother trying to refute it. It sounds a little like Torek's "making the rational choice/decision" in a way. In any case, the religious view on free will centers on the ABILITY to make a decision between "right" and "wrong", where those two are determined by some moral code. The ability they speak of is exactly the same ability you describe in your earlier paragraph. Thus, no real conflict at all. One in the same. > So, if free will is not either of these things, what is it? H O L D I T ! ! ! ! If the definitions of a word do not describe something that exists, are you at liberty to simply say "let's make it mean something else"? Because the word unicorn doesn't represent a real object, can you just "reassign" the "pointer" for the definition of unicorn to something else because you feel like it? > I think I agree > with my earlier posting, and Paul Torek, and Dave Hudson (if he said it), > that free will is the action of a conscious mind which is (partly) free from > current external influence. My other complaints aside (for the moment), why the arbitrary demarcation of "current external influence". So as to "get" free will? If you are going to build a system of axioms and definitions such that you get what you want, of course free will will "exist". But is that a legitimate thing to do? >>And how do you now define a conscious mind, as opposed to something else? (THIS IS THE QUESTION I ASKED EARLIER.) > A good question. I don't really know how to define a conscious mind. I do > know of a good many cases where I know a conscious mind is present, and a > good many others where I am reasonably certain it is not. Thus I know it > is a real object. I suspect more scientific research will be required before > I could attempt a definition. Ask me when the first artificial intelligence > is functional. >>Does a cat have a conscious mind? > This is one of the cases where I'm not sure. When (if) I find out, I will > be able to tell you whether it has free will. You omitted the most important part of my article, and in so doing ignored the conclusion it came to: that such a definition of free will (in any case) is hopelessly obscure, vacuous, and circular. "What's free will?" "The act of a conscious mind." "And how do you define conscious mind? Does, say, a fish have one?" "No, of course not, obviously, it doesn't have free will, so it can't..." Not to mention that it doesn't cover the bases of the definition. -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/29/85)
> Most people consider themselves to be constrained only when unwanted > realities compel behavior against their will. Dennett offers a strong > argument of this point: > > Jones hates Smith and decides, in full possession of his faculties, > to murder him. Meanwhile, Black, the nefarious neurosurgeon.. , > who also wants Smith dead, has implanted something in Jones' brain > so that just in case Jones changes his mind (and chickens out), > Black, by pushing his special button, can put Jones back on his > murderous track.. Black doesn't have to intervene; Jones does the > deed all on his own. > > Jones could not have done otherwise, yet he behaved according to his own > choice! Black's total control never subverted Jones decision process. > I'd say that Jones behaved of his own free will. Yes, I'd guess that you would regardless of the outcome. I see little connection between this analogy and the issues of free will, except in your own mind. > Likewise, even if I am constrained by physical causality, I only > consider such constraints to be external when they prevent me from > following my will. But your will itself is constrained by that same causality: why is it that you want to do THIS and not THAT? > The below are not `obvious tautologies', they are a priori assertions: > > (1) Our minds are totally determined by our brain state > (2) Our brain states are totally determined by antecedent causes > > I'm willing to suppose (1) if that's what it takes to hold a > philosophical discussion with you, Rich. Michael, this ceased to be a "philosophical discussion" when you lowered yourself to abusive namecalling because I disagreed with your holy religious beliefs. > Especially since I can offer no > evidence that it is obviously wrong. However, I'll gladly drop this > assumption in philosophical discourse with those who are more skeptical > than yourself, since subjective decisions clearly affect physical > events. (1) is reasonable, but not yet fact. > However, (2) has been scientifically disproven. First off, if they're not determined in this way, how does this "get" us "free will"? All it gets us is another dependency. Not only are we dependent on how our brains have come to be configured through our experiences in life, we are also dependent upon random quantum fluctuations which are more analogous to a banana peel on the floor than to the making of a "free" decision. Remember that "choice" is the selection of an alternative after consideration. If the "consideration" is a quantum phenomenon, you have lost your freedom, not gained it. > Nobody knows what determines the outcome of individual random quantum > events, but those occurring in our brains arguably can and do manifest > themselves as high-level conscious phenomena (unlike the quantum > phenomena in rocks, which have no perceptible effect on a rock's > high-level behavior). Arguably can and do? I wonder who's asserting what now? > Strict behavioristic assertions that one's choices are totally > determined by past causal chains rooted in the past would have been > clearly validated by strict causal determinism. > First, quantum considerations provide empirical evidence that events > are apparently not totally determined by known physical causes > (admittedly, future discoveries may change this). > Secondly, rigorous analysis proves that any future deterministic > theories will have to be noncausally deterministic (ie- not determined > by spatially and temporally impingent events). Michael Ellis predicts the future of science, describing (nay, DEMANDING) what future theories "will have to be"! >>> Furthermore, I am frequently quite successful at NOT monitoring my >>> behavior -- except when I really need to. >>Your articles here are evidence of that. :-( > At least I restrict my flamage to the only flamer here (besides myself). > I'll correct that omission -- Ellis, you are an ignorant and arrogant > fool!! Congratulations! :-? I much prefer your public self-abuse to your abuse directed at me, for obvious reasons. I have to wonder if the only reason for the abuse in the first place is the fact that I disagree with you. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr