tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) (10/07/85)
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There is some dispute in this newsgroup about the philosophical
implications of quantum mechanics, if any.
Definitions:
1. Determinism -- The claim that every state of affairs is
precisely and exhaustively determined by prior states of affairs.
2. Determined -- one state of affairs, S2, is determined by another
state of affairs, S1, just in case the complete description of S1,
plus the application of come causal transformation rules, entails S2.
3. Entails -- one set of propositions entails another proposition
if and only if the latter could not be false in the event that the
former are true.
4. Indeterminism -- the denial of (1). Positively, the claim that
the universe does not have a determinate future. No amount of
information about the present would allow prediction of the future (in
detail).
One dispute is whether QM supports indeterminism. Another is whether
any of this has anything to do with the free will dispute. I shall
address the second issue (for the moment).
QM is relevant because it contradicts hard determinism. Hard
determinism is the claim that determinism is true *and* that "free
will" means "choice not determined by causal necessity."
It is nonsense to speak, as Rich Rosen often does, of "random
influences" not producing free will. For one thing, "randomness" in
this context simply means "not determined by causal influences"; it is
not a *new* set of influences. Also, I don't think that anybody
supposes that quantum randomness just IS free will. What at least some
people assert is that free will *requires* indeterminism, as a
necessary but not sufficient condition. It is rubbish to claim that a
choice not determined by causal necessity MUST BE determined by
randomness. It is rubbish, because "determined by randomness" is
rubbish.
IF one acknowledges, then, that QM supports an indeterministic view of
nature, the question is either:
-- is this indeterministic aspect of nature a necessary condition
of what people are talking about when they use "free will"?
OR
-- is whatever people are talking about when they use "free will"
completely (in principle) explicable in deterministic terms?
OR
-- is "free will", for some reason, not a meaningful expression at
all?
The expression "free will" refers primarily to the subjective
experience of being, somehow, the originator of one's deeds. The
philosophical dispute is not primarily about whether there is such a
subjective experience. Anyone who denies it is simply not in a
position to contribute to the discussion, much as a person who cannot
feel pain is in no position to discuss the relative merits of
analgesics.
The problem is to DEFINE AND EXPLAIN this experience, in rational
terms. That is why it is pointless to BEGIN a philosophical
discussion about free will with a fixed definition. If there were a
single, univocal, universally accepted definition, there would be very
little to discuss. This is why there is not much discussion about
"unicorns".
It appears to me that it is difficult to deny that indeterminism is
*relevant* to free will. It also seems clear that indeterminism is
not, in itself, a complete explanation.
Todd Moody {allegra|astrovax|bpa|burdvax}!sjuvax!tmoody
Philosophy Department
St. Joseph's U.
Philadelphia, PA 19131