throopw@rtp47.UUCP (Wayne Throop) (09/22/85)
Perhaps I'm dense, but I just can't see that "interference" (as used in
Rich's "objective morality") can be defined clearly enough to be
usefull. There seems to be no rigid rule that determines what is
interference, and what is not. Some examples are in order.
Two persons in a "public place". Person A is playing a
"boom-box". Person B is reading. At what point (if any) is
A interfering with B? When the boom-box is loud enough to:
- be heard by A
- cause distraction (so that reading is difficult)
- cause hearing impairment to A (if A were to stay in range)
- cause hearing impairment to A (before A can get out of range)
- cause damage to the public place itself
(must be playing a Disaster Area concert :-)
I think it is clear that the first noise level is not interference
(according to Rich), and the last two are. However, how about the
others? And how about noise levels intermediate between causing damage
if A were to stay and if A were to leave? And the problem isn't even as
simple as drawing a hard line somewhere at noise level. Consider
another scenario.
Two persons in a "public area". Person A has on a red, flashing
neon shirt (powered by a battery pack). Now, person B is present,
and has a reaction to pulsating red light that is
- a personal preference for blue
- a result of a bad childhood experience, and causes mild nausea
- a result of torture in vietnam, and causes violent nausea,
vomitting, and so on.
- a result of an neurologic condition, and can induce a seisure
- a result of an neurologic condition, and can incude a fatal
seisure.
Again, at what point is "interference" going on? These examples seem to
show that "interference" isn't nearly so easy to define as Rich makes
out. It seems that there are at least two dimensions to it, severity of
stimulus, and severity of reaction. And each of these factors forms a
fuzzy spectrum with no clearly delineated boundaries that I can see.
And if one focuses on coersion there is yet another fuzzy dimension.
Consider the indirect coersion dimension: If you do X I'll
- be upset with you
- tell your mother
- ruin you financially
- kill your pet
- kill your child
- kill you
Or the direct coersion dimension, making it varying degrees of
physically difficult to "disagree" with a coercing agent. Let's choose
Rich's example of a person in a chair with a bright light shining at the
person. Let us say that nothing prevents this person from simply
standing up and leaving, except that, when this person stands up, (or
otherwise avoids the light) an automatic mechanism will
- do nothing
- give 10% of a fatal dose of x-rays
- 50%
- 90%
- 100%
Just when is coersion occuring here (if at all)?
Or the probablity of damage dimension, such as
- A buys cigarettes for B
- A buys cocain for B
- A injects B with heroin (unlikely to cause permanent damage)
- A injects B with heroin (likely to cause permanent damage)
- A injects B with heroin ("certain"to cause permanent damage)
- A shoots B (in the leg) (unlikely to kill)
- A shoots B (in the abdomen) (fairly likely to kill)
- A shoots B (in the heart) (quite likely to kill)
- A shoots B (in the head) (extremely likely to kill)
At which point is A "guilty" of attempted murder? Does intent enter
into it? If so, how can this intent be judged objectively? And on and
on and on and on.
Note that I *don't* want a pointer to which of the levels of severity in
these examples constitutes interference in somebody's opinion. I
want a procedure for determining when interference is going on in an
*objective* way in *real time* that could in principle be used by a
police force of some sort, and be applied to *any* situation. I can see
how such procedures might be arrived at, but I can't see how they could
be applied in practice in a real situation without subjectivity entering
into it.
Note also that I don't disagree that the notion of "interference" should
be central to a practical moral system. What I find hard to buy is that
it is all so neat and simple as Rich seems to be implying, and that it
can be done purely objectively.
--
Wayne Throop at Data General, RTP, NC
<the-known-world>!mcnc!rti-sel!rtp47!throopwfriesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (09/29/85)
In article <194@rtp47.UUCP> throopw@rtp47.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes: >Perhaps I'm dense, but I just can't see that "interference" (as used in >Rich's "objective morality") can be defined clearly enough to be >usefull. There seems to be no rigid rule that determines what is >interference, and what is not. Some examples are in order. > I feel the problem goes even deeper than that. There is the problem that occurs when *any* action amounts to interference. For example: I share an office at work with someone who smokes, and who becomes nervous and irritable when he cannot smoke. BUT, I am irritated and distracted by smoke, and my efficiency on the job is impaired by smoking nearby. Now if my officemate smokes he is *interfering* with my ability to do my job and with my ability to avoid stress, I cannot readily leave, since that would be equivalent to quitting.(And pushing me into quitting a job I like is most certainly interference as far as I am concerned). On the other hand if I refuse to let him smoke in our office, then I am interfering with *him* and reducing *his* effectiveness at his job. So what do we do until we can cinvince our employer to give us seperate offices, do we let him interfere with me or do I interfere with him, in what amounts to *equivalent* interference either way, since we would both suffer essentially the same consequences. -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa