warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack ) (08/09/85)
[ouch]
Recently a lot of discussion in this newsgroup has touched on morality. It
seems that people have used it indiscrimanently; everyone has a different
meaning for it. So, what is this morality stuff?
Isn't morality a framework for deciding Good=Right=The-Thing-to-Do vs.
Evil=Bad=Wrong=The-Thing-Not-to-Do?
In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical
function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system
would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.]
Next step -- so an action maps to good or evil. A person acting morally
would proceed with a good action, and avoid an evil action. If he didn't,
he would be acting immorally. Correct?
Is this all? It's a pretty simple system, as is. Of course, *IN*REALITY*,
the problem with morality is how to make that 'mapping' from an action to
{good, evil}. There are other questions ...
Does morality include the punishment for immoral behavior? I think that is
separate from the system. Some moral systems include them; some don't. The
Judeo-Christian morality [if you will] in the overall picture promises
eternal life to those who lead moral lives, and eternal damnation for those
who do not. [Whether this promise is fulfilled is a discussion for another
group.] Rich has proposed a moral system based on the [forgive me]
function: if {I desire it} and
{It does not infringe on the rights of others}
then GOOD
else EVIL
This system doesn't include any means of punishment. But it seems to be as
much a moral system as the Judeo-Christian system; albeit simpler and
untested.
Does a morality have to have a wide {universal?} acceptance or application to
validate it as a morality? It seems that Charlie has said that a moral
system that doesn't account for those who do not suscribe to it directly is
not a moral system. Why is that necessary? The basic goal of a moral
system is to determine what to do and not to do ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.* If
a large group suscribes to a morality, then life is simpler for that group
since they can predict certain things about their neighbor's actions. But,
it does not make the morality any more or less valid. Maybe the person with
the perfect morality is the only one who suscribes to it.
Everyone has a morality as defined above. Some may be quite complex; some
may [forgive me again] reduce to: every action is GOOD. I think that these
could even be studied [perhaps using scientific method :-)]. Published
moralities (e.g. Judeo-Christian) are perscriptions for developing an
individual morality. People can definitely influence one another's moral
'rules'.
How is one morality better than another? This is probably the real issue.
What makes one morality better? How is that judged? Is there a perfect
morality? Now here is where the problems start. I don't have any clear
ideas on these questions, [although I do have some murky ones]. Any ideas?
I do think that Rich's morality is actually pretty decent.
Morality is also dynamic. It can change rather quickly, in fact. But, of
course, the more people who suscribe to the same morality, the slower it
changes [at least as a whole].
In any case, I've been confused recently by the many conflicting uses of
morality. I'd like to see some feedback on the subject [seperate from free
will and the emporor's clothes.]
For your consideration,
Chris
*A decision must be made by the individual. Even if he is told to do
something and uses that as the basis for his actions, he must determine
whether to act or not. Any morality but his own cannot make a difference in
this, except maybe to judge him [but only after he has made a determination.]
--
_______
|/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617
||hello||
|| || warack@aerospace.ARPA
|-------| warack@aero.UUCP
|@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest!
|_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack
|| || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245
^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/11/85)
In article <341@aero.ARPA> warack@aero.UUCP (Chris Warack (5734)) writes: >Recently a lot of discussion in this newsgroup has touched on morality. It >seems that people have used it indiscrimanently; everyone has a different >meaning for it. So, what is this morality stuff? >Isn't morality a framework for deciding Good=Right=The-Thing-to-Do vs. >Evil=Bad=Wrong=The-Thing-Not-to-Do? >In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical >function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system >would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.] I think it's reasonable to include the restriction that we consider only those systems which actually attempt to deal with the question of "Why shouldn't I do what I want to do?" >Next step -- so an action maps to good or evil. A person acting morally >would proceed with a good action, and avoid an evil action. If he didn't, >he would be acting immorally. Correct? >Does morality include the punishment for immoral behavior? I think that is >separate from the system. Some moral systems include them; some don't. The >Judeo-Christian morality [if you will] in the overall picture promises >eternal life to those who lead moral lives, and eternal damnation for those >who do not. This is a serious oversimplification of almost any Christian system. I'll go into more detail further along. Rich has proposed a moral system based on the [forgive me] >function: if {I desire it} and > {It does not infringe on the rights of others} > then GOOD > else EVIL >This system doesn't include any means of punishment. But it seems to be as >much a moral system as the Judeo-Christian system; albeit simpler and >untested. >Does a morality have to have a wide {universal?} acceptance or application to >validate it as a morality? It seems that Charlie has said that a moral >system that doesn't account for those who do not suscribe to it directly is >not a moral system. Why is that necessary? The basic goal of a moral >system is to determine what to do and not to do ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.* If >a large group suscribes to a morality, then life is simpler for that group >since they can predict certain things about their neighbor's actions. But, >it does not make the morality any more or less valid. Maybe the person with >the perfect morality is the only one who suscribes to it. This is a serious misunderstanding of my position. There are two basic classes of moral systems: personal and universal. Personal systems are what you come up with for yourself. They bind only upon you. Universal systems, on the other hand, include the expectation that others will follow the moral code. I can see how Rich's system is a personal code for himself, but it seems to me that the way he attempts to get to universality is flawed. The principles he appeals to simply are not universal; if they were, then there would be no criminal behavior. >How is one morality better than another? This is probably the real issue. >What makes one morality better? How is that judged? Is there a perfect >morality? Now here is where the problems start. I don't have any clear >ideas on these questions, [although I do have some murky ones]. Any ideas? >I do think that Rich's morality is actually pretty decent. I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this does not constitute a measure of merit). The explicit morality of the New Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his principles with additional constraints. >Morality is also dynamic. It can change rather quickly, in fact. But, of >course, the more people who suscribe to the same morality, the slower it >changes [at least as a whole]. I don't think this is correct. Some systems have absolute morality which is unchanging. Others have absolutes whose implications for action change. Still others have absolutes the perceptions of which change. Almost any system which is based on the maximization of some good provides a basis for an absolute morality (even Rich's). If one looked at all of history, and were sufficiently wise, one could perceive what the optimal thing to do in any situation would be. This, I submit, forms an absolute for that moral system. This absolute is of course obscure to us, and you can go on at great length about whether it implies anything at all. There seems to be a near total lack of understanding of New Testament morality by some readers of this group. From a pre-existent Good, an absolute of the kind described above is seen to exist. God can in fact know this absolute. Therefore the reason we listen to God's laws is NOT simply because he is God, but because he is in a position to know and instruct. Futhermore, it can be argued that Christian morality is universal only for Christians. Therefore those who seek (for instance) to bring prayer into public schools are flatly wrong. (Note that this doesn't absolve Rich of having to follow his own morality!) C Wingate
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/12/85)
> Isn't morality a framework for deciding Good=Right=The-Thing-to-Do vs. > Evil=Bad=Wrong=The-Thing-Not-to-Do? > In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical > function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system > would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.] > > Is this all? It's a pretty simple system, as is. Of course, *IN*REALITY*, > the problem with morality is how to make that 'mapping' from an action to > {good, evil}. There are other questions ... > > Does morality include the punishment for immoral behavior? I think that is > separate from the system. Some moral systems include them; some don't. > [CHRIS WARACK] Punishment is only a necessity for punitive moralities, i.e. those that believe that punishment is what is warranted when the morality is not adhered to. > The Judeo-Christian morality [if you will] in the overall picture promises > eternal life to those who lead moral lives, and eternal damnation for those > who do not. [Whether this promise is fulfilled is a discussion for another > group.] The impositional version of this morality states that 1) this morality should be taught to and adhered to by all, and 2) that suitable (?) punishments in this world may be discovered in the Bible. > Rich has proposed a moral system based on the [forgive me] function: > if {I desire it} and {It does not infringe on the rights of others} > then GOOD > else EVIL > This system doesn't include any means of punishment. It doesn't require one. The notion that there should or must be a "punishment" for disobeying a moral statute is a sign of a very disturbed society. Only if persistent attempts at serious re-education fail should the "transgressor" simply be removed from society (imprisoned). The reason NOT being to "administer punishment" (which seems to be a goal for some people) but rather to protect people from this person's anti-human acts. > But it seems to be as much a moral system as the Judeo-Christian system; > albeit simpler and untested. Its simplicity is a virtue, I would think. As for its untestedness, it may never get its chance, as long there are those who feel there MUST be arbitrary restrictions against human beings. > Does a morality have to have a wide {universal?} acceptance or application to > validate it as a morality? It seems that Charlie has said that a moral > system that doesn't account for those who do not suscribe to it directly is > not a moral system. Why is that necessary? The basic goal of a moral > system is to determine what to do and not to do ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.* If > a large group suscribes to a morality, then life is simpler for that group > since they can predict certain things about their neighbor's actions. But, > it does not make the morality any more or less valid. Maybe the person with > the perfect morality is the only one who suscribes to it. Hear, hear! Charles' bogus arguments about the "failures" of minimal morality apply just as much to his own system (whatever that is -- he keeps denying that any particular brand currently available is his). The question then becomes: Which system gives the most to the most people? Clearly the one that restricts them the least does that. > How is one morality better than another? This is probably the real issue. > What makes one morality better? How is that judged? Is there a perfect > morality? Now here is where the problems start. I don't have any clear > ideas on these questions, [although I do have some murky ones]. Any ideas? > I do think that Rich's morality is actually pretty decent. Thank you. It's not exactly an original idea, but I think it's one whose time has come. > Morality is also dynamic. It can change rather quickly, in fact. But, of > course, the more people who suscribe to the same morality, the slower it > changes [at least as a whole]. Unfortunately, especially when part of the indoctrination of the existing morality is that anything going against that morality is evil. But then, I guess all moral systems do this to varying degrees. -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) (08/13/85)
> This is a serious misunderstanding of my position. There are two basic > classes of moral systems: personal and universal. Personal systems are > what you come up with for yourself. They bind only upon you. Universal > systems, on the other hand, include the expectation that others will follow > the moral code. I can see how Rich's system is a personal code for himself, > but it seems to me that the way he attempts to get to universality is flawed. > The principles he appeals to simply are not universal; if they were, then > there would be no criminal behavior. It has been pointed out already that the validity of a moral system does not rely on its acceptance. All moral systems fail this criterion therefore it is meaningless to apply it. > >How is one morality better than another? ... > > I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this > does not constitute a measure of merit). The explicit morality of the New > Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his > principles with additional constraints. This is easier said than demonstrated. I would be interested in your proof. Also, by your own reasoning the morality of the n.t. cannot be correct since criminal behaviour exists. > There seems to be a near total lack of understanding of New Testament morality > by some readers of this group. From a pre-existent Good, an absolute of the > kind described above is seen to exist. God can in fact know this absolute. > Therefore the reason we listen to God's laws is NOT simply because he is God, > but because he is in a position to know and instruct. Futhermore, it can be > argued that Christian morality is universal only for Christians. Therefore > those who seek (for instance) to bring prayer into public schools are flatly > wrong. (Note that this doesn't absolve Rich of having to follow his own > morality!) > > C Wingate First you have to prove that there is such a thing as a pre-existent Good of the form that you describe. Then you must prove that there is such a thing as god. After doing that you must demonstrate that the god you have in mind is one and the same as that in the n.t. and so on ... You say that it can be argued that "christian morality is universal only for christians". This is meaningless. If this is the case then Rich's morality, is as universal as your's since his has probably got some adherents. Incidently I thought that sometime during the discussion you claimed that your morality was not god based? Padraig Houlahan.
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/13/85)
[warack]
Isn't morality a framework for deciding Good=Right=The-Thing-to-Do vs.
Evil=Bad=Wrong=The-Thing-Not-to-Do?
In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical
function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system
would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.]
[wingate]
I think it's reasonable to include the restriction that we consider only
those systems which actually attempt to deal with the question of "Why
shouldn't I do what I want to do?"
[balter]
Only if you want to insist on presuming your conclusions. I hold that you
and other religious ethicists make errors because you have confused notions
about what morality is, mixing it up with absolutes. If we follow your
restriction above, we will inevitably be led to an absolute authority as the
only way to answer your question. QED, from your POV. But:
morality tells us what we should do. If we want to do something that we
shouldn't, the reason not to, by definition, is that it is immoral.
That is, the morality is a model that labels actions "should do" and
"shouldn't do". But the deeper question, what perhaps you really mean,
is why shouldn't we from the point of view of benefit to ourselves;
morality says we shouldn't, but is it *really* true that we shouldn't?
You see, *should* is a very fuzzy term; it is dependent upon point of view;
it is relative, not absolute. All absolute moralists totally ignore this
issue. What I should do from my POV, what I should do from your POV, what
I should do from the POV of any given morality, are all different.
The very *meaning* of "should" is relative. For any "should" statement,
I can respond "Says who?".
So back to the deeper question, what should I do from the point of view of
my own benefit? Well, it depends on how you define benefit.
See, it is all relative.
Let's look at another question: is it reasonable or possible to want to do
things which are immoral? If the morality is what you would call "universal",
i.e., shared by community, then I claim that I will want to do something
I shouldn't (from the POV of the universal morality) whenever my personal
morality differs from the universal, but that it is impossible for me to want
to do something violating my own personal morality. It might be the case
that I would want to do it *if only it weren't immoral*, or that what I wanted
to do yesterday I find immoral today, but my personal morality is in fact
a codification of what behavior I do in fact find desirable.
Consider the possiblity that I want to fulfill various sexual fantasies,
but I don't even when the means are available. If I don't because I *fear*
retribution, either social or physical, then I am responding to the
community's morality, but if I don't because it would require an infringement
upon the rights of unassenting persons, then I *don't want to* because it
violates my sense of right amd wrong, i.e., my personal morality.
For it to be possible to want to do something which violates personal morality
would require a definition of `want' that makes "I want to but it is wrong"
equivalent to "I want to" rather than a confused phrasing of
"I don't want to".
[warack]
Next step -- so an action maps to good or evil. A person acting morally
would proceed with a good action, and avoid an evil action. If he didn't,
he would be acting immorally. Correct?
Does morality include the punishment for immoral behavior? I think that is
separate from the system. Some moral systems include them; some don't. The
Judeo-Christian morality [if you will] in the overall picture promises
eternal life to those who lead moral lives, and eternal damnation for those
who do not.
[wingate]
This is a serious oversimplification of almost any Christian system. I'll
go into more detail further along.
[balter]
And of Judaism too, which promises no such thing; morality involves the
notion of duty (back to "should"). I would say that what *is* true of almost
all group moral systems is that they work through a system of coercion.
Threat of damnation is just one form. As I think Warack is saying, punishment
is a property of moral systems, where the system includes the community
enforcing the moral rules; it is not associated with particular moral rules.
[warack]
Rich has proposed a moral system based on the [forgive me]
function: if {I desire it} and
{It does not infringe on the rights of others}
then GOOD
else EVIL
This system doesn't include any means of punishment. But it seems to be as
much a moral system as the Judeo-Christian system; albeit simpler and
untested.
[balter]
I think all personal moral systems are of the form
if {I desire it}
then OK
else not OK
The interesting questions that are being avoided are:
What are the nature of people's desires? Where do they come from?
How do the issues that we think of as "moral", that is, those affecting
those other than ourselves, become incorporated into our personal morality?
Warack's formulation above is ultra-simplistic: how do we determine what
a right is? What is an infringement? What happens when people's rights
conflict? Who do we include among "others"?: women, black, gays, mammals,
ants, rocks, ecology, mother earth? If I were to follow the formulation
strictly, I wouldn't be able to act at all. 2500 years ago Greeks
were wondering whether or not they should eat beans because Pythagoras
proscribed it; I would hope that our questions have evolved in depth and
complexity since then.
[warack]
Does a morality have to have a wide {universal?} acceptance or application to
validate it as a morality? It seems that Charlie has said that a moral
system that doesn't account for those who do not suscribe to it directly is
not a moral system. Why is that necessary? The basic goal of a moral
system is to determine what to do and not to do ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.* If
a large group suscribes to a morality, then life is simpler for that group
since they can predict certain things about their neighbor's actions. But,
it does not make the morality any more or less valid. Maybe the person with
the perfect morality is the only one who suscribes to it.
[wingate]
This is a serious misunderstanding of my position. There are two basic
classes of moral systems: personal and universal. Personal systems are
what you come up with for yourself. They bind only upon you. Universal
systems, on the other hand, include the expectation that others will follow
the moral code. I can see how Rich's system is a personal code for himself,
but it seems to me that the way he attempts to get to universality is flawed.
The principles he appeals to simply are not universal; if they were, then
there would be no criminal behavior.
[balter]
That appears to me to be a total non-sequitur. In any community, some will
follow the group's moral code more than others. Given the same level of
coercive force applied, I would expect more people to follow Rich's code than
one that proscribes eating beans or screwing when you aren't married
because his is more rational and less contrary to people's personal desires
and therefore *more universal* for any reasonable meaning of universal
I can imagine.
You say "include the expectation"; expectation *by whom*? How is a universal
system different from a system shared by a number of individuals? How can
a moral system have *inherent* authority? Group moral systems obtain their
authority from *humans* enforcing them. The "laws of God" are written by men
and enforced by men, full of hubris, claiming to speak for God.
[warack]
How is one morality better than another? This is probably the real issue.
What makes one morality better? How is that judged? Is there a perfect
morality? Now here is where the problems start. I don't have any clear
ideas on these questions, [although I do have some murky ones]. Any ideas?
I do think that Rich's morality is actually pretty decent.
[wingate]
I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this
does not constitute a measure of merit). The explicit morality of the New
Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his
principles with additional constraints.
[balter]
How can you use a loaded term like strength and then say it doesn't constitute
a measure of merit? NT morality is more constraining than Rich's, period.
I would suggest that a group morality is better in some sense if it closely
aligns with the personal moralities of the members of the group, and given
two moralities with the same level of alignment the one which is *less*
constraining would be preferable. As for personal moralities, they are not
simply chosen, they are *acquired*. Now, one could choose to alter one's
personal morality (we're back to wanting to want). But what it should be
changed to, what is "better", depends uopn the goal. The goal might be:
to better better liked, to be more like others, be wealthier, to live longer,
etc. These goals can certainly be furthered by changing one's moral posture.
But which is better? There is only an absolute good if you select one.
If you can prove that P is good, I assure you that you have assumed that
P is good somewhere along the line, or you didn't prove it.
[warack]
Morality is also dynamic. It can change rather quickly, in fact. But, of
course, the more people who suscribe to the same morality, the slower it
changes [at least as a whole].
[wingate]
I don't think this is correct. Some systems have absolute morality which is
unchanging. Others have absolutes whose implications for action change.
Still others have absolutes the perceptions of which change.
[balter]
Semantic confusion. An individual's morality can change, as can a group's.
This means which moral rules are ascribed to is changing. Of course a given
set of rules is itself, and therefore does not change (if you want to argue
that, you didn't understand it). Are you claiming that there are groups
whose rules have not changed at all over a long period of time? I disagree
with Warack that it is a matter of numbers. It is more a matter of history,
power of the enforcers, internal consistency, and the degree to which the
rules as presented include their own interpretaton.
[wingate]
Almost any system which is based on the maximization of some good provides a
basis for an absolute morality (even Rich's). If one looked at all of
history, and were sufficiently wise, one could perceive what the optimal thing
to do in any situation would be. This, I submit, forms an absolute for that
moral system. This absolute is of course obscure to us, and you can go on
at great length about whether it implies anything at all.
[balter]
By absolute, you seem to mean able to provide a judgement in all situations.
Aside from questioning that (there is no order relation for goodness), I must
point out that "absolute morality" normally means one which is held as being
the ONE TRUE MORALITY, having a preferred place in the order of things over
other claimed moralities, and therefore setting down in absolute fashion what
is right or wrong. Relativists hold that notions of absolute right or wrong
are semantically empty; even if some big bad bugger in the sky will zap me if
I disobey his law, it is still only right or wrong from *his* point of view.
But mostly it is humans with circular arguments demanding that I obey *their*
morality.
[wingate]
There seems to be a near total lack of understanding of New Testament morality
by some readers of this group. From a pre-existent Good, an absolute of the
kind described above is seen to exist. God can in fact know this absolute.
Therefore the reason we listen to God's laws is NOT simply because he is God,
but because he is in a position to know and instruct. Futhermore, it can be
argued that Christian morality is universal only for Christians. Therefore
those who seek (for instance) to bring prayer into public schools are flatly
wrong.
[balter]
Lack of understanding of an arbitrary dogma as interpreted by you?
So what? Pre-existing good? That *your* god has access to? Give me a break.
I claim to have access to the *true* good; yours is a false version.
Prove me wrong.
Aside from all the other inconsistencies and foolishes expressed by the
above, let me concentrate on one that is highly illustrative of the subject
at hand: what about those that argue that Christian morality is *not*
universal *only* for Christians (just how can it be "universal" if it isn't
Universal, hmmm?)? Those who consider keeping organized (a key word;
individual prayer is allowed) prayer out of the schools to be an immoral,
Godless, devil-inspired goal? They are clearly acting morally, from their
point of view. Thus they cannot be *flatly* wrong, only wrong from your (and
my, BTW) POV. If they claimed that the earth was flat, then we can argue
that they are flatly (heh heh) wrong on the basis of empirical evidence.
No such basis is available when arguing moral issues.
[wingate]
(Note that this doesn't absolve Rich of having to follow his own
morality!)
[balter]
Here we have that fundamental misunderstanding of what morality is.
Absolve? Have to? What do these words mean in this context?
What happens if Rich proclaims a morality and then fails to follow it?
Will a big thunderbolt labeled "morality enforcement" strike him dead?
Morality is a codification of the behaviors that an individual or group
finds good or bad, where good and bad are primitive (mathematical
sense) concepts related to desired and undesired behaviors.
Rich may establish a general rule of good and bad, perform an action,
and then decide the action was bad within his rules. Depending upon whether
his emotional response to the action is that it really is good or really
is bad, he is likely to either modify his rules to allow that behavior as
acceptable, or feel guilt and attempt to reorient himself in a way such
that he won't perform the action again (from mental scolding to hara kiri);
or it is possible that he will actually enjoy having performed the action
and intend to repeat it, in which case his "morality" is a charade,
perhaps borrowed from his community (cf. previous discussion about Hell's
Angels) and his true inner morality is somewhat different.
In the same way, a group's true morality may be different than what is
professed in official dogma; examples are boundless.
-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/13/85)
In article <539@utastro.UUCP> padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan) writes: >> This is a serious misunderstanding of my position. There are two basic >> classes of moral systems: personal and universal. Personal systems are >> what you come up with for yourself. They bind only upon you. Universal >> systems, on the other hand, include the expectation that others will follow >> the moral code. I can see how Rich's system is a personal code for >> himself, but it seems to me that the way he attempts to get to >> universality is flawed. The principles he appeals to simply are not >> universal; if they were, then there would be no criminal behavior. >It has been pointed out already that the validity of a moral system does >not rely on its acceptance. All moral systems fail this criterion therefore >it is meaningless to apply it. Rich's system in fact relies upon the acceptance of certain priniciples by some group; therefore someone who does not accpet the principles cannot be expected to follow the morality. A system which posits some absolute, which is (at least partially) knowable, however, does allow this expectation. To a great extent, this distinction manifests itself in whether a system claims evil to be abnormal and willful. Rich's system does not, as best I can tell, and therefore falls into the first class. A system which claims that evil people do recognize what good is falls into the second class. >> I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this >> does not constitute a measure of merit). The explicit morality of the New >> Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his >> principles with additional constraints. >This is easier said than demonstrated. I would be interested in your proof. >Also, by your own reasoning the morality of the n.t. cannot be correct since >criminal behaviour exists. THere is not time to go into this comparison. I would point out, however, that NT morality clearly falls into the second class stated above. >> There seems to be a near total lack of understanding of New Testament >> morality by some readers of this group. From a pre-existent Good, an >> absolute of the kind described above is seen to exist. God can in fact >> know this absolute. Therefore the reason we listen to God's laws is NOT >> simply because he is God, but because he is in a position to know and >> instruct. Futhermore, it can be argued that Christian morality is >> universal only for Christians. Therefore those who seek (for instance) >> to bring prayer into public schools are flatly wrong. (Note that this >> doesn't absolve Rich of having to follow his own morality!) >First you have to prove that there is such a thing as a pre-existent Good >of the form that you describe. Then you must prove that there is such a thing >as god. After doing that you must demonstrate that the god you have in mind >is one and the same as that in the n.t. and so on ... Who are you to set the grounds for this discussion? Did you not read what I just said? This is not the place for such an argument. Besides, I think the point quite clearly is that "Christian morality is in theory universal, but in practice must be treated as personal." If you take just this one sentence, like so: >You say that it can be argued that "christian morality is universal >only for christians". This is meaningless. I admit I am unclear. But that is a cheap debator's trick, and not real argument. > If this is the case then >Rich's morality, is as universal as your's since his has probably got some >adherents. Incidently I thought that sometime during the discussion >you claimed that your morality was not god based? Well,interestingly enough, Rich also says that a society determines what morality is. I would therefore submit to you that Rich's morality is wrong by his own arguments, since it is certainly not the morality of THIS country. It certainly isn't the morality of P.G. County, Md. Rich has highlighted a different distinction, namely, between those moralities which on occaision demand defiance of a society, and those which demand allegiance to society. Rich's other statements lead one to believe that his personal morality is of the first type; the system he is arguing for, however, is of the second type. Earlier in this discussion, I said that I was not going to attack Rich's system simply on the basis that was not christian. Since the floor has been opened to a more general topic, I have brought in NT morality as an example of something rather different from Rich's avowed system. I am still, however, hoisting Rich on his own petard; his derivation of his system simply does not convince me, in the face of how he applies it in practice. C Wingate
dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi) (08/14/85)
In article <341@aero.ARPA> warack@aero.UUCP (Chris Warack (5734)) writes: >In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical >function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system >would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.] Would you consider allowing three categories? Instead of {good, evil}, I would suggest {required, optional, forbidden}. The vast majority of behaviour seems to belong to the "optional" category. >Next step -- so an action maps to good or evil. A person acting morally >would proceed with a good action, and avoid an evil action. If he didn't, >he would be acting immorally. Correct? > >Is this all? ... I've been toying with the idea that morality is *less* than this. In our day-to-day lives we're constantly confronted with this decision: What will I do next? I prefer to define the idea of morality in terms of the grounds on which these decisions are made. A moral ground for decision-making is some criterion which is independent of your desires, and that you place ahead of your desires in making the decision. (Sacrificing your life for an ideal is often held up as a fine example of moral behaviour.) This definition doesn't imply, and is not meant to imply, that a choice made on other than moral grounds is immoral, or that a moral decision can only be one that goes against your interests. (I think the Objectivists will flame me for the above definition, but this is an honest attempt on my part to determine the *common* meaning of the word "morality". I have no use for Ayn Rand's Humpty-Dumpty-like practice of defining the word "morality" to mean what she wants it to mean. To me, Ayn Rand's moral system appears really to be a denial of morality, disguised, with the help of some specially chosen definitions, in moralistic language.) An important corollary of this is that, since behaviour is classified as moral on the basis of the grounds on which that behaviour was chosen, it is impossible to force people to behave morally. Moral behaviour can only happen by *choice*. The best you can do is arrange rewards and punishments, so that it will be in people's best interests to act the way you want them to. Another interesting corollary is that religious moral systems based on eternal rewards and punishments (eg. Heaven and Hell), are not moral systems at all, because the motivation for good behaviour is based ultimately on self-interest. A third corollary is that, since the person must make the moral decision himself, what is moral behaviour for him is what he feels is moral, not what anybody else thinks is moral. That's right folks, I'm a moral relativist. The fact that I've drawn three highly unpopular conclusions from what I take to be the common conception of morality indicates either that I'm way out in left field, or that the majority of people have failed to think through the consequences of their concept of morality. So far, I have said nothing about what those moral grounds for decision making are. Now I get controversial. As far as I can tell, most people's moral codes are derived entirely from the words of other people. In the case of those people who believe their morals come from God, they are forgetting that it was *other* *people* who told them what God says is moral or immoral, or *other* *people* who told them which book God chose to write down the One True Moral System in. Unfortunately, a lot of these other people disagree with each other. In determining what moral code to believe in, which other people do we end up believing? Usually our parents, our teachers, or whatever *authority* figure is handy. Our morals appear to be ultimately based on appeals to authority. The only ways to arrive at "moral truth", if such a thing exists, are accepting somebody else's word for it (ie. authority), or guessing (intuition). Neither one of these is considered as a reliable way of arriving at any kind of truth. As far as I can tell, there is no way to determine "moral truth". My belief is that there is no such thing as "moral truth". There is no logical or rational reason to put any criterion ahead of self-interest in deciding on your next action. Gosh, I didn't mean to write a dissertation... -- David Canzi Ultimate tabloid headline: "Crazed by UFO radiation, pregnant man bites dog."
dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi) (08/14/85)
Having just reread my previous article, I've come to the conclusion that when I described myself as a moral relativist, I described myself inaccurately. It seems clear that I'm an *amoral* relativist. -- David Canzi Ultimate tabloid headline: "Crazed by UFO radiation, pregnant man bites dog."
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/14/85)
In article <27500096@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >>>[warack] >>>Isn't morality a framework for deciding Good=Right=The-Thing-to-Do vs. >>>Evil=Bad=Wrong=The-Thing-Not-to-Do? >>>In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical >>>function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system >>>would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.] >>[wingate] >>I think it's reasonable to include the restriction that we consider only >>those systems which actually attempt to deal with the question of "Why >>shouldn't I do what I want to do?" >Only if you want to insist on presuming your conclusions. I hold that you >and other religious ethicists make errors because you have confused notions >about what morality is, mixing it up with absolutes. If we follow your >restriction above, we will inevitably be led to an absolute authority as the >only way to answer your question. QED, from your POV. But: >morality tells us what we should do. If we want to do something that we >shouldn't, the reason not to, by definition, is that it is immoral. >That is, the morality is a model that labels actions "should do" and >"shouldn't do". But the deeper question, what perhaps you really mean, >is why shouldn't we from the point of view of benefit to ourselves; >morality says we shouldn't, but is it *really* true that we shouldn't? >You see, *should* is a very fuzzy term; it is dependent upon point of view; >it is relative, not absolute. All absolute moralists totally ignore this >issue. What I should do from my POV, what I should do from your POV, what >I should do from the POV of any given morality, are all different. >The very *meaning* of "should" is relative. For any "should" statement, >I can respond "Says who?". >So back to the deeper question, what should I do from the point of view of >my own benefit? Well, it depends on how you define benefit. >See, it is all relative. But I think that's the whole point. If I'm walking down the street, and I want an ice cream cone, so I buy one: do we really care about that as a moral dilemma? It seems to me that you can't be talking about morality in any meaningful way until you are dealing with conflicting wants. To simply define morality as "that which tells us what to do" is plainly wrong to me. There are a number of different reasons why we decide things. We can do it on the basis of simple desires, as in the above case. We can reason out a course of action. But it seems to me that most everyone acknoledges the existence of a faculty called the conscience, which only acts to forbid a desire from being acted out. C Wingate
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack ) (08/15/85)
[ouch] >>Chris Warack >Charley Wingate >>Isn't morality a framework for deciding Good=Right=The-Thing-to-Do vs. >>Evil=Bad=Wrong=The-Thing-Not-to-Do? >>In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical >>function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system >>would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.] >I think it's reasonable to include the restriction that we consider only >those systems which actually attempt to deal with the question of "Why >shouldn't I do what I want to do?" O.K. I have problems with exactly how 'want' ties into all of this so I may break this restriction later. >>Next step -- so an action maps to good or evil. A person acting morally >>would proceed with a good action, and avoid an evil action. If he didn't, >>he would be acting immorally. Correct? [Deletion of some discussion on punishment and Rosen's morality] >>Does a morality have to have a wide {universal?} acceptance or application to >>validate it as a morality? It seems that Charley [ed] has said that a moral >>system that doesn't account for those who do not suscribe to it directly is >>not a moral system. Why is that necessary? The basic goal of a moral >>system is to determine what to do and not to do ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.* If >>a large group suscribes to a morality, then life is simpler for that group >>since they can predict certain things about their neighbor's actions. But, >>it does not make the morality any more or less valid. Maybe the person with >>the perfect morality is the only one who suscribes to it. >This is a serious misunderstanding of my position. There are two basic >classes of moral systems: personal and universal. Personal systems are >what you come up with for yourself. They bind only upon you. Universal >systems, on the other hand, include the expectation that others will follow >the moral code. I can see how Rich's system is a personal code for himself, >but it seems to me that the way he attempts to get to universality is flawed. >The principles he appeals to simply are not universal; if they were, then >there would be no criminal behavior. It is true that by this definition of universal morality that Rich's system would fail to reach universality. This is simply because Rich's system advocates non-interference, thus no 'expectation' that others will follow it, thus it fails by definition. Why is a universal system necessary? What are the consequences of someone not living up to the 'expectations' of the universal systems? If there are none, then how do they differ from personal systems which have a mass appeal? If there are real consequences, how are they dealt with? This would probably imply some sort of judge. Except for a super-natural judge [i.e. God], who could have the ability to really 'judge' another? This is one of my biggest problems with the discussion of morality. I don't think it is possible for there to be a truly universal system of morality which does not include some sort of perfect judge. This judge then decides whether you have been moral or immoral -- when? I don't know. In a more day-to-day existence, I don't see 'complete' universal moralities. Total morality is on a personal basis. No matter who or what proclaims something good or evil, unless a person believes it himself, he isn't/won't act it. Coercion might force a person to act other than he believes. For instance, the threat of jail might prevent someone from hitchhiking on the freeway even if he believes it is OK to do so. What is universal are certain issues which involve others. For instance, it's wrong to kill another human being. Yet, even in some instances such obvious rules as this are questioned. Some people think war is moral -- it certainly involves the death of other humans. Some people advocate the death penalty. So even these universal morals have grey areas that must be incorporated into an individual morality. I guess the importance of all of this is in perspective. A 'universal system' is very incomplete. It only provides a framework on which people build there on rules. Some parts are incorporated into the personal system, some are thrown out. I propose that whatever develops is a complete moral system -- it has to be in order for that person to decide what is right or wrong. This system is unassailable externally. Only that person can make changes to it. How willing they are to make changes depends on how open-minded they are. Can WE judge another person's morals? I don't think so. If they act in ways that interfere with anothers morals, then a conflict exists. It may be resolved through reason, intervention or force depending on the morals of the parties involved. If you think about it, isn't this the way things happen. The web becomes more tangled when people announce one set of morals and follow another. Why isn't more energy focused on understanding morals on a personal level? Almost all discussion revolves around 'universal systems' that only provide the foundation of these things. Even if Rich's system is incomplete, I find it appealing because it approaches morals at a personal level. One of the problems I find with advocating a morality for everyone is that it is used as an excuse for actions 'good and bad.' If morality is moved to a personal level, it stresses personal responsibility as well. [Remainder is followed-up in a seperate article] -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (08/15/85)
In article <27500096@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >The very *meaning* of "should" is relative. For any "should" statement, >I can respond "Says who?". >So back to the deeper question, what should I do from the point of view of >my own benefit? Well, it depends on how you define benefit. >See, it is all relative. Now you've gone too far. Benefit isn't a matter of definition, it's a matter of learning from experience. Now, what benefits one person may harm the next (in some cases), but the paradigmatic relativist idea -- that the answer depends on your attitudes -- is mistaken. (Not entirely mistaken, since one's attitudes influence what benefits one; but they are not the sole determinants.) As evidence for my position, I offer this experiment: hold you hand in a flame until it is consumed... I don't think it matters what attitude you have toward this event at the start. You will be burned -- figuratively as well as literally. Now "morality", in the sense of what is right or wrong behavior toward others, is a different (but not wholly unrelated) story. It is not as simple as the purely empirical test for individual benefit or harm. But I'm not ready to buy the relativist idea there either. >I think all personal moral systems are of the form > if {I desire it} > then OK > else not OK But, arguably, this gets the cart before the horse. One desires something because one thinks it OK, often (though some desires are stubbornly independent of one's evaluations). The point is, the reason that one's attitudes and evaluations agree is that one's attitudes are always influenced by one's evaluations. One's attitudes may also, in turn, influence one's evaluations, but the connection in that direction is not as inevitable. --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/15/85)
[wingate] But I think that's the whole point. If I'm walking down the street, and I want an ice cream cone, so I buy one: do we really care about that as a moral dilemma? It seems to me that you can't be talking about morality in any meaningful way until you are dealing with conflicting wants. To simply define morality as "that which tells us what to do" is plainly wrong to me. There are a number of different reasons why we decide things. We can do it on the basis of simple desires, as in the above case. We can reason out a course of action. But it seems to me that most everyone acknoledges the existence of a faculty called the conscience, which only acts to forbid a desire from being acted out. [balter] Excuse me if I didn't make it clearer that morality is "that which tells us what to do" *if there are reasonably competing alternatives*; I would think that was obvious. If there is no conflict, then there is no issue of decision. Aside from all the possible political issues involved, some persons consider the self-indulgence of eating an ice cream cone as a moral issue. If two people are walking down the sidewalk and want to take off their clothes and make love, do we really care about that as a moral dilemma? It wouldn't bother me any more than my eating an ice cream cone bothers you; we have different moral perspectives. I consider eating ice cream in public as setting a very destructive example for children; how does this differ from many people's attitudes toward public sex? (one answer: they want to legislate against it) You don't seem to be able to escape from the belief that *your* moral views are *universal*. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack ) (08/15/85)
[ouch] >>Chris Warack >Charley Wingate >>How is one morality better than another? This is probably the real issue. >>What makes one morality better? How is that judged? Is there a perfect >>morality? Now here is where the problems start. I don't have any clear >>ideas on these questions, [although I do have some murky ones]. Any ideas? >>I do think that Rich's morality is actually pretty decent. >I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this >does not constitute a measure of merit). The explicit morality of the New >Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his >principles with additional constraints. What constraints? Why do additional constraints make it stronger? Maybe a perfect morality is one where it could be shown that: if everyone followed it, then all actions would be good. That is it could not cause moral dilemmas where the only actions available would be bad. But an even better morality might achieve the same results even if some people did not suscribe to it. >>Morality is also dynamic. It can change rather quickly, in fact. But, of >>course, the more people who suscribe to the same morality, the slower it >>changes [at least as a whole]. >I don't think this is correct. Some systems have absolute morality which is >unchanging. Others have absolutes whose implications for action change. >Still others have absolutes the perceptions of which change. My basis for that statment is that an individual may have his 'eyes opened' and change his morality in an instant. A universal morality would not change as quickly since it's rooted in a number of people or other sources that would all have to change. I think that what is said above goes into how a 'universal' morality provides the foundation for a personal morality. A persons perceptions of universal morals become personal morals [along with other rules which aren't covered in the universal set]. I can't imagine any morality that is totally unchanging. Can I get an example? >Almost any system which is based on the maximization of some good provides a >basis for an absolute morality (even Rich's). If one looked at all of >history, and were sufficiently wise, one could perceive what the optimal thing >to do in any situation would be. This, I submit, forms an absolute for that >moral system. This absolute is of course obscure to us, and you can go on >at great length about whether it implies anything at all. There are situations where history doesn't apply. [Genetics for instance.] Wouldn't a morality have to handle situations like this as well. I think that is a useful definition for comparison. An absolute for a moral system it the optimal action in any situation [the 'goodest']. But I don't think knowledge of all of history is enough, but that isn't really relevant. >There seems to be a near total lack of understanding of New Testament morality >by some readers of this group. From a pre-existent Good, an absolute of the >kind described above is seen to exist. God can in fact know this absolute. >Therefore the reason we listen to God's laws is NOT simply because he is God, >but because he is in a position to know and instruct. Futhermore, it can be >argued that Christian morality is universal only for Christians. Therefore >those who seek (for instance) to bring prayer into public schools are flatly >wrong. (Note that this doesn't absolve Rich of having to follow his own >morality!) I like this description of God and morality. But it follows from the existence of God, which many of the readers of this group don't allow for. Thus, this would not work to convince them to adopt Christian morals into their personal morality. Also, how are these laws communicated? Through the Bible? There is a lot of merely human intervention in what the Bible says today. It is quite open to wide range of interpretation. I would not argue that God knows the absolute to THE perfect morality, but I don't find much evidence that He has communicated it to us! For your consideration, Chris -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack ) (08/15/85)
>> Chris Warack > Rich Rosen >> The Judeo-Christian morality [if you will] in the overall picture promises >> eternal life to those who lead moral lives, and eternal damnation for those >> who do not. [Whether this promise is fulfilled is a discussion for another >> group.] >The impositional version of this morality states that 1) this morality should >be taught to and adhered to by all, and 2) that suitable (?) punishments in >this world may be discovered in the Bible. This is but one way of looking at it. I don't think the majority of Christians truly believe it. In fact, I don't think the majority of Christians would even SAY it. >> Rich has proposed a moral system based on the [forgive me] function: >> if {I desire it} and {It does not infringe on the rights of others} >> then GOOD >> else EVIL >> This system doesn't include any means of punishment. >It doesn't require one. The notion that there should or must be a >"punishment" for disobeying a moral statute is a sign of a very disturbed >society. Only if persistent attempts at serious re-education fail should >the "transgressor" simply be removed from society (imprisoned). The reason >NOT being to "administer punishment" (which seems to be a goal for some people >but rather to protect people from this person's anti-human acts. Then banishment and/or exile would work as well as prison. As I mentioned earlier, though, this type of thinking requires a 'judge.' How does he determine the need to remove a 'transgressor?' His own morals may differ significantly from anyone elses... >> The basic goal of a moral >> system is to determine what to do and not to do ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.* If >> a large group suscribes to a morality, then life is simpler for that group >> since they can predict certain things about their neighbor's actions. But, >> it does not make the morality any more or less valid. Maybe the person with >> the perfect morality is the only one who suscribes to it. >Hear, hear! Charles' bogus arguments about the "failures" of minimal >morality apply just as much to his own system (whatever that is -- he >keeps denying that any particular brand currently available is his). >The question then becomes: Which system gives the most to the most people? >Clearly the one that restricts them the least does that. However, any number of moralities can be 'least restrictive' even interpretations of the Christian ones [semi- :-)]. There is still a question about which gives the most to the most people. >> Morality is also dynamic. It can change rather quickly, in fact. But, of >> course, the more people who suscribe to the same morality, the slower it >> changes [at least as a whole]. >Unfortunately, especially when part of the indoctrination of the existing >morality is that anything going against that morality is evil. But then, >I guess all moral systems do this to varying degrees. Not ALL moral systems do this. I guess most of them do though. It brings to a head the question of which is evil: the person or his morality? Some moral systems [Rich's own, for instance] regard anything 'interfering' = 'going against' as bad. If it regards the person as evil, then it must rid itself of him somehow. If it is the person's morals, then should it attempt to convince the person to change his morals [rehabilitate]? or should it rid itself of the morals by ridding itself of the person? For your consideration, Chris -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/17/85)
> Rich's system in fact relies upon the acceptance of certain priniciples by > some group; therefore someone who does not accpet the principles cannot be > expected to follow the morality. [WINGATE] Cannot be expected? I'm not sure if you mean "is not required" here or not. No matter. Even if someone "does not accept" the principles, if they have common sense, they will recognize that failure to abide by the principles will result in problems for them, thus they cooperate. Very simple, Charles. > A system which posits some absolute, which > is (at least partially) knowable, however, does allow this expectation. Are you implying that whether or not there is a god it is necessary to make one in order to have an absolute reference point for a morality? Does that make any sense? > To a great extent, this distinction manifests itself in whether a system > claims evil to be abnormal and willful. Rich's system does not, as best I > can tell, and therefore falls into the first class. A system which claims > that evil people do recognize what good is falls into the second class. Again with this "good" and "evil" stuff? You cannot define good and evil in absolute terms. They are relative to the person(s) using the terms. Of course, to an individual, interfering behavior on the part of another individual(s) may be thought of as "evil", but why so? If an absolute is to be drawn from this, it is that everyone thinks that other people interfering in their lives is "evil". Thus you have the basis for the minimal morality. >>>I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this >>>does not constitute a measure of merit). The explicit morality of the New >>>Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his >>>principles with additional constraints. [WINGATE] >>This is easier said than demonstrated. I would be interested in your proof. >>Also, by your own reasoning the morality of the n.t. cannot be correct since >>criminal behaviour exists. [PADRAIG] > THere is not time to go into this comparison. I would point out, however, > that NT morality clearly falls into the second class stated above. Well, I used that excuse this week (it WAS four in the morning), so I'm in no position to judge. I don't think you DO realize that "strength" (how many tenets and constraints a morality has) is not a measure of a morality's merit. I say this precisely because I am suggesting a morality of the exact opposite proportions: minimal "strength" (meaning minimal number of constraints---actually this makes a morality stronger not weaker). At the same time, you are attempting to find fault in that, and not doing very well either. >>First you have to prove that there is such a thing as a pre-existent Good >>of the form that you describe. Then you must prove that there is such a thing >>as god. After doing that you must demonstrate that the god you have in mind >>is one and the same as that in the n.t. and so on ... > Who are you to set the grounds for this discussion? Did you not read what > I just said? This is not the place for such an argument. Who are YOU to set the grounds for this discussion? In reality, each and every one of us sets the grounds for the discussion. Yes, Charles, Padraig is quite right, you are obliged to prove that this pre-existent good does exist, because otherwise your whole argument falls to the ground like confetti. > Besides, I think the point quite clearly is that "Christian morality is in > theory universal, but in practice must be treated as personal." If you take > just this one sentence, like so: > > >You say that it can be argued that "christian morality is universal > >only for christians". This is meaningless. > > I admit I am unclear. But that is a cheap debator's trick, and not real > argument. It is not a trick at all. In fact, calling it a cheap debator's trick sounds to me like a cheap debator's trick to get out of having to answer the questions posed. >> If this is the case then >>Rich's morality, is as universal as your's since his has probably got some >>adherents. Incidently I thought that sometime during the discussion >>you claimed that your morality was not god based? > Well,interestingly enough, Rich also says that a society determines what > morality is. I would therefore submit to you that Rich's morality is wrong > by his own arguments, since it is certainly not the morality of THIS country. Societies and countries have developed bad moralities, have they not? Building a state of existence where minimal morality can exist and flourish is of course a gradual process, just as humanity's slow but sure learning about cooperation is a gradual process. > Rich has highlighted a > different distinction, namely, between those moralities which on occaision > demand defiance of a society, and those which demand allegiance to society. > Rich's other statements lead one to believe that his personal morality is > of the first type; the system he is arguing for, however, is of the second > type. I'm not at all sure what relevance this has. In any non-minimal morality, you are serving the needs of the people less than the optimum way possible. Thus it may be in one's interest to rebell against restrictions such as the ones rightwing Christians propose to make into popular law. In a minimal morality, what restrictions would there be for you to rebell against? Restrictions against hurting other people? Now, is that something to fight for? > Earlier in this discussion, I said that I was not going to attack Rich's > system simply on the basis that was not christian. This in fact never happened because Charles kept drawing in god repeatedly though he promised he had "shirked" such things for purposes of this discussion. > Since the floor has been > opened to a more general topic, I have brought in NT morality as an > example of something rather different from Rich's avowed system. I am still, > however, hoisting Rich on his own petard; his derivation of his system simply > does not convince me, in the face of how he applies it in practice. Where is minimal morality applied in practice by a society? Your phraseology makes it sounds like it's a lot more important to "hoist" people than to rationally discuss and rebut their arguments. Is that your set of priorities? -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate) (08/18/85)
At the moment I am too busy to participate in this discussion to any depth. I think that Chris is going in the right direction (even though I don't agree with his conclusions). It seems much more useful at this point to continue to consider what is characteristic about the kinds of descisions that people refer to as "moral" decisions. Is it a characteristic of grounds? Rules of inference? Motivations? Try to remember that, at this point, attacks upon definitions are quite proper; for now, "it's my definition and you'll just have to go along with it" simply won't cut it (since the goal is, after all, to try and find some common definitions which we can agree with). Charley Wingate "The punkers-- for once, they were the innocent victims."
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/19/85)
>>>The Judeo-Christian morality [if you will] in the overall picture promises >>>eternal life to those who lead moral lives, and eternal damnation for those >>>who do not. [Whether this promise is fulfilled is a discussion for another >>>group.] [WARACK] >>The impositional version of this morality states that 1) this morality should >>be taught to and adhered to by all, and 2) that suitable (?) punishments in >>this world may be discovered in the Bible. [ROSEN] > This is but one way of looking at it. I don't think the majority of > Christians truly believe it. In fact, I don't think the majority of > Christians would even SAY it. [WARACK] On the other hand, many modern neo-Nazis don't SAY that they hate certain groups in a bigoted sort of way. Enough Christians do believe this such that we have reason to fear the imposition of such a morality in this country. >>>Rich has proposed a moral system based on the [forgive me] function: >>> if {I desire it} and {It does not infringe on the rights of others} >>> then GOOD >>> else EVIL >>>This system doesn't include any means of punishment. >>It doesn't require one. The notion that there should or must be a >>"punishment" for disobeying a moral statute is a sign of a very disturbed >>society. Only if persistent attempts at serious re-education fail should >>the "transgressor" simply be removed from society (imprisoned). The reason >>NOT being to "administer punishment" (which seems to be a goal for some people >>but rather to protect people from this person's anti-human acts. > Then banishment and/or exile would work as well as prison. As I > mentioned earlier, though, this type of thinking requires a 'judge.' > How does he determine the need to remove a 'transgressor?' His own > morals may differ significantly from anyone elses... This is an implementation question, "how do we select judges?". All moral systems are incomplete, they cannot cover everything in written word. In cases where there is conflict, obviously some form of arbitration must occur. >>>The basic goal of a moral >>>system is to determine what to do and not to do ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS.* If >>>a large group suscribes to a morality, then life is simpler for that group >>>since they can predict certain things about their neighbor's actions. But, >>>it does not make the morality any more or less valid. Maybe the person with >>>the perfect morality is the only one who suscribes to it. >>Hear, hear! Charles' bogus arguments about the "failures" of minimal >>morality apply just as much to his own system (whatever that is -- he >>keeps denying that any particular brand currently available is his). >>The question then becomes: Which system gives the most to the most people? >>Clearly the one that restricts them the least does that. > However, any number of moralities can be 'least restrictive' even > interpretations of the Christian ones [semi- :-)]. There is still a > question about which gives the most to the most people. Clearly any system that makes arbitrary restrictions of "thou shalt not do this", where "this" is something not involving a negative effect on another person's life, is NOT a candidate for the moral system that does the most for the most people. >>>Morality is also dynamic. It can change rather quickly, in fact. But, of >>>course, the more people who suscribe to the same morality, the slower it >>>changes [at least as a whole]. >>Unfortunately, especially when part of the indoctrination of the existing >>morality is that anything going against that morality is evil. But then, >>I guess all moral systems do this to varying degrees. > Not ALL moral systems do this. I guess most of them do though. It > brings to a head the question of which is evil: the person or his > morality? Some moral systems [Rich's own, for instance] regard anything > 'interfering' = 'going against' as bad. If it regards the person as > evil, then it must rid itself of him somehow. If it is the person's > morals, then should it attempt to convince the person to change his > morals [rehabilitate]? or should it rid itself of the morals by ridding > itself of the person? The first, of course, as much as possible. The society's responsible is NOT to a code of morality but to its members, and it is their protection from such actions as this person has taken that is sought. -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) (08/19/85)
In article <1604@watdcsu.UUCP> dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi) writes: >Another interesting corollary is that religious moral systems based on >eternal rewards and punishments (eg. Heaven and Hell), are not moral >systems at all, because the motivation for good behaviour is based >ultimately on self-interest. If moral systems based on self-interest aren't moral systems, then a lot of ancient Greek moral philosophy will have to be thrown out as not really addressing morality at all. I don't think that's right. (Though I do agree that there is something bogus about the idea of a morality based on the Heaven-or-Hell carrot-and-stick scheme.) >My belief is that there is no such thing as "moral truth". There is no >logical or rational reason to put any criterion ahead of self-interest >in deciding on your next action. How about, a benevolent concern for the welfare of others? Acting on that is perfectly rational. Identifying rationality with self-interest is bogus. Or maybe your point is, some people might not have any benevolence? Anyhow, there is such a thing as moral truth: what you *really* ought to do (as opposed to what you think you should do) is what you would do if you were fully informed, rational, and free. --Paul V Torek, Iconbuster-In-Chief
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack ) (08/20/85)
[ouch] >[balter] >I think all personal moral systems are of the form > if {I desire it} > then OK > else not OK Actually, I don't think you do, because you explain what you mean later. >Warack's [actually Warack's formulation of Rosen's philosophy -chris] >formulation above is ultra-simplistic: how do we determine what >a right is? What is an infringement? What happens when people's rights >conflict? Who do we include among "others"?: women, black, gays, mammals, >ants, rocks, ecology, mother earth? If I were to follow the formulation >strictly, I wouldn't be able to act at all. 2500 years ago Greeks >were wondering whether or not they should eat beans because Pythagoras >proscribed it; I would hope that our questions have evolved in depth and >complexity since then. There actually IS a difference between morality and desire. Desire is a basic feeling -- a want for something [such as the sexual fantasies mentioned before]. Morality is more rational. It employs the conscience. An action may have roots in desire, but it must be filtered through a person's morals before he can determine whether or not it is OK. Actually someone may have the ultra-simplistic morals if {I desire it} then it is OK. I think it is obvious that this person couldn't function in society unless ... he never had a desire that conflicted with another's. >How is one morality better than another? This is probably the real issue. >What makes one morality better? How is that judged? Is there a perfect >morality? >[wingate] >I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this >does not constitute a measure of merit). The explicit morality of the New >Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his >principles with additional constraints. >[balter] >How can you use a loaded term like strength and then say it doesn't constitute >a measure of merit? NT morality is more constraining than Rich's, period. >I would suggest that a group morality is better in some sense if it closely >aligns with the personal moralities of the members of the group, and given >two moralities with the same level of alignment the one which is *less* >constraining would be preferable. As for personal moralities, they are not >simply chosen, they are *acquired*. Now, one could choose to alter one's >personal morality (we're back to wanting to want). But what it should be >changed to, what is "better", depends uopn the goal. The goal might be: >to better better liked, to be more like others, be wealthier, to live longer, >etc. These goals can certainly be furthered by changing one's moral posture. >But which is better? There is only an absolute good if you select one. >If you can prove that P is good, I assure you that you have assumed that >P is good somewhere along the line, or you didn't prove it. Definite conflict of personal morals here. Maybe someone feels that the more constraining system is preferrable??? There is some interesting insight into proof of goodness here. To inductively prove that something is good. There has to be something good to begin with. Then there has to be a method to show that because that is true, it is likely that the next is true, and so on. To deductively prove it; there again has to be something that has good in it. And either a way to show how this transfers to the object in question or how it has the qualities necessary to infer good. Does anyone know how to do this without postulating 'good' somewhere along the line??? >[wingate] >Almost any system which is based on the maximization of some good provides a >basis for an absolute morality (even Rich's). If one looked at all of >history, and were sufficiently wise, one could perceive what the optimal thing >to do in any situation would be. This, I submit, forms an absolute for that >moral system. This absolute is of course obscure to us, and you can go on >at great length about whether it implies anything at all. >[balter] >By absolute, you seem to mean able to provide a judgement in all situations. >Aside from questioning that (there is no order relation for goodness), I must >point out that "absolute morality" normally means one which is held as being >the ONE TRUE MORALITY, having a preferred place in the order of things over >other claimed moralities, and therefore setting down in absolute fashion what >is right or wrong. Relativists hold that notions of absolute right or wrong >are semantically empty; even if some big bad bugger in the sky will zap me if >I disobey his law, it is still only right or wrong from *his* point of view. >But mostly it is humans with circular arguments demanding that I obey *their* >morality. OK This is the difference between 'relativists' and 'absolutists.' Although it is possible for a RIGHT one to exist without a 'big bad bugger.' [Maybe its imbedded in the structure of the universe] I have no evidence either for or against. It's plausible though. >[wingate] >There seems to be a near total lack of understanding of New Testament morality >by some readers of this group. From a pre-existent Good, an absolute of the >kind described above is seen to exist. God can in fact know this absolute. >Therefore the reason we listen to God's laws is NOT simply because he is God, >but because he is in a position to know and instruct. Futhermore, it can be >argued that Christian morality is universal only for Christians. Therefore >those who seek (for instance) to bring prayer into public schools are flatly >wrong. >[balter] >Lack of understanding of an arbitrary dogma as interpreted by you? >So what? Pre-existing good? That *your* god has access to? Give me a break. >I claim to have access to the *true* good; yours is a false version. >Prove me wrong. Prove him wrong. Arguments about this won't go anywhere. Either of you MIGHT be right about there being an absolute good. I must admit, though, that Charley has given the best argument I've seen for a reason to abide by biblical 'morality.' >Aside from all the other inconsistencies and foolishes expressed by the >above, let me concentrate on one that is highly illustrative of the subject >at hand: what about those that argue that Christian morality is *not* >universal *only* for Christians (just how can it be "universal" if it isn't >Universal, hmmm?)? Those who consider keeping organized (a key word; >individual prayer is allowed) prayer out of the schools to be an immoral, >Godless, devil-inspired goal? They are clearly acting morally, from their >point of view. Thus they cannot be *flatly* wrong, only wrong from your (and >my, BTW) POV. If they claimed that the earth was flat, then we can argue >that they are flatly (heh heh) wrong on the basis of empirical evidence. >No such basis is available when arguing moral issues. If you believe in an absolute morality, why cannot they be '*flatly* wrong.' The basis for arguing moral issues MIGHT exist. I do agree that we don't have it in our hands now [at least knowingly]. I don't think it is fair to say no such basis exists. >[wingate] >(Note that this doesn't absolve Rich of having to follow his own >morality!) >[balter] >Here we have that fundamental misunderstanding of what morality is. >Absolve? Have to? What do these words mean in this context? >What happens if Rich proclaims a morality and then fails to follow it? >Will a big thunderbolt labeled "morality enforcement" strike him dead? >Morality is a codification of the behaviors that an individual or group >finds good or bad, where good and bad are primitive (mathematical >sense) concepts related to desired and undesired behaviors. >Rich may establish a general rule of good and bad, perform an action, >and then decide the action was bad within his rules. Depending upon whether >his emotional response to the action is that it really is good or really >is bad, he is likely to either modify his rules to allow that behavior as >acceptable, or feel guilt and attempt to reorient himself in a way such >that he won't perform the action again (from mental scolding to hara kiri); >or it is possible that he will actually enjoy having performed the action >and intend to repeat it, in which case his "morality" is a charade, >perhaps borrowed from his community (cf. previous discussion about Hell's >Angels) and his true inner morality is somewhat different. >In the same way, a group's true morality may be different than what is >professed in official dogma; examples are boundless. This seems to me to be a much more thorough understanding behind personal morality than stated at the beginning of the discussion. I'm going to attempt to restate these points as I take them. A personal morality is an individual's mechanism for determining what is desired or undesired behavior [for himself]. A person may change his behavior to abide by his morality. He may also decide that his morality is flawed and change it. He may present one morality to others while following another himself. Morality is intrinsic in causing guilt. For your consideration, Chris -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack ) (08/20/85)
[ouch] >>Chris Warack >David Canzi >>Next step -- so an action maps to good or evil. A person acting morally >>would proceed with a good action, and avoid an evil action. If he didn't, >>he would be acting immorally. Correct? >>Is this all? ... >I've been toying with the idea that morality is *less* than this. > >In our day-to-day lives we're constantly confronted with this >decision: What will I do next? I prefer to define the idea of >morality in terms of the grounds on which these decisions are made. A >moral ground for decision-making is some criterion which is independent >of your desires, and that you place ahead of your desires in making the >decision. I agree that it is placed ahead of desires since moral reasons are commonly used to supress desire. But, they are not independent unless you want to define them that way. There are too many situations were a person's morals follow their desires. In fact I would say that at a formative level; personal morals start as desires. Later experience and thought mold them and might separate the two [from very little to totally]. >An important corollary of this is that, since behaviour is classified >as moral on the basis of the grounds on which that behaviour was >chosen, it is impossible to force people to behave morally. Moral >behaviour can only happen by *choice*. The best you can do is arrange >rewards and punishments, so that it will be in people's best interests >to act the way you want them to. There is a difference of perspective here. 'Moral behavior' according to whom? If you mean the person, then the above makes no sense. If you mean some group or universal morality, then that is true. But I postulate that every person has a personal morality. A person may choose a ''universal'' morality as their own -- then they are moral 'by *choice*'. By the way, WHO is arranging rewards and punishments?? >Another interesting corollary is that religious moral systems based on >eternal rewards and punishments (eg. Heaven and Hell), are not moral >systems at all, because the motivation for good behaviour is based >ultimately on self-interest. Why aren't they moral systems? I maybe see you arguing that they are not 'unselfish' systems; but, that doesn't have anything to do with it. >A third corollary is that, since the person must make the moral >decision himself, what is moral behaviour for him is what he feels is >moral, not what anybody else thinks is moral. That's right folks, I'm >a moral relativist. OK, now you have defined personal morality. >The fact that I've drawn three highly unpopular conclusions from what >I take to be the common conception of morality indicates either that >I'm way out in left field, or that the majority of people have failed >to think through the consequences of their concept of morality. :-? >So far, I have said nothing about what those moral grounds for decision >making are. Now I get controversial. As far as I can tell, most >people's moral codes are derived entirely from the words of other >people. [...] >[EDITED]Our morals appear to be ultimately based on appeals to >authority [parent, teacher ...] These, of course, are going to have a major impact in determining the development of personal morals, but not exclusively. And as I said earlier, it is a development that has its roots in desires. >The only ways to arrive at "moral truth", if such a thing exists, are >accepting somebody else's word for it (ie. authority), or guessing >(intuition). Neither one of these is considered as a reliable way >of arriving at any kind of truth. As far as I can tell, there is >no way to determine "moral truth". >My belief is that there is no such thing as "moral truth". There is no >logical or rational reason to put any criterion ahead of self-interest >in deciding on your next action. What are you striving at? Maybe you meant by 'guessing,' inductive reasoning? This is the process by which observations and knowledge can be used to extend or forecast more knowledge. It is somewhat reliable at arriving at truth. Admittedly, it is not perfect, but that is built into the system. An inductive logician deals in probabilities. Probably the most famaliar of these people is your friendly weatherman. Contrary to popular opinion, they do alright. And, because of the methods of inductive logic, they are constantly getting better. For your consideration, -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack ) (08/20/85)
>[wingate] >But I think that's the whole point. If I'm walking down the street, and I >want an ice cream cone, so I buy one: do we really care about that as a >moral dilemma? It seems to me that you can't be talking about morality in >any meaningful way until you are dealing with conflicting wants. To simply >define morality as "that which tells us what to do" is plainly wrong to me. >There are a number of different reasons why we decide things. We can do it >on the basis of simple desires, as in the above case. We can reason out a >course of action. But it seems to me that most everyone acknoledges the >existence of a faculty called the conscience, which only acts to forbid a >desire from being acted out. There are plenty of instances where morality plays a role that doesn't involve conflicts or dilemmas. You're talking about the hard cases. The simple cases are much more common. BTW, there's a guy I know who doesn't feel it is right to lock cows up in barns all their life hooked to machines. He'd give you a dirty look, because he sees that ice cream cone as contributing toward the perpetuation of that wrong. You've ascribed to the conscience the role of determining what should or should not be acted out. I ascribe this to a moral decision. I don't really see a conflict. I see the conscience as the 'machine' that implements morality. So I think we are talking about a rose by any other name... >[balter] >Excuse me if I didn't make it clearer that morality is "that which tells us >what to do" *if there are reasonably competing alternatives*; I would think >that was obvious. If there is no conflict, then there is no issue of >decision. Aside from all the possible political issues involved, some >persons consider the self-indulgence of eating an ice cream cone as a >moral issue. If two people are walking down the sidewalk and want to >take off their clothes and make love, do we really care about that as a >moral dilemma? It wouldn't bother me any more than my eating an ice cream >cone bothers you; we have different moral perspectives. I consider eating >ice cream in public as setting a very destructive example for children; >how does this differ from many people's attitudes toward public sex? >(one answer: they want to legislate against it) >You don't seem to be able to escape from the belief that *your* >moral views are *universal*. How does a person act when confronted with a moral dilemma? That is when nothing he can do is moral by his standards. How does a person act when his actions will conflict with another's morals? These situations can be dealt with differently by different people. Basically, they are covered by other 'morals.' One person may feel that an immoral act in the face of a moral dilemma is acceptable. That person in retrospect may see a way he could have done better. He may feel guilty about not finding that at the time, or he may feel that he did the right thing at the time and chalk it up to experience. These are just differing moralities. The diffence between these hard moral issues and the more common simple moral issues is that the morals involved in hard issues are dealing not only with actions but with the morality of actions. They might be called meta-morals [semi :-)], but really they are no different than any other moral just 'higher level.' I've talked enough for now ... :-) For your consideration, -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack) (08/22/85)
from this person's anti-human acts. >> Then banishment and/or exile would work as well as prison. As I >> mentioned earlier, though, this type of thinking requires a 'judge.' >> How does he determine the need to remove a 'transgressor?' His own >> morals may differ significantly from anyone elses... >This is an implementation question, "how do we select judges?". All moral >systems are incomplete, they cannot cover everything in written word. In cases >where there is conflict, obviously some form of arbitration must occur. This is more than an implementation question. [I'm expanding the issue beyond just arbitration]. Some moral systems may not NEED arbitration in any case. One such that springs to mind is the moral "Turn the other cheek." In this case, the solution to any conflict is built in. I don't see this moral as very satisfactory, but the point is that arbitration may not be necessary. It seems more desirable to try and avoid it if possible. I'm curious if anyone has come across other 'morals' that remove the need for 'judges.' >> However, any number of moralities can be 'least restrictive' even >> interpretations of the Christian ones [semi- :-)]. There is still a >> question about which gives the most to the most people. >Clearly any system that makes arbitrary restrictions of "thou shalt not do >this", where "this" is something not involving a negative effect on another >person's life, is NOT a candidate for the moral system that does the most >for the most people. If you are speaking of the Bible, then the "thou shalt not do THIS"'s all involve some effect on another's life [Steal, Kill, Adultery, ...] or direct potential [Covet ...]. There are other "thou shall"'s which are positive [Honor father/mother, love one another ...]. Then there are other's involving God [Not take name in vain, Keep holy the Sabbath]. The only ones I can think of that fit your description fall into the 'involving God' category. Thus, if you ignore the religious aspects [which I maintain can be kept separate from morality], Christian morality should be kept in consideration as a decent system. >> It >> brings to a head the question of which is evil: the person or his >> morality? Some moral systems [Rich's own, for instance] regard anything >> 'interfering' = 'going against' as bad. If it regards the person as >> evil, then it must rid itself of him somehow. If it is the person's >> morals, then should it attempt to convince the person to change his >> morals [rehabilitate]? or should it rid itself of the morals by ridding >> itself of the person? >The first, of course, as much as possible. The society's responsible is NOT >to a code of morality but to its members, and it is their protection from >such actions as this person has taken that is sought. I'm not sure that the former is the less restrictive path. At least with banishment and exile, the restrictions placed on the person are small. He cannot go to certain areas. Rehabilitation implies changing a person's viewpoint maybe even AGAINST his will. I would consider this a major interference. Also note that this implies some sort of judgment by society on that person's guilt. Of course, in some cases the judgment might be obvious, but there are always borderline cases. Again, this raises the question of whether judgment can be avoided. For your Consideration, Chris -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/24/85)
>[balter] >I think all personal moral systems are of the form > if {I desire it} > then OK > else not OK [warack] Actually, I don't think you do, because you explain what you mean later. [balter] I think we are quibbling over the meaning of "desire"; even you used "desirable and undesirable behaviors" in your recapitulation of my later explication. >[balter] >Warack's [actually Warack's formulation of Rosen's philosophy -chris] >formulation above is ultra-simplistic: how do we determine what >a right is? What is an infringement? What happens when people's rights >conflict? Who do we include among "others"?: women, black, gays, mammals, >ants, rocks, ecology, mother earth? If I were to follow the formulation >strictly, I wouldn't be able to act at all. 2500 years ago Greeks >were wondering whether or not they should eat beans because Pythagoras >proscribed it; I would hope that our questions have evolved in depth and >complexity since then. [warack] There actually IS a difference between morality and desire. Desire is a basic feeling -- a want for something [such as the sexual fantasies mentioned before]. Morality is more rational. It employs the conscience. An action may have roots in desire, but it must be filtered through a person's morals before he can determine whether or not it is OK. Actually someone may have the ultra-simplistic morals if {I desire it} then it is OK. I think it is obvious that this person couldn't function in society unless ... he never had a desire that conflicted with another's. [balter] My dictionary says, as you seem to, that "desire" is "craving", but that doesn't seem to me to encompass the notion of "desirable behavior" in a moral sense. We will probably have to keep repeating what we mean in order to be sure that we not disagreeing only in word but not in intent. My use of "desire" above was intended as "complex, filtered, rationally evaluated preference", as opposed to "craving" or "simple desire" or "animal desire" or immediate desire". >[warack] >How is one morality better than another? This is probably the real issue. >What makes one morality better? How is that judged? Is there a perfect >morality? >[wingate] >I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this >does not constitute a measure of merit). The explicit morality of the New >Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his >principles with additional constraints. >[balter] >How can you use a loaded term like strength and then say it doesn't constitute >a measure of merit? NT morality is more constraining than Rich's, period. >I would suggest that a group morality is better in some sense if it closely >aligns with the personal moralities of the members of the group, and given >two moralities with the same level of alignment the one which is *less* >constraining would be preferable. As for personal moralities, they are not >simply chosen, they are *acquired*. Now, one could choose to alter one's >personal morality (we're back to wanting to want). But what it should be >changed to, what is "better", depends uopn the goal. The goal might be: >to be better liked, to be more like others, be wealthier, to live longer, >etc. These goals can certainly be furthered by changing one's moral posture. >But which is better? There is only an absolute good if you select one. >If you can prove that P is good, I assure you that you have assumed that >P is good somewhere along the line, or you didn't prove it. [warack] Definite conflict of personal morals here. Maybe someone feels that the more constraining system is preferrable??? [balter] I was trying to talk in some sort of universal sense here, independent of the actual content of any morality. *Given* that two group moral systems are equally well aligned with the set of personal moralities, the one that imposes fewer constraints *of its own*, separate from those of any of the personal moralities, seems "naturally" preferable, somewhat analogously to Occam's Razor. If I think it is ok to do anything but snorf, and you think it is ok to do anything but fringle, wouldn't proscription of snorfing or fringling be preferable to proscription of snorfing, fringling, or glabbing? However, to concede the conflict as you indicate, there doesn't seem to be any inherent preference of a proscription against snorfing or fringling over allowing snorfing, fringling, and anything else; I don't share the former to the degree that it doesn't allow fringling, and I don't share the latter because it does allow snorfing. [warack] There is some interesting insight into proof of goodness here. To inductively prove that something is good. There has to be something good to begin with. Then there has to be a method to show that because that is true, it is likely that the next is true, and so on. To deductively prove it; there again has to be something that has good in it. And either a way to show how this transfers to the object in question or how it has the qualities necessary to infer good. Does anyone know how to do this without postulating 'good' somewhere along the line??? [balter] Seems pretty unlikely to me. >[wingate] >Almost any system which is based on the maximization of some good provides a >basis for an absolute morality (even Rich's). If one looked at all of >history, and were sufficiently wise, one could perceive what the optimal thing >to do in any situation would be. This, I submit, forms an absolute for that >moral system. This absolute is of course obscure to us, and you can go on >at great length about whether it implies anything at all. >[balter] >By absolute, you seem to mean able to provide a judgement in all situations. >Aside from questioning that (there is no order relation for goodness), I must >point out that "absolute morality" normally means one which is held as being >the ONE TRUE MORALITY, having a preferred place in the order of things over >other claimed moralities, and therefore setting down in absolute fashion what >is right or wrong. Relativists hold that notions of absolute right or wrong >are semantically empty; even if some big bad bugger in the sky will zap me if >I disobey his law, it is still only right or wrong from *his* point of view. >But mostly it is humans with circular arguments demanding that I obey *their* >morality. [warack] OK This is the difference between 'relativists' and 'absolutists.' Although it is possible for a RIGHT one to exist without a 'big bad bugger.' [Maybe its imbedded in the structure of the universe] I have no evidence either for or against. It's plausible though. [balter] But what does it *mean* for one to be RIGHT? How do you *demonstrate* that that the right one is right? The fact that some big mouthed absolutist says so doesn't make it so. The fact that a big bugger with a GOD label all over it says so doesn't make it so. How can a morality have *inherent* preference? It must take some logical form. You could adopt a Panglossian attitude that what happens is right and good and what doesn't is wrong and bad, but that is rather too convenient and useless. Absolutists *believe* that their beliefs are universal in some sense, but they have no logical force behind this belief. I think I have good reason to hold the absolute position to in fact be a position of arrogance. >[wingate] >There seems to be a near total lack of understanding of New Testament morality >by some readers of this group. From a pre-existent Good, an absolute of the >kind described above is seen to exist. God can in fact know this absolute. >Therefore the reason we listen to God's laws is NOT simply because he is God, >but because he is in a position to know and instruct. Futhermore, it can be >argued that Christian morality is universal only for Christians. Therefore >those who seek (for instance) to bring prayer into public schools are flatly >wrong. >[balter] >Lack of understanding of an arbitrary dogma as interpreted by you? >So what? Pre-existing good? That *your* god has access to? Give me a break. >I claim to have access to the *true* good; yours is a false version. >Prove me wrong. [warack] Prove him wrong. Arguments about this won't go anywhere. Either of you MIGHT be right about there being an absolute good. I must admit, though, that Charley has given the best argument I've seen for a reason to abide by biblical 'morality.' [balter] I have no desire or ability to prove him wrong. My point is that his position has no weight. He read a book and believes what it says. So what? What does that have to do with philosophical inquiry? (Actually, I understand that I am being too hard here, to the degree that Charley was simply explaining Christian dogma; but my point is that I could have returned the favor by explaining Blarfle dogma; the fact that his dogma has more history or more proponents does not make it more valid). As for a "reason" to abide by biblical morality, you first must *accept* that there is a God with such properties as he describes and that the bible communicates this pre-existent Good faithfully and consistently. But there is no "reason" to do any of that, other than desire. But there is *reason*, as in logic, not to, because there does not seem to be any way to describe the nature of "good" other than in terms of *opinion*, so that the notion of pre-existent Good seems non-sensical without a pre-existent holder of opinions. Pre-existent Good is, as far as I can see, like pre-existent desire. Whose desire? God's. But God communicates the Good. Through the Bible. Well, if you *choose* to *believe* it. Why should you choose to believe it? Because God says so. Good reason. The point is that Charley doesn't have an *argument*, he "only" has *faith*. >[balter] >Aside from all the other inconsistencies and foolishes expressed by the >above, let me concentrate on one that is highly illustrative of the subject >at hand: what about those that argue that Christian morality is *not* >universal *only* for Christians (just how can it be "universal" if it isn't >Universal, hmmm?)? Those who consider keeping organized (a key word; >individual prayer is allowed) prayer out of the schools to be an immoral, >Godless, devil-inspired goal? They are clearly acting morally, from their >point of view. Thus they cannot be *flatly* wrong, only wrong from your (and >my, BTW) POV. If they claimed that the earth was flat, then we can argue >that they are flatly (heh heh) wrong on the basis of empirical evidence. >No such basis is available when arguing moral issues. [warack] If you believe in an absolute morality, why cannot they be '*flatly* wrong.' The basis for arguing moral issues MIGHT exist. I do agree that we don't have it in our hands now [at least knowingly]. I don't think it is fair to say no such basis exists. [balter] The mere fact that you believe in an absolute morality gives you no right to claim access to it. I said no such basis is *available*, to Charley or anyone else. He can say he *considers* them wrong. Going beyond that is arrogance (in my opinion, of course). In this case, he can't even quote the bible (actually, I would be delighted to learn that I am wrong, that there is a biblical passage indicating that mandated school prayer violates the pre-existent Good (I would put a `:-)', if I didn't find the joke of p-e G so pathetic). >[wingate] >(Note that this doesn't absolve Rich of having to follow his own >morality!) >[balter] >Here we have that fundamental misunderstanding of what morality is. >Absolve? Have to? What do these words mean in this context? >What happens if Rich proclaims a morality and then fails to follow it? >Will a big thunderbolt labeled "morality enforcement" strike him dead? >Morality is a codification of the behaviors that an individual or group >finds good or bad, where good and bad are primitive (mathematical >sense) concepts related to desired and undesired behaviors. >Rich may establish a general rule of good and bad, perform an action, >and then decide the action was bad within his rules. Depending upon whether >his emotional response to the action is that it really is good or really >is bad, he is likely to either modify his rules to allow that behavior as >acceptable, or feel guilt and attempt to reorient himself in a way such >that he won't perform the action again (from mental scolding to hara kiri); >or it is possible that he will actually enjoy having performed the action >and intend to repeat it, in which case his "morality" is a charade, >perhaps borrowed from his community (cf. previous discussion about Hell's >Angels) and his true inner morality is somewhat different. >In the same way, a group's true morality may be different than what is >professed in official dogma; examples are boundless. [warack] This seems to me to be a much more thorough understanding behind personal morality than stated at the beginning of the discussion. I'm going to attempt to restate these points as I take them. A personal morality is an individual's mechanism for determining what is desired or undesired behavior [for himself]. A person may change his behavior to abide by his morality. He may also decide that his morality is flawed and change it. He may present one morality to others while following another himself. Morality is intrinsic in causing guilt. [balter] I think this needs to be extended; I can consider another's actions to be immoral. This means I find them undesirable. It isn't clear that this means exactly that I would think it wrong of me, even if I were in the other's shoes, since a moral system is not formal, exact, unambiguous, or nonfluctuating. Your action is immoral; you shouldn't do it; it isn't good. I am pretty much convinced that the notion of "good" is primitive within the human psychological mechanism. Smiles, "positive" mood swings, pleasure, perhaps lowered blood pressure, all kinds of physiological and mental (= physiological, for the mechanists) effects accompany "good" things, often resulting in repeating good things or causing them to be repeated. I think the notion that good and bad are "out there" rather than "in here" comes from a fundamental rejection by the organism that it is in fact an organism, rather than some sort of pure rational entity tapped into some sort of idealized "real" world (for more on this concept of the real mind as only an approximation of the idealized mind, see Dennett's "Elbow Room"; the book is quite literally "thought provoking"). -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (08/25/85)
>>This is an implementation question, "how do we select judges?". All moral >>systems are incomplete, they cannot cover everything in written word. In cases >>where there is conflict, obviously some form of arbitration must occur. > This is more than an implementation question. [I'm expanding the issue > beyond just arbitration]. Some moral systems may not NEED arbitration > in any case. One such that springs to mind is the moral "Turn the other > cheek." In this case, the solution to any conflict is built in. Ah, but look what happens in the real world to practitioners of this morality. Not many survivors. Viable moral systems, ones that last and perpetuate, all cannot be complete, and thus arbitration is necessary. (I contend that this morality is not viable for the following reason: if a person doesn't adhere it, what is done? Coercion? No, cheek turning. The morality cannot sustain itself.) >>>However, any number of moralities can be 'least restrictive' even >>>interpretations of the Christian ones [semi- :-)]. There is still a >>>question about which gives the most to the most people. >>Clearly any system that makes arbitrary restrictions of "thou shalt not do >>this", where "this" is something not involving a negative effect on another >>person's life, is NOT a candidate for the moral system that does the most >>for the most people. > If you are speaking of the Bible, then the "thou shalt not do THIS"'s > all involve some effect on another's life [Steal, Kill, Adultery, ...] > or direct potential [Covet ...]. What about prohibitions that have nothing to do with other people's lives? Like choice of sexual lifestyle, for example. Obviously stealing and killing are part of minimal non-interference morality, so I'm not sure why you bothered to mention them. Adultery and coveting? I think these stem from notions of marriage as ownership, which fit into the category of negative restrictions. Commitment to marriage is a personal between two people. > There are other "thou shall"'s which > are positive [Honor father/mother, love one another ...]. Then there > are other's involving God [Not take name in vain, Keep holy the > Sabbath]. The only ones I can think of that fit your description fall > into the 'involving God' category. Thus, if you ignore the religious > aspects [which I maintain can be kept separate from morality], Christian > morality should be kept in consideration as a decent system. But the 'involving god' part IS most definitely a part of the Christian morality that some Christians seek to impose on the rest of us. And since not all the "shalt not"s are part of the minimal morality mold, there you see the problems with Christianity as a viable societal moral code. >>>It brings to a head the question of which is evil: the person or his >>>morality? Some moral systems [Rich's own, for instance] regard anything >>>'interfering' = 'going against' as bad. If it regards the person as >>>evil, then it must rid itself of him somehow. If it is the person's >>>morals, then should it attempt to convince the person to change his >>>morals [rehabilitate]? or should it rid itself of the morals by ridding >>>itself of the person? >>The first, of course, as much as possible. The society's responsible is NOT >>to a code of morality but to its members, and it is their protection from >>such actions as this person has taken that is sought. > I'm not sure that the former is the less restrictive path. At least > with banishment and exile, the restrictions placed on the person are > small. He cannot go to certain areas. Rehabilitation implies changing > a person's viewpoint maybe even AGAINST his will. I would consider this > a major interference. Also note that this implies some sort of judgment > by society on that person's guilt. If we were talking about aversion therapy for homosexuals or something arbitrary like that, I could see your point. This would be a vile restriction of human freedom (of which Alan Turing was a victim). On the other hand, if we are talking about anti-human behavior, harming other people, such a person is a danger to other people. The first method gives the person a chance to change to behavior that doesn't harm other people, before banishment or exile. -- Popular consensus says that reality is based on popular consensus. Rich Rosen pyuxd!rlr
friesen@psivax.UUCP (Stanley Friesen) (08/26/85)
In article <376@aero.ARPA> warack@aero.UUCP (Chris Warack (5734)) writes: >>David Canzi > >>An important corollary of this is that, since behaviour is classified >>as moral on the basis of the grounds on which that behaviour was >>chosen, it is impossible to force people to behave morally. Moral >>behaviour can only happen by *choice*. > >There is a difference of perspective here. 'Moral behavior' according >to whom? If you mean the person, then the above makes no sense. If you >mean some group or universal morality, then that is true. But I >postulate that every person has a personal morality. > Well, actually it *does* make sense even when applied to personal morality(though I think he was actually talking about group or universal morality). It is most definately possible for a person to violate his own personal morality, even by deliberate choice. I know this because I do so from time to time. When I have achieved perfection by my own moral standards I will tell you;-) -- Sarima (Stanley Friesen) UUCP: {ttidca|ihnp4|sdcrdcf|quad1|nrcvax|bellcore|logico}!psivax!friesen ARPA: ttidca!psivax!friesen@rand-unix.arpa
dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi) (08/27/85)
In article <1303@umcp-cs.UUCP> flink@maryland.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) writes: >>Another interesting corollary is that religious moral systems based on >>eternal rewards and punishments (eg. Heaven and Hell), are not moral >>systems at all, because the motivation for good behaviour is based >>ultimately on self-interest. > >If moral systems based on self-interest aren't moral systems, then a lot >of ancient Greek moral philosophy will have to be thrown out as not really >addressing morality at all. I don't think that's right. (Though I do >agree that there is something bogus about the idea of a morality based >on the Heaven-or-Hell carrot-and-stick scheme.) I guessed, perhaps wrongly, at what the word morality means to most people, and used that definition throughout my article. It just so happens that that definition excludes some ancient Greek philosophy that your personal definition includes. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that I have correctly guessed at the most widely accepted definition of morality, and that your personal definition disagrees with it, on what grounds can you claim that your definition is true, and theirs is false? >>My belief is that there is no such thing as "moral truth". There is no >>logical or rational reason to put any criterion ahead of self-interest >>in deciding on your next action. > >How about, a benevolent concern for the welfare of others? Acting on that >is perfectly rational. Identifying rationality with self-interest is bogus. >Or maybe your point is, some people might not have any benevolence? I was trying to show that, given a random moral principle, there is no way to demonstrate its "truth" or "falsehood". If so, then the choice of whether to accept that moral principle is arbitrary. Given this arbitrariness, there is no real reason to accept *any* moral principles, so total amorality seems like a reasonable position to adopt. >Anyhow, there is such a thing as moral truth: what you *really* ought to do >(as opposed to what you think you should do) is what you would do if you >were fully informed, rational, and free. This looks like either a definition or a moral principle. If the former, it's arbitrary (part of the nature of definitions), if the latter, it's arbitrary. I have no logical reason to accept it. >--Paul V Torek, Iconbuster-In-Chief Better guard yer icons, buster. -- David Canzi This has been a test of the emergency broadcasting sytem. It was only a test. Repeat: only a test. If this had been a real emergency, you would be dead.
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack) (08/27/85)
at last and perpetuate, >all cannot be complete, and thus arbitration is necessary. (I contend that >this morality is not viable for the following reason: if a person doesn't >adhere it, what is done? Coercion? No, cheek turning. The morality cannot >sustain itself.) I didn't mean to imply that I thought 'turn the other cheek' was a moral system we should all use. The point I wish to make is that ARBITRATION is not necessary in ALL moral systems. A morality of this type can sustain itself through persuasion. [Again, I am not implying that 'turn the other cheek' would work well; I'm talking of the class of systems of which it is a member.] I mean persuasion that is not forced on another. This kind of system would be more desirable, wouldn't it? There are problems that such a system would have to deal with. How to deal with certain types of people -- For instance, some one who killed people randomly and doesn't want to listen to persuasion. In a case like this, there is clearly a problem. This may be solved without arbitration only if everyone else agrees on a course of action. This may not be too plausible, but in a small society it may work. Borderline cases may be more difficult for a unanimous decision to be reached, but then what is wrong with nothing being done? If the situation gets worse, eventually a consensus can be reached. I'm not proposing these as good moral systems. I'm just showing that it is possible to devise a VIABLE moral system without 'arbitration'. And, remember we were talking about arbitration in terms of judges or other mechanisms that don't include the ENTIRE group. The benefit of a system without arbitration is that it doesn't need to worry about the problems surrounding judges. >>>Clearly any system that makes arbitrary restrictions of "thou shalt not do >>>this", where "this" is something not involving a negative effect on another >>>person's life, is NOT a candidate for the moral system that does the most >>>for the most people. >> If you are speaking of the Bible, then the "thou shalt not do THIS"'s >> all involve some effect on another's life [Steal, Kill, Adultery, ...] >> or direct potential [Covet ...]. >What about prohibitions that have nothing to do with other people's lives? >Like choice of sexual lifestyle, for example. Obviously stealing and >killing are part of minimal non-interference morality, so I'm not sure why >you bothered to mention them. Adultery and coveting? I think these stem >from notions of marriage as ownership, which fit into the category of >negative restrictions. Commitment to marriage is a personal between two >people. I don't know that the Bible directly prohibits certain sexual lifestyles. [Some sections, like the story of Sodom in Genesis, certainly 'discourage' it]. Adultery and coveting [neighbor's wife] may have stemmed from marriage as ownership, but they most certainly affect others' lives. As you say, commitment to marriage is personal between two people, if one of those person chooses to 'break' that commitment, he/she is directly affecting the other. [Also remember that covet applies to other's property -- thy neighbor's goods]. >> There are other "thou shall"'s which >> are positive [Honor father/mother, love one another ...]. Then there >> are other's involving God [Not take name in vain, Keep holy the >> Sabbath]. The only ones I can think of that fit your description fall >> into the 'involving God' category. Thus, if you ignore the religious >> aspects [which I maintain can be kept separate from morality], Christian >> morality should be kept in consideration as a decent system. >But the 'involving god' part IS most definitely a part of the Christian >morality that some Christians seek to impose on the rest of us. And since >not all the "shalt not"s are part of the minimal morality mold, there you >see the problems with Christianity as a viable societal moral code. I mentioned previously that there are several 'Christian' moralities. Maybe the 'involving God' is part of THE Christian morality, but I know of many 'Christians' who are really agnostic or even athiest. That 'disembodied' kind of 'Christian' morality is what I meant above. I have yet to see how a system based in 'Christian' morality cannot be a viable societal moral code. I think that morality and religion can be pretty well seperated. The only thing that may not be easy to disentangle is a rationale behind the morality that is based in religion. However, this does not get in the way of observing the characteristics of the morality [philosophically]. I would still find the Bible quite interesting as a morality text even if the religious references were omitted. [I'm not making a statement on either my morals or my religious beliefs in this paragraph; so nobody try to infer any]. For Your Consideration, -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (08/28/85)
In article <27500102@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >[balter] >My dictionary says, as you [warack] seem to, that "desire" is "craving", >but that doesn't seem to me to encompass the notion of "desirable >behavior" in a moral sense. We will probably have to keep repeating >what we mean in order to be sure that we not disagreeing only in word >but not in intent. My use of "desire" above was intended as "complex, >filtered, rationally evaluated preference", as opposed to "craving" or >"simple desire" or "animal desire" or immediate desire". I think your definition of desire, while not unusual, is so loose as to make it a useless concept. I.e., all the air has gone out of your statement about morality and desire once you define desire so loosely. >[balter] >>[...] If they claimed that the earth was flat, then we can argue >>that they are flatly (heh heh) wrong on the basis of empirical evidence. >>No such basis is available when arguing moral issues. How about individual benefit? Empirical evidence is available on that, and it's obviously relevant to interpersonal morality. For (admittedly rather trivial) example, if someone is doing something that harms himself and others, and helps nobody, we can argue that he should stop, and we have an empirical basis to appeal to. (And unfortunately, people do that sort of thing more often than you might think!) >[balter] >I think the notion that good and bad are "out there" rather than "in here" >comes from a fundamental rejection by the organism that it is in fact an >organism, rather than some sort of pure rational entity tapped into some >sort of idealized "real" world (for more on this concept of the real mind as >only an approximation of the idealized mind, see Dennett's "Elbow Room"; >the book is quite literally "thought provoking"). Funny, I would say just the opposite: forgetting you're an organism is the source of the idea that good and bad are "in here", where "here" is the mind. Our bodies make good and bad "out there" in the sense that they are recalcitrant like the rest of reality; one can't "decide" a la Sartre, R.M. Hare, etc. what they are. (J. Habermas aptly calls the views of people like Hare and Sartre "decisionistic". He rejects their position -- he must be brilliant, he agrees with me! :-> ).) --Paul V Torek, umcp-cs!flink
jim@ISM780B.UUCP (08/30/85)
>[balter] >My dictionary says, as you [warack] seem to, that "desire" is "craving", >but that doesn't seem to me to encompass the notion of "desirable >behavior" in a moral sense. We will probably have to keep repeating >what we mean in order to be sure that we not disagreeing only in word >but not in intent. My use of "desire" above was intended as "complex, >filtered, rationally evaluated preference", as opposed to "craving" or >"simple desire" or "animal desire" or immediate desire". [torek] I think your definition of desire, while not unusual, is so loose as to make it a useless concept. I.e., all the air has gone out of your statement about morality and desire once you define desire so loosely. [balter] I disagree. I find it useful; you claim it isn't; why should I care what you claim without argument? At the very least, you should explain what "desirable behavior" means, since that was my grounds for rejecting "craving" as a sufficient definition. And I don't need much air, since I gave a fuller description of morality later. >[balter] >[...] If they claimed that the earth was flat, then we can argue >that they are flatly (heh heh) wrong on the basis of empirical evidence. >No such basis is available when arguing moral issues. [torek] How about individual benefit? Empirical evidence is available on that, and it's obviously relevant to interpersonal morality. For (admittedly rather trivial) example, if someone is doing something that harms himself and others, and helps nobody, we can argue that he should stop, and we have an empirical basis to appeal to. (And unfortunately, people do that sort of thing more often than you might think!) [balter] You say individual benefit but you talk about lack of physical bodily harm; while the latter can be objectified, I have not seen anything indicating that the former can. And there are many societies and conditions where it is not immoral to harm your wife, your children, members of other societies, your equals in duels, members of other races who aren't considered quite human, etc. Of course all moral judgements are statements about empirical realities, but there is no empirical evidence for goodness or badness itself. We have to *decide* (or, more often, *believe*, since morality is primarily acquired, not chosen) that harming others is bad. But this is based on evolutionary conditioning that favors continuance of the species; randomly plucking flowers, smashing rocks, or squashing spiders (certainly a non-self-beneficial act for a human) is not considered by most to be *immoral* (although it is by some Bhuddists). Killing a friendly dog or a deer strikes many as more immoral than killing a field mouse, probably because the former seem more loving and childlike, and we *empathize* with them. I have no reason to view morality to be anything other than human-generated. But this does not lead me to reject my morality or live for so-called "self-interest"; I find that accepting my personal morality, which involves such empathy with and protection of other humans, is very rewarding and beneficial and in my true self-interest, whereas acquisition of goods or power, while of some value, is much the lesser in terms of providing satisfaction. >[balter] >I think the notion that good and bad are "out there" rather than "in here" >comes from a fundamental rejection by the organism that it is in fact an >organism, rather than some sort of pure rational entity tapped into some >sort of idealized "real" world (for more on this concept of the real mind as >only an approximation of the idealized mind, see Dennett's "Elbow Room"; >the book is quite literally "thought provoking"). [torek] Funny, I would say just the opposite: forgetting you're an organism is the source of the idea that good and bad are "in here", where "here" is the mind. Our bodies make good and bad "out there" in the sense that they are recalcitrant like the rest of reality; one can't "decide" a la Sartre, R.M. Hare, etc. what they are. (J. Habermas aptly calls the views of people like Hare and Sartre "decisionistic". He rejects their position -- he must be brilliant, he agrees with me! :-> ).) [balter] I agree that good and bad are "out there" in the sense that you cannot simply decide what to view as good and what to view as bad, though you can come to feel differently, and you yourself can contribute to such a change. I'm glad you made that very good point. But while they may not be "in here" in the mind and subject to simple manipulation, they are no further "out there" than in your brain; your good and bad are not out there in the "real world" in some absolute form where they control any mind but yours. All the other minds have their own distinct, controlling, recalcitrant, notions of good and bad. Of course, due to common origins and influences there is great commonality and similarity among the minds, but forgetting biological humility leads to raising these commonalities to absolutes. -- Jim Balter (ima!jim)
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (08/30/85)
In article <1634@watdcsu.UUCP> dmcanzi@watdcsu.UUCP (David Canzi) writes: >... Assuming, for the sake of argument, that I have >correctly guessed at the most widely accepted definition of morality, and >that your personal definition disagrees with it, on what grounds can you >claim that your definition is true, and theirs is false? I don't grant your premise. I think one could come up with a definition that more people would accept than would accept yours. >I was trying to show that, given a random moral principle, there is no >way to demonstrate its "truth" or "falsehood". If so, then the choice >of whether to accept that moral principle is arbitrary. Given this >arbitrariness, there is no real reason to accept *any* moral principles, >so total amorality seems like a reasonable position to adopt. By my definition of morality, which is close to some of the definitions suggested on the net, it is *impossible* to adopt total amorality. I don' agree that there are no reasons to prefer certain moral principles. Here are two: consistency, and conduciveness to individual benefit. (These might not determine a unique principle, but they definitely suffice to reject many.) >>Anyhow, there is such a thing as moral truth: what you *really* ought to do >>(as opposed to what you think you should do) is what you would do if you >>were fully informed, rational, and free. > >This looks like either a definition or a moral principle. If the former, >it's arbitrary (part of the nature of definitions), if the latter, it's >arbitrary. I have no logical reason to accept it. It's primarily a definition, though it's not entirely morally neutral. It may, *qua* definition, be arbitrary, but that just means that if you reject it you will be using the word "ought" differently from most English speakers. You may have no reason to accept the *definition* (other than convenience), but you still have plenty reason to *do* what you would do if you were fully informed, rational, and free. Aye, and there's the rub. --Paul V Torek, iconoclast for all reasons
warack@aero.ARPA (Chris Warack) (08/31/85)
thing but fringle, wouldn't proscription of snorfing or >fringling be preferable to proscription of snorfing, fringling, or glabbing? >However, to concede the conflict as you indicate, there doesn't seem to be >any inherent preference of a proscription against snorfing or fringling >over allowing snorfing, fringling, and anything else; I don't share the >former to the degree that it doesn't allow fringling, and I don't share >the latter because it does allow snorfing. I wonder how this can be extended to cover larger and larger groups? Can some sort of universal morality be reached this way? I think that problems will surface, because even using an Occam's Razor's approach, the proscriptions will build. I'm curious about other related ideas. How do people's morals actually compare? Most people don't even think about how their morality fits into life. Do they have a naive view that might influence their morals, or is their view a better one? I sometimes think that it might be a good idea to teach morality in school [is this secular humanism :-)?], but it's important enough that I'd be afraid of incompetency screwing someone up. Anyways, as I started to say, if PERSONAL morals of a large segment of the population were compared, I wonder what the results would be. How close would they be to 'universal' moralities? How would certain cross sections of society compare [rich vs. poor; technological vs. music industry]. >>[balter] >>By absolute, you seem to mean able to provide a judgement in all situations. >>Aside from questioning that (there is no order relation for goodness), I must >>point out that "absolute morality" normally means one which is held as being >>the ONE TRUE MORALITY, having a preferred place in the order of things over >>other claimed moralities, and therefore setting down in absolute fashion what >>is right or wrong. Relativists hold that notions of absolute right or wrong >>are semantically empty; even if some big bad bugger in the sky will zap me if >>I disobey his law, it is still only right or wrong from *his* point of view. >>But mostly it is humans with circular arguments demanding that I obey *their* >>morality. >[warack] >OK This is the difference between 'relativists' and 'absolutists.' >Although it is possible for a RIGHT one to exist without a 'big bad >bugger.' [Maybe its imbedded in the structure of the universe] I have >no evidence either for or against. It's plausible though. >[balter] >But what does it *mean* for one to be RIGHT? How do you *demonstrate* that >that the right one is right? The fact that some big mouthed absolutist >says so doesn't make it so. The fact that a big bugger with a GOD label >all over it says so doesn't make it so. How can a morality have *inherent* >preference? It must take some logical form. You could adopt a Panglossian >attitude that what happens is right and good and what doesn't is wrong >and bad, but that is rather too convenient and useless. Absolutists >*believe* that their beliefs are universal in some sense, but they have >no logical force behind this belief. I think I have good reason to hold >the absolute position to in fact be a position of arrogance. The way I can envision the POSSIBILITY of an absolute morality is through the following analogy. Take the problem of human happiness* as a puzzle [static or dynamic]. There is a solution or best solution to this puzzle. The moves which reach this solution are the correct actions to take. The rules governing the moves are an absolute morality. Let me restate, that I'm not sure such a morality exists, but I don't discount it as a possibility. I'm also not sure how anyone could know that it was correct, though I would probably have to have some proof before 'I' accepted it. Note that some Christian's believe that Biblical morality is absolute because God knows the 'solution to that puzzle' and has set down the 'rules' in the Bible. I personally don't see the Bible as an absolute morality, but I can see where someone with a strong faith in God could ... *I'm using human happiness here as an idiom of the ideal human situation. FYC, Chris -- _______ |/-----\| Chris Warack (213) 648-6617 ||hello|| || || warack@aerospace.ARPA |-------| warack@aero.UUCP |@ ___ | seismo!harvard!talcott!panda!genrad!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest! |_______| sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!warack || || \ Aerospace Corporation, M1-117, El Segundo, CA 90245 ^^^ ^^^ `---------(|=
flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V Torek) (09/01/85)
In article <27500117@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes: >I disagree. I find it useful; you claim it isn't; why should I care what >you claim without argument? At the very least, you should >explain what "desirable behavior" means, since that was my grounds for >rejecting "craving" as a sufficient definition. "Desirable behavior" means "good behavior"; the relationship between the meanings of the words "desirable" and "desire" is not as close as their common root might suggest. >You say individual benefit but you talk about lack of physical bodily harm; >while the latter can be objectified, I have not seen anything indicating that >the former can. To put it simply: if you are wondering whether a certain sexual caress will promote your individual benefit, there is a straightforward and paradigmatically empirical method of finding out. If you mean "verifiable by anyone" by "objective", you have a point -- of course this allows only the person involved to directly experiment. But others can, in principle, use the empirical evidence of your bodily construction to predict whether the sexual caress will benefit you (you might have to be dissected, but hey! that's life). >[...] Of course all moral judgements are statements about empirical >realities, but there is no empirical evidence for goodness or badness itself. >We have to *decide* (or, more often, *believe*, since morality is primarily >acquired, not chosen) that harming others is bad. As far as behavior toward others -- morality, narrowly defined -- I can't refute your position (tho I have doubts). But your statement "there is no empirical evidence for goodness or badness itself" is wrong (see above). >this [relativism] does not lead me to reject my morality or live for >"self-interest"; I find that accepting my personal morality, which >involves such empathy with and protection of other humans, is very rewarding >and beneficial and in my true self-interest, whereas acquisition of goods or >power, while of some value, is much the lesser in terms of providing >satisfaction. This brings up an interesting point: even where behavior toward others is concerned, there may be reasons to prefer some moral viewpoints to others. The self-defeating nature of a morality of "self-interest"-as-you-describe- it is an example. >I agree that good and bad are "out there" in the sense that you cannot >simply decide what to view as good and what to view as bad, though you can >come to feel differently [...]. But while they may not be "in here" >in the mind and subject to simple manipulation, they are no further >"out there" than in your brain; your good and bad are not out there in the >"real world" in some absolute form where they control any mind but yours. Hmm. The good and bad of individual benefit and harm do not control any mind but yours; but still they are more than just a matter of opinion, bias, etc.; they must be *discovered*. --Paul V Torek, moving soon to U of MI, but mail to umcp-cs!flink will reach me.
rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) (09/04/85)
[Chris, apparently a good chunk of your article got cut off somewhere. I am responding to what I got.] >>... cannot be complete, and thus arbitration is necessary. (I contend that >>this morality is not viable for the following reason: if a person doesn't >>adhere it, what is done? Coercion? No, cheek turning. The morality cannot >>sustain itself.) > I didn't mean to imply that I thought 'turn the other cheek' was a > moral system we should all use. The point I wish to make is that > ARBITRATION is not necessary in ALL moral systems. A morality of this > type can sustain itself through persuasion. In the one example I can think of of this specific morality, not only can't the followers persuade others of the "need" to do this, a good portion of them don't use it themselves. Moot. > [Again, I am not implying > that 'turn the other cheek' would work well; I'm talking of the class > of systems of which it is a member.] I mean persuasion that is not > forced on another. This kind of system would be more desirable, > wouldn't it? Give another example of this "class" that has lasted. Or any other at all. > There are problems that such a system would have to deal with. How to > deal with certain types of people -- For instance, some one who killed > people randomly and doesn't want to listen to persuasion. In a case > like this, there is clearly a problem. This may be solved without > arbitration only if everyone else agrees on a course of action. This > may not be too plausible, but in a small society it may work. And the net result is the exact same case as minimal morality, resulting in a final coercion only when necessary. > I'm not proposing these as good moral systems. I'm just showing that it > is possible to devise a VIABLE moral system without 'arbitration'. And, > remember we were talking about arbitration in terms of judges or other > mechanisms that don't include the ENTIRE group. The benefit of a system > without arbitration is that it doesn't need to worry about the problems > surrounding judges. You have not shown a system where arbitration would not be required. You have shown no practical example of such a morality. The one example you gave you admitted yourself had to refer to arbitration of sorts. >>>>Clearly any system that makes arbitrary restrictions of "thou shalt not do >>>>this", where "this" is something not involving a negative effect on another >>>>person's life, is NOT a candidate for the moral system that does the most >>>>for the most people. >>> If you are speaking of the Bible, then the "thou shalt not do THIS"'s >>> all involve some effect on another's life [Steal, Kill, Adultery, ...] >>> or direct potential [Covet ...]. >>What about prohibitions that have nothing to do with other people's lives? >>Like choice of sexual lifestyle, for example. Obviously stealing and >>killing are part of minimal non-interference morality, so I'm not sure why >>you bothered to mention them. Adultery and coveting? I think these stem >>from notions of marriage as ownership, which fit into the category of >>negative restrictions. Commitment to marriage is a personal between two >>people. > I don't know that the Bible directly prohibits certain sexual > lifestyles. [Some sections, like the story of Sodom in Genesis, > certainly 'discourage' it]. Tell that to someone like Charley Wingate, who repeatedly asserts his dissociation from Falwelist fundamentalism yet who derides freedom of choice in such matters. > Adultery and coveting [neighbor's wife] may > have stemmed from marriage as ownership, but they most certainly affect > others' lives. As you say, commitment to marriage is personal between > two people, if one of those person chooses to 'break' that commitment, > he/she is directly affecting the other. [Also remember that covet > applies to other's property -- thy neighbor's goods]. And there's nothing wrong in coveting as long as you seek to obtain what you covet (or its equivalent) by reasonable means. Your neighbor has the first place bowling trophy? You want it? You COVET it? So, you work hard and practice and maybe you'll get it. No disrespect. No interference. Back to marriage, IF a personal commitment is broken, that is the affair of the people involved. >>> There are other "thou shall"'s which >>> are positive [Honor father/mother, love one another ...]. Then there >>> are other's involving God [Not take name in vain, Keep holy the >>> Sabbath]. The only ones I can think of that fit your description fall >>> into the 'involving God' category. Thus, if you ignore the religious >>> aspects [which I maintain can be kept separate from morality], Christian >>> morality should be kept in consideration as a decent system. >>But the 'involving god' part IS most definitely a part of the Christian >>morality that some Christians seek to impose on the rest of us. And since >>not all the "shalt not"s are part of the minimal morality mold, there you >>see the problems with Christianity as a viable societal moral code. > I mentioned previously that there are several 'Christian' moralities. > Maybe the 'involving God' is part of THE Christian morality, but I know > of many 'Christians' who are really agnostic or even athiest. That > 'disembodied' kind of 'Christian' morality is what I meant above. I > have yet to see how a system based in 'Christian' morality cannot be a > viable societal moral code. Well, when you make reference to a "christian" morality that does not make reference to god, or make reference to arbitrary "shalt not"s, then I'd say you are pretty damn close to minimal morality in the first place, with only a few possible exceptions. I doubt many Christians would agree with your assessments that this is a "Christian" morality. > I think that morality and religion can be pretty well seperated. The > only thing that may not be easy to disentangle is a rationale behind the > morality that is based in religion. One thing I mentioned once before is that if your basis for a morality is "god says so", and you find someone intelligent enough to figure out, despite societal indoctrination that god exists, that there is no real proof for god's existence, the whole reason for "obedience" is shattered. -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
walker@oberon.UUCP (Mike Walker) (10/01/85)
> > [warack] > Isn't morality a framework for deciding Good=Right=The-Thing-to-Do vs. > Evil=Bad=Wrong=The-Thing-Not-to-Do? > In an absolute sense, a moral system could be viewed as a mathematical > function M from actions into the set {good, evil}. A perfect moral system > would map every action. [I'm not suggesting that such a system exists.] > Pardon my late posting but: All actions do not have to be mapped into a set of good or evil. Actions can be said to moral or nonmoral in a larger sense. That is they can belong or not belong to the sphere of morality. Whether or not I have diet pepsi or diet coke is not a moral question (for me anyhow). -- Michael D. Walker (Mike) Arpa: walker@oberon.ARPA Uucp: {the (mostly unknown) world}!ihnp4!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker {several select chunks}!sdcrdcf!oberon!walker